





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

BAPTISM,

WITH REFERENCE TO

ITS

IMPORT AND MODES,

BY

EDWARD BEECHER, D.D.

NEW YORK:

JOHN WILEY, 161 BROADWAY
AND 13 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON,

1849.

H

30627

265.124K

13391

ENTERED, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1848, by

REV. EDWARD BEECHER, D.D.,

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York.

~~~~~  
R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER & STEREOTYPED,  
112 FULTON STREET.

## PREFACE.

---

It is a very striking fact, and one which I do not remember ever to have seen properly noticed, if noticed at all, that the controversy on the import of the word βαπτίζω is, in its origin, entirely modern. In Matthiæ's history of Greek Literature we find an account of the authors who have written in Greek, beginning with Homer, 1000 B. C., and ending with Constantinus Harmenopolus, 1380 A. D. This history includes all the poets, orators, historians, philosophers, physicians, mathematicians, geographers, rhetoricians, and philologists of Greece, also the Greek Fathers of the Christian Church, and the Byzantine writers of the middle ages. For more than two thousand years, then, the Greek language was written; though with diminished purity and classic elegance, by the Patristic and Byzantine writers. And yet during this long period, never was the position assumed by any writer of Greek, concerning the import of the word βαπτίζω, which is now assumed by Dr. Carson and other Baptist writers, i. e. that βαπτίζω means exclusively to immerse.

Nor was this because the attention of writers of Greek was not turned to the subject. The question came up whether affusion on a bed, in the case of sick persons, should be regarded as valid baptism. It was decided that it should, and no one ever made the reply, Christ commanded us to immerse, the word βαπτίζω means only to immerse, and you cannot immerse by sprinkling or affusion on a bed. The reason is plain. So long as the Greek was a living spoken language, no one dared to take this ground.

Nor is this all; lexicons and vocabularies were made by Suidas, Zonaras, Hesychius, and others, exhibiting sometimes the classical, at others, the ecclesiastical uses of the word, and yet, in no instance, taking the modern Baptist ground, not to say that some directly oppose it.

Besides all this, numerous treatises on Baptism were written in Greek, and allusions to it are frequent in all the Greek Fathers. Moreover, commentaries were written on both the Old Testament and the New, containing constant allusions to baptism, especially in commenting on the Mosaic ritual, and on the predictions of the great purification to be effected by the Messiah, and their fulfilment in the Evangelists; and yet, in no treatise or commentary, is the Baptist ground taken, not to say that it is often and pointedly contradicted.

It is plain, therefore, that the Baptist position is entirely of modern origin. It has come up since the Greek ceased to be a spoken and written language, and it may be added, that it depends for its continued existence on preventing a revival of a full and general knowledge of the *usus loquendi* of the ecclesiastical Greek writers.

In order to a comprehensive view of the origin and peculiarities of the present work on baptism, I ask attention to the following summary of facts.

The Septuagint, the New Testament, and the Greek Fathers, belong to one system of writers. The writers of the New Testament were affected by the Septuagint, in their style and use of words. The Fathers were affected by both.

Taking this system as a whole, it is easy to produce proof of the most positive and decisive kind, that βαπτίζω means to purify. Around these central and absolutely irresistible passages, there are others in which there is satisfactory moral evidence, to the

same effect, in various lower degrees of power, although the sense to immerse is not impossible.

Now it has so happened that the passages in the New Testament, with reference to which this controversy began, are in this second class. They furnish real and satisfactory proof to those qualified to exercise a sound critical judgment, and to feel the various degrees and shades of moral evidence. They have, in fact, led the great body of lexicographers and commentators to decide that βαπτίζω has a secondary sense, and does not always mean to immerse.

My investigations began with passages of this kind. Indeed, I was not aware, when I began, of the existence of the stronger class of passages.

I therefore stated the laws of probability, and, in the exercise of a critical judgment, came to a result.

From a slight examination of the language of the Fathers, I came to the same results. These results are contained in Part I., and were published in 1840, and were republished in England, with the decided recommendation of Dr. Henderson.

Immediately on their appearance, Dr. Carson published his first reply to me, in a pamphlet of 74 pages.

Meantime, before I had seen this reply, I was continuing my examination of Patristic usages, and also undertook a radical investigation of the celebrated passages in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12.

The results I published in 1841, and these compose Part II.

After this, I imported a copy of Dr. Carson's reply to me. This led me to make new investigations in the Fathers, the result of which I published in 1843. These compose Part III.

To these Dr. Carson published a short answer, and soon after died. His work on Baptism, including this answer, and others

of his controversial writings, were published in London, in a volume of 500 pages, just before his death, and were at length republished in this country.

To this second reply, and to other parts of his book, I now publish a final answer, which is contained in Part IV.

No one can fail to notice how entirely the critical judgments of my earlier investigations are sustained, when the whole system to which they belong is unfolded.

And yet, because the evidence on which these earlier critical judgments rested, did not amount to an impossibility of the sense to immerse, Dr. Carson, and the whole body of the Baptists would have trod them down as nothing.

The issue of the controversy shows that it is dangerous thus to despise such results of moral evidence, and critical judgment, especially under the bias of organic influences. The greatest questions of life are often decided by similar moral evidence.

Although, therefore, I have produced passages so strong as to defy any fair answer, yet I still look with great pleasure and increasing confidence on the first results of my critical judgments. The capacity of perceiving the various shades of moral evidence which God has given us, was not designed to lead us astray.

My original articles I have revised, enlarged, and rewritten, as seemed best. But I have not deemed it best to make any radical changes, because there is a historical interest attached to them, in consequence of the extended discussion to which they have given rise.

So far as I know, this is the first time in which the issue presented in this work has been discussed, in full view of its relations to the usages of that system of writers, by whom the question in controversy must be finally settled.

*Boston, Aug. 27, 1848.*



# CONTENTS.

## PART I.

THIS portion of the discussion was republished in England, and gave rise to Dr. Carson's first reply.

### CHAPTER I.

#### *The Import of βαπτίζω.*

|                                                                                                                             | PAGE   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Introduction. Reasons for engaging anew in the discussion, . . . . .                                                        | 1      |
| Division of Christians, and desirableness of unity, . . .                                                                   | ib.    |
| God's mode of producing unity, . . . . .                                                                                    | 2      |
| § 1. Statement of the case, and principles of investigation, . . .                                                          | 3, 4   |
| § 2. Causes of the disregard of these principles, and the false positions to which this disregard has given rise, . . . . . | 5-7    |
| § 3. Statement of the position to be proved, . . . . .                                                                      | 7-11   |
| Four false positions, . . . . .                                                                                             | 7, 8   |
| The true position, . . . . .                                                                                                | 8      |
| Other uses of βαπτίζω, . . . . .                                                                                            | 9, 10  |
| Transition to the sense claimed, . . . . .                                                                                  | 10, 11 |
| § 4. Doctrine of probabilities, . . . . .                                                                                   | 11-18  |
| Laws of mind and of language favor the transition alleged, . . . . .                                                        | 11-13  |
| Analogous transitions in other words, . . . . .                                                                             | 13-18  |
| § 5. Probabilities as to βαπτίζω, . . . . .                                                                                 | 18, 19 |
| Influence of the conquests of Alexander, . . . . .                                                                          | 19     |
| § 6. Probabilities from the subject, . . . . .                                                                              | 19, 20 |
| Use of the word to describe the work of the Holy Spirit, . . .                                                              | 20     |

|                                                                                                    | PAGE   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| § 7. Philological principles, . . . . .                                                            | 20-22  |
| The true nature of a cumulative argument, . . . . .                                                | 22     |
| § 8. A question about purifying, . . . . .                                                         | 22-25  |
| In Jn. iii. 25, καθαρισμός is a synonyme of βαπτισμός, . . . . .                                   | 22     |
| Facts of the case, and conclusion, . . . . .                                                       | 23, 24 |
| § 9. Accordance of this view with the prophecies, and the language of the Old Testament, . . . . . | 25, 26 |
| § 10. Baptism of water, and of the Holy Spirit, contrasted by John, . . . . .                      | 26, 27 |
| § 11. Baptism of the Holy Spirit, . . . . .                                                        | 28     |
| § 12. Sacrificial sense of βαπτίζω, . . . . .                                                      | 28-31  |

## CHAPTER II.

*The Import of βαπτίζω.*

|                                                                               |        |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| § 13. Mosaic Purifications, . . . . .                                         | 32-37  |
| Called βαπτισμοί in Heb. ix. 10, in the sense καθαρισμοί . . . . .            | 32     |
| Scope of the passage, . . . . .                                               | ib.    |
| They relate to persons, . . . . .                                             | ib.    |
| They are enjoined, . . . . .                                                  | ib.    |
| No immersions of persons are enjoined, . . . . .                              | 33, 34 |
| Immersion of persons was not deemed important, . . . . .                      | 35     |
| The immersions of things enjoined in the law, not referred to here, . . . . . | ib.    |
| Inmersions are not <i>diverse</i> , purifications are, . . . . .              | 36     |
| Purification accords with the Spirit of the passage, . . . . .                | 37     |
| § 14 Jewish purifications, . . . . .                                          | 38-40  |
| βαπτίζω means to purify in Mark vii. 4, 8, and in Luke xi. 38, . . . . .      | 38     |
| The sense appropriate, . . . . .                                              | ib.    |
| The context demands it, . . . . .                                             | ib.    |
| Immersion of couches absurd, . . . . .                                        | 39     |
| False principles of Dr. Carson, . . . . .                                     | 40     |
| Statements of Prof. Ripley and Dr. Gill, devoid of force, . . . . .           | ib.    |
| § 15. Purification by the ashes of a heifer, . . . . .                        | 40-43  |
| In Sirach xxxi. 25, βαπτίζω means to purify, . . . . .                        | 40     |
| The preposition ἀπό demands this sense, . . . . .                             | 41     |

|                                                                                                                                                                                             |        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| No immersion was enjoined, but washing, and the essence of the rite was sprinkling, . . . . .                                                                                               | 41     |
| λούω means to wash, to cleanse; λουτήρες denotes wash-basins for the hands, . . . . .                                                                                                       | 42     |
| View of Philo, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                    | ib.    |
| § 16. Judith xii. 7, βαπτίζω means to purify, . . . . .                                                                                                                                     | 43     |
| Nature of the case demands it, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                    | ib.    |
| Dr. Carson admits that all the lexicographers and commentators are against him, . . . . .                                                                                                   | 44     |
| § 17. Relations to the system of writers, . . . . .                                                                                                                                         | 44-47  |
| Current of probability all one way, . . . . .                                                                                                                                               | 44     |
| Baptism of Paul, Acts xxii. 16. Reference of Peter to baptism 1 Pet. iii. 21. Language of Josephus . . . . .                                                                                | 45, 46 |
| § 18. The Fathers, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                | 47, 48 |
| Their authority. . . . .                                                                                                                                                                    | 47     |
| Appealed to merely to decide the <i>usus loquendi</i> of βαπτίζω . . . . .                                                                                                                  | 48     |
| § 19. Baptismal Regeneration, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                     | 48-50  |
| § 20. Denial of water baptism, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                    | 50, 51 |
| § 21. Patristic usage, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                            | 51-54  |
| In speaking of the rite they often omit the idea immersion. They use βαπτισμός in the sense purification. They often, in describing the rite, use καθαίρω or καθαρίζω, to purify, . . . . . | 52     |

## PART II.

This portion of the original discussion was not republished in England, and was written before Dr. Carson's reply to the first part was seen.

## CHAPTER I.

*The Import of βαπτίζω.*

|                                                                       |        |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Recapitulation of the argument, . . . . .                             | 55     |
| § 22. Patristic practice, . . . . .                                   | 55-57  |
| Bewildering and disturbing influence of patristic practice, . . . . . | 55, 56 |

|                                                                                                                                                                                                     | PAGE   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Facts as to that practice, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                | 57     |
| § 23. False inferences, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                   | 57-60  |
| Philological opinions of the Fathers inferred from their<br>practice. Opinion of Prof. Stuart, . . . . .                                                                                            | 58     |
| Inference incorrect, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                      | 59     |
| Causes of the prevalence of immersion, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                    | 59, 60 |
| § 24. Decisive cases from the Fathers called for, . . . . .                                                                                                                                         | 60, 61 |
| § 25. Baptism of blood, in the case of Christ, . . . . .                                                                                                                                            | 61-63  |
| Views of the Fathers, Origen, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Gre-<br>gory Naz., Theophylact, John of Damascus, . . . . .                                                                                   | 62, 63 |
| § 26. Baptism of blood in the case of martyrs, . . . . .                                                                                                                                            | 63-68  |
| Strong tendencies to desire martyrdom, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                    | 63     |
| Opinion as to its expiatory power, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                        | 64     |
| To denote its purifying power βαπτίζω was used, . . . . .                                                                                                                                           | ib.    |
| Origen, Chrysostom, Gregory Naz., Augustine, Petilianus, . . . . .                                                                                                                                  | 64-66  |
| The Fathers understood Mat. xx. 22, 23, Mark x. 38, 39,<br>Luke xii. 49, 50, in the sense purify. In this they<br>were correct, . . . . .                                                           | 66, 67 |
| Causes of modern erroneous view, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                          | 67, 68 |
| Opinions of modern Greeks, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                | 68     |
| § 27. Principles as to co-existent senses. Objection from<br>2 Kings v. 14, refuted. Different senses of טָבַל. Opi-<br>nion of Suicer and Fuerstius. Parallel case in βάπτω<br>supposed, . . . . . | 68, 69 |
| § 28. Coincident facts, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                   | 69-82  |
| Relation of the rite to the forgiveness of sins, . . . . .                                                                                                                                          | 69     |
| Words with which βαπτίζω is interchanged, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                 | 70     |
| κατάδυσις is used for immersion, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                          | ib.    |
| When βάπτισμα is used in this sense an explanatory note<br>needed, . . . . .                                                                                                                        | 71     |
| General principles hence derived, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                         | 71, 72 |
| Immersion never defended on philological grounds. Case<br>of Cyprian, . . . . .                                                                                                                     | 72, 73 |
| Baptism of the deluge, and of the Red Sea. Views of<br>Augustine, . . . . .                                                                                                                         | 73, 74 |
| Elias baptizing the wood. Origen's view of it, . . . . .                                                                                                                                            | 75     |
| Reasons of Christ's baptism given by the Fathers. Not like<br>those given by Prof. Chase, . . . . .                                                                                                 | ib.    |
| Augustine's views, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                        | ib.    |

|                                                                                                                           |        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Baptism of the Holy Spirit. Gregory Nyss. Augustine,<br>Origen, . . . . .                                                 | 76     |
| Opinions of the Fathers on Heb. ix. 10. Athanasius, Theo-<br>phylact, Macarius, Tertullian, . . . . .                     | 76, 77 |
| Baptism of fire, Origen, Jerome, Rufinus, . . . . .                                                                       | 77, 78 |
| Baptism of tears. Nilus, Gregory Nyss. . . . .                                                                            | 79     |
| Application of Old Testament. Justin Martyr, Hippolytus,<br>Cyprian, Jerome, . . . . .                                    | 79, 80 |
| Clinic baptism, . . . . .                                                                                                 | 80     |
| Fitness of the idea purification to be the name of the rite,<br>and unfitness of the idea immersion, . . . . .            | 81     |
| Immersion used figuratively denotes degradation, and is not<br>adapted to describe the work of the Holy Spirit, . . . . . | 82     |

## CHAPTER II.

*The Interpretation of Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12.*

|                                                                                                                                                |        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| § 29. Importance of a correct interpretation of these pas-<br>sages, . . . . .                                                                 | 83-85  |
| Requisites for union among Christians, . . . . .                                                                                               | 83     |
| Influence of these texts to prevent union great, . . . . .                                                                                     | 84     |
| Opinion of critics, . . . . .                                                                                                                  | ib.    |
| Confidence of the Baptists in them, . . . . .                                                                                                  | 84, 85 |
| § 30. Points at issue. Principles of reasoning. Is the<br>baptism external? Are the burial and resurrection<br>external? Principles, . . . . . | 85, 86 |
| § 31. Position to be proved. Sources of evidence, . . . . .                                                                                    | 86, 87 |
| § 32. Argument from the logical exigencies of Rom.<br>vi. 3, 4, . . . . .                                                                      | 87-95  |
| The baptism here spoken of, destroys sin. External rites<br>do not, . . . . .                                                                  | 88-91  |
| Theory of Prof. Chase, . . . . .                                                                                                               | 92     |
| Theory of Dr. Carson, . . . . .                                                                                                                | 93     |
| Remark of Mr. Barnes, . . . . .                                                                                                                | 95     |
| The internal view alone logical, . . . . .                                                                                                     | ib.    |
| § 33. Argument from the usus loquendi as to Spiritual<br>Death, Burial, &c. . . . .                                                            | 95-103 |
| Principles, . . . . .                                                                                                                          | 95-97  |



|                                                                                                                                                                               | PAGE     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Table of parallel analogies, . . . . .                                                                                                                                        | 98       |
| Reasons of the usage, . . . . .                                                                                                                                               | 99, 100  |
| Scripture proof, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                    | 101-103  |
| True interpretation, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                | 103      |
| § 34. Argument from the congruity of the interpretation<br>with the general system of truth, . . . . .                                                                        | 103-107  |
| Verisimilitude, what? . . . . .                                                                                                                                               | 103      |
| Incongruities, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                      | 104-106  |
| § 35. Argument from the moral tendencies and effects of<br>each mode of interpretation, . . . . .                                                                             | 107-110  |
| Tendency of men to avoid self-crucifixion and to fall into<br>formalism, . . . . .                                                                                            | 107      |
| The external interpretation augments this tendency; the<br>internal opposes it, . . . . .                                                                                     | 107, 108 |
| Appeal to facts, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                    | 109, 110 |
| § 36. Objection from authority considered, . . . . .                                                                                                                          | 110-114  |
| Appeal to authority here is illogical, . . . . .                                                                                                                              | 110      |
| There has been a universal <i>petitio principii</i> , . . . . .                                                                                                               | 110, 111 |
| Facts in the New Testament as to internal and external<br>baptism, . . . . .                                                                                                  | 111, 112 |
| Exposition of 1 Cor. x. 2, and result, . . . . .                                                                                                                              | 112      |
| Pernicious influence of external and technical use of the<br>word baptism, . . . . .                                                                                          | 112, 113 |
| The language in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, would have<br>been as it is now, had there been no external rite of<br>baptism, . . . . .                                     | 113, 114 |
| § 37. Apostolic practice considered, . . . . .                                                                                                                                | 114, 115 |
| It is not binding on us, for the command is only to purify.<br>No mode can be proved to have been universal. The<br>presumption is in favor of liberty and variety, . . . . . | 114      |
| Causes of modern inflexible rigidity, . . . . .                                                                                                                               | 115      |
| § 38. Final result, . . . . .                                                                                                                                                 | 115, 116 |
| Three fundamental points of the discusssion, and the deci-<br>sion on each, . . . . .                                                                                         | 115      |
| Result of the whole; as to the mode of purification we may<br>enjoy Christian liberty, . . . . .                                                                              | 116      |
| Unity on the Baptist ground impossible, . . . . .                                                                                                                             | 116      |

## PART III.

## FIRST REPLY TO DR. CARSON.

## CHAPTER I.

*Examination and refutation of Dr. Carson's Principles and Position.*

|                                                                                                                                        | PAGE     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| God's providence with reference to the Baptist controversy.                                                                            |          |
| Two systems in conflict, . . . . .                                                                                                     | 117      |
| § 39. Present position of the Baptists, . . . . .                                                                                      | 117-120  |
| Their power as a denomination, . . . . .                                                                                               | 117      |
| Logical result of their principles, . . . . .                                                                                          | 118      |
| Statements of Prof. Eaton, Mr. Hinton, H. Malcom, Baptist<br>American and Foreign Bible Society, J. D. Gotch, and<br>others, . . . . . | 119, 120 |
| § 40. Inferences from the opposite system, . . . . .                                                                                   | 120-122  |
| Other denominations defended against the charges of the<br>Baptists, . . . . .                                                         | 121      |
| Charges of the Baptists retorted against themselves, . . . . .                                                                         | 121, 122 |
| § 41. Translation of the Bible, . . . . .                                                                                              | 122, 123 |
| To transfer words is not to mistranslate, . . . . .                                                                                    | 122      |
| How the sense of such words can be fixed, . . . . .                                                                                    | 123      |
| § 42. Commandments of men, . . . . .                                                                                                   | 123, 124 |
| The Baptist demand, is merely a commandment of men, . . . . .                                                                          | 124      |
| § 43. State of the controversy. Dr. Carson's reply, . . . . .                                                                          | 124-126  |
| Vast results depend on one word, . . . . .                                                                                             | 124      |
| Baptist opinions of Dr. Carson's reply, . . . . .                                                                                      | 125      |
| Division of it into rhetoric and logic, . . . . .                                                                                      | 126      |
| § 44. Dr. Carson's rhetoric. Its influence, . . . . .                                                                                  | 126-132  |
| Appeal for sympathy in his trials, . . . . .                                                                                           | 126-128  |
| Specimens of rhetoric, . . . . .                                                                                                       | 128, 129 |
| Influence, . . . . .                                                                                                                   | 130-132  |
| § 45. Dr. Carson's logic. Preliminary remarks, . . . . .                                                                               | 132, 133 |
| § 46. Dr. Carson's system and canons, . . . . .                                                                                        | 133-143  |
| Consists of four parts, . . . . .                                                                                                      | 133      |
| He has labored needlessly to prove what no one disputes, . . . . .                                                                     | 134      |
| His canon as to beginning a secondary sense of βαπτίζω, . . . . .                                                                      | 134, 135 |

|                                                                 | PAGE     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| His canons of trial to test secondary senses, . . .             | 135-139  |
| His final step, . . . . .                                       | 139, 140 |
| The whole process is based on a begging of the question, . . .  | 140-143  |
| § 47. My principles. How Dr. Carson represents them, . . .      | 143-145  |
| § 48. True statement of my principles, . . .                    | 145-148  |
| Five points stated, . . . . .                                   | 145, 146 |
| True issue between Dr. Carson and me, . . .                     | 147, 148 |
| § 49. Dr. Carson's course, and his objections, . . .            | 148-153  |
| He arrogates to himself the philological doctrines of others.   |          |
| He does not state nor answer my principles. He is               |          |
| obliged to act on my principles, . . .                          | 148-151  |
| Answer to the case of Columbo bridge . . . . .                  | 152      |
| § 50. Appeal to facts, . . . . .                                | 153-156  |
| Clemens Alexandrinus, . . . . .                                 | 153, 154 |
| Justin Martyr, . . . . .                                        | 155, 156 |
| § 51. Dr. Carson's principles subvert themselves, . . .         | 156, 157 |
| § 52. Cases. Clinic Baptism. Purifying agents, . . .            | 158-160  |
| Nicephorus, . . . . .                                           | 158      |
| Tertullian, Augustine, Isidore, . . . . .                       | 159      |
| Maximus, Anastasius, . . . . .                                  | 160      |
| § 53. Other cases. Expiation by sprinkling called               |          |
| Baptism, . . . . .                                              | 160-167  |
| Statement of previous principles as to the sacrificial sense of |          |
| βαπτίζω, . . . . .                                              | 160, 161 |
| Ambrose, . . . . .                                              | 162, 163 |
| Cyril of Alexandria, . . . . .                                  | 163, 164 |
| Tertullian, . . . . .                                           | 165      |
| Sense of tingo, . . . . .                                       | 166      |
| Justin Martyr, . . . . .                                        | ib.      |
| Ambrose, . . . . .                                              | 167      |
| § 54. Passage from Proclus, . . . . .                           | 168-170  |
| § 55. Definitions of βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα, by the               |          |
| Fathers, . . . . .                                              | 170-174  |
| Basil, . . . . .                                                | 170      |
| Hilarius, . . . . .                                             | 171      |
| Athanasius, . . . . .                                           | 172      |
| Zonaras and Phavorinus, . . . . .                               | 172-174  |
| § 56. Proof from the use of prepositions, . . .                 | 174, 175 |
| § 57. Argument cumulative, . . . . .                            | 175-177  |

|                                                  |        |          |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------|----------|
| Hilarius. Baptism of Constantius and Theodosius. | Basil. |          |
| Gregory Nyss.                                    | .      | 175, 176 |
| § 58. Dr. Carson's canons cannot weaken it,      | .      | 177-178  |

## CHAPTER II.

*Additional facts, and refutation of Dr. Carson's attack on the  
Biblical and Patristic argument.*

|                                                                                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| § 59. Reasons for a further notice of Dr. Carson. His<br>bad spirit not rebuked by the Baptists. Danger of<br>organic corruption, | . | . | . | . | . | 179-181  |
| Eulogies of Dr. Carson and of his reply to me, as unan-<br>swerable,                                                              | . | . | . | . | . | 181, 182 |
| Dr. Carson the great Baptist champion of the age,                                                                                 | . | . | . | . | . | 183, 184 |
| Causes of his power as a leader,                                                                                                  | . | . | . | . | . | 184      |
| § 60. Dr. Carson's remarks on the Patristic argument,                                                                             | . | . | . | . | . | 184-187  |
| He asserts that the Fathers knew infallibly the sense of<br><i>βαπτίζω</i> ,                                                      | . | . | . | . | . | 184      |
| And that they always use it in the sense to immerse, with-<br>out exception,                                                      | . | . | . | . | . | 186      |
| Moral character of this last statement,                                                                                           | . | . | . | . | . | 188      |
| § 61. Additional facts in refutation of Dr. Carson,                                                                               | . | . | . | . | . | 187-195  |
| Ambrose, Theodoret,                                                                                                               | . | . | . | . | . | 189      |
| Anastasius, Isaias Abbas, John of Damascus,                                                                                       | . | . | . | . | . | 190      |
| Tertullian, Augustine, Cyprian, Hilarius, Theophylact,                                                                            | . | . | . | . | . |          |
| Basil,                                                                                                                            | . | . | . | . | . | 191      |
| Theodoret, Theophylact, Chrysostom,                                                                                               | . | . | . | . | . | 192      |
| Anastasius, Ambrose,                                                                                                              | . | . | . | . | . | 195      |
| Grossness of Dr. Carson's error,                                                                                                  | . | . | . | . | . | ib.      |
| § 62. Other errors of Dr. Carson,                                                                                                 | . | . | . | . | . | 195-197  |
| § 63. General view of patristic uses of <i>βαπτίζω</i> ,                                                                          | . | . | . | . | . | 197-202  |
| § 64. General view applied,                                                                                                       | . | . | . | . | . | 202-206  |
| Photius, Theophylact,                                                                                                             | . | . | . | . | . | 202      |
| Trine immersion. Balsamon, Gregory Naz.                                                                                           | . | . | . | . | . | 203      |
| Chrysostom,                                                                                                                       | . | . | . | . | . | 204, 205 |
| Gregory Nyss.                                                                                                                     | . | . | . | . | . | 205      |
| Use of prepositions,                                                                                                              | . | . | . | . | . | 206      |
| § 65. Commission to baptize,                                                                                                      | . | . | . | . | . | 206, 207 |

|                                                                                                                        |          |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| The commission not omitted in Luke and John, though<br>not given by the word βαπτίζω, . . . . .                        | 207      |
| § 66. Dr. Carson's dissertation on λούω, . . . . .                                                                     | 207-211  |
| His effort to settle the question, . . . . .                                                                           | 208      |
| Reply. Porphyry, Photius, Zonaras, Basil, Nicephorus<br>Gregoras, Julius Pollux, Anaxilas, . . . . .                   | 208, 209 |
| Origen, Gregory Naz., Eupolis, Euripides, Strabo, . . . . .                                                            | 210      |
| Force of λούω, νίπτω, and πλύνω, . . . . .                                                                             | 210, 211 |
| § 67. Dr. Carson's attack on the Biblical argument re-<br>pelled, . . . . .                                            | 211-224  |
| Summary of the argument, . . . . .                                                                                     | 211, 212 |
| Dr. Carson's whole process illogical, . . . . .                                                                        | 212, 213 |
| Vindication of the argument from Jn. iii. 25. Chrysostom,<br>Gregory Nyss., Cyril Alexandrinus, Theophylact, . . . . . | 213, 214 |
| Vindication of the argument from the Old Testament, . . . . .                                                          | 214-217  |
| Basil, Eusebius, Origen, Jerome, Cyril Alexandrinus, Theo-<br>doret, . . . . .                                         | 215, 216 |
| Baptism of the Holy Spirit, Cyril, Origen, Basil, . . . . .                                                            | 217, 218 |
| Dr. Carson's lesson in rhetoric, . . . . .                                                                             | 219      |
| Sacrificial purification, . . . . .                                                                                    | 219, 220 |
| Divers baptisms, . . . . .                                                                                             | 220      |
| Commentary of Theophylact on Jn. iii. 25, . . . . .                                                                    | 221      |
| True translation of the passage, . . . . .                                                                             | ib.      |
| Baptism of couches, and baptism by the ashes of a heifer, . . . . .                                                    | 222      |
| Baptism of Paul, . . . . .                                                                                             | 223      |
| Baptism of the flood, . . . . .                                                                                        | ib.      |
| Cyprian, . . . . .                                                                                                     | ib.      |
| § 68. Dr. Carson's reply to the argument from the<br>Fathers, . . . . .                                                | 224-229  |
| False statement of facts, . . . . .                                                                                    | 224      |
| True character of my argument, . . . . .                                                                               | 225, 226 |
| "Original nonsense," . . . . .                                                                                         | 227-229  |
| § 69. Result, . . . . .                                                                                                | 229, 230 |
| § 70. Conclusion, . . . . .                                                                                            | 230-237  |
| Position of the Baptists dishonorable to God, and injurious<br>alike to themselves and to the church, . . . . .        | 231-233  |
| No higher duty than to bring this controversy to a close, . . . . .                                                    | 233      |
| To terminate it possible, . . . . .                                                                                    | ib.      |
| Obstacles to such a result, . . . . .                                                                                  | 234      |



|                                                                           |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| The responsibility rests on learned scholars and leading minds, . . . . . | 235 |
| Recommendations of the view advocated by this work, .                     | 236 |

## PART IV.

## NOTICE OF DR. CARSON'S SECOND REPLY.

## CHAPTER I.

*Analysis of Dr. Carson's Reply.*

|                                                                                                 |          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| § 71. State of the controversy, . . . . .                                                       | 238-243  |
| The true issue, . . . . .                                                                       | 238      |
| Facts in the case, . . . . .                                                                    | 239-241  |
| Dr. Carson's course is a confession of defeat, . . . . .                                        | 242      |
| § 72. Philosophy of Dr. Carson's second reply, . . . . .                                        | 243, 244 |
| His high reputation in England, Scotland, and Ireland, . . . . .                                | 243      |
| His purpose was to destroy the influence of my argument without answering it, . . . . .         | 243, 244 |
| § 73. American Baptist Publication Society, . . . . .                                           | 244      |
| Have endorsed and republished Dr. Carson's work, . . . . .                                      | ib.      |
| Eulogies of the work and defence of Dr. Carson's spirit, . . . . .                              | 244, 245 |
| "Attic salt," . . . . .                                                                         | 245      |
| § 74. Motives to reply to Dr. Carson, . . . . .                                                 | 246      |
| It gives an opportunity to review his whole work, and to add new facts and arguments, . . . . . | 246      |
| § 75. Outline of Dr. Carson's second reply, . . . . .                                           | 247-249  |
| § 76. Question concerning principles, . . . . .                                                 | 250, 251 |
| § 77. Additional exposure of Dr. Carson, . . . . .                                              | 251-254  |
| § 78. Begging the question, . . . . .                                                           | 254      |
| § 79. My Principles vindicated, . . . . .                                                       | 255-260  |
| Dr. Carson agitated and confused, . . . . .                                                     | 261      |
| § 80. Argument from prepositions, stated at large, . . . . .                                    | 261-266  |
| Chrysostom, Origen, Basil, Paul, . . . . .                                                      | 262      |
| Justin Martyr, Athanasius, Gregory Thaumaturgus, . . . . .                                      | 263      |
| Acta Passionis Pamphili, Eusebius, John of Damascus, Gregory Nazianz., . . . . .                | 264      |

|                                                                                                                                                | PAGE     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Cyril of Jerus., Clemens Alexandrinus, . . . . .                                                                                               | 265      |
| Translation of ἐν, . . . . .                                                                                                                   | 266      |
| § 81. Dr. Carson's magnanimity, . . . . .                                                                                                      | 266-269  |
| Imaginary error as to ἐκ, . . . . .                                                                                                            | 267      |
| Constructio Pregnans, . . . . .                                                                                                                | 269, 270 |
| § 82. Dr. Carson's first alleged mode of solving all my<br>quotations from the Fathers, . . . . .                                              | 269, 270 |
| The theory is false, and insufficient if true, . . . . .                                                                                       | 270      |
| § 83. Dr. Carson's second mode of solution, . . . . .                                                                                          | 270-276  |
| Abandons the ground of the first theory, . . . . .                                                                                             | 270      |
| Taking the word emblem in its true sense, the theory is<br>false, . . . . .                                                                    | 271      |
| Secondary sense of the word emblem, . . . . .                                                                                                  | 271      |
| Second theory insufficient, Dr. Carson being judge, . . . . .                                                                                  | 272-276  |
| § 84. Dr. Carson's self-contradiction, . . . . .                                                                                               | 276, 277 |
| He makes assertions for effect, . . . . .                                                                                                      | 278      |
| § 85. Dr. Carson's false theory as to clinic baptisms, . . . . .                                                                               | 279-282  |
| Dr. Carson's ignorance of Cyprian's usus loquendi, . . . . .                                                                                   | 279      |
| Mistranslation of Cyprian, . . . . .                                                                                                           | 280      |
| Other errors, . . . . .                                                                                                                        | 281, 282 |
| § 86. Dr. Carson's insinuations, . . . . .                                                                                                     | 282, 283 |
| He insinuates that my quotations from the Fathers do not<br>prove the sense of βαπτίζω at the time of establishing<br>the ordinance, . . . . . | 282      |
| Refutation, . . . . .                                                                                                                          | 283      |

## CHAPTER II.

*Dr. Carson's attempt to argue from the Fathers.*

|                                                                              |          |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Introductory remarks, . . . . .                                              | 284      |
| § 87. Point at issue, . . . . .                                              | 285-287  |
| § 88. Analysis and classification of Dr. Carson's asser-<br>tions, . . . . . | 287-291  |
| Four irrelevant assertions, . . . . .                                        | 287, 288 |
| Two, draw false inferences from historical facts, . . . . .                  | 289, 290 |
| Three already answered, . . . . .                                            | 290      |
| One an argument against himself, . . . . .                                   | ib.      |
| The rest not to his purpose, . . . . .                                       | 291      |

|                                                                                                              | PAGE     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| § 89. Second class of assertions, . . . .                                                                    | 291, 292 |
| § 90. Assertions as to Justin Martyr, . . .                                                                  | 293-299  |
| Importance of Justin's testimony, . . . .                                                                    | 292      |
| Justin's description of baptism, . . . .                                                                     | 293, 294 |
| Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, . . . .                                                                        | 295-298  |
| Other assertions, . . . .                                                                                    | 299      |
| § 91. Dr. Carson's demonstration, . . . .                                                                    | 299-302  |
| § 92. Argument from Tertullian and Chrysostom, .                                                             | 302-304  |
| § 93. Trine immersion, . . . .                                                                               | 304, 305 |
| § 94. Appeal to Jerome and Cyprian, . . . .                                                                  | 305-308  |
| Dr. Carson's strange assertion, . . . .                                                                      | 305      |
| Jerome's real view, . . . .                                                                                  | 306, 307 |
| Cyprian's real view, . . . .                                                                                 | 308      |
| § 95. Cause of Dr. Carson's delusion, and notice of Dr.<br>Sears, . . . .                                    | 308-310  |
| § 96. Baptism of the Holy Spirit, . . . .                                                                    | 310-316  |
| Importance of the topic. Great efforts of Dr. Carson<br>through his volume. Turning point of the discussion, | 310      |
| View of Dr. Carson, Neander, Wahl, Rosenmüller, Schleus-<br>ner, and Bloomfield, . . . .                     | 310      |
| This view clearly erroneous by the explicit testimony of the<br>Fathers, . . . .                             | 311, 312 |
| Paul testifies against it, . . . .                                                                           | 313      |
| The antithesis forbids it, . . . .                                                                           | 313, 314 |
| Dr. Carson's lesson in rhetoric of no avail, . . .                                                           | 314-316  |
| § 97. Dr. Carson's candor, . . . .                                                                           | 316, 317 |
| § 98. Dr. Carson's bad spirit, . . . .                                                                       | 317-322  |
| § 99. Dr. Carson's first series of attacks on my com-<br>petency as a scholar, . . . .                       | 322-326  |
| § 100. Second series of attacks, . . . .                                                                     | 326-333  |
| Dr. Carson's aim in such a course, . . . .                                                                   | 327      |
| Assault on the statement as to taking away the right to<br>think others wrong, . . . .                       | 327, 328 |
| He charges me falsely with trying to prove my point by<br>recommendations, . . . .                           | 328      |
| He tries to rebut the assertion as to the inconvenience of<br>immersion, . . . .                             | 328      |
| He assails me for declaring my view liberal, and free, rea-<br>sonable, and fit, . . . .                     | 329, 330 |

|                                                                                                         | PAGE     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| He assails the remarks as to the formalism, arrogance, and exclusion, to which immersion tends, . . . . | 330, 331 |
| He ridicules the statement that this view is adequate to harmonize the church, . . . . .                | 331, 332 |
| Remarks as to capability of proof, . . . . .                                                            | 332      |
| Dr. Carson's reasons for assailing my competency as a scholar stated in his own words, . . . . .        | 333      |
| Conclusion, . . . . .                                                                                   | 333, 334 |

---

|                                                                                                                                                 |     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| NOTE 1. On commingling of senses, and on baptismal regeneration, as spoken of in §§ 19, 20, . . . .                                             | 335 |
| NOTE 2. On the opinions of the modern Greeks as referred to on page 68 . . . . .                                                                | ib. |
| NOTE 3. On evidence of the sense to wash in βαπτίζω, derived from baths : to illustrate pp. 192 and 198, . . .                                  | 336 |
| NOTE 4. Extract from letters to Rev. Wm. Hague, in reply to Dr. Carson's assertion on a passage from Clement, quoted on p. 153, § 50, . . . . . | ib. |
| NOTE 5. No attempt by Dr. Carson to reply to Part II. Chap. II. on Rom. vi. 3, 4. Col. ii. 12. . . . .                                          | 342 |

# PART I.

## THE IMPORT OF βαπτίζω.



### CHAPTER I.

To engage anew in the discussion of the subject of Baptism, may seem to need an apology. Mine is, that it is a point in which Christians are not as yet agreed, and therefore all truth is not seen. For I cannot think that God has of design hidden the truth, or that he has revealed it doubtfully on a point which has proved to be of such magnitude by its practical results. Hence I believe that when all truth is seen on this subject, which may be seen, all true Christians will so far agree that no obstacle to their perfect union in feeling and action will remain.

But the truth on this, as on all other subjects, is not to be elicited by the action of any one mind, but by the united contributions of many.

When in the dark ages, in the midnight of Papal gloom, all truth was lost or obscured, and the social fabric erected on principles radically corrupt, it pleased God to make no new revelation, nor to raise up and illumine any one gigantic mind, of power to grasp all truth, and to restore it at once to its systematic proportion, or to erect in all its harmony a model of the social system in its perfect state.

Of the universal system different individuals grasped different part, yet still mingled with much error, and thus God accomplished that which no single mind was capacious enough to do.

He grasped, through many minds, the great outlines of the system of universal truth, so that none might be lost. Yet as in individual minds it was still limited and mingled with much error, divisions and sects arose, each holding important truth, which God was not willing to lose ; and yet not so unmingled or in such proportions that all could unite as one.

But this mixture of error with truth is not destined always to last. The movement of the mind of the universal church is destined still to be upward ; for she is taught of God.

And in completing the fabric which he is about to erect, each shall contribute his portion of truth to the grand result, whilst the errors of each shall disappear and die away. Then shall all finite minds be harmonized in one by the all-pervading mind of God. As if to prepare the way for this result, the public mind has of late been directed with new interest to this subject. It has been brought up by certain great questions in evangelizing the world, and has excited much attention.

It has elicited works of much talent and extensive research through a wide field of philology. The spirit of the discussion has been much ameliorated, at least in many of the leading writers, though not always in the local and subordinate controversies. Yet union is far from being obtained ; nay, in some particulars, the prospect is more discouraging than ever. This must be a matter of grief to all who desire the fulfilment of the prayer of Christ. Nor is it in harmony with the convictions of the age on the duty of Christian unity ; for however Christians practise, they are more and more convinced that there is something wrong and offensive to God in the present divided state of the Church.

We have reason, then, to suppose that exactly the right ground has not been taken on either side, and we ought to aim at the simple ground of truth for the sake of union and the common good.

To furnish some small share of the materials which God may use in producing this result, is my object in this effort.—And at present my remarks will relate entirely to the *mode* of Baptism.



§ 1. *Statement of the case, and of principles of investigation.*

The case is this : Christ has enjoined the performance of a duty in the command to baptize.

What is the duty enjoined ?—or, in other words, what does the word *Baptize*, in which the command is given, mean ? One of two things must be true :—

1. Either it is, *as to mode*, generic, denoting merely the production of an effect (as purity), so that the command may be fulfilled in many ways ;—or, it is so specific, denoting a definite mode, that it can be fulfilled in but one. To illustrate by an analogous case, Christ said, “Go, teach all nations.” Here the word *go*, is so generic as to include all modes of going which any one may choose to adopt. If a man walks, or runs, or rides, or sails, he equally fulfils the command. On the other hand, some king or ruler, for particular reasons, might command motion by a word entirely specific, as for example, that certain mourners should *walk* in a funeral procession. Now it is plain that such a command could not be fulfilled by riding or by running, for though these are modes of going, they are not modes of walking, and the command is not to go in general, but specifically to walk. So when a general says *March*, it will not answer for the soldiers to run ; for, though this is a mode of going, it is not a mode of marching.

So, likewise, when Christ said baptize, he either used a word which had a generic sense, denoting the production of an effect, in any mode, such as purify, cleanse ; or a specific sense, denoting a particular mode, such as immerse, sprinkle, pour.

2. Whichever way we decide, as it regards the import of the word, we ought to be uniform in its use as applied to the rite of baptism. For though the same word may have diverse meanings when applied to different things, and in various circumstances, yet it certainly cannot, when applied to the same thing, and in the same circumstances.

Hence, if we adopt the generic meaning, purify or cleanse, we

must adhere to it at all times, when speaking of the rite. On the other hand, if we adopt a specific meaning, as immerse or sprinkle, we must adhere to it in the same way, and not pass from the generic to the specific, or from the specific to the generic, according to exigencies, on the ground that the word βαπτίζω may, in the whole circuit of its use, mean sometimes one thing and sometimes another. Nor must we adopt both, for however numerous the possible meanings of a word may be in its various usages, it has in each particular case but one meaning, and in all similar cases its meaning is the same. Hence the word βαπτίζω, as applied to a given rite, has not two or many meanings, but one, and to that one we should in all cases adhere.

3. If we adopt a generic meaning, denoting the production of an effect, we are not limited by the command to any specific mode of fulfilling it, and are at liberty to vary the mode according to circumstances. But if we adopt a specific meaning, denoting merely a mode, we are limited by the very import of the command, to the range of that meaning.

Hence if the command is purify or cleanse, we are not limited by the command to any one mode, but may choose that which seems to us most appropriate, whether it be sprinkling, pouring, or immersion.

But if the command is specific and modal, as immerse, then we are limited by the range of that word, and cannot fulfil the command by sprinkling or pouring, for these are not modes of immersion, any more than riding is a mode of walking, or writing a mode of painting.

It is true that sprinkling and pouring may be modes of purifying,—and so is riding a mode of going. But if the command is not purify, but immerse, then all debate as to the mode is at an end, for you can immerse, not by sprinkling, but only by immersion.

§ 2. *Causes of the disregard of these principles, and the false positions to which this disregard has given rise.*

Though the principles stated are simple and obvious, yet the natural operations of the mind on questions of philology, have been in this case embarrassed and perplexed by certain influences of a kind peculiar to this word.

At the time of the translation of the Bible, a controversy had arisen as it regards the import of the word, so that, although it was conceded to have an import in the original, yet it was impossible to assign to it in English any meaning, without seeming to take sides in the controversy then pending.

Accordingly, in order to take neither side, they did not attempt to give the sense of the term in a significant English word, but merely transferred the word βαπτίζω, with a slight alteration of termination, to our language. The consequence was that it did not exhibit its original significancy to the mind of the English reader, or indeed any significancy, except what was derived from its application to designate an external visible rite.—In short, it became merely the name of a rite, and had a usage strictly technical, and lost to the ear whatever significance it originally had.

The habit of using the word in a technical sense, has tended to unfit the mind for the discussion of the question as to the mode of baptism, in various ways, of which I shall mention three.

1. It has led to a departure from the principles already stated, that words, when applied to the same subject, and in the same circumstances, cannot have a double sense. This rule, as has been remarked, does not forbid that the same word in different circumstances should have various senses; accordingly it may be conceded that the word βαπτίζω has various senses in the wide range of its usage, in scriptural and classical Greek: but out of this variety of usages, there is one strictly of a religious nature, and having direct reference to one of the great revealed facts of

Christianity. Now in a case like this, the laws of philology require that some one of the meanings of the word should be fixed on, and assigned to it in all cases. But the habit of using the word baptize in a strictly technical sense, as the name of a rite, has led to a disregard of this simple and obvious rule.

Many writers, fixing their minds merely upon the idea of a rite, and finding that the word βαπτίζω means sometimes to wash, sometimes to immerse, and sometimes, as they think, to pour or sprinkle, conclude that the rite of Baptism may be performed in either way; entirely forgetting that, although the word should happen, in the wide range of its usage, scriptural and classical, secular and religious, to have all these meanings, it by no means follows that when used as a religious term, it has more than one. Hence, if as a religious term, and in certain circumstances, it means immerse, it does not also in similar circumstances mean to wet or to wash, to sprinkle or to pour, to color or to dye, but simply to immerse. And just as plainly, if in some cases of its religious uses, it means to purify, it does not in others of the same kind mean to pour, to sprinkle, or to immerse.

2. The other mode in which the technical use of this word has unfitted the mind for a fair consideration of the question is, it has permitted the introduction of a discussion as to the mode of baptism, after concessions have been made, which ought for ever to exclude it. For example, the question arises what meaning did the word βαπτίζω convey to those, who in the age of the New Testament writers read the command, go baptize all nations? Was it to immerse? So our brethren the Baptists maintain, and so many who do not immerse, concede. Now after such a concession, with what propriety they can debate any longer as to the mode, I acknowledge that I cannot perceive. Nor do I think that they would do it, were it not for an illusion practised by the technical word *Baptize*, upon their minds.

After admitting as a point of philology, that the word βαπτίζω in its religious use means immerse, the mind seems to revert to the old habit of using the Anglicised word *baptism*, without attach-

ing to it any meaning, and we are at once told that it is of no use to dispute as to the mode of baptism. Suppose, now, instead of the word baptism, we substitute the meaning which it has been conceded to have, and the illusion is at once exposed. We concede that βαπτίζω means immerse, but of what use is it to dispute concerning the mode of immersion? Of none, surely, so you do but immerse. But can you immerse by sprinkling? Is sprinkling a mode of immersion? The fact is, that if the word denotes a given definite act, no other dissimilar act is, or can be a mode of it. Pouring is not a mode of sprinkling or of immersion, nor is sprinkling a mode of pouring or of immersion, nor is immersion a mode of sprinkling or pouring.

3. Others, again, still using the word merely as a technic, say that Baptism is the application of water, in any way, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; but base their conclusions rather on reason and the nature of the case, or on the design of the rite, than on a thorough philological investigation of the word. Now the defect of this last mode of reasoning is, that it does not interpret the command. It uses the word like a technic, having no meaning of its own, and gives rather a description of a rite, than a definition of βαπτίζω.

No one ever pretended to *define* βαπτίζω as meaning "to apply water in any way"—of course Baptism cannot be defined to be "the application of water in any way." And whether this view of the rite is correct or not, must depend entirely on the meaning of the word.

### § 3. *Statement of the position to be proved.*

From what has been said it is plain that those who have written on the subject of the mode of Baptism may be arranged in four classes.

1. Those who maintain that the word in the whole extent of its usage has various meanings, and from this fact alone draw the inference that, therefore, the rite may be performed in various

ways, making at the same time no attempt to prove which of its possible meanings it actually has in the case in question.

2. Those who fix on a specific and modal meaning—e. g. immerse, and which, of course, excludes all dispute as to the mode, and yet insist that no mode is essential.

3. Those who look mainly at the obvious design of the rite, i. e. to indicate purity, and on this ground affirm that to Baptize is to apply water in any way which denotes purity, without attempting to make out a philological proof of the truth of their position from the import of the word βαπτίζω.

4. Those who insist that the word in all its extent of usage has but one meaning—viz. to immerse—and that this excludes all debate as to the mode.

None of these positions is, in my judgment, adapted to explain all the facts which occur in the use of the word, and to give satisfaction and rest to an inquiring mind. Any view which shall effectually do this will be found to have the following requisites:

(1.) That it shall be strictly philological.

(2.) That out of all the possible meanings of βαπτίζω, it shall fix on one as the real meaning in the case in question.

(3.) That it shall at all times steadily adhere to this.

(4.) That this shall limit the performance of the rite to no particular mode.

The position which I shall endeavor accordingly to prove by appeal to facts, is this, that the word βαπτίζω, as a religious term, means neither dip nor sprinkle, immerse nor pour—nor any other external action in applying a fluid to the body, or the body to a fluid—nor any action which is limited to one mode of performance; but that as a religious term it means at all times, to purify, or cleanse—words of a meaning so general as not to be confined to any mode, or agent, or means, or object, whether material or spiritual, but to leave the widest scope for the question as to the mode—so that, in this usage, it is in every respect a perfect synonym of the word καθαρίζω.

Let it then be borne in mind, that the question is not this,



Does the word in all its extent of usage denote *at any time* a definite external act? Nor this, Is this its *original, primitive* signification? Even if all this were admitted, it would not touch the question—for, as we all know, nothing is more common than for words to be used in more meanings than one, and to decide in what sense a word is used in a given instance, we are not to follow etymology or fancy, but evidence, derived from the facts of the case.

With regard then to other uses of the word βαπτίζω, I freely admit that in classic usage it does, as a general fact, clearly denote some external act of a specific kind, yet it is by no means clear to my mind that it does not in different cases denote different acts. And though I do not regard it as an integral part of the argument which I propose to construct, yet for the sake of completeness, I think it best to state what seems to be the truth on this point.

1. I freely admit that in numerous cases it clearly denotes to immerse—in which case an agent submerges partially or totally some person or thing. Indeed, this is so notoriously true, that I need attempt no proof. Innumerable examples are at hand, and enough may be found, in all the most common discussions of this subject.

2. It is also applied to cases where a fluid without an agent rolls over, or floods, and covers anything—as in the oft quoted passage in Diodorus Siculus, Vol. VII. p. 191, as translated by Prof. Stuart: “The river, borne along by a more violent current, overwhelmed many” (ἐβάρυξε). So, Vol. I. p. 107, he speaks of land animals intercepted by the Nile, as βαπτίζόμενα, overwhelmed and perishing. The same mode of speaking is also applied to the sea shore, which is spoken of by Aristotle as baptized or overwhelmed by the tide.

3. It is also applied in cases where some person or thing sinks passively into the flood. Thus Josephus, in narrating his shipwreck on the Adriatic, uses this word to describe the sinking of the ship.

I am aware that by some writers vigorous efforts are made to reduce all these senses to the original idea to immerse or dip. But it seems to me that they are rather led by their zeal to support a theory, than by a careful induction from facts; and that they wrest facts to suit their principles, rather than derive their principles from facts.

To me it seems plain that in all these cases there is a material difference as to the external act, nor am I prepared to admit that either, in preference to the other, is the original and primitive meaning of the word. If it were an object of much importance to decide what this is, inasmuch as they all agree in one common idea of a state or condition, though variously caused, I should incline to give to the word the meaning to cause to come into that state, and this idea is favored by the termination,  $\iota\zeta\omega$ . The state is, a state of being enveloped or surrounded by a fluid, or any thing else adapted to produce such a result. And a general meaning of  $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\zeta\omega$  would thus be, to cause to come into this state—whether it be done by an agent immersing an object in a fluid, or by the flowing of a fluid over an object, without the intervention of any agent, or by the passive sinking of an object into it. In all these cases the state of the object becomes the same, but the external act, by which it comes into this state, is not the same in either case.

To all this, however, I attach no great importance in the discussion of the present question; unless it be of use in exposing the fallacy of all efforts to reduce this word to such a perfect simplicity of meaning, even as it regards an external act, as is claimed for it by some.

On the other hand, even if I were to admit that its original and primitive idea was to immerse, and that when it denotes an external act, it never departs from this sense; still the question would arise, Is there not another meaning derived from the effects of this act, and in which the mind contemplates the effect alone, entirely irrespective of the mode in which it is produced?

I contend that there is—and that as thorough purification or

cleansing is often the result of submersion in water, so the word βαπτίζω has come to signify to purify or cleanse thoroughly, without any reference to the mode in which it is done.

#### § 4. *Doctrine of Probabilities.*

There is not *à priori* the least improbability of such a change of meaning, from the laws of the mind, or of language.

It may at first sight seem an improbable position to some, that if a word originally signifies "to immerse," it can assume a meaning so remote from its primitive sense as "*to purify*," and entirely drop all reference to the mode.

Yet the slightest attention to the laws of the mind, and to well-known facts, will show that not the least improbability of such a result exists.

No principle is more universally admitted by all sound philologists, than that to establish the original and primitive meaning of a word, is not at all decisive as it regards its subsequent usages. It often aids only as giving a clue by which we can trace the progress of the imagination, or the association of ideas, in leading the mind from meaning to meaning, on some ground of relation, similitude, or connexion of cause and effect.

So the verb *to spring*, denotes an act, and gives rise to a noun denoting an act. A perception of similitude transfers the word to the issuing of water from a fountain—to the motion of a watch-spring—and to the springing of plants in the spring of the year. Yet who does not feel that to be able to trace such a process of thought, is far from proving that, when a man in one case says, I made a *spring* over the ditch, in another, I broke the *spring* of my watch, in another, I drank from the *spring*, in another, I prefer *spring* to winter, he means in each case the same thing by the word *spring*? And who, in using these words, always resorts to the original idea of the verb? Indeed, so far is it from being true that this is commonly done, that most persons are pleased when the track of the mind is uncovered, and the path is pointed

out by which it had passed from meaning to meaning, as if a new idea had been acquired. So *conversation*, *prevent*, *charity*, as now used, have obviously departed widely from the sense in which they were used in the days of the translators of the Bible.

But to multiply words on a point so plain, would be needless, had not so much stress been laid on the supposed original meaning of this word. It is, therefore, too plain to be denied, that words do often so far depart from their primitive meaning, as entirely to leave out the original idea—and that the secondary senses of a word are often by far the most numerous and important.

Moreover, to establish such secondary meanings, it is not necessary that we should be able to trace the course of the mind, though it is pleasant to be able to do it. A secondary meaning, however unlike it may seem to the primitive, may yet be established like any other fact in the usage of language, that is, by appropriate testimony.

But whilst such transitions are common in all words, they are particularly common in words of the class of βαπτίζω, denoting action by, or with reference to, a fluid. This is owing to the fact that the effects produced by the action, depend not on the action alone, but on the action and the fluid combined—and of course may be varied as the fluid or its application varies.

Let us now take the general idea of enveloping or immersing in a fluid, and see how unlike the effects to which it may give rise.

If the envelopment is produced by a flood, or torrent, or waves, the effect may be to overwhelm, to oppress, to destroy.

If, by taking up the object and immersing it into a coloring fluid, it is to impart a new color, or to dye.

If by taking up an object and immersing it into a cleansing fluid—or by going into a cleansing fluid, the effect is to purify or cleanse.

And on these natural or material senses, may be founded the same number of spiritual or moral senses, by transferring the ideas to the mind.

Now as a matter of fact such transfers have taken place in cognate and similar words.

I shall out of many select a few cases from Greek, Latin, English, and Hebrew words, fully to illustrate, and clearly to confirm these principles, and to show that they are peculiar to no language, but rest on universal laws of the mind.

In Greek, all admit that the most common sense of βάπτω is to dip, to immerse. I am willing to admit that it is the primitive sense.

But it is beyond all dispute that the same word has passed to the meaning to dye, without any reference to mode. Great efforts were once made to deny this. But the most intelligent Baptists now entirely abandon this ground, and that with the best reason. And indeed, so far has the word passed from its original sense that it is applied to coloring the surface of an object by gold, i. e. to gilding. A few examples out of many, in so plain a case, must suffice. In the battle of the frogs and mice, a mouse is represented as dyeing or coloring the lake with his blood—ἐξάπτετο αἵματι λιμνῇ. On this there was once a battle royal to prove that it could be proper to speak of dipping a lake into the blood of a mouse; and all the powers of rhetoric were put in requisition to justify the usage. Hear now Dr. Carson, inferior in learning and research to none of the Baptists: "To suppose that there is here any extravagant allusion to the literal immersion or dipping of a lake, is a monstrous perversion of taste. The lake is said to be *dyed*, not to be *dipped*, or *poured*, or *sprinkled*. *There is in the word no reference to mode*. Had Baptists entrenched themselves here, they would have saved themselves much useless toil, and much false criticism, without straining to the impeachment of their candor or their taste. What a monstrous paradox in rhetoric is the figuring of the dipping of a lake in the blood of a mouse! Yet Dr. Gale supposes that the lake was dipped by hyperbole. The literal sense he says is, the lake was *dipped in blood*. Never was there such a figure. The lake is not said to be *dipped in blood*, but to be *dyed with blood*." p. 48, last American edition. This is well said, and is the more to our

purpose on account of its author. Indeed his whole discussion of this point is able, lucid, and decisive. Of the examples adduced by him I shall quote one or two more.

“Hippocrates employs it to denote dyeing, by dropping the dyeing liquid on the thing dyed : ἐπειδὴν ἐπιστάξῃ ἐπὶ τὰ ἱμάτια βάπτεται : ‘When it *drops* upon the garments they are *dyled*.’ This surely is not dyeing by dipping.” Carson, p. 44.

“Again. In Arrian—Expedition of Alexander : τοὺς δὲ πύγωνας λέγει Νεάρχος ὅτι βάπτωνται Ἰνδοί : ‘Nearchus relates that the Indians dye their beards.’ It will not be contended that they *dyled* their beards by immersion.” p. 44.

He quotes cases in which it is used to describe the coloring of the hair ; the staining of a garment by blood ; the staining of the hand by crushing a coloring substance in it ; for which, and others of a like kind, I refer to him, and to Prof. Stuart.

In the compounds and derivatives of this word the sense to dye is very extensive ; to be fully satisfied of which, let any one examine the Thesaurus of H. Stephens, or the abbreviation of it by Scapula on this word.

It is compounded with colors of all kinds, as πορφυρεοβαφής, ἰακινθινοβαφής, of a purple or a hyacinthine dye. It denotes a dyer, a dyeing vat, a dye-house, etc., βαφεύς βαφεῖον, etc., and it even passes, as before stated, to cases in which a new color is produced by the external application of a solid, as χρυσοβαφής, colored with gold, or gilded.

But it is needless to quote at large all the examples which might be adduced to illustrate and confirm these points ; and as all that I claim is conceded even by our Baptist brethren, to proceed further would seem like an attempt at useless display. I shall therefore proceed to consider the usages of a kindred word in the Latin language.

*Tingo*, beyond all doubt, means to immerse. In this sense Facciolatus and Forcellinus, in their Totius Latinitatis Lexicon, give βάπτω as its synonyme. And as βάπτω is used to describe the immersing of an axe to temper it, so is *tingo*, to describe simi-



lar operations. So Virgil, speaking of the operations of the Cyclopean workmen of Vulcan, thus describes them as immersing the hissing metals in water to temper them, “Stridentia tingunt æra lacu.” *Æ.* viii. 450. They dip the hissing brass in the lake.

So speaking of a sword. He had dipped the sword in Stygian water. “Tinxerat unda stygia ensem.” *Æ.* xii. 91. Celsus speaks of sponges dipped in vinegar. “Spongia in aceto tincta.”

The setting of the heavenly bodies is spoken of as an immersion in the sea, and to describe this *tingo* is used :

“Tingere se oceano properant soles hyberni.” Virg. *Georg.* ii. 481. The winter suns haste to dip themselves in the ocean.

“Tingat equos gurgite Phœbus,” *Æ.* xi. 914. Phœbus dips his horses in the deep.

But to prove that it means immerse is needless ; no one can deny it, nor is it the point at which I chiefly aim. This is, that like βαπτω, it loses all reference to the act of immersion, and comes to signify simply to dye or color in any way.

Of this there is a presumptive proof that is obvious even to those who do not understand the learned languages. It has given rise to the words *tinge* and *tint* in our language—and who that speaks of the rosy tints of morn, or of the sun tinging the clouds with golden light, would have the least thought of immersion ? And is it probable that such senses would have passed from the Latin to our language, had *tingo* not passed from its original sense to that of dyeing or coloring in any mode ?

But there is direct proof in the Latin classics of the same kind as exists with respect to βαπτω.

Horace uses the word to denote the dyeing of wool, as “tingere lanas murice ;” Ovid, to denote the coloring of the hair and of ivory ; Horace, to denote the coloring of the axe used in sacrificing the victims, as “victima pontificum secures cervice tinget ;” Virgil, *Geor.* iii. v. 492, to denote the malignant effects of a plague on cattle, mentions that they had scarce blood enough left to color the knives used to slay them.

Vix suppositi tinguntur sanguine cultri.

So in Georg. ii. v. 8. We have the words “*Tinge crura musto*,” referring to the coloring or staining of the legs by the treading of the wine-press. In Pliny we have “*Tingentium officinæ*,” shops of dyers, and in Cicero, *Tincta*, in the phrase “*tincta absint*,” to denote colored things. It is followed by an accusative of the color, as in Pliny “*tingere cœruleum*,” to dye blue. We have also in Lucretius, “*Loca lumine tingunt nubes*”—to tinge or color, that is to illuminate with light. See Forcellinus and Facciolatus, or Leverett’s *Lexicon*, on the word.

Indeed on this word no less than on βάπτω we have the unequivocal concession of Dr. Carson, that it means to dye. “In Latin also, the same word, *tingo*, signifies both to dip and to dye.” Carson, p. 54.

Facciolatus and Forcellinus, and Leverett, also give it the sense to moisten, to wet, and make it in this sense synonymous with *τέγγω*—from which indeed it is derived, and to my mind the examples adduced are abundantly sufficient to establish this sense. But on this it is needless to insist, as Dr. Carson professes not to be satisfied that this sense can be established, and for the present I wish to rely on facts concerning which there is no dispute.

In English, for the sake of contrast, I shall select the word to wash.

The original and common idea of this word is, undeniably, to cleanse by a purifying fluid, as water—and that, without respect to mode. Of these ideas in its progress it drops all, and assumes a meaning that involves neither to purify, nor to use a fluid at all.

As washing is often performed by a superficial application of a fluid, it often assumes this sense and loses entirely the idea of cleansing, as when we speak of washing a wound with brandy : or with some cooling application, to alleviate inflammation. In this case we aim not at cleansing but at medicinal effect. So we can speak of the sea as washing the shores or rocks, denoting not cleansing, but the copious superficial application of a fluid.

Again, as a superficial application of a fluid or a coloring

mixture is often made for the sake of changing the color, we have to white-wash, to red-wash, to yellow-wash; and the substances or fluid mixtures with which this is done, are called washes.

Next it drops the idea of a fluid at all, and assumes the sense of a superficial application of a solid—as to wash with silver or gold.

And here a remarkable coincidence in result, in words of meaning originally unlike, deserves notice, as a striking illustration of the progress of the mind in effecting such changes.

In Greek, βάπτω denotes originally to immerse—action alone, without reference to effect. In English wash denotes to cleanse or purify alone, without reference to mode. Yet by the operation of the laws of association, both are used to denote coloring, and both to denote covering superficially with silver or gold.

Finally, when we speak of the wash of a cow-yard, and call those places where deposits of earth or filth, or vegetable matter, are made, washes, who will contend that the idea of purity is retained?

Again, *lustrō* denotes to purify, by certain religious rites, and especially by carrying around the victim previously to its being killed.

From this it passes to the idea of passing around or through—dropping the idea of purifying—as “Pythagoras Egyptum lustravit.” *Cicero*—Pythagoras traversed Egypt; “Navibus lustrandum æquor.” *Virg.*—the ocean to be traversed with ships.

Hence it passes to the idea of observing, surveying, accurately examining, either with the eyes or the mind. “Totum lustrabat lumine corpus,” *Virg.* He scrutinized, or examined his whole body with his eyes. “Cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris,” when you shall have surveyed and accurately examined all things by your reason and in your mind.

And what wider departure from the original sense to purify is possible? In *Leveret* καθαρισίς is given as a synonyme of *lustratio*, and yet the same word is used to denote travelling from

city to city. "Lustratio municipiorum"—also the course or circuit of the sun—"lustratio solis."

So too in Ezek. xxiii: 15. טָבַל to immerse is used to denote dyeing—where תְּבוּנָהּ denotes dyed attire, as Dr. Carson also allows.

Similar transitions of meaning could be pointed out in *lavo* בָּרַס and נִסְכָּה and other words, were it at all necessary, and did time allow.

Now with such facts before us, to increase the number of which indefinitely, were perfectly easy, who can say that there is the slightest improbability in the idea that the word βαπτίζω should pass from the sense to immerse, to the sense to purify, without reference to the mode? Can βάλω, tingo, and wash, pass through similar transitions, and cannot βαπτίζω?

But what secondary sense shall be adopted cannot be told *a priori*, but must be decided by the habits, manners, customs, and general ideas of a people, and sometimes by peculiar usages for which no reason can be given. For example, no reason exists in the nature of things why βάλω rather than βαπτίζω should pass from the sense immerse to the sense to dye—yet there is evidence that it did. On the other hand, it could not be certainly foretold that βαπτίζω rather than βάλω would pass to the sense to cleanse, and yet that it did so pass may still be true, and if true, can be proved like any other fact.

And the existence of manners and customs tending to such a result, renders such a result probable.

### § 5. Probabilities as to βαπτίζω.

Circumstances did exist tending to produce such a transfer of meaning in βαπτίζω, and therefore there is a strong probability that it was made.

As it regards βάλω and tingo we have no proof that any peculiar causes existed tending to such a change of meaning as they are confessed to have actually undergone.

But as it regards βαπτίζω, such a tendency can be proved to

have existed in the manners and customs of the Jews, for though no immersions of the person were enjoined in the Mosaic ritual, but simply washings of the body, or flesh, in any way, yet there can be no doubt that immersions and bathings were in daily use—and these, as well as all their other washings, were solely for the sake of purity, and held up this idea daily before the mind.

Hence, when after the conquests of Alexander, the Greek language began to be spoken by the Jews, it encountered a tendency of the same kind as that which had already changed the meaning of βάπτω to color or dye; but far more definite, powerful, and all-pervading; for the practice of immersing to color was limited to a few, but the practice of bathing or immersing to purify, was common to a whole nation. Indeed the idea of purification from uncleanness pervaded their whole ritual, in numberless cases, and must have been perfectly familiar to the mind of every one.

The inference from these facts is so obvious that it hardly needs to be stated. As the laws of the mind made from βάπτω, to dye, to color, to paint, and from *tingo*, the same; so there is a very strong presumption that so general a use of immersion, to produce purity, would give to βαπτίζω the corresponding sense, to purify. This does not, I am aware, prove that it did. But it opens the way for such proof, and shows that there is not the least ground for the vigorous efforts that are made to set it aside.

Even a moderate degree of proof is sufficient in a case like this, when the most familiar laws of the mind and all the power of presumptive evidence from analogical cases tends this way.

### § 6. *Probabilities from the subject.*

There is no probability *à priori* against this position from the general nature of the subject to which the word is applied, in the rite of Baptism. But the probability is decidedly and strongly in its favor.

No law of philology is more firmly established than this, that in the progress of society, new ideas produce new words and new senses of old words, and hence in judging concerning such new

senses we are to look at the nature of the new subjects of thought that arise.

Now that, in this case, the Greek language was applied to a new subject of thought is most plain, and that subject is the peculiar operations of the Holy Spirit; for that the ordinance of Baptism refers to these is admitted by all.

Hence if any external act had any peculiar fitness to present these to the mind, a presumption would be in favor of that act; and if the meaning claimed by me was unfit to present them to the mind, there would be a presumption against it.

But so far is this from being the fact, that directly the reverse is true. What is the peculiar effect of the operation of the Holy Ghost on the mind? Is it not moral cleansing or purification?

But no word denoting merely a mode of applying a fluid to a thing, or of putting anything into a fluid, conveys of itself any such idea. To pour, sprinkle, immerse, or dip, convey in themselves no idea at all of cleansing. The effect of the action depends mainly on the fluid, not on the action, and may be either to purify or to pollute. If clean water is used, the effect is to purify. If filthy water is used, the effect is to pollute. So Job says, "If I wash myself with snow-water and make my hands never so clean, yet shalt thou plunge me [Greek βύπτω. Heb. טָבַל] in the ditch, and my own clothes shall abhor me." Here the effect of plunging is pollution, because it is not into clean water but into filthy. Hence, *no external act has in itself any fitness to present to the mind the operations of the Holy Spirit.*

On the other hand to wash, to purify, to cleanse, all direct the mind to the very thing done by the Holy Spirit—hence the presumption is entirely against the supposition that the word denotes an external act, and in favor of the meaning claimed.

### § 7. *Philological principles.*

There is decided philological proof in favor of this view. This I shall soon proceed to adduce. But the course which the argu-



ment has too often taken, renders it necessary to make a few remarks on the principles of the reasoning involved.

It is commonly the case, that after proving that there are clear instances in which βαπτίζω means to immerse, it is assumed that it is violently improbable that it ever means anything else, and that, if it can but be shown that in a given passage it can possibly mean immerse, no more is needed, so that the main force of argument is not to prove that it does so mean from the exigency of the place, but that it may possibly so mean, and, therefore, in consequence of its meaning so in other places, it does so here.

Prof. Ripley reasons on these principles in his reply to Prof. Stuart, but Dr. Carson has more boldly and fully developed them than any writer on that side of the question with whom I am acquainted. He goes so far as to say, pp. 72, 73, that when one meaning of a word is proved by sufficient evidence, no objections to retaining this meaning in other places can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility. This he says is self-evident, and lays it down as a canon; and affirms, p. 70, that the man who does not perceive the justness of his positions is not worth reasoning with. Now that there is not the least ground for assuming the improbability of the meaning to purify, nay that the probability is decidedly in its favor, I have clearly shown. Of course to show that in a given case βαπτίζω can possibly mean immerse is nothing to the point. The question is, what is its fair, natural, and obvious sense in the case in question, not what it can possibly by any stretch of ingenuity be made to mean.

Of old it was customary in the same way to try to prove that βάπτω does not mean to dye, because some other sense is possible or conceivable—and as we have seen, Gale even goes so far as to maintain, that a lake is spoken of as figuratively dipped in the blood of a mouse—lest he should be obliged to admit the obvious sense that the lake was dyed, colored, or tinged, with the blood of a mouse.

But this mode of reasoning, as it regards βάπτω, is at last

candidly and fairly given up—and may we not hope that the same candor will at length lead to the same results in the case of the cognate word βαπτίζω?

It may be further observed that the reasoning of philology is not demonstrative, but moral and cumulative; and that an ultimate result depends upon the combined impression of all the facts of a given case as a whole—on the principle that the view, which best harmonizes all the facts, and falls in with the known laws of the human mind, is true.

And where many and separate and independent facts all tend with different degrees of probability to a common result, there is an evidence, over and above the evidence furnished by each case by itself, in the coincidence of so many separate and independent probabilities in a common result. And to be able to prove that each may be explained otherwise, and is not in itself a demonstration, cannot break the force of the fact, that so many separate and independent probabilities all tend one way. The probability produced by such coincidences is greater than the sum of the separate probabilities: it has the force of the fact that they coincide—and that the assumption of the truth of the meaning in which they all coincide, is the only mode of explaining the coincidence.

That there are various independent proofs, that βαπτίζω as a religious term means to purify, and that these all coincide, and that this view harmonizes and explains all the facts of the case, I shall now attempt to show.

### · § 8. *A question about purifying.*

In John iii. 25, καθαρισμός is used as synonymous with βαπτισμός, and thus the *usus loquendi*, as it regards the religious rite, is clearly decided.

The facts of the case are these, vs. 22, 23. John and Jesus were baptizing, one in Judea, the other in Ænon, near to Salim, and in such circumstances that to an unintelligent observer there

would seem to be a rivalry between the claims of the two. The disciples of John might naturally feel that Jesus was intruding into the province of their master. They might even believe John to be the Messiah, and thus give rise to the sect which held that belief. On this point a dispute arose between the disciples of John and the Jews (or a Jew, as many copies read), v. 25.

They come to John and state the case, v. 26. "Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou bearest witness, *behold the same baptizeth, and all men come to him.*" Plainly implying that in so doing he was improperly interfering with the claims of John.

John in reply, v. 27—31, disclaims all honor except that bestowed on him by God, of being the forerunner of the Messiah, and rejoices to decrease in order that he may increase—thus justifying the course which was so offensive to his disciples, and settling the dispute in favor of the claims of Christ.

The argument from these facts is this: The dispute in question was plainly a specific dispute concerning baptism, as practised by Jesus and John, and not a general dispute on the subject of purification at large; so that *ζητήσις περὶ βαπτισμοῦ* is the true sense; and if it had been so written, the passage would have been regarded by all as perfectly plain.

But instead of *βαπτισμοῦ*, John has used *καθαρισμοῦ*, because the sense is entirely the same. In other words, "a question concerning baptism," and "a question concerning purification," were at that time modes of expression perfectly equivalent; that is, *βαπτισμός* is a synonyme of *καθαρισμός*.

The only mode of escaping this result is to say, that as immersion in water involves purification, and is a kind of purification, so it may have given rise to a question on the subject of purification at large; but to this I reply, that the whole scope of the passage forbids such an idea. The question was not general but specific, being caused by the concurrence of two claims to baptize; and so was the reply of John.

Moreover, to assume a general dispute on purification renders

the whole scope of the passage obscure ; as is evident from the fact that those who have not seen that in this case καθαρισμός is a synonyme of βαπτισμός, are much perplexed to see what a dispute on purification in general, has to do with the facts of the case.

The origin of the dispute from the concurrence of two claims to baptize, is obviously indicated by the particle οὖν in v. 25, showing undeniably that the events just narrated gave rise to the question. This connexion does not appear in our translation, and hence the course of thought is somewhat obscured.

It is plain, then, that independently of all theories or interests, καθαρισμός is used as synonymous with βαπτισμός. Assigning this meaning makes the passage natural, lucid, and simple ; to assume a general debate on purification at large, renders it forced and obscure, and the reply of John totally irrelevant.

And what reason is there for denying this conclusion ? None but the fear of the result. No law of language requires it—no existing fact—no previous probability. These, as we have shown, are all decidedly the other way. It is then of no avail to talk of possible senses. The question is not what is possible, but what is a rational inference from a fair view of the facts of the case ; and this I do not hesitate to say is, that βαπτισμός and καθαρισμός are synonymous.

I have spoken the more at large on this case, because it is so rarely referred to in arguments on this question, and because the light which it throws on the *usus loquendi* is peculiarly clear.

No word is more entirely independent of all reference to modes and forms than καθαρίζω, and nothing can more clearly show that βαπτίζω had dropped all reference to form, and assumed the sense to purify or cleanse, than making it a synonyme of καθαρίζω. And the evidence is the more striking, as it is incidental and undesigned. It is as if we could stand on the plains of Judea and hear them interchange Βαπτισμός and καθαρισμός as synonymous words.\*

---

\* For ample confirmation of this view, by the Fathers, and others, see § 67, No. 1 and 5.

But if this is the force of the word in one instance as a religious rite, then it is its force in all similar cases.

### § 9. *Prophecies—Old Testament.*

This view alone fully explains the existing expectation that the Messiah would baptize.

That the Messiah should immerse is nowhere foretold; but that he should *purify*, is often and fully predicted.

But especially is this foretold in that last and prominent prophecy of Malachi (iii. 1—3), which was designed to fill the eye and the mind of the nation, until he came.

He is here presented to the mind in all his majesty and power, but amid all other ideas that of purifying is most prominent. He was above all things to purify and purge, and that with power so great, that few could endure the fiery day. Who may abide the day of his coming, and who shall stand when he appeareth?

Suppose now the word βαπτίζω to mean as I affirm—the whole nation are expecting the predicted purifier; all at once the news goes forth that a great purifier has appeared, and that all men flock to him and are purified in the Jordan. How natural the inference! The great purifier so long foretold, has at last appeared, and how natural the embassy of the Priests and Levites to inquire who art thou? and when he denied that he was the Messiah, or either of his expected attendants, how natural the inquiry, why purifiest thou then? It is his work—of him it is foretold, why dost thou intrude into his place and do his work?

In view of these facts I do not hesitate to believe most fully, that the idea which came up before the mind of the Jews when the words Ιωάννης ὁ Βαπτιστής were used, was not, John the immerser, or John the dipper, but John the purifier, a name peculiarly appropriate to him as a reformer—as puritan was to our ancestors, and for the same reason.

This view has to my own mind the self-evidencing power of truth, for there is not the slightest presumption against it; all probable evidence is in its favor; and it explains and harmonizes

the facts of the case as no other view does. Indeed I can never read the account of John's baptism, and his various replies, without feeling that this passage from Malachi gives color to them all.\* This idea I shall consider more at large in the following section.

### § 10. *Baptism of Water and the Holy Spirit.*

The contrast made by John between his own baptism and that of Christ, illustrates and confirms the same view.

This contrast exists in three particulars—the subject, the agent, and the means.

In the case of John, the subject was the body—in the case of Christ, the mind.

In the case of John, the agent was material, i. e. a man—in the case of Christ, the agent was the Holy Spirit. In the case of John, the means were water—in the case of Christ, the truth and the emotions of God.

Now the idea to purify is perfectly adapted to illustrate and carry out such a contrast, but to immerse is not.

This sense is never transferred to the mind, in any language, so far as I know, to indicate anything like the effects of the agency of the Holy Spirit.

Where oppressive, crushing, painful, or injurious influences are denoted, it is so transferred—as *μύριαις φρόντισιν βεβαπτισμένος τὸν νοῦν*.—*Chrysostom*. *βαρύταταις ἁμαρτίαις βεβαπτισμένοι*.—*Idem*. *πολλοῖς κύμασι πρᾶγματων βεβαπτισμένοι*.—*Idem*. But this does not denote the peculiar and appropriate effects of the agency of the Holy Spirit.

But the sense to purify, can be with ease applied to body or mind, to human agents or to the Holy Spirit, to water or to the truth and divine influence.

How simple and natural the statement! “I indeed purify you with water—but he shall purify you with the Holy Spirit.” I per-

---

\* See § 67, No. 2, for an unanswerable defence of this view, from the Fathers.



form an external and symbolical rite, by which the body is cleansed with water, but he shall perform a higher cleansing, or that in which the mind itself is purified by the Spirit of God.

And how harsh, how forced, how unnatural to say, I immerse you in the Holy Spirit. In fine, such a use of language to denote purification is entirely foreign to all the laws of the human mind.

Indeed so much is the force of this felt, that in this part of the antithesis many resort to a new modification of the idea, and maintain that it means to imbue largely, to overwhelm with divine influences.

But this destroys the whole symmetry of the antithesis. John does not mean to say I imbue you largely with water, but either, I immerse you in water, or I cleanse you with it, and whichever sense we adopt in one part of the antithesis, we ought to retain in the other.

But when the agent is the Holy Spirit, the object the human spirit, the means spiritual, and the end purity, the sense immersion is out of the question. Nothing but the most violent improbability of the sense to purify, can authorize us to reject it in such a case. But no such improbability exists; the probability is entirely in its favor. Purify, then, in any view of the subject, must here be the sense.

This view is still further confirmed by comparing the language of John with the passage from Malachi already quoted. It seems to be at all times his great desire to lead them to apply those words to Christ, and not to himself. As if he had said, "Do not think that I am the great purifier spoken of in those words. After me cometh one mightier than I, the latchet of whose shoes I am unworthy to loose. He shall purify you with the Holy Ghost and with fire—whose fan is in his hand, and he shall thoroughly purge (διακαθαρίσει) his floor," etc. But all the force, correspondence, and mutual illumination of these passages, depend on giving to the word βαπτίζω the sense which I claim.

§ 11. *Baptism of the Holy Spirit.*

In 1 Cor. xii. 13, the Holy Spirit is directly said to baptize, and in this case all external acts are of course excluded, and purify is the only appropriate sense.

“For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body, and have been all made to drink into one Spirit.”

If any shall say that admitting to the church by the external rite is here meant, I reply, that is never performed by the Spirit, but by man. But this baptism is as much an internal work of the Holy Spirit, as the causing to drink into one Spirit, which is not external, but an internal and real work of the Spirit.

But to immerse in water is not the work of the Holy Spirit, nor is it his work to immerse the mind, but to purify the mind is. Hence, not an external union to the visible Church, but a real union to the true and spiritual body of Christ is here meant, one which is produced by the purification of the mind, not by the immersion of the body. Hence to describe the operations of the Holy Spirit in uniting us to the body of Christ, *purify* is adapted—*immerse* is not.\*

§ 12. *Sacrificial Sense of βαπτίζω.*

βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω are so similarly used in connexion with the forgiveness of sins, as decidedly to favor the idea that they are in a religious use synonymous.

The purification effected by the Holy Spirit is of two kinds—(1) a purification from spiritual defilement; (2) a deliverance from the guilt of sin, i. e. liability to be punished, and from a sense of guilt, through the atonement.

It is through the atonement that pardon is given; and through the Holy Spirit conviction of sin is produced; and by him also a sense of guilt is taken away in view of the atonement; and in this sense he is said to cleanse from sin by the blood of Christ.

---

\* For full confirmation of this view see § 67, No. 3, and § 96.

This kind of purification may be called legal, as it relates to guilt, forgiveness, and an atonement. The other kind of purification may be called moral, inasmuch as it removes the unholy and impure feelings and habits of the mind, and produces in their place those that are holy and pure.

Both kinds of purification are expressed by the same word καθαρίζω. Its use to denote legal purification or expiation is very extensive. It denotes, (1) to make atonement. As in Ex. xxix. 37, and xxx. 10. "Thou shalt make atonement for the altar," "Aaron shall make atonement ; Sept. καθαρίζω, Heb.

כִּפֹּר.

(2.) To forgive, Ex. xx. 7. "The Lord will not *hold him guiltless* (ὃν καθαρίζῃ) that taketh his name in vain." Ex. xxiv. 7. "That will by no means *clear* the guilty." Deut. v. 11.—*Idem*. In these and similar cases the Greek καθαρίζω corresponds to the Hebrew כִּפֹּר to forgive, to absolve from punishment, and is used in a sense strictly legal, and does not refer to moral purity at all. So in 1 John i. 7. "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son *cleanseth* us from all sin ;" and v. 9, "He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to *cleanse* us from all unrighteousness." In these cases the idea of atonement and forgiveness by it, are involved in καθαρίζω, and in Heb. the blood of Christ is said to *purge* the conscience from dead works, implying a deliverance from a sense of guilt and a sense of pardoned sin. Καθαρίζω is here used ; hence an atonement is called καθαρισμός in Heb. i. 3. When he had by himself purged our sins (καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος), he sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high. In this case the atonement, καθαρισμός, was made first, and then applied to cleanse by the Holy Spirit.

Nor is this usage confined to Scriptural Greek ; we find that when Cræsus exempted Adrastus from liability to punishment for killing his brother, it is said μὲν ἐκαθάρσε—he purified him—and when Adrastus requested such exemption, καθαρσίου ἐδέετο he requested expiation—or exemption from liability to punishment. Among the Jews this kind of purification was indicated by its ap-

propriate external forms, of which the sprinkling of blood was the most common—if not the only one. Besides this, as all know, καθαρίζω is used abundantly to denote moral purification or its emblem, ceremonial purification—of which no examples are needed.

Hence to a Jew it was natural to apply to a rite symbolizing the forgiveness of sins the term καθαρισμός, or some synonymous word.

Between immersion, and the forgiveness of sins, no such associations had ever been established. For all the remissions of sin under the old ritual, were by blood, and hence Paul, Heb. ix. 19–23, after speaking of the sprinkling of blood upon the people and the book, the tabernacle and the vessels, says, καὶ σχεδὸν ἐν αἵματι πάντα καθαρίζεται κατὰ τὸν νόμον, καὶ χωρὶς αἵμα-τεχυσίης οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις.

“Almost all things are by the law purified by blood, and *without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins.*” Here a rite denoting remission of sins, *by sprinkling of blood*, is spoken of as a καθαρισμός, a purification. But under the law, the forgiveness of sins was never symbolized by an immersion of the person forgiven. Hence, if any word is used to denote a rite symbolical of the forgiveness of sins, in the same way as καθαρισμός, it is probably used in the same sense. But βαπτίζω and its derivatives are so used. Mark i. 4. “John preached the Baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins,”—so in Luke iii. 3. Also, Acts iii. 38. “Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the Holy Ghost.”

Here is a rite, symbolizing the forgiveness of sins. The common name for rites of this import is καθαρισμός. βαπτίζω is used to denote the rite. Immersion had never previously been used for any such purpose. How reasonable, then, the conclusion that βαπτισμός has the same sense as the word, whose familiar office it performs.

But though Baptism in these places relates chiefly to legal

purification, in others it relates as clearly to moral purification, and in this respect also corresponds with καθαρίζω, which, as we have seen, includes both kinds of purification, legal and moral.

To sum up all in a few words, βαπτίζω is used in connexion with both kinds of purification, legal and moral, of the conscience and of the heart; and the language most commonly applied to the first is καθαίρω or καθαρίζω—and this is always in the ritual symbolized by sprinkling and by blood. Hence as βαπτίζω is used in reference to the same kinds of purification with καθαρίζω, and as it stands in the same relations with it to the forgiveness of sins, it is highly probable that it has the same sense. By giving it a meaning so extensive as purify, it is adapted to fulfil all its relations. By confining it to a meaning so limited as to immerse, it is unfitted for at least one half the relations in which it stands.\*

---

\* See §§ 25, 26, 53, 54, for a full defence of this view.

## [CHAPTER II.]

### § 13. *Mosaic Purifications.*

IN Heb. ix. 10, a fair view of the scope and connexion of the passage requires βαπτισμοί to be used as synonymous with καθαρισμοί.

In this case the word does not indeed relate to the ordinance of Christian Baptism, but to Mosaic purifications. Yet it is still a religious use of the word ; moreover, it is applied with reference to those very usages, of which I have spoken, as adapted to cause the word βαπτίζω to pass from its original, to the secondary sense, to *purify*. Hence it is an example of great weight in the case, and, as might have been expected, it has been strongly contested. But with how little reason I shall endeavor to show.

The scope of chapters 8, 9, and 10, is to show that the purifications, legal and moral, provided by Christ for the conscience and the heart, had in themselves a real efficacy, and were, therefore, entirely superior to those of the Mosaic dispensation, which related only to the body, and could produce no purity but such as was merely external and symbolical. Let now the following things be noticed.

1. Those things only are spoken of in the whole discussion, which have a reference to action on the worshippers—that is, the whole passage relates to the effects of the Mosaic ritual entirely on *persons*, and not on *things*. The gifts, the sacrifices, the blood of sprinkling, the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, all relate to persons.

2. The βαπτισμοί are spoken of as enjoined, as well as the other rites. But of persons, no immersions at all are enjoined under the Mosaic ritual. As this fact does not seem to have been



noticed as it ought, and as many assume the contrary, it is necessary to furnish the proof of this assertion.

It lies in this fact, that no washing of persons is ever enjoined by the word *טָבַל*, to *immerse*, even in a single instance, nor by any word that denotes immersion—but as I think without exception by the word *רָחַץ*, which denotes to *wash* or *purify*, without any reference to mode.

Those who read the English version might suppose that, where the direction to bathe occurs, immersion is enjoined ; but in every such case the original denotes only to wash.

I do not deny that where the washing of the body, or of the flesh, or of all the flesh, is enjoined, it would probably be done, if most convenient, by immersion or bathing. But I affirm that there is no washing of the person enjoined in the whole ritual, which could not be performed wherever there was water enough to wash the body all over, in any way, even though bathing or immersion was out of the question. Why should it not be so ? Could Moses suppose that at all times, and in all circumstances, while in the desert, during journeys, at home and abroad, every man who became unclean, in various and numerous ways specified in the ritual, would be able to bathe or to immerse himself ? Even when best supplied with the means of bathing it could not be expected, that every family, rich or poor, and however situated, would be able to have a private bath. Nor could it be expected, that every running stream or rivulet would be deep enough to bathe in. But such was the benign regard of God to all these possible contingencies, that he did not enjoin immersion at all ; but in some cases a total washing, such as could be performed in any brook, or running stream,—or in any suitable vessel at home.

If any doubt whether this is the true view of the import of *רָחַץ* let him take a Hebrew Concordance and trace it through the whole of the Old Testament, and he will have abundant proof. He will find it used to denote the washing of anything, in any way,—of the feet, the hands, the face, the body, or the

mind. Its translation in the Septuagint denotes how wide its range of meaning is ;—for it is at one time λούω, at another νίπτω, and at another πλύνω, just as circumstances may seem to require. If ever it is applied in cases where bathing was probably performed, the idea depends not at all on the word, but on the circumstances of the case. So a Baptist writer thinks that, in the case of Pharaoh's daughter, Ex. ii. 5, the word denotes bathing. It may be true that the daughter of Pharaoh did, as a matter of fact, bathe herself,—but all our evidence of it lies in the fact, that she went down to the Nile, and not at all in the word רָחַץ, and therefore our translators have properly rendered it wash.

I would quote passages to illustrate all these assertions, did not the proof lie so plainly on the surface of the whole usage of the word that I do not suppose any one, who has investigated the subject, will think of denying it. Let any one, who desires to see a specimen of proof, examine, in the original, Gen. xviii. 4, and xliii. 31, Lev. xiv. 9, Ex. xxix. 17, Is. iv. 4, Ps. xxvi. 6 and lxxiii. 13, Is. i. 16.

Nor is the washing of the clothes, so often spoken of, enjoined by a word denoting immersion. In all such cases, רָחַץ is used, which denotes merely to wash, a word commonly confined to the washing of clothes. But it is sometimes also applied to the washing of the mind, as in Ps. li. 4, 9 (English version Ps. li. 2, 7), Jer. iv. 14 ; ii. 22.

It is perfectly plain, therefore, that, whatever was the practice of the Jews, no immersions of the person were enjoined, and the whole Mosaic ritual, as to personal ablution, could be fulfilled to the letter, without a single immersion. I do not doubt that immersions were common, but nothing but washings of the body was enjoined—and immersions fulfilled the law, not because they were immersions, but solely because they were washings. Of course, as רָחַץ had only the sense to wash, even in case of bathing, βαπτίζω would tend to the same.

3. Even where immersion was convenient, and, à priori, probable, it was not deemed essential to complete and thorough

purification, or to an entire washing of the body. This I infer from the account given in Tobit vi. 2, of the washing of the young man. We are told that he went down to the river—Τὸ δὲ παιδάριον κατέβη—for what? To immerse himself, of course, the advocates of immersion will reply. Whole volumes of argument, as we all know, depend on *going down to a river*. But how was it? did he go down to immerse himself? Hear the writer: κατέβη περιέλυσάσθαι. He went down to wash himself all around,—just as a man stands in the stream and throws the water all over his body, and washes himself by friction; a mode of washing much more thorough than a mere immersion, and corresponding much more nearly to the import of the word כָּחַל.

Let it not be supposed that I regard this as an actual fact. The story may be true or false, and yet be equally in point to illustrate the ideas of the age in which the writer lived. If he was a Jew, as all admit, and was writing of Jews, it is enough. He would of course write in accordance with the views of his day. He may indeed, after his περιέλυσις, be supposed to have immersed himself. But he is not represented as going down for an immersion,—but for such a washing as could be performed in any stream, even though immersion was out of the question. I regard the incidental testimony of a case like this, as of far more worth than the formal testimony of the Rabbis of a later age, as to the importance attached, by the Jews, to immersion, which learned writers have so copiously adduced. For the testimony of later Jews, as to the times preceding the fall of Jerusalem, needs to be received with much doubt and suspicion. But on an incidental statement of this kind, of so early a date, no reasonable suspicion can rest.

4. The only immersions enjoined in the Mosaic law were immersions of things to which no reference can be had here,—as vessels, sacks, skins, etc. In this case no act was performed, that directly affected the body of *the worshipper*, but only the thing immersed. But in all this passage, Paul regards the ritual with reference to its effects on *the worshipper*. In v. 9, he says, that

these rites could not make *the worshipper*, τὸν λατρεύοντα, perfect as to the conscience. In v. 10, he assigns the reason why. They consisted only in services which could affect the body, δικαιώμασι σαρκὸς—and these related to meats and drinks, and divers purifications. The καὶ before δικαιώμασι σαρκὸς, ought to be omitted, as it is by Griesbach and others; so that those words shall not denote other ordinances, but stand in apposition to βρώμασι and πόμασι, and διαφόροις βαπτισμῶις, to denote the imperfection of them all, because they affect the body alone and not the mind. Hence it is perfectly plain that no reference can be had here to the immersions of *inanimate things*, but only to the purifications of *persons*. Indeed the whole scope of the passage forbids the idea of such immersions. What could any one think that the immersion of vessels of earth, or wood, had to do with purifying the conscience or the heart of a worshipper? A washing of the body, or a sprinkling of blood, or of the ashes of a heifer, might seem to purify the unclean—but not surely the immersion of vessels of earth or wood, or of sacks and skins. To refer here, then, to such things, is totally unnatural, and entirely out of the train of thought.

5. Besides the purifications of the person are διαφόροι, *diverse, various*;—but the immersions of things are not, either in act, or circumstances, or end. If vessels or things became unclean, in the cases specified, they were all immersed, and all alike—and all for the same end. What various immersions here!

On the other hand, the purifications of men were exceedingly numerous, and of various kinds. Some were legal and sacrificial, relating to the atonement, and made by blood. Others were moral, relating to regeneration and purity of heart, as symbolized, sometimes by various kinds of washing, and at other times by sprinkling. To all these various kinds, reference is had in the context. Purification by blood, in ch. ix. 7, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, and ch. x. 1, 2—and in numerous other places. Purification by water, and by sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer, ch. ix. 13, and x. 22. Why should the Apostle leave purifications so

various and numerous as these, and so entirely in point, and speak of a simple regulation as to the immersion of cups and vessels, etc., things altogether foreign to the scope of the passage, as *διαφόροι βαπτισμοί*, that were unable to make perfect the worshipper? No man who had not a theory to support could bring himself to do such violence to all the laws of interpretation in a case so plain.

6. To conclude,—to give *βαπτισμοί* the sense *καθαρίσμοί*, fits the word to include all the kinds of purification spoken of in the context. For, as we have seen, *καθαρίζω* has an established legal and sacrificial use in all cases of atonement by blood. And we have also seen *βαπτίζω* standing in relations of the same kind. Now in this passage the idea of purification by blood greatly predominates, as may be seen by examining the passages just referred to; and yet the idea of moral purification is also most clearly presented to the mind;—and no sense but the one assigned gives the word the scope necessary to take in both kinds. But that does, and it thus fully meets all the exigencies of the case. It is a sense fully to the purpose of Paul; it is natural, simple, easy, obvious, and gives a richness and fulness to all his ideas. The idea of immersions is out of the scope and spirit of the passage;—it is forced and unnatural: it is unfitted for the purposes of Paul, and narrows down his ideas to topics totally foreign to the subject, and has but one solitary advantage—it aids in escaping an unwelcome result.

What evidence is there against all this mass of presumptive reasoning? Does any previous probability, any law of language or of the mind, anything in the context, demand the idea of immersions? Nothing of this kind. All is the other way. The meaning claimed is highly probable, *à priori*, and the whole scope of the passage tends to establish it. By all laws of sound philology, then, it is here the sense.\*

---

\* See § 53 and § 57, No. 5.

§ 14. *Jewish Purification.*

In Mark vii. 4, 8, and in Luke xi. 38, καθαρίζω is the natural and obvious sense of βαπτίζω, and καθαρισμός of βαπτισμός.

1. This sense fulfils perfectly all the exigencies of the passages. I know indeed that it is said by some, that in Mark there is a rise in the idea from the lesser washing of the hands, which was common before all meals, to the greater washing implied in the immersion of the body after coming from the market. But on the other hand, there is simply a change from the specific to the general and indefinite. They always *wash their hands* before meals, and when they return from market they, in addition to this, *purify themselves* (as the nature of the case may require) before they eat. In the latter case, Bloomfield remarks, it denotes a washing of the body, but not an immersion. The sense, καθαρίζω, also more naturally suggests the reply of Christ in Luke. “Now do ye Pharisees make clean (καθαρίζετε) the outside of the cup and the platter,” etc.—where βαπτίζω seems to suggest καθαρίζω. I admit indeed that the object of immersion might suggest the same idea. But such associations of thought are more likely, the more obvious the similarity in the meaning of the words. But, not to rely on this, I remark,

2. Nothing in the context demands the sense, immerse, and powerful reasons forbid it.

All must confess that purification is the only idea involved in the subject of thought. Now it is no more likely that a want of *immersion* offended the Pharisee, Luke xi. 38, in the case of Christ, than it is that this was the ground of offence in the case of the disciples, Mark vii. It does not appear that Christ had been to the market. Nor is it likely at all that an immersion was expected, as a matter of course, before every meal, even on coming from a crowd. The offence in the case of the disciples was that they had not washed their hands. An immersion was not expected of them, though they had been in crowds. Why should it be of Christ?



Kuinöel, on this passage, well remarks, that the existence of any such custom of regular immersion before all meals cannot be proved. And the opinions and statements of Jewish writers, in after ages, are of very little weight. The case narrated in Tobit has, in my mind, more weight in throwing light on actual opinions than a host of such more modern writers. It teaches us clearly that, even in cases where it was possible, they attached no peculiar importance to the form of immersion, and thought only of a suitable washing. How much more is this likely to be true of a purification, which the Pharisee seemed to expect, as a matter of course, before every meal?

3. But above all, the immersion of the couches on which they reclined at meals is out of the question. That this is the meaning of *κλινῶν* here, the whole context shows, and all impartial critics allow; and these were large enough for three to recline upon at their ease. And are we to believe that the Pharisees, and *all the Jews*, were in the habit of immersing these, just to avoid the inference that *βαπτίζω* means to *purify*? What if remarkable instances of superstition in particular sects can be pointed out? Is it likely that a whole nation, *all the Jews*, ever held to a practice like this? That they should *purify* them with various and uncommanded rites is altogether probable. But that they should immerse them is totally incredible.\*

Dr. Carson seems to feel this point keenly, and yet manfully maintains his ground. He says that he will maintain an immersion until its *impossibility* is proved, and suggests that the couches might be so made as to be taken to pieces for this end! He has proved, he says, the meaning of the word,—the Holy Ghost affirms that the couches were immersed,—and to call this absurd is to charge the Holy Ghost with uttering an absurdity; —and he is filled with horror at the thought, and warns his opponents to beware of so fearful a crime, and he has a long dissertation on the infidel and Unitarian tendencies of allowing difficulties to

---

\* See § 67, No. 6.

shake our faith in the assertions of God. But what is all this to the point? The question is not, Will we believe that the couches were immersed *if the Holy Ghost says so?*—but this, *Has he said so?* And what has Dr. Carson proved? Why truly that, in other instances, βαπτίζω means immerse. But does this prove that it means so here? Does it even create a probability that it does? Not at all. The probability, as we have shown, is all the other way. Hence the demand to prove an impossibility of immersion is altogether unreasonable. And it is against his own practice in other cases. Does he not admit that βάπτω means to dye or color, when it is applied to the beard and hair? And is it impossible to dip these? Improbable it surely is, but not half so much so as the immersion of couches.

The fact is, that the whole reasoning against the sense claimed for βαπτίζω in these passages, rests on false principles. It assumes a violent improbability of the meaning in question, and resorts to all manner of shifts, to prove the *possibility* of immersion, as though that were all that the case required, whilst the truth is that no such improbability exists, but one directly the reverse, and the whole scope of the passage demands the meaning claimed, that is, to purify.

Were it necessary, I would remark more in detail on the statements of Prof. Ripley, as to the dipping of hands, and the Jewish rules concerning couches, as quoted by Dr. Gill. It is sufficient to remark that these ideas are the result of the ingenuity of later ages, and the existence of any such rules or practices in the days of Christ, is totally devoid of proof, and even of probability.

### § 15. *Purification by the Ashes of a Heifer.*

In the case so often quoted from Sirach xxxi. 25, βαπτίζω requires the sense, καθαρίζω. The passage is this: βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ καὶ πάλιν ἀπτόμενος αὐτοῦ, τί ὠφέλησε τῷ λουτρῷ αὐτοῦ; He that is cleansed from a dead body, and again toucheth it, of what profit to him is his cleansing?

Here I remark :

1. The sense, καθαρίζω, purify, suits the preposition ἀπο,—immerse does not. It is natural to speak of purifying or cleansing from, but not of immersing from, a dead body.

2. No immersion, in the case of touching a dead body, was enjoined, but simply a *washing of the body*, so as to leave room for various modes in various circumstances, and it is not likely that this would be spoken of as an immersion.

3. The rite of purification from a dead body was complex, and no import of the word βαπτίζω, but the one claimed, is adapted to include the whole. By far the most important part of the rite was the sprinkling of the water, in which had been put the ashes of the heifer. Concerning this it is said, Num. xix. 13, that whosoever shall not *purify* himself with it, after touching a dead body, “that soul shall be cut off from Israel, because the water of separation was not *sprinkled* on him.” Of the washing no such thing is said, and Paul, Heb. ix. 13, refers to the sprinkling, as if it included the part of the rite on which the effect mainly, if not entirely, depends. It is the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling the unclean, that is spoken of as sanctifying to the purification of the flesh,—ἀγιάζει πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα. Of course the writer could not mean to exclude so essential a part of the rite as this, nay its very essence. Nor could he call it an immersion. It is a sprinkling. It can purify, but it cannot immerse. But the sense, καθαρίζω, can include both the sprinkling and the washing :—for, taken together, they purify, and this is the complex result of the whole rite, and nothing else. If any object that it is not consistent to apply λουτρῶν to a complex operation like this,\* I ask them, how then is it consistent to apply it to the blood of Christ, which is spoken of as the blood of sprinkling? And yet we are spoken of as washed from our sins in the blood, where λούω is used. The truth is, that the sense is general too, and denotes merely a washing or cleansing.

\* Λουτρῶν is applied to clinic baptism by sprinkling or perfusion.

respect to mode. Besides, an actual washing is a part of the complex rite.

The effort of Prof. Ripley to establish the sense, bathing, from the word λουτρόν, is vain. No fact is more notorious than that λούω, of itself, does not mean to bathe. In this respect it is as unlimited to any mode as ῥῥῥ; so much so that the vessels, in the vestibules of ancient churches, for washing the hands, were called λουτῆρες, as well as νεπτῆρες. One of the Fathers, as quoted by Suicer, says λουτῆρες ὁδοῦ περιεργαζόμενοι, stand before the gate of the church, that you may wash your hands (νίψης), so without the church, sit the poor, that by alms you may wash (πλύνης) the hands of your soul. I do not quote this passage for the sake of its theology, but to show that λούω and its derivatives mean simply to wash or to cleanse, and not to bathe, any more than the Latin lavo. Circumstances may show that bathing is meant, but the word itself does not.

Dr. Carson says that all reasoning from this passage proceeds on the assumption that the Jews had made no additions to the rite. Not so. It proceeds upon the assumption that they had not omitted its very essence, the sprinkling with the ashes of a heifer, and that they would not call this an immersion, but a purification, as in fact it was; and that as no immersion was enjoined, but simply washing, so the sense, immersion, is not to be assumed without necessity and without proof, and against the whole probability of the case.

That the Jews did take the view of this rite that I claim, is plain from the account given of it by Philo. He directs the whole attention to sprinkling and nothing else. He says, "Moses does this philosophically, for most others are sprinkled with unmix'd water, some with sea or river water, others with water drawn from mountains. But Moses employed ashes for this purpose. As to the manner, they put them into a vessel, pour on them, and then moisten branches of hyssop with the mixture (ἐκ τοῦ νεπτῆρος ὑσσόπου κλάδους), then sprinkle it upon those who are purified" (τοῖς καθαιρόμενοις). And this account was given in the passage in question. Here we note, in passing,

a use of βάπτω with ἐκ, at war with the idea to dip, and consistent only with the idea to moisten or wet.

Now for what reason are we to set aside probabilities like these? Merely to avoid so simple, natural, and probable a conclusion, as that βαπτίζω sometimes means simply to purify, as in this case it most clearly does.\*

### § 16. *Purification of Judith.*

The case of Judith also sustains the same view. In Judith xii. 7, we are told that "she remained in the camp of Holofernes three days, and by night (that is, *on each night*) she went out to the valley of Bethulia and purified or washed herself, in the camp, at the fountain of water." Παρέμεινεν ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ ἡμέρας τρεῖς, καὶ ἐξεπορέετο κατὰ νύκτα εἰς τὴν φάραγγα Βετυλοῦα καὶ ἐβαπτίζετο ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ ἐπὶ τῆς πηγῆς τοῦ ὕδατος.

Here we notice that the purification in question was performed in the camp, and at or near the fountain—and for three nights in succession. In narrating the case of Tobit, a man at a river, and away from all observation, no reference to immersion was made. But here a female, in a camp, and at or near a fountain, it is insisted, did immerse herself, three nights in succession. We are told of her courage and faith, and of possible bathing places near the spring, and all for what? To avoid so obvious a conclusion as that the writer merely means to say that she purified, or washed herself, without reference to the mode. In the case of Susannah, we are told that she desired to wash herself, λούσασθαι, in the garden, because it was warm. Here she could shut the doors and be alone, v. 17. Yet the writer says merely *wash*. But in the case of Judith, even in a camp, he must needs insist, it seems, on the mode, and that mode must be immersion. And what reason is there for all this? Is not the sense καθαρίζω, *a priori*, probable? Yes. Does it not fulfil all the exigencies of

---

\* Cyril of Alexandria settles this question, for he expressly calls purifying by ashes baptizing. See § 53.

the case? Yes. Was it of any importance to specify the mode? No. Do the circumstances of the case call for immersion? No; they seem at first sight entirely to forbid it; and nothing but skill in suggesting possibilities can at all remove the impression. In fact, the circumstances of the case have led the vast majority of minds in all ages, to feel that immersion is not the meaning here,—and that to purify or to wash is. Hence it is that Dr. Carson, in his arduous attempt to prove that βαπτίζω never means to wash, irrespective of mode, is obliged to admit that he has “all the lexicographers and commentators” against him. p. 79.

### § 17. *Relations to the System of Writers.*

No contrary probability, or usage, can be established from the writers of the New Testament age, or of the preceding age, who used the Alexandrine Greek. It will be noticed that the argument thus far is specific, and relates to a religious usage, produced at a particular time, and by particular circumstances definitely and clearly marked. Now to refute this argument, it is of no use to go to writers who lived and wrote entirely out of this range of circumstances and ideas. It could only prove that, in other circumstances, another usage of the word did exist, and this no one need deny.

But it is very noticeable that, in the very writers where alone proof of an opposite religious usage, or even of a probability of it, can reasonably be looked for, there is none to be found. It is in these very writings that the whole current of probability, and of usage, sets strongly the other way.

I do not deny that these writers do also use the word βαπτίζω, in other circumstances, and in a secular sense, to denote immersion, sinking, overwhelming, or oppression. But this only proves that the two usages did coexist; just as Dr. Carson proves that the two usages of βάπτω did coexist in Hippocrates, and that the existence of the one did not disprove the existence of the other. So, at least four meanings of the word spring co-exist, and yet no one infers from one that the others do not exist.



That the religious usage of these writers all sets one way, one obvious and admitted fact may show. Dr. Carson admits that all the lexicographers and commentators do assign to the word βαπτίζω the unlimited sense to wash, or cleanse. Now on what writers do they rely? Beyond all dispute on the writers of Alexandrine Greek,—the very writers who have furnished all the facts on which this argument is based. And these writers, be it noticed, furnish no presumption or usage the other way. Even in those minuter shades of meaning, which are furnished by allusion, comparison, or association of ideas, all things tend the same way. So, in the account of the baptism of Paul, the sacrificial reference of Baptism is plainly indicated, Acts xxii. 16: “Arise and be baptized, and wash away thy sins (Ἀναστὰς βάπτισαι καὶ ἀπόλousσαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας σου), calling upon the name of the Lord.” Here we have faith in Christ, the washing away or pardon of sins, and a purification intended to symbolize it. Βάπτισαι, purify thyself, or be purified bodily,—ἀπόλousσαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, wash away thy sins, as to the mind, by calling on the name of the Lord. Here the antithesis and correspondence are beautiful and complete, and one seems naturally to suggest the other. So the case in Peter iii. 21, where he speaks of baptism as saving us, is far more natural and beautiful, if we adopt this sense, for he seems to think that, if he left the word βάπτισμα unguarded, he might be taken to mean the external purification of the body. But as this does not save us, and as nothing but the purification of the mind does, he guards himself and says, I do not mean the putting away of the filth of the flesh, by the purification of which I speak, but the answer of a good conscience towards God. Hence, too, the legal or sacrificial sense lies upon the very face of the passage,—for it is the purification of the conscience by atoning blood, to which he refers, and not to an external washing at all; and I need not say to any one who can feel the nice correspondencies of words, how much more beautiful and clear the whole passage becomes by assigning to βάπτισμα the sense of a spiritual purification, by the blood of Christ, which Peter affirms

that it has. On the subject, however, of the external washing in this case, I shall speak more at large under another head.

So too the account given by Josephus of the baptism of John, Antiq. B. xviii. c. 5, § 2, presents the same train of thought to the mind. Instead of the awkward translation of Whiston I prefer to give a free statement of the obvious sense, and to quote the original where critical exactness is needed.

John, he says, informed the Jews that before they could be baptized they must commence and profess the practice of piety towards God, and justice towards each other—and that their baptism would be acceptable to God, if they did not rely upon it as a means of putting away a part only of their sins, but used it merely as a means of purifying the body, to indicate that the soul had been previously thoroughly purified by righteousness.

To denote baptism he uses the word βάπτισις, and to denote its import he states that they are to use it ἐφ' ἀγνείᾳ τοῦ σώματος, ὅτε δὲ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δικαιοσύνη προεξεκαθαρευμένης. Now here, I remark that there was nothing to cause Josephus or any other Jew to think of the mode, or to attach any importance to it. No idea of a fancied reference, in the rite, to the death of Christ, could bias his mind towards the sense immerse. To him, it is plain, that it meant nothing but “purifying the body, to indicate that the mind had been previously thoroughly purified by righteousness;” and he speaks just as he would, if these ideas had been suggested by the name of the rite; in other words, just as he would if καθαγισις had stood in the place of βάπτισις.

Now although I would not rely on such places for proof, against a strong contrary probability, yet when I find them so perfectly coincident with all other facts, when all shades of probability so perfectly harmonize and blend in a common result, I cannot hesitate, for I see no good reason for doubt. It is not a solitary fact on which the argument rests. To overthrow it, the whole current of probability must be reversed, and so striking a coincidence and harmony of meaning, in so many independent passages, be supposed to exist without a cause. Particular errors

may no doubt be detected in the argument, and individual passages, viewed out of their relations, may be made to admit another possible sense. But that a fair and comprehensive view of all the facts of the case can be made to lead to a result opposite to the one here maintained, I shall not think possible, until I see it done ; and there are no new and undiscovered means for doing it. The facts all lie within a given and definite compass, and they can easily be placed before the minds of all. If any that bear on the case have been omitted, it can easily be shown. If not, then it must be shown that the principles, on which this argument rests, are unsound, or that they have not been accurately applied, and I am not aware that either of these things can be done.

The argument from the usage of the writers of Alexandrine Greek is now at an end. Other considerations, as it regards this part of the subject, still remain ; but the statement of them will be deferred till the leading objections to this view shall claim our attention.

### § 18. *The Fathers.*

I shall now proceed to show that evidence of the truth of this view is also to be found in the writings of the Fathers.

I appeal to them, not because I think that their opinions, on questions of interpretation, or sacred philology, are of much weight, for it is well known to all, that either their attainments in biblical literature were small, or that their principles of philology were to a great extent fluctuating or unsound. Nor do I appeal to them, because I deem their theological opinions of peculiar weight. They deserve, indeed, a respectful attention, and are of great use in investigating the history of opinions. Moreover, they often furnish rich and valuable materials for thought. But nothing can be more desperate than the attempt to make a regular and harmonious system of truth from their works. The sentence of Milton on them is well known ; and though, if left unbalanced by other considerations, it would produce undue neglect, yet it is essentially based on truth. But I refer to them, simply as furnish-

ing facts in the history of language, and it will be my object to show that these facts are such as would naturally flow from the truth of the view which I have given.

My position then is this: if we admit that in the days of Christ, καθαρίζω was the import of βαπτίζω, taking all the texts in the New Testament in which the word occurs, and the ideas connected with the rite, and looking at the laws of the mind and the natural course of thought, we shall find that no view can so well explain the *usus loquendi* of the Fathers and the opinions entertained by them, and by their opponents, of the import and effects of the rite.

### § 19. *Baptismal Regeneration.*

This view shows how ἀναγεννάω, to regenerate, and other words of like import, could easily become, with the Fathers, synonymes of βαπτίζω. That these words did so become, is a notorious fact, as will presently be proved, but the whole reason is not commonly assigned. The reason, at least in part, appears to be this: καθαρίζω, and of course βαπτίζω, in its spiritual sense, is in fact a synonyme of ἀναγεννάω;—for what is it to purify the spirit, but to regenerate? In fact, this very form of speech is used to denote this thing. Thus in 1 Pet. i. 22, 23. The idea *to purify* the soul *in obeying the truth*, through the spirit, in v. 22, is in v. 23 expressed by the equivalent *born again of the word of God*, in which ἀναγεννάω is used. So in Acts xv. 9. He made no difference between them and us, “having purified their hearts by faith” (τῇ πίστει καθαρίσας τὰς καρδίας αὐτῶν). So, too, the pure in heart (καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ) shall see God, Matt. v. 8. “Who gave himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and *purify* (καθαρίσῃ) unto himself a peculiar people,” Tit. ii. 14. So Eph. v. 26.

It also explains the origin of Baptismal Regeneration, for where analogical senses exist, one denoting external and material, and the other spiritual purification, it is natural that they should run into each other, also that terms applied to

one should be applied to the other. Thus, if βαπτίζω means to purify, then there is natural purification and spiritual purification, and in a passage where spiritual purification alone is meant, the idea of external purification may commingle. Thus in Pet. i. 9, κάθαρσμον denotes only spiritual purification from sin. But extensively the sense ritual purification by the external rite was commingled, among the Fathers—as also among the formalists of this day. The same is true in 1 Cor. vi. 11, where “ye are washed” (ἀπελούσασθε) denotes spiritual washing only, and yet the same idea of external ritual washing, has extensively been commingled, in the conceptions and interpretations of formalists.\* Moreover, since spiritual purification is regeneration, there would be a tendency first to use ἀναγεννάω in the place of βαπτίζω when it denoted spiritual purification. Having thus become an equivalent of βαπτίζω in one sense, there would be a tendency in the word to assume its place when used in the other sense, and thus to denote the external rite, and not, in the first instance, to denote its actual efficacy. So in Justin Martyr, βαπτίζω is rarely, if ever, used at all to describe the rite, but ἀναγεννάω. Ἐπειτα ἄγονται ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἐνθα ὕδωρ ἐστὶ καὶ τρόπον ἀναγεννέσεως ὅς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀναγεννήθημεν ἀναγεννῶνται:—“Then they are brought by us where there is water, and in the manner of regeneration, in which we were regenerated, they are regenerated;” that is, in the manner of baptism, wherein we were baptized, they are baptized. And this use was general and familiar, as may be fully seen in the quotations collected by Wall in his history of infant baptism.

---

\* Baptismal regeneration, as held by the Fathers, does not imply regeneration by mere water, without the spirit, but it is a commingling of external and internal purification, by the theory that it is God’s established mode to give *internal* purification through *external*, and not independently of it. Hence, when the internal alone is spoken of, their mode of thinking mingled the external with it. The one purification in Eph. iv. 5, is spiritual only, so also in Rom. vi. 3, 4; yet the idea of the external purification was so commingled with it as to predominate.

Another cause tended to the same result, the application of the figure "born of water" in John iii. 5, to external baptism. Of this I shall speak in the next section. Which exerted most influence let others decide.

### § 20. *Denial of Water Baptism.*

This view explains not only the early prevalence of the idea of baptismal regeneration, but also of the other extreme, the entire denial of water baptism.

As already stated, there are two kinds of purification, that of the Spirit and that of water;—one real and effectual, the other only a symbol, an external rite, and yet both are called by the same name, purification, or baptism.

Now in the New Testament there is a class of texts, in which the true and spiritual purification alone is spoken of, and a saving energy is ascribed to it; as Eph. iv. 5, Gal. iii. 27, 1 Cor. xii. 13, Rom. vi. 3, 4, Col. ii. 12, Eph. v. 26, 1 Pet. iii. 21, Titus iii. 5, John iii. 5. That the external form cannot be here spoken of, I propose to show in another place. I refer to these passages here to illustrate fully the idea.

But soon, the external sense intruded, and with what was first said only of the essential spiritual purification, the idea of the external form was mingled, according to the uniform tendency of the human mind to sink from the spirit to the form, and thus made baptismal regeneration, and all its train of errors. And as one extreme begets another, those who opposed this view as too carnal, relying on those passages where baptism denotes clearly no more than a spiritual purification, would deny that the form was to be used at all. In practice, words are things. Systems grow out of words. And a word of a double analogical sense, like purify, would naturally give rise to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, on the one side, and to an entire denial of water baptism on the other; and that such were the results all know. On the other hand, the word in the sense to immerse, tends to no such result, for the



spiritual sense, in this usage, has no relation at all to regeneration or purity in any form, and denotes, as before stated, only to overwhelm, to oppress. And it deserves notice, that the same passages, which, by this process of sinking the spiritual in the natural, gave rise to the gross errors of baptismal regeneration, are still the passages which, in consequence of the general concession of the church that they relate to the external form, fill the hands of the Romanists, Puseyites, Campbellites, and other errorists of the like kind, with their most powerful weapons.

Had καθαρίζω, and not βαπτίζω, been used, so that its analogical uses could have been noticed, and its spiritual import felt, by modern scholars, the root of the error would have been seen. But by using the word baptize, as a technic, the laws which influenced the mind in its original use have been veiled. And, until that class of passages, from which the doctrine of baptismal regeneration sprang, is restored to their original, true, and spiritual sense, the occasions of this pernicious error can never be thoroughly eradicated from the Christian church.

Hence I do not ascribe the origin of the usage of αναγεννάω, as a synonyme of βαπτίζω, to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration as some do,—but rather believe that the natural and early use of this word to denote the rite, and a false application of certain texts to it, gave rise to the doctrine itself, and that, when this doctrine was established, the whole range of language pertaining to regeneration passed over to the rite, as φώς, φωτισμός, παλιγγενεσία, θεογενεσία, ανάπλασις;—that is, light, illumination, regeneration, the divine generation, a new creation. Hence also φωτίζω, to baptize.

### § 21. *Patristic Usages.*

Besides this general reasoning from well-known facts, there is also philological proof that the word was often used by the Fathers in the sense καθαρίζω. That the other sense also occurs I need not deny; for they were originally formed rather in the school of classic, than of Alexandrine Greek. In their case two

currents met, and we are not to look so much for universally consistent use, as for evidence that the Alexandrine current did mingle in the stream. A general view of facts is this.

1. The earlier Christian writers do not so often use the word βαπτίζω, as some synonyme derived from the sense to purify, as αναγεννάω, as before stated. Nor do they fix the mind on the idea immerse, but on purification, and use such paraphrases as denote it. Thus, after the passage of Justin Martyr already quoted, he says, in describing the mode of regeneration or baptism, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται, they wash or purify them.

2. They often use βαπτισμός in the legal and sacrificial sense, so as to exclude any idea but καθαρισμός. So Chrysostom, Hom. 33, says, "He calls his cross and death, a cup and baptism,—a cup, because he readily drank it; baptism (βαπτισμὸν), because by it he purified, ἐκάθηνεν, the world;" that is, he calls it *purification*, because by it he *purified* the world, in which case the sense is sacrificial, he made atonement for the world,—and the reason assigned depends, for all its force, on giving to βαπτισμός the sacrificial sense καθαρισμός. Such usages as βάπτισμα διὰ μαρτυρίου καὶ αἵματος, "purification *by* martyrdom and *by* blood," demonstrate the truth of this view. See §§ 25 and 26, also § 64.

So Theophylact, on Matt. xx. 22, 23, says, "He calls his death βαπτισμὸν ὡς καθαρτικὸν ὄντα πάντων ἡμῶν; as making a purification, or expiation for all of us," where the whole force, as before, rests on giving to βαπτισμὸν the sacrificial sense καθαρισμὸν. As if he had said, he calls his death a *purification*, because it was *designed to purify* all of us. So, on Mark x. 38, 39, he says, "He calls his cross βαπτισμὸν, as about to make a purification for sins," καθαρισμὸν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. Here the sacrificial sense is still more evident and undeniable, and requires βαπτισμὸν to mean καθαρισμὸν, as before. Many other passages of a like kind could be adduced, but it is needless. §§ 25, 26.

3. They sometimes, in describing the rite, use καθάρω or καθαρίζω alone. Thus Gregory-Nazianz. says, ὁψεί καθαιρόμενον

Ἰησοῦν ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ τὴν ἐμὴν κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγνίζοντα τῇ καθάρσει τὰ ὕδατα—ὅν γὰρ ὁ αὐτός ἐδόξετο καθάρσεως ὁ ἄϊρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου ; that is, “thou shalt see Jesus purified, i. e. baptized, in the Jordan, with my purification (i. e. baptism), or rather, sanctifying the waters, by his purification : for he did not need purification who taketh away the sins of the world.” Here βαπτίζω is not used at all in describing the rite, and in its place is used καθάιρω and its derivatives, both in a moral and sacrificial sense.\*

Again, “He who can take away the sins of others,” ὁ καθαρσίων ἔνεκα ἐπὶ τὰ νάματα ἔρχεται, ἀλλ’ ὥστε δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ἐνθῆναι καθαρτικὴν, does not come to the water for the sake of being purified himself, but to impart to it a purifying power.

Here, as before, I do not vouch for the truth of the ideas. They are pregnant with superstition. From the notion that Christ, at his baptism, gave to the water a purifying power, came the idea of holy water, and of a mysterious influence or presence in the water of baptism, which is a constituent part of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Still the passages are of no less importance in showing the use of words ; and for this alone I quote them.

It would be of no avail, here, to say that the Fathers did in fact immerse ; this could not decide that purify was not the sense,—and even if it could be shown that some of them use the word βαπτίζω to denote the act of immersion in baptism, it would avail nothing. It would only prove inconsistent usage. But in the confluence of classical and Alexandrine Greek, after the days of Christ, and in writers so various and so multifarious, we are not to look for consistent usage. It is enough that we find the usage claimed. We should rather expect a transition from the original ideas of the New Testament writers, through a period of inconsistent usage, till, as the form usurped the place of the spirit, and a superstitious efficacy was attached to immersion, the original sense would disappear, and the name of the form alone remain, as is the case in the Greek Church at the present day.

---

\* See § 25.

I do not expect to find in the Fathers a correct philosophical account of the origin or progress of their own errors. They assign different, and often inconsistent reasons for the usages of language already adverted to. It is enough for me that I have the facts before me, and the laws of the mind to explain them. They are just such as I should expect, on the supposition that the original religious sense of βαπτίζω was καθαρίζω.

---

## NOTE.

What precedes was the basis of Dr. Carson's first reply to me. I did not consider the discussion complete, but was then preparing the two following chapters. All of my positions I have sustained since, by the Fathers. I have not endeavored to give a minute answer to all of Dr. Carson's allegations, false as I deem them to be. The work would have been endless. Yet I have in reality answered all his arguments, either by more fully expanding my views so as to correct his misrepresentations, or by adducing or referring to new evidence, subsequently produced.—See especially §§ 67, 68.

## PART II.

### CHAPTER I.

THE principles and leading positions of the argument in regard to the import of βαπτίζω have been stated. This argument involves three main points: 1. The clearing away of irrelevant or false positions, and definitely stating the point really at issue, and the proposition to be maintained—§§ 1-3. 2. The antecedent probability of the meaning claimed, according to the laws of language and of the mind, and from the nature of the subject—§§ 4-7. 3. Philological proof from the writers of Alexandrine Greek and from the fathers—§§ 8-21.

The Philological argument is therefore complete, so far as is implied in a statement of its principles and leading positions. It is not, however, complete so far as its cumulative power is concerned. A large number of facts still remains, which, in their proper place, will strongly confirm every main position I have assumed.

#### § 22. *Patristic Practice.*

But here the regular operations of the mind are interrupted by the entrance of disturbing forces of great and bewildering power. In every fundamental investigation of the mode of baptism, three inquiries are commonly involved and combined. 1. The import of the word βαπτίζω. 2. The original practice of the church. 3. The full and perfect signification of the rite. The influences of these two last inquiries on the question of philology, I call bewildering and disturbing forces—not because they

are not important and legitimate objects of inquiry in their proper sphere ; and not because they have no bearing on the main question of the mode—but because they have exercised over the question of philology, an unauthorized though unsuspected power. No attentive observer of the operations of the human mind can have failed to notice, that the impression of an argument, true and sound in itself, is often destroyed by the secret influence of some fact or principle, which does not appear in the discussion. These deep under-currents have frequently a power entirely superior to the logical force of the argument presented, and produce a state of mind which, if expressed in words, would be in substance this : “ All this looks well enough ; it is quite plausible, to be sure ; but still *it cannot be true* ; there must be an error somewhere.” States of mind like this—felt but not announced—often do more to break the strength of an argument, than any direct perception of its falsehood. So now, that the philological argument has been stated, I have no doubt that the thought will arise in many a mind : “ Well, after all, it is a fact that the early Christians did universally immerse, and did attach great importance to that form ; and *they surely understood the import of the word as well as we*. Besides, the rite is designed to represent, not merely purification from sin, but purification in a way significant of death and the resurrection of Christ, as we are expressly told in Rom. vi. 2, 3, and Col. ii. 12. All these learned philological inquiries are no doubt very fine, and quite plausible, but the single expression, “ *buried with Christ in baptism*,” is enough to dissipate them all. Now, while these under-currents of thought are overlooked, it is in vain to attempt to give to the philological argument, however sound in itself, any power at all. As some mighty stream, undermining banks, trees, and houses, precipitates them together into the flood, and hurries them along in promiscuous ruin, so do these deep under-currents undermine and lay prostrate the walls of the best-compacted logical fabric. Considerations like these, indeed, produce a greater popular ef-



fect than reasonings, however profound. The ideas lie upon the surface, and are therefore easily stated and easily apprehended.

It is essential, then, to inquire what are the facts on the first of these points, and what is their bearing on the philological question? Having done this, we may resume and review our investigations.

What, then, are the facts, as it regards the practice of the earlier ages of the church? I am willing freely and fully to concede that, in the primitive church, from the earliest period of which we have any historical accounts, immersion was the mode generally practised, and, except in extraordinary cases, the only mode. I do not mean that these remarks shall apply to the *apostolic age*, but to the earliest historical ages of the uninspired primitive church. The practice of the apostolic age, I shall consider by itself. After all that has been said upon this point by learned men, it will not be deemed necessary for me to advance proof of the position, that in the primitive church immersion was the general mode of baptism. No one who has candidly examined the original sources of evidence, will entertain a doubt. If any one does doubt, let him read the articles in Suicer on *ἀνάδυσσις* and *κατάδυσσις*; or, still better, some of the Fathers themselves. For a comprehensive, clear, and definite view of the great outlines of primitive practice in this respect, I know of no passages more full, and at the same time eloquent, than the sermons of Augustine to the Neophytes, pp. 97-99, vol. i. supp. Paris, 1555. I do not mean that the early practice included all which is stated by Augustine; for many superstitious usages had, by this time, become prevalent. It is the main outline to which I refer.

### § 23. *False Inferences.*

But admitting these things to be facts, what then? Does it follow of course, that the Fathers were led to adopt this form by a belief that the import of the word βαπτίζω is to immerse? This I know seems very generally to have been taken

for granted on both sides of the question. For example, Professor Stuart, after an able and clear exhibition of the proof that the early churches did baptize by immersion, says: "In what manner, then, did the churches of Christ, from a very early period, to say the least, understand the word βαπτίζω in the New Testament? Plainly they construed it as meaning immersion." "That the Greek Fathers, and the Latin ones who were familiar with the Greek, *understood* the usual import of the word βαπτίζω, would hardly seem to be capable of a denial." Bib. Rep. Vol. iii. 362. Now, all this is manifestly based on the assumption, that the practice of the Fathers, in this case, is an infallible index of their philology; i. e. if they did in fact immerse, they must of course have believed that βαπτίζω means to immerse. Indeed, this seems generally to have been regarded as a first principle, an indisputable truth. As long as it is so regarded, the facts already stated, as to early practice, will exert a strong, disturbing influence on the mind. The scholar, in the region of philology and logic, finds all plain; but he enters the dizzy and bewildering region of early practice, and his brain reels, his energy is dissolved, and some unseen power seems to be wresting his previous philological conclusions from his grasp. Indeed, if it is a sound principle that we must infer the opinions of the Fathers, as to the import of βαπτίζω, from their practice, I see not how he can avoid letting them go; for of the facts there can be no doubt. But it is high time to ask: Is the principle sound? is it logical? has it any force at all? It may seem adventurous to call in question a principle so generally received and so firmly believed. Nevertheless, I am compelled to say that I cannot perceive that the position is based on any sound principle of philology or logic; nay it seems to me that there is abundant evidence that it is entirely illogical and unsound. 1. Because, where a given result may have been produced by many causes, it is never logical to assume, without proof, that it is the result of any one of them alone. The proper course is, to inquire which of the possible causes was, in fact, the real and efficient cause of the result in question. 2. Because, on

making the inquiry, it appears manifest to me, that the practice in question did not originate in a belief that the word βαπτίζω means immerse, but in entirely different and independent causes. Suppose now the word to mean *to purify*, it is neither impossible nor improbable, that certain local and peculiar causes may have led to some one mode of purifying rather than another, and that this mode may have been immersion; and if all these things may have been so, who has a right to assume, without proof, that they were not so? I believe that they were. If it is inquired: What causes they were? I answer: 1. Oriental usages and the habits of warmer regions. 2. A false interpretation of Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12. 3 A very early habit of ascribing peculiar virtue to external forms. The first cause is sufficient to begin the practice; the other two to extend, perpetuate, and confirm it. Now, if it can be shown that these causes did exist, and did operate, and had great power, then a sufficient account of the origin and progress of the usage *may be given by these alone*; and thus, all presumption against the meaning I have assigned to βαπτίζω, or in favor of the sense to immerse, will be taken away; and thus, the way will be prepared to resume the direct philological proof, that in the earlier ages the word βαπτίζω did mean purify. But of their existence or their power, can there be a doubt? Did not Christianity begin in the warm regions of the East, and in the midst of a people whose climate, habits, costume, and mode of life were all adapted to bathing? and was not the practice nearly universal? Hence nothing could be more natural than its use on *convenient occasions*, as a mode of religious purifying; and if, as some maintain, the form had been previously used as a religious rite, nothing could be more natural than its adoption as a mode of purifying in the church. As to the interpretation of Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, as referring to the external form, all may not be ready to concede that it was false; yet that it was early prevalent and powerful, no one, I think, at all acquainted with the facts of the case, will deny. But of this, more in another place. As to a superstitious attachment to forms—who can

deny it? nay, who that is a Protestant does? Evidence of it throngs on every page that records the early history of the Church. To omit all else, the history of this rite alone would furnish volumes of proof. Let the holy water—the baptismal chrism, to symbolize and bestow the Holy Spirit—the putting on of white robes after baptism, to symbolize the putting on of Christ—the baptism of men and women perfectly naked, to denote their entire moral nakedness before putting on Christ—let the anointing of the eyes and ears, to denote the sanctification of the senses—let the eating of honey and milk—the sign of the cross; and, finally, let baptismal regeneration—the sum and completion of all these formal tendencies—bear witness to the mournful truth. Now, when the tendencies to formalism and superstition were so all-pervading and almost omnipotent, what could avert a blind and superstitious devotion to an early form—one especially in which so much was supposed to be involved, both of emblematical import and of sanctifying power.

#### § 24. *Decisive Cases.*

Having now pointed out causes, amply sufficient in extent and power, to account for the early prevalence of immersion, and thus removed all presumption against the sense I claim, I will resume, and exhibit more fully the philological evidence, that the early understanding of the church was, that βαπτίζω, as a *religious* term, did signify to *purify*. I shall, 1, notice more at large those cases in which it is not only in the highest degree probable that βαπτίζω has the sense to purify, but in which it is positively absurd to assign it any other meaning. 2. Show that a very large number of coincident facts sustains and gives verisimilitude to this view. The argument already presented is, to my own mind, perfectly conclusive. For it has been shown that the sense to purify is, *a priori*, probable, according to the laws of language and of the mind, and from the nature of the subject. See §§ 4–7. It has also been shown that the fair and obvious import of a large class of passages demands the sense; that the coincidence of so many

separate probabilities brings together an array of proof that cannot be resisted ; and, also, that no opposite probabilities exist. See §§ 8–21. Still, it may be felt, if not said, how much better, in a case so important, to have proof so clear, unequivocal, and decided, that the opposite sense shall not only be highly improbable, but absolutely impossible. Though I by no means admit the justice of this demand—because hundreds and thousands of senses are daily admitted on evidence far less ample than that already given, and to admit the necessity of such proof to establish a meaning would subvert all principles of sound philology—yet, as the materials for such proof exist, it seems appropriate here to present them.

§ 25. *Baptism of Blood. Case of Christ.*

To perceive fully the force of these, it is necessary to notice, 1. The source whence they are derived, which is ancient usage, as it regards the baptism of blood : 2. The cases to which they relate, which are two ; (1) the bloody baptism of Christ ; (2) the bloody baptism of the martyrs : 3. Their views in relation to this subject. They apply the word baptism merely to the *act of making an atonement by shedding blood*, even where no one is spoken of, either as sprinkled by it or immersed in it, and when the only external act spoken of is totally at war with the idea of immersion. In cases of this kind, no sense is possible but καθαρισμός, which is the established sacrificial term for an atonement, as I have already shown, § 12. Let us then begin with the case of our Saviour, of whose bloody baptism they so often speak. He shed his blood for sins, and this is called καθαρισμός, in the word of God. Heb. i. 5. Now, if they call the mere act of shedding his blood a βαπτισμα, it is *totally impossible* that it should be taken in any except the sacrificial sense, καθαρισμός. But in Origen, Hom. 7, on Judges vi., occurs a long passage on the baptism of blood, in which this very usage of language occurs. Speaking of Luke xii. 50, he says : “ Pertendit enim nostra probatio non

usque ad verbera solum, sed usque ad profusionem sanguinis pervenit. Quia et Christus, quem sequimur, pro redemptione nostra effudit sanguinem suum, ut inde exeamus loti sanguine nostro. Baptisma enim sanguinis solum est, quod nos puriores reddat, quam aquæ baptismus reddit. Et hoc ego non præsumo, sed Scriptura refert, dicente domino ad discipulos: Baptismum habeo baptizari, quod vos nescitis; et quomodo urgeo ut perficiatur. Vides ergo quia *profusionem sanguinis sui baptismum nominavit.*”

“Our probation extends, not only to stripes, but to the shedding of blood, for Christ whom we follow, shed his blood for our redemption, in order that we may leave this world washed in our own blood. For it is the baptism of blood alone, which renders us more pure than the baptism of water. Nor do I say this presumptuously, but the Scripture authorizes it, by the statement of our Lord to his disciples: I have a baptism to be baptized with, which ye know not. You see, therefore, that he called the shedding of his blood a baptism.” Here observe, 1. That the mind is fixed intently and alone on the *effusion of blood*. 2. He expressly states, that Christ calls *this shedding of blood a baptism*. 3. By a reference to other parts of his writings, his meaning is fixed beyond dispute. He uses *διὰ* after *βάπτισμα*, as do John of Damascus, Athanasius, and others, so as to render impossible the idea immersion. Origen, Vol. iv. p. 156, Ed. Delarue, Paris, 1733, τὸ τέλειον βάπτισμα διὰ τοῦ μυστηρίου παθοῦς. “The perfect purification by the mystery of his sufferings.” John of Damascus, Vol. i. p. 261, Paris, 1712: τὸ βάπτισμα δι’ αἵματος καὶ μαρτυρίου ὃ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν εἰβαπτίσαστο. “The purification by blood and martyrdom, by which Christ purified himself for us.” Athanasius, Vol. ii. p. 286, Paris, 1698: τὸ βάπτισμα διὰ μαρτυρίου, καὶ αἵματος. “The purification by martyrdom and blood.” In all these cases the use of *δια* with the Genitive renders the sense immersion impossible. See also § 64 at the end. 4. The only external act spoken of is *outpouring*; and, surely, to call this an immersion is absurd. Here, then, an *impossibility* of the sense immersion is clearly proved. 5. But,



give to baptisma the sense καθαρισμός, and all is harmonious and plain; for an outpouring of blood is a καθαρισμός in the sacrificial sense, i. e. an atonement. In Heb. i. 3, καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν is applied to Christ in this very sense. Let now the passages from Chrysostom, Gregory Naz., and Theophylact be re-examined, and carefully compared with these. § xxii. 2, 3. Those from Chrysostom and Theophylact both relate to the baptism of blood, and refer to passages in Matthew and Mark, parallel in sense to that in Luke, to which Origen refers—Mark x. 38, 39, Matthew xx. 22, 23. So that their usage of βαπτισμός to denote καθαρισμός, is certainly and undeniably the same with that of Origen. By Gregory Naz. this same sacrificial sense is just as clearly extended to the baptism of water; for he says: “He did not need purification) i. e. forgiveness of sins) who taketh away the sins of the world.” Two points are now perfectly established. 1. Βαπτισμός has the sacrificial sense καθαρισμός. 2. In the description given of the rite by Gregory Naz., not only are καθάρω and κάθαρσις used in the place of βαπτίζω and βαπτισμός, but they are used as perfectly synonymous.

### § 26. *Baptism of Blood. Case of Martyrs.*

But let us look once more at this same usage, not only in the case of Christ, but also of the martyrs who followed his steps. In order to do this the more clearly, let us for a moment consider the feelings of the early ages as it regards martyrdom. The following points are here to be noticed. 1. The religion of Christ began with a solemn act of martyrdom—even that of the Son of God. 2. Christ knew that multitudes of his disciples were soon to be called to endure the same fate. 3. Both by his example and also by his spirit-stirring words, he provided great and powerful motives to excite his disciples to meet death, in its most terrific forms, without weakness or fear. 4. These motives were not only effectual to produce the desired result in multitudes of instances, but the minds of the early Christians were so

deeply affected and so highly excited on this subject, that soon they went even to the extreme of undue eagerness for such a death. 5. This disposition was increased by a false construction put on the words of Paul: "I am ready to be offered."—2 Tim. iv. 6. "Yea, and if I be offered up," etc.—Phil. ii. 7. Also on the words of Christ: "Can ye be baptized with the baptism wherewith I am baptized?" which, as we have shown, they understood as: "Can ye be purified with the purification wherewith I am purified?" and regarded as an inquiry, whether they were ready to be purified in their own blood, as he was in his. See, in the preceding passages of Origen: "*loti sanguine nostro.*" Hence they ascribed to the death of a martyr a kind of atoning power, and spoke of it as a *καθαρισμός* or *βαπτισμός*, in the sacrificial sense. 6. This purification was supposed to avail especially for the martyr; so that, if he had never been purified in water for the remission of his sins, they were remitted by his purification in his own blood. Hence, the universal idea of a bloody baptism was, that the martyr was purified, or purged from sin, by his own blood. 7. It was also supposed, that the deaths of martyrs had a purifying power on behalf of others. Now the correctness of these views is not the question. They were evidently false. Our only inquiry is: In what language were they expressed? And the answer is as before; *βαπτίζω* and *βάπτισμα* are freely used to denote the act of purifying, or purging from sin by the shedding of blood; and that in such circumstances, all attempts to introduce the idea of immersion are vain. Origen, on John i. 29, speaking of Jesus, the Lamb of God, says: "*Et sane hujus victimæ cognatæ sunt cæteræ, quarum symbola sunt legales: per cæteras vero victimas huic victimæ cognatas, effusiones intelligo sanguinis generosorum martyrum;*" and after a few lines he adds: "*Quæ purgant eos pro quibus offeruntur.*" "And truly the other victims, of whom the legal victims are symbols, are related to this victim (i. e. Christ). By other victims related to this, I understand the shedding of the blood of generous martyrs—who *make expiation* for those on whose behalf they are offered." In Latin the idea of expiation is conveyed by

purgo—in Greek, καθάιρω. Just before, Christ as a victim, is called καθάρσιον τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου, a purification of the whole world. Again, in his notes on Matthew xx. 22, 23, he says: “Quod autem quis in passione remissionem accipit peccatorum baptismus est.” “But because any one by suffering receives remission of sins it is a baptism” (that is an expiation). He assigns this reason: “Si enim baptismus indulgentiam peccatorum promittit, sicut accepimus de baptismo aquæ et spiritus, remissionem autem accipit peccatorum, et qui martyrii suscipit baptismus, sine dubio ipsum martyrium rationabiliter baptismus appellatur.” “For if the rite of absolution promises the forgiveness of sins, as we have been taught concerning the purification of water and the Spirit, and if he who receives the purification of martyrdom, also receives the forgiveness of sins, without doubt, martyrdom itself is reasonably called an absolution” (or a baptism). Here note, 1. Previously, as we have seen, he said of Christ, “profusionem sanguinis baptismum nominavit.” Here he conveys the same idea in other words, when he says, “Martyrium baptismus appellatur.” 2. He gives us express reasons for this use of terms. The martyrs are victims like Christ; like his, their death has an atoning or purging power, and because of this power their death is to them a baptism, i. e. a purification. Indeed, had Origen designed to give a concise definition of the sacrificial sense which I have assigned to the word βαπτισμός, he could not have been more exact. “Quod autem quis in passione remissionem accipit peccatorum baptismus est.” Because any one through his suffering receives the remission of sins, it is a purification—a καθαρισμός—a βαπτισμός. *It is not called a baptism, because the martyr is immersed*, for in fact he is not. This is not even thought of; it is totally out of the mind. But it is so called simply because, by suffering, by effusion of blood, he secures the forgiveness of sin.\* But that effusion of blood, which secures the forgiveness of sins,

---

\* Hence the expressions τὸ βύπτισμα διὰ μαρτυρίου, or διὰ παθοῦς, or διὰ ἡματός. Purification by martyrdom, by suffering, by blood, not immersion in martyrdom, &c.

is always called καθαρισμός, and never an immersion, because in fact there is no immersion in the case. An expiatory offering is never called an immersion. The making an atonement by blood, is never called the making of an immersion. He who pardons through blood, is always said to purify, to purge, to cleanse by blood, but never to immerse by, or with, or in blood. Now, though the idea that the blood of martyrs has an atoning or purging power is false, yet it does not in the least diminish the force of the argument. We are inquiring how Origen expressed his belief that the blood of martyrs was a purgation from sin, and not whether his opinions were correct. In perfect accordance with these ideas, Chrysostom says of the martyrs in the hour of death, "that they have the Spirit copiously," that "their sins are taken away," that "there is a wonderful purification of the mind," καθαρός, and "as others are purified, βαπτίζονται, in water, these are washed, λούονται, in their own blood."

So Gregory Naz., speaking of the baptism of blood, says: "it is more august than the rest," those of water, tears, etc.—because, after it the martyr is polluted no more (ὃν μολύνεται). The same ideas are also found in the writings of Augustine, and in those of his antagonists, thus proving themselves to be the prevailing ideas of the age. See his work *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 13, cap. 7, also lib. 2, cap. 23, of his treatise *contra literas Petilianus*, where Petilianus uses the expression: "Similes Christo martyres, quos post aquam veri baptismi, sanguis baptista perfundit," i. e. whom their own blood, as a purifier, cleanses or washes. So far indeed was this idea carried, that, as we have seen, the purification by blood was even more desired than the purification by water, though to this also they attached an exaggerated, and almost miraculous power. Nor have I found any evidence that the passages in Luke xii. 50, Mark x. 38, 39, Matt. xx. 22, 23, were ever understood by any of the Fathers in the sense either of immersion or overwhelming. They seem universally to have referred them to the baptism of blood, and to have taken the words βαπτισμός and βαπτίζω in the sacrificial

sense—to purify. Now I do not think that in these passages the words have that sense. I regard them as instances in which the word is used in the sense to overwhelm with cares, and agony of body and mind. But this only shows how deeply fixed and strong was the *usus loquendi* for which I contend; for it was so powerful as even to overrule the true sense, in cases where the word obviously departs from the sense to purify.\* And if it was sufficiently powerful to force the sense to purify on the word, even when it does not belong there, are we to suppose that it was not powerful enough to retain it, in instances where all the facts of the case show that it truly belongs? In view of these facts, which are a small part only of those which might be adduced, I am utterly unable to resist the conviction, that to *purify*, was clearly, and so far as I have observed, universally the religious sense of the word βαπτίζω among the Fathers.

I do not indeed affirm that they did not, any of them, at any time, use it as a religious term to denote *immersion*. To say this intelligently, would require a certainty that every usage of it by the Fathers had been seen, which, in my case, certainly is not true. But I must say, that even if such cases can be found, they will not disprove my position. They can only prove inconsistent usage; and this I have already admitted would be nothing strange, and might even be expected in writers so numerous and so various. Still, when I consider the extreme power of the usage which I have proved, when I find it clearly and decidedly, even in the eleventh century, I am inclined to believe that a general perception of the true sense was not lost or obscured, till the Greek language itself sank in the ruins of the Eastern empire; and that the present state of opinion has been produced by party spirit, and by the mistakes of learned men to whom the Greek was a dead language, and who, being familiar with the style and usage of classic Greek, as that which holds the earliest and primary place in the modern systems of education, have allowed

---

\* Reflection has convinced me that the Fathers are right, and that in these passages also, βαπτίζω has the sense to purify.

it to expel the true spiritual and sacred sense of the word, and in place of it, to introduce a merely physical, and, too often, barren and profitless external act.

In opposition to this, the opinion of the Greek church is often alleged as decisive in favor of the meaning immerse. Being by *name* the Greek church, it is inferred that they must, of course, be good judges of the import of a Greek word. In reply to this, I would ask: Is modern Italian ancient Latin? If not, neither is modern Greek ancient Greek. That modern Greek resembles its parent stock, more than modern Italian does the Latin, I do not deny. But the resemblance is not such that the opinion of a modern Greek scholar, on a point like this, is worth any more than that of a modern German, Italian, or English scholar. No man can form an opinion on this subject except by a study of the facts found in the ancient writers who exhibit the usage in question; and his opinion is worth most who most carefully investigates, compares, classifies, and judges in view of the whole case. And if this be so, the opinions of the modern Greek church, unsustained by argument, ought to have no peculiar weight. Their proficiency in philological studies certainly does not exceed that of other European scholars, to say nothing of those of America.

### § 27. *Principles, as to co-existent senses.*

The passage in 2 Kings v. 14, is often alleged as decisive proof that βαπτίζω means immerse. The facts are these. The prophet commanded Naaman to wash seven times in Jordan, using רָחַץ. In obeying the command it is said בָּרַחֲצָהּ, Sept. ἐβαπτίσασατο seven times. It is said to be universally conceded that בָּרַחֲצָהּ means immerse only. I reply, it is not so conceded. Even Dr. Carson allows that it has passed to the sense to *dye*, without respect to mode. Why then could it not pass to the sense to *wash*, without respect to mode? Scholars of the first eminence believe and affirm that it did. Of these it is enough to mention Suicer. He affirms that the word is here the equivalent both of רָחַץ and



βαπτίζω, in the sense to wash.\* Nor can it be disproved, for it is in perfect analogy with other known facts in language. Even if the sense immerse is here admitted, it only proves the coexistence of the secular sense immerse with the religious sense purify, and that in this case there was a desire to fix the mind on the mode of washing. Take a parallel case. Dr. Carson admits the coexistence in βάπτω of the sense to dye and to dip. Suppose now an order to dye a cloth is given, and in narrating its execution, it is said, a man dipped it seven times in a dye-tub, and in each case βάπτω is used. Does the fact that it means dip in the last case prove that it does not mean dye in the first? Cannot two different meanings of a word coexist even in the same sentence? Can it not be said, I drank out of this *spring* last *spring*? How then could the use of the word βαπτίζω to denote an act *here*, prove that it does not mean purify *elsewhere*? On neither ground, then, has the passage any force. For first, it cannot be proved that the word here means to dip; and secondly, if it could, it would be nothing to the purpose.

### § 28. *Coincident Facts.*

It only remains that I adduce, as I proposed, a large amount of coincident facts, sustaining and giving verisimilitude to the whole.

1. The early and decidedly predominant idea of the rite was, that it was the appointed, and almost the only means of obtaining the remission of sins. How natural, now, that its name should indicate this idea? It does, if βαπτισμός is taken in the sacrificial sense καθαρισμός, but not if taken in the sense immersion. A proof that βαπτισμός is taken in the sacrificial sense is found in its equivalents in Latin and Greek; remissio peccatorum, ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν, ἁμαρτιῶν κάθαρσις, ἄφεσις πλημμελημάτων. These and similar phrases are used as the names of the rite, and are obviously mere equivalents of καθαρισμός. See § 55.

---

\* Fuerstius, in the learned lexicon contained in his Concordance, defines רָחַץ rigare, tingere, perfundere, and last of all *immergere*. To wet, to wash, to perfuse, to immerse.

2. The words with which βαπτίζω is interchanged, in giving variety to the style, and preventing the too frequent repetition of the same word, show that it is used by the Fathers in the sense of purify. In such interchanges, we always expect the fundamental idea of the leading term to be retained; or some one into which it easily passes, and with which it has a natural affinity. The class of words that has an affinity to the idea καθαρίζω, is very large. In Greek they are λούω, ἀγιάζω, ἀγνίζω, ἀναγεννάω, etc.; in Latin, purgo, mundo, emundo, lavo, abluo, diluo, eluo, perfundo; together with the nouns and participles derived from them, as λουτρὸν, ἀγνισμός, etc., purgatio, lavatio, lavaeum, emundatus, ablutus, etc. The class of words that has an affinity to the idea immersion is small, as it is a mere external act. Now let three facts be noted. 1. The range of equivalents, or substitutes for βαπτίζω, is in fact large. 2. They are all of the class having affinity to καθαρίζω; and there is a great readiness to pass into any mode of speech equivalent or analogous to it, or derivable from it. 3. There is no readiness to use equivalents of immersion, except in cases in which, for some particular reason, it is intended to give prominence to the form of purifying. Let any one read Augustine's controversies with the Donatists, and his various works on baptism, the works of Origen, or any of the Greek Fathers who have written much on the subject, and he will easily find the same thing. It is impossible by a few quotations to give an idea of the impression produced by noticing such facts in passages of considerable extent.

3. When it is desired to speak definitely of immersion as an act, βαπτισμός is not generally used, but κατάδυσις; and for emersion, ἀνάδυσις. See Suicer on these words. Why is this, if βαπτισμός never means anything but immersion?

4. On the other hand, in the Apostolic Constitutions, Can. L., the expression τρία βαπτίσματα μίας μνήσεως occurs, in which τρία βαπτίσματα denotes three acts of immersion, but not the name of the rite; for in trine immersion, three immersions are necessary to one purification. And if the expression were understood to

mean three purifications, the idea would be false ; for three immersions make but one purification. Lest any misunderstanding should arise, a note was deemed necessary by Zonaras, informing the reader that βαπτίσματα here means καταδύσεις, and μύησις denotes the rite as a whole, i. e. is used for βάπτισμα. He therefore says, Ἱεῖα βαπτίσματα, ἐνλαῦθα ἰὰς Ἱεῖς καταδύσεις φησὶν. As much as to say βάπτισμα is not here used in its common import, but denotes the *act of immersion*, so that the passage means, not three purifications, as you might suppose, but three immersions and one purification. Why this care to explain, and to state that βαπτίσματα, in this case—ἐνλαῦθα—means immersions, if it never has any other meaning ? But if its common meaning is purification, all is plain. We see too the use of the word κατάδυσις. It was univocal : βαπτισμός was equivocal, and in its common religious sense denoted purification.

From this case in the Apostolic Constitutions, and from the closing remarks on βαπτίζω in 2 Kings v. 14, the following general principles may be derived, which will be of great use in a critical investigation of the meanings of this word in the Fathers.

1. In speaking of baptism, the two senses, immerse and purify, are sometimes both used.
2. They are applied to the rite in different ways, and for different ends. Taken in the sense of purify, βαπτίζω denotes the real import of the rite and the thing enjoined, and is used in the sacrificial and religious sense ; but when it denotes the act of immersion, it is not used to denote the real import of the rite, nor in the religious sense, but simply to denote a physical act, i. e. a mode in which purification may be performed. For example, suppose an ancient bishop to have ordered a priest to purify, i. e. baptize a man. The priest obeys, and immerses him three times, according to the principles of trine immersion ; and in describing this trine immersion, uses the word βαπτίζω in the sense of immerse. Here both senses of the word are used in relation to the same rite. In the first instance, it is used in the sacred sense of purify ; in the second, in the secular sense to denote a *mode* of purifying.
3. Whenever βαπτίσματα

is used with the numeral three, in describing a single baptism, of course it is used in the secular sense, as the name of an act ; because in such a case, the *purification* is but one, whilst the *immersions* are three. 4. To prove the existence of the secular sense as indicating the existing mode of a religious washing, does not disprove the existence of the religious sense as the name of the rite itself. This shows the fallacy of all arguments based on 2 Kings v. 14. 5. To guard against the ambiguity produced by applying the same word to the rite in two senses, *κατάδυσις* was used to denote immersion, leaving to *βάπτισμα* the religious sense of purification.

5. Although immersion was deemed of immense importance, yet its necessity was never defended on philological grounds ; and leave was conceded to sprinkle, in extraordinary cases, on such grounds as plainly show that they did not feel bound by the import of the word. Hear Cyprian : “ Neque enim sic in sacramento salutari, delictorum contagia, ut in lavacro carnali et seculari, sordes cutis et corporis abluuntur, ut aphronitris et cæteris quoque adjumentis et solio et piscina opus sit, quibus ablui et mundari corpusculum possit. Aliter pectus credentis abluitur, aliter mens hominis per fidei meritum mundatur.” Notice now, that this whole passage, designed to prove that a man may be baptized by sprinkling, depends for its force entirely on assigning to the word the sense to purify. His argument in brief is this ; the power of baptism to purify from sin, does not depend on the quantity of water used, but upon the internal faith of the person baptized. “ In baptism,” he says, “ the pollution of sin is not washed away, as the pollution of the body and skin is washed away in an external, physical bath, so that there is need of saltpetre (or nitre (see Jer. ii. 22), and other auxiliary means, and a bath or pool, in which the body can be washed and purified. Far otherwise is the breast of the believer washed ; far otherwise is the mind of a man purified from sin by the merits of faith.” From all this he inferred that a man might properly be baptized, if necessary, by sprinkling. But how could he do this, if he knew

that the command was not to purify but to immerse? On this ground all such reasoning would be vain. Any one could have replied: "The command is not to *purify*, but to *immerse*; and you cannot immerse without immersion; and sprinkling is no immersion at all." But such an idea does not seem to have entered Cyprian's mind. To him plainly the only command was a command to *purify*. The word baptize does not indeed occur; but evident synonymes of it are used, as *abluo* and *mundo*. I know not how we can obtain stronger testimony to the prevailing opinion of the age than this; and it is the stronger because indirect and undesigned.

6. In explaining the similitude between baptism and the salvation of Noah in the ark, also between baptism and the passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea—I Pet. iii. 20, 21, and 1 Cor. x. 1, 2—Noah and the Israelites are not looked on as immersed, but merely as *purified*, or *saved*; and that too by the same element which overwhelmed and destroyed the enemies of God. They even go so far as to speak of *the wicked as immersed*, by way of antithesis to the righteous, who are *not immersed*, but only *purified* and *saved*. This view is based on the expression in Peter, "saved by water," as applied to the eight souls who were saved by water in the ark. To be purified, with them was equivalent to *being sanctified*, or *being saved*; and in looking at baptism, their minds were fixed on this idea. "Now," said they, "as in baptism water saves, so in the flood it saved, and so in the Red Sea it saved; not by overwhelming Noah or the Israelites, but by dividing them from the enemies of God, and by overwhelming and immersing those enemies. And its similarity to baptism lies only in the fact, that it *saves* or *purifies* the people of God. Augustine (Sermo de Cataclysmo, Vol. ix. p. 320, Paris, ed. 1586) speaks of the Israelites delivered out of Egypt, as hastening to the Red Sea, "*that they may be saved by water*;" the Egyptians follow, the sea opens, the Israelites pass through, the Egyptians enter, then, "Unum elementum aquarum, auctore totius, creatore jubente, judicavit utrosque; separavit enim pios

ab impiis. *Illos abluit, istos obruit; illos mundavit, istos occidit.*" "One element, water, by the command of the Creator, judged both; for it separated the righteous from the wicked. The former it washed, the latter it overwhelmed; the former it purified, the latter it destroyed." He then speaks of Moses as a type of Christ, his rod as a type of the cross, and the *Red Sea* as a type of the waters of baptism, *purpled* by the blood of Christ. Now compare with this the anxious efforts of our Baptist brethren, to prove that in some way the *Israelites were immersed*. Augustine says, they were *washed* and *purified*, and the Egyptians overwhelmed (and of course *immersed*) and destroyed.

It is quite certain that no man, who believed and was anxious to prove that immersion was the sense and the only sense of βαπτισμός, would ever have used this language. In like manner, comparing the salvation of Noah and his family to the salvation effected by baptism, he often calls the flood a sacrament; and compares its effects to those of baptism. He compares the church to the ark; and one out of the church, and unbaptized, to one out of the ark; and his fate to the fate of one so excluded. Concerning the one who perishes out of the ark, he says: "*submersus est diluvio non ablutus.*" Hence he regarded those in the ark, who were saved, as *abluti*, i. e. *purified* or *saved*, and those out of it, as *submersi*, i. e. *submersed*, or *immersed* and *destroyed*. All this he says in commenting on 1 Pet. iii. 20, 21. See Lib. 1, Cap. 21, Vol. vi. p. 253. Here then he opposes the righteous who were *purified*, but *not immersed*, to the wicked who were *immersed*, but not purified; and regards one as *saved by purification*, and the other as *destroyed by immersion*. Would any modern advocate of immersion have ever written so? For the true sense of 1 Pet. iii. 20, 21, see § 18.

7. Elias is spoken of by Origen as baptizing the wood in the sense of purifying it. The passage is this. Origen is commenting on John i. 25: "Why baptizest thou, if thou be not the Christ, nor Elias, nor that prophet?" He is aiming to show that they had no reason to suppose that Elias would baptize in person



when he should come. The reason is this. Although the wood needed *purification*, yet he did not baptize, *purify*, it himself, but told others to do it. His words are : Οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπὶ θυσιαστήριον ξύλα, κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ Ἀχαὶδ᾽ χρόνους, δέσμενα λουτρῶν ἵνα ἐκκαύθῃ ἐπιφανέντος ἐν πυρὶ, τοῦ κυρίου, βαπτίσαντος· ἐπικελεύεται γὰρ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. “Who did not baptize—*purify*—the wood upon the altar in the days of Ahab, although it needed to be purified, in order that it might be burned when the Lord should be revealed in fire ; for he commanded the priest to do this.” In this case the words ξύλα δέσμενα λουτρῶν, beyond all dispute, fix the sense, and show that he regarded the pouring as a rite of *purification*, and used βαπτίζω in its usual religious sense. In this view, the passage remarkably falls in with and confirms the reasoning in § 9 ; and proves that Origen understood them to inquire in John i. 25 : “Why *purifiest* thou?” This passage also is in perfect accordance with those already quoted from his writings.

8. It was a natural inquiry of old, as now : “Why was Christ baptized?” In answering this question, the Fathers do not say, as does Prof. Chase, he was immersed “as a fit and striking emblematical declaration of his voluntarily yielding himself up to his sufferings, with the confidence of emerging ;” because “to represent one as overwhelmed in the water was a well-known figure to indicate deep affliction.” See Chase’s Sermon on the Design of Baptism, p. 13. They do not try to answer the question : “Why was he *immersed*?” but solely the question : “Why was he purified?” And in those passages where βαπτίζω really means overwhelm,\* they retain, as we have seen, the sense of purify. Various answers were given. In general they all denied that he was purified because he had any sin ; and most commonly they added, that he was purified in order to give to the water of baptism a purifying power. See § 21, δύναμιν ἐνδύειν καθαριστήν. Augustine says : “Aquæ quæ cætera mundare consueverant, Domino nostro lavante, mundatæ sunt.” “The waters which

---

\* According to common modern usage, I now agree with the Fathers.

were accustomed to purify other things, when our Lord was washed in them, were purified." He also says it was to give an example of humility, and to honor the rite so that others should not despise it. Their difficulties were caused by the idea *purify*, as applied to Christ; to this their answers correspond; and they do not correspond with the views of those who believe that the word means *immerse*. Can we doubt, then, what was the general understanding of the word? Had they regarded the word as our Baptist brethren do, would they not have given their solution of the question?

9. In speaking of the baptism of the Holy Spirit, they do not speak of it as an inward *spiritual immersion*, but as an inward spiritual purification. Gregory Nyss. calls baptism *ὁμολή κάθαρσις*. As we have a body and a soul, so we need a twofold cleansing, *δι' ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος ἡ δὲ βάθη καθαίροντος*. To denote the internal baptism here, he uses *καθαίρω*, and calls the external and internal together *ὁμολή κάθαρσις*, a twofold cleansing. Augustine says: Baptizatur a Joanne in carne; sed ipse Joannem in Spiritu lavat. "He is purified by John in the flesh, but he washes, or purifies John in the Spirit." So he says: "Quod enim dicimus ipse baptizat, non dicimus ipse tenet, et in aqua corpus credentis tingit; sed ipse invisibiliter *mundat* et hoc universam prorsus ecclesiam." "When we say that Christ baptizes, we do not say that he holds, and washes in water the body of the believer, but that he invisibly purifies him, and not only him, but the whole church." Lib. iii. c. 49. In the Fathers, such passages are of constant occurrence; but in none of them is found the strange, incongruous, and modern idea of an internal and spiritual immersion into the Holy Spirit and fire. Comp. § 10. Origen contrasts those who are "*loti aqua*," with those who are "*sancto spiritu loti*."

10. In speaking of the *διαφόροι βαπτισμοί*, Heb. ix. 10, they invariably regard them as *purifications of persons*, not as immersions of things. See § 14. In an enumeration of the various kinds of baptism, often ascribed to Athanasius—an unexceptionable witness as to the *usus loquendi* of that century—it is said, as an explanation of the *διαφόροι βαπτισμοί*, *πᾶς γὰρ ὑπάδαρτος ἐλούετο*

ὕδατι. "Every one who was unclean was washed in water." Theophylact says, more particularly, that a man was washed in water, and thus purified, καὶν νεκροῦ ἢ ἀποστο, καὶν ληπτοῦ, καὶν γονεῶν ἢ ἑγγύης ἐγένετο τις. "If he had touched a dead body, or a leper, or had an issue." With this comp. βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ, § 16. Macarius says: ἦν παρ' αὐτοῖς βάπτισμα σάρκα ἀγιάζον, παρ' ἡμῶν βάπτισμα ἀγίου πνεύματος καὶ πυρός. "There was with them a baptism purifying the flesh, but with us is the baptism of the Holy Spirit and of fire." In this he manifestly refers to Heb. ix. 13: "the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh;" for his use of ἀγιάζω and καθαρίζει is clearly taken from Paul. Of course, he regards this sprinkling as a βάπτισμα. Tertullian says: Judæus quotidie lavat, quia quotidie inquinetur: quod ne in nobis factitaretur, propterea de uno lavacro definitum est. "The Jew washes daily, because he is daily defiled: that we might not need to do this, he definitely established one washing."

11. In speaking of the baptism of fire, the fathers regard it, not as an immersion, but as a *purification* or *purgation*; and from this use the idea of a future purgatory came. A few regarded the fire spoken of in the words, "he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire," as referring to punishment, as some do even now. But others of them regarded it as the purifying fire of the Holy Spirit. Others believed in a literal fire of purification after death, particularly Origen. In Hom. 24, on Luke iii. 16, he speaks of Jesus as purifying in a river of fire, each one who, after death, and before entering heaven, needs to be purged, "qui purgatione indiget." Hom. 2, on Jer., he says: "Itaque et Jesus baptizat spiritu sancto et igne, non quia eundem in spiritu sancto atque igne baptizet: sed quia sanctus baptizetur spiritu sancto, et is qui post fidem et magisterium Dei rursus ad scelera conversus est, cruciatus purgetur incendii. Beatus qui lavacrum accepit spiritus sancti, et ignis lavacro non indiget. Miserabilis autem, et omni fletu dignus, qui, post lavacrum spiritus, baptizandus est igni." "Therefore Jesus also baptizes with the Holy Spirit and with fire. Not because he baptizes the

same person with the Holy Spirit and with fire, but because he who is holy, is baptized with the Holy Spirit; but he who turns to sin after professing his faith and submitting to God, is purified by the torments of fire. Blessed is he who has received the purification of the Holy Spirit, and does not need the purification of fire. Miserable is he, and deserving of tears, who, after the purification of the Spirit, needs to be purified (baptizandus) with fire."

In the Greek text of Origen, the word βαπτίζω is used where the Latin translator uses *lavacrum*. Thus, μακάριος ὁ βαπτισζόμενος ἐν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι. Beatus qui lavacrum accepit spiritus sancti.

If Jerome or Rufinus was the translator, as I suppose, it is a direct testimony that βαπτίζω did not mean to immerse, and that, by one perfectly qualified to judge. So βαπτίσματος τοῦ ἀπὸ πυρός corresponds to "ignis lavacro." A little after he speaks of "peccator qui ignis indiget *baptismo*, qui combustione *purgatur*." "The sinner who needs the baptism of fire, who is purged by burning." In his Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. Lib. 8, he says: "Ut ignis gehennæ in cruciatibus *purgat* quem nec apostolica doctrina, nec evangelicus sermo *purgavit*, secundum illud quod est scriptum, *purificabo* te igni ad *purificationem*." "That the fire of Gehenna may purify him by torments, whom neither the apostolical doctrine nor the evangelical truth purified, according to that which is written, I will purify thee with fire, in order to make thee pure." Here baptizo, purgo, purifico, and lavo (involved in lavacro), are all used as synonymous terms in describing the baptism of fire. If Gieseler is correct (Vol. i. § 119, note 14), this purgation of Origen is not to be confounded with the Roman Catholic purgatory, first suggested, as he says, by Augustine. Neither the opinion of Origen nor of Augustine is correct; yet they show as clearly as if true, that by the baptism of fire, a *purgation* by fire, and not an *immersion*, was meant. Clearly they had in mind the words of Malachi: "he is like a refiner's fire," and, "he shall *purify* and *purge*." These words gave rise to the expression in the gospel: "He shall purify you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." Taking the word

βαπτίζω in this sense, we can clearly see how the various and erroneous forms of the doctrine of *purgatory* grew out of it. Compare §§ 9, 10.

12. In speaking of the baptism of tears, the Fathers regard it as a *purification* by tears, and not as an *immersion* in tears. The very nature of the case shows that it must have been so, and the language of the Fathers proves that the purifying power of tears did not depend on having a quantity sufficient for an immersion. Says Nilus, Λευτῆς ἀγάθης τῆς ψυχῆς, τῆς προσευχῆς τοῦ δάκρυον. “The tear of prayer”—not a flood or river, or ocean of tears—“the tear of prayer is a good wash-basin of the soul.” For this use of Λευτῆς, see § 16, and the idea there given of washing the hands of the soul. So Gregory Nyss. calls tears λουτρὸν κατοικίδιον καὶ κρήνας ἰδίας οἱ ἐν ἐσθλῇ τῆς κηλίδας τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπονίψασθαι, “a domestic washing place and fountains of your own, by means of which you can wash off the pollution of your soul.” Ἀπονίψω, as no one can deny, never denotes immersion, but commonly, the washing of hands and feet. From the nature of the case then, as well as from the language of the Fathers, we are certain that they regarded the baptism of tears, not as an immersion, but as a purification.

13. The Fathers applied passages of the Old Testament commanding washing, or predicting purification, to the rite of baptism in such a way, as evinces a belief that βαπτίζω means to purify.

In Is. i. 16, is a command to wash and make clean—Heb. רָחַץ וְהָיִיתָ טָהוֹר, Sept. Λούσασθε, καθαροὶ γένεσθε—Vulg. lavamini, mundi estote. Justin Martyr and Hippolytus regard this as an anticipation, or prophetic injunction of baptism. Hippolytus says: “Propheta Isaias Baptismi vim *purgativam* prædixit, cum ait, lavamini, mundi estote.”\* Cyprian, Jerome, and others apply to baptism the prediction: “I will *sprinkle* clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean.” Now, if they regarded βαπτίζω as a syno-

---

\* For Justin's view see § 90. See, also, Basil on Is. iv. 4, as another fact, § 55.

nyme of καθαρίζω, all this is plain and natural; for in one of these cases *purification* is commanded, in the other it is predicted, but in neither is immersion mentioned. The only external act alluded to is sprinkling. I desire that here may be noted the use of כִּרְחַץ, in Isa. i. 16. By this word all the commands for personal ablution in the Mosaic ritual are given, and to it, I remarked, § 14, βαπτίζω would naturally become a synonyme. Here is proof that it did so become. And this word always denotes washing, without respect to mode, and never immersion.

14. From the time of the clinic baptism of Novatian, down to the Reformation, there were cases of baptism by affusion or sprinkling, defended on grounds similar to those stated by Cyprian (No. 5), and totally inconsistent with the idea that they felt bound by the word βαπτίζω to regard nothing as a baptism that was not an immersion. All this is plain, and easily accounted for, if they regarded βαπτισμός merely as a purification, to be performed in common cases, by immersion, and in extraordinary cases, by affusion or sprinkling. It shows that their attachment to the mode did not depend on βαπτίζω, but on a regard to general practice, and its supposed significance. Constantine the Great was baptized by sprinkling on his bed. In 499, Clodovius, king of the Franks, was baptized by affusion. Gennadius, of Marseilles, A. D. 490, says, that the baptized person is either sprinkled or immersed—vel aspergitur, vel intingitur. For other clear and striking cases, see Pond, pp. 42—50; where he clearly proves, that immersion was never considered as essential to baptism till after the Reformation. The bearing of all these facts on the meaning of the word is irresistible. Had it been regarded as demanding immersion, when there was such a universal attachment to that mode, a deviation would have been resisted on philological grounds; but, though frequent and extensive deviations took place, they were never so resisted. The conclusion is inevitable—they could not be so resisted; it was universally known that βαπτίζω, as a religious term, meant to purify, not to immerse.



15. To conclude, the idea of purification is, in the nature of things, better adapted to be the name of the rite, than immersion. It has a fitness and verisimilitude in all its extensive variety of usage, which cause the mind to feel the self-evidencing power of truth, as producing harmony and agreement in the most minute, as well as in the most important relations of the various parts of this subject to each other. This is owing to three facts: 1. The idea of purification is the fundamental idea in the whole subject. 2. It is an idea complete and definite in itself in every sense, and needs no adjunct to make it more so. 3. It is the soul and centre of a whole circle of delightful ideas and words. It throws out before the mind a flood of rich and glorious thoughts, and is adapted to operate on the feelings like a perfect charm. To a sinner, desiring salvation, what two ideas so delightful as forgiveness and purity? Both are condensed into this one word. It involves in itself a deliverance from the guilt of sin, and from its pollution. It is a purification from sin in every sense. See § 12. It is purification by the atonement, and purification by the truth, —by water and by blood. And around these ideas cluster others likewise, of holiness, salvation, eternal joy, eternal life. No word can produce such delight on the heart, and send such a flood of light into all the relations of divine truth; for purification, in the broad Scripture sense, is the joy and salvation of man, and the crowning glory of God. Of immersion none of these things are true. 1. Immersion is not a fundamental idea in any subject or system. 2. By itself, it does not convey any one fixed idea, but depends upon its adjuncts, and varies with them. Immersion? In what? Clean water, or filthy; in a dyeing fluid, or in wine? Until these questions are answered, the word is of no use. And with the spiritual sense the case is still worse; for common usage limits it in English, Latin, Greek, and so far as I know, in all languages, by adjuncts of a kind denoting calamity or degradation, and never purity. It has intimate and firmly established associations with such words as luxury, ease, indolence, sloth, cares, anxieties, troubles, distresses, sins, pollution. We

familiarly speak of immersion in all these, but with their opposites it refuses alliance. We never speak of a person as immersed in temperance, fortitude, industry, diligence, tranquillity, prosperity, holiness, purity, etc. Sinking and downward motion are naturally allied with ideas which, in a moral sense, are depressed, and not with such as are morally elevated. Very few exceptions to this general law exist, and these do not destroy its power. Now, for what reason should the God of order, purity, harmony, and taste, select an idea so alien from his own beloved rite, for its name, and reject one in every respect so desirable and so fit? Who does not feel that the name of so delightful an idea as purification must be the name of the rite? And who does not rejoice that there is proof so unanswerable, that it is?

The philological argument is now closed. Whatever may be the interpretation of Romans vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, the question of philology must remain untouched. All that they can prove, at most, is the fact, that those to whom Paul wrote were immersed, and that he deemed immersion a significant act. Neither of these do they prove, in my opinion; for which I propose soon to give my reasons. But if they did, it is impossible, as we have shown, to settle the question of philology by early practice. Even if they did immerse, it was only a mode of purification; and it was baptism, not because it was immersion, but because it was purification.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE INTERPRETATION OF ROM. VI. 3, 4, AND COL. II. 12.

#### § 29. *Importance of a correct Interpretation of Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12.*

THE conclusion to which we have arrived by our previous inquiries is this: *Purification* is enjoined by a specific command, but no *particular mode* of purification is enjoined. Of course, any individual may be lawfully purified in the way that he prefers. No result can be more desirable than this, for none tends more directly to harmonize the church. It combines the two fundamental requisites for union, which are, 1, to take from no church anything which it desires, as to its own mode of purification; and 2, to authorize each church to regard the purification of others, though differing from its own, as valid. Who, that loves the harmony of the church, who, that regards the feelings and wishes of Christ, would not rejoice at an issue so auspicious? What can be more desirable than a union without sacrifice of principle, or loss of any valued practice? But this result secures all this; nay more, it would give to our Baptist brethren, not only the full enjoyment of all they desire, without diminution or loss, but add to it the sweet persuasion, that, on this point, all their Christian brethren are also right, and can, in like manner, enjoy the mode which they prefer. Thus all painful barriers to communion will at once be taken away, the middle wall of partition will fall, and all, in Christian love, will be united as one new man.

In proportion then to the desirableness of this event, is the importance of a radical investigation and correct interpretation of

Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12; for, next to the word βαπτίζω, these have been, and still are, the most serious obstacles to such a result. As I have before stated, our Baptist brethren regard these passages as an inspired exposition of the mode of baptism—as proving, irresistibly, that the rite is designed, not merely to represent purification from sin, but purification in a way significant of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, and of the death, burial, and resurrection of the believer with him; and although this signification of the rite was not seen by men, when it was first established, yet it was fully before the mind of God, and was finally and fully disclosed by the Apostle Paul. In this they are no doubt perfectly sincere, as they are also in the conviction that no mode of purification, devoid of this striking significance, is in accordance with the revealed will of God. Nor are they without authority for interpreting these texts as referring to the mode of the external rite. Indeed, the opinions of the Fathers, whatever they may be worth, so far as I have examined, are entirely with them. This explanation seems to have been adopted at a very early period. But it was most fully developed by Chrysostom; and undoubtedly his authority and eloquence, more than those of any other man, tended to give it currency in the East, whilst the influence of Augustine was equally decisive in the West. Besides, it is strongly sustained by the opinions of many modern critics. Of these, it is enough to mention Luther, Jaspis, Knapp, Rosenmüller, Doddridge, and Barnes—none of them Baptists by profession.

Of course we need not wonder that our Baptist brethren feel strong, and express themselves with confidence and even exultation, in speaking of these passages. Says Dr. Carson (p. 144), “I value the evidence of these passages so highly, that I look on them as perfectly decisive. They contain God’s own explanation of his own ordinance. And in this, I call upon my unlearned brethren to admire the divine wisdom. They do not understand the original, and the adoption of the words *baptize* and *baptism* can teach them nothing. Translators, by adopting the Greek word, have

contrived to hide the meaning from the unlearned. But the evidence of the passages in question cannot be hid, and it is obvious to the most unlearned. The Spirit of God has enabled them to judge for themselves in this matter. Whilst the learned are fighting about βαπτίζω, and certain Greek prepositions, let the unlearned turn to Rom. vi. 4, and Col. ii. 12, etc." This may be taken as a fair specimen of the strength of feeling that pervades the whole body; and if so, it is plain that all hopes of union are fallacious, until the true interpretation of these passages is ascertained. Most cordially, therefore, do I unite with Dr. Carson in inviting, not the unlearned only, but all—learned and unlearned—to turn to Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12.

### § 30. *Points at Issue—Principles of Reasoning.*

Let us first present in full these remarkable and important passages of the word of God, and then endeavor to ascertain upon what points the interpretation of them turns. They are as follow: "Ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε, ὅτι ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν; Συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον· ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν. Rom. vi. 3, 4. Συνταφέντες αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βαπτίσματι· ἐν ᾧ καὶ συνῆγέρθητε διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐν ἐργείᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἐγείναντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν. Col. ii. 12.

Upon these passages two distinct *questions* may be raised.

I. *Is the BAPTISM of the believer here spoken of, external?*

II. *Are the BURIAL and RESURRECTION of the believer here spoken of, external?*

I here assume the following positions or principles, the first of which has been already proved, and the second of which is so obviously true as to need no proof.

1. The philological question, as to the import of βαπτίζω, neither depends upon the interpretation of this passage, nor is affected by it. Each stands upon its own ground, and must be decided by its own evidence. And if it were proved that external

baptism, burial, and resurrection are here referred to, it would only prove, that, under a command to purify, they did in fact purify by immersion. And we must still translate the passage: "We have been buried with him by *purification* into his death"—not by "*immersion*" into his death. For we have already shown that, as a religious term, βαπτίζω does not mean to immerse, but solely to purify. In other words, we could prove immersion, &c., only by the word *bury*, and not at all by the word baptism.

2. *As the baptism is, so is the burial.* That is, if the baptism is external, so is the burial; and if internal, so is the burial. We are buried by the baptism spoken of,—Συνεταφήμεν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, etc. Rom. vi. 4. And an external baptism cannot produce an internal burial, nor can an internal baptism produce an external burial.

### § 31. *Position to be proved—Sources of Evidence.*

We now proceed to consider the two questions above stated. In answering them, three positions have been taken:

1. The baptism into Christ is external, and of course the burial and resurrection.

2. The baptism is external, but the burial and resurrection are internal.

3. The baptism, burial, resurrection, etc., are all internal, and the passage does not refer to the external rite at all, nor derive any of its language from it; but the language would have been just as it is, if the rite had been administered by sprinkling alone, or even if there had been no external rite.

The third is the position which I intend to maintain; and it is obviously the direct antagonist of the first,—the usual position of the Baptists, and also of the Fathers and others. The second is an intermediate position, advocated by Wardlaw, Prof. Stuart, and others, but, as I have indicated above, inconsistent with itself; because, if the baptism is external, so must be the burial and the resurrection. It is on this ground that Prof. Ripley reasons, and I think conclusively, against Prof. Stuart. "This opinion"



(that the burial is internal), he says, “seems effectually opposed by the circumstance that the burying is performed by *baptism*, an *external rite*.” p. 86. And all, who admit that the external rite is here spoken of, must, it seems to me, be inevitably driven to Prof. Ripley’s ground. But, believing as I do, that the external rite is not meant, and that the external interpretation of this passage is not only false, but injurious to the cause of truth and holiness, I shall proceed to state the evidence which seems to me to overthrow the first position, and to establish the last. My leading arguments may be arranged under the four following heads :

1. Evidence from the logical exigencies of the passages, i. e. from the course of the argument.

2. Evidence from the *usus loquendi*, as to spiritual death, burial, resurrection, &c.

3. Evidence from the congruity of the interpretation, with the general system of truth.

4. Evidence from the moral tendencies and effects of each interpretation.

### § 32. *Argument from the Logical Exigencies of Rom. vi. 3, 4.*

Let us then consider, 1, the course of the argument, and 2, the logical exigencies of Rom. vi. 3, 4. We shall consider Col. ii. 12 by itself. The argument involves three points :

1. An objection stated in the form of a question, v. 1 : “What then ? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound ?” Does not the doctrine of the free forgiveness of the greatest sins, by the abounding grace of God through Christ, lead to this result ? Or, to put it in the form of a positive objection, the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins by free grace, tends to relax the power of motives to holiness, and to encourage men to live in sin.

2. A reply, v. 2 : “God forbid. How shall we, who are dead to sin, live any longer therein ?” Here Paul speaks in the name of all who are really forgiven, and virtually asserts, that all, who are in fact forgiven, are of course dead to sin, and cannot live any longer therein. Implying, of necessity, that the system

itself produces this effect on all who experience its true and genuine influence, and that this is necessary and universal. In brief, the objection is: Does not the system encourage men to sin? The answer is: No, it makes them dead to sin, so that they cannot live any longer in it.

3. A proof that the fact alleged is true—i. e. that the system does tend to holiness, with immense power, and not to sin. vs. 3-11.

The question now at once arises, What is good and logical proof of such a point, i. e. of the true and natural operation of a moral system on the human mind? In answering this, we shall perceive at once the logical exigencies of the passage.

Can such proof then be found in external rites, solemn promises, and significant symbols? Or must we look for it in a clear statement of the internal, natural, and inevitable operation of the system, as a system, on the mind? As to the first, I need only ask, what system, be it good or bad, is destitute of significant rites and symbols, and of solemn confessions and promises? Papists and Protestants, Arminians, Calvinists, Unitarians, Campbellites, Mormonites—all have them; even the rite of immersion is common to some of the worst with some of the best. But in what case have these things given to any system a regenerating or sanctifying power sufficient to uproot and destroy the desperate depravity of the human heart? Is it not a well known fact, that the radical effects of all systems depend, not on external rites and solemn promises, but on principles? These are the internal and germinating power of every system, and just so far as these are adapted to act on the human mind, so is the system. And as a general fact, those who depend most on promises, professions, and external rites, as a means of subduing sin, have the least success.

In order, then, to make out a sound logical argument, it is necessary that Paul should exhibit the *internal* operation on the mind, of the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins by faith, and prove that it does in fact cause all who come under its influence, to be dead to sin. *This, according to the internal mode of interpretation,*

*he does ; but, according to the external mode, he does not.* The one states the actual and inward effects of the forgiveness of sins through faith. The other merely refers us to the influence of an external rite. That this is so let us now proceed to establish.

The fundamental points in the interpretation are four :

1. Ἐξαπείσθημεν is to be interpreted, *we have been purified or purged*, in the legal or sacrificial sense, to denote the actual purification or purgation of the conscience from guilt by the Spirit. This is the spiritual baptism of the Holy Ghost, and the designed influence of the system on the mind of a convicted sinner. Of this state of mind we have the following beautiful description from the pen of Cowper :

Sweet was the time when first I felt  
The Saviour's pardoning blood,  
*Applied to cleanse my soul from guilt,*  
And bring me home to God.

Thus, by this mode of translation, we pass at once, not to an external rite, but to the actual influence of the system on the mind.

2. Ἐξαπείσθημεν εἰς Χριστόν, is to be interpreted as indicating no external rite, but an actual union with Christ, by this spiritual purgation, or sense of the forgiveness of sins. This consciousness of forgiving love awakens corresponding love, and produces an entire union to Christ, and devotedness to him. "Whom not having seen, ye love ; and in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory." This is a spiritual baptism into Christ, involving a real and vital union to him.

3. As the baptism into Christ is thus internal and spiritual, so are the death, burial, and resurrection spoken of as produced by it ; and these are to be regarded as the genuine and universal effects of the system of forgiveness by faith in Christ.

4. These changes involve a crucifixion to sin, a death to it, a burial as it regards the old man, and a resurrection as it regards

the new, analogous to the natural crucifixion, death, burial, and resurrection of Christ. Thus the propositions of Paul may be briefly reduced to this : By forgiveness of sins we are truly and vitally united to Christ, and the inevitable effect of this union is to exterminate, radically and entirely, our old sinful character, and to produce a new one, pure and holy like his own. That these propositions, if true, do make a logical argument, none can deny. Thus,

Objection. The system of forgiveness of sins through faith in Christ tends to embolden men in sin.

Reply. It does not ; for all who are truly forgiven are dead to sin, and cannot live in it any longer. This is the natural and necessary consequence of the system.

Proof. All who are forgiven are united by it to Christ, and it is the inevitable consequence of this union to cause death unto sin, and life unto God.

Now if the facts alleged are not only true, but obvious and well known, then the argument is not only logical, but one of the highest power. But need I attempt to show that they are so ? Look first at a spiritual baptism. See the convinced sinner, agonized by the scorpion stings of a guilty conscience, and fears of coming wrath, and earnestly inquiring, What shall I do ? Next look at him baptized by the Holy Ghost, his conscience purged from guilt by the blood of Christ, his sins forgiven, his soul redeemed—an enemy, an alien, a rebel no more, but a child of God, a son, an heir. In the midst of all his joy, what one thought above all others will of necessity fill and overwhelm his mind ? It is this : *To the death of Christ I owe it all ;—Oh what had eternity been to me, had it not been for the death of Christ !* And now what must be—what will be, the inevitable course of his soul ? Can he endure the thought of living in sin any longer ? Speak, oh speak, ye who have ever felt the overwhelming, the infinite, the irresistible power of a Saviour's love. Was not its natural, its necessary tendency to produce an entire and vital union of the soul to Christ, and a ceaseless and intense desire to be formed in his per-

fect image, and under the power of his love to make efforts to exterminate every sin, of which not even the remotest idea had been formed before? Such an appeal to every possible principle of gratitude, honor, generosity, love, hope, and fear, was never combined in the universe before; nor is such a combination possible, save to an infinite, incarnate, atoning God. And what do facts say? Need the oft repeated story of the Moravian brethren and the poor Greenlanders be told again? Need the experience of ages past, and of every faithful and successful minister of the present day, be rehearsed in proof? Nay, we all know the fact; it lies on the very surface of the system, as well as in its lowest depths; yea, I had almost said, it is its all in all.

What, therefore, the internal interpretation affirms, as it regards the natural influence of the system of forgiveness by faith in Christ, is an obvious and well known truth; and it is true concerning this system alone. The argument, then, is not only perfectly logical, but one of the highest importance and power.

But what shall we say of the external interpretation? How does, or how can an external rite prove that the system of forgiveness of sins through Christ produces death to sin? The reply of the Fathers would have been logical if true. They held that Christ gave to the water a purging power; it was holy water; there was a mysterious energy to destroy sin and to communicate the Holy Spirit. Hence they urged sinners to come to the baptismal pool, very much as sinners are urged to come to the inquirer's seat, or even to Christ. Alas for the religion of Christ! for centuries long and dark this was almost the only view of the church; and let those who attach such weight to patristic interpretation, weigh well, before they give it much authority, that malignant and damnable system—of which it was an essential part—BAPTISMAL REGENERATION! What tongue can utter the delusion, the spiritual despotism and the misery, which have been poured from that full cup of wrath on a guilty world! This view, therefore, is not only to be rejected as false, but to be abhorred as unutterably pernicious.

We come then to all that remains—to the moral influence of the solemnity of the baptismal promise and rite, as exhibited by Prof. Chase, and others ; or, to the argument from its import, as stated by Dr. Carson. According to the first view, those who have been duly immersed are supposed to be thus addressed : “ Reflect how solemn your professions and promises in the hour of baptism, and how significant the rite by which your duty was shadowed forth, and your relations to Christ presented to the mind. Did you not solemnly promise, when immersed, to die unto sin and to live unto God ? And as you sank into a watery grave, and came forth once more to the vital air, did you not solemnly show forth your duty to die to sin, and rise to a new and holy life, and also the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, by which your salvation was procured ? ”

It is painful indeed even to seem to speak severely of what is so sincerely and conscientiously said. But, in fidelity to God and to man, I am constrained to ask : What does all this amount to, unless it be to throw the main and peculiar reforming power of the gospel, upon the influence to be exerted by the solemnities of one external rite ? And is it come to this ? Is this all the answer that even an apostle can give to an objection against the gospel, so deep, so fundamental ? Are solemn promises and the moral power of one rite, the vital and essential elements of the reforming power of the gospel ? God forbid that I should deny or diminish their usefulness in their place. But this is not their place. We all know—universal experience has taught us—that promises, however solemn, and rites however significant, have no such reforming power. And universal observation has shown, that those who are baptized by the particular mode of immersion, are not by it made better Christians than others. On this point let Prof. Chase himself speak. “ To you,” he says, “ I have intrusted the vindicating of my wisdom and goodness in the institution of baptism, by exemplifying in your lives *its holy tendency*. Vain are all other vindications without this.” Sermon on the Design of Baptism, p. 28. But he says, p. 26, “ Chris-



tians living in error on this subject, and attached, as men naturally are, to what has been handed down from their fathers, have marked us; and the men of the world have marked us. They have observed our lives. And have we never heard the keen reproach: What do ye more than others? Ah! my brethren, if it were only a slander, we could bear it. But when he himself—our Lord and Master—into whose death we have been baptized, casts on us the grieved and piercing look, which he cast on Peter when he had denied him, and asks: What do ye more than others? we can only go out and weep bitterly.” Will my honored brother allow me to suggest, that, if he will place infinitely less dependence on the power of that external rite, in which he *differs* from other Christians, and infinitely more dependence on those great truths of the system, which he has in common with other Christians, and on which its reforming power is entirely based, he will have reached the true and only secret of irresistibly moving moral appeals? Till then, unless all the laws of the human mind shall be changed, he will labor in vain to secure, by the aid of any external rite, the end which he so sincerely and ardently desires.

But Dr. Carson and others will say: That is not our view. We hold that Paul uses the symbolical import of baptism, to prove that believers are in fact dead to sin. To this I reply: It does not help the case; for any external rite, in such a course of argument, cannot prove any such thing. How can the operation of any system on the mind be proved, except by looking directly at the mind itself, and considering the effect of the system on it? To test the argument, let us suppose an objector, and see what Dr. Carson on his ground can reply.

Obj. I distrust this system of freely forgiving the greatest sins through faith in Christ. It tends to encourage men to live in sin.

Dr. C. Not at all. Those who live under it are of course dead to sin.

Obj. Pray how do you prove that?

Dr. C. Are you indeed so ignorant as not to know ? Why it is clearly proved by the import of the baptismal rite.

Obj. Pray explain the nature of the proof ?

Dr. C. It exhibits those baptized in a figure, as dead with Christ, and thus proves that they are so. See p. 143.

Obj. But how can an external exhibition of this sort prove that Christians are dead to sin ?

Dr. C. Thus. This is not an accidental similitude, but a divinely appointed emblem ; and, therefore, what it indicates God affirms, and, therefore, it must be true. See p. 143.

Obj. So then it amounts to this ; it is so, because God declares it to be so by this rite ?

Dr. C. Yes, this is its force.

Obj. Well then, if it were a case of mere authority, and not of argument, it would be in point. But as a means of removing my difficulties by argument, it is not in point. For I am looking at a system of forgiveness of sins ; and I affirm that it appears to me as if it would encourage, and not check sin. And you undertook to reason with me, and yet you explain nothing, and only silence me by mere authority. Can you not reason with me, and show from the system itself, and from the laws of the mind, that it does not so tend ? Lay aside, I beseech you, your external symbols, and look at the things themselves. Just show me the necessary operation of the system on the mind of a forgiven sinner.

What can Dr. Carson do but comply with his request ? And this brings him at once to the true and internal mode of interpretation—to lay aside all external rites, and to bend all his energies to prove, by an appeal to the mind under the operation of the system, that it has a reforming, and not a demoralizing power. And this, as I have already shown, is precisely what Paul does, without the least allusion to an external rite.

The obvious fact is, that all allusion to an external rite is here out of place. It destroys the train of reasoning, perplexes and confuses the mind, and causes a deep and painful feeling of the

entire absence of logical proof. Hence we need not wonder, that logical minds have felt this. Mr. Barnes says openly, that there is no *reasoning* here, but mere popular appeal; and truly, according to the external mode of interpretation, there is none. But is this the place for popular appeal? If ever an objection deserved a thorough and logical reply, this is the one. Moreover, up to this point we have had reasoning, cogent and condensed. Why suppose a break in the chain here? Above all other places, this ought to be strictly logical, and unanswerably strong; and so indeed it is. There is no break; there is no flaw; there is no relying on popular appeal; there is no magnifying of the power of promises, professions, and external rites. But there is a close logical and unanswerable argument, from the necessary operation of the gospel on the human mind. But this will become still more evident, when we proceed to consider the requisitions of the *usus loquendi*, as to spiritual crucifixion, death, burial, etc.

§ 33. *Argument from the Usus Loquendi as to Spiritual Death, Burial, etc.*

We have great reason for gratitude, that the mode of speech, used in these disputed passages, is not limited to them, but exists in numerous other places, where it can be the subject of no fair dispute. The *usus loquendi* in question, is not accidental, without rules, and obscure, but based on principles clear, certain, and consistent. It is found chiefly in the writings of Paul, but it clearly occurs in those of Peter. Its principles are these:

1. The spiritual crucifixion, towards which the forgiveness of sins tends, as already shown, is a work involving great and intense pain, and to induce a man to summon all his resolution and energy to do it thoroughly, powerful motives are needed.

2. Such is the nature of man, that the most powerful motives, by which he can be influenced, must be derived from the following sources—(1) affecting examples of fortitude in suffering—

(2) infinite blessings received through a suffering friend—(3) the deep interest of that friend in our suffering for him. The loss of fortitude to endure suffering for the general good, and a love of indolence and ease, are the universal characteristics of our depraved nature, and are the hardest of all to be overcome. But if the idea can be fully thrown into the mind, and kept daily before it, that our highest benefactor himself *suffered with infinite fortitude*, and not only so, but that he thus suffered *for us*, and not only so, that he infinitely and ardently desires *to form the same traits in us*, and rejoices to see us, from love to him, crucify the spirit of indolence, indulgence, and ease, and learn to rejoice in a life of fortitude and suffering for the good of others, like his own, then motives are concentrated and accumulated, the power of which no man can resist.

3. It is the design of this mode of speech to combine all these varied motives in one condensed appeal. The mode adopted is this. Christ and the believer are represented as mutually interested in each other, and both as *suffering* for, and with, the other. The part in each, that suffers, is called by the same name—the flesh. But in the one case, it is external and material—the body of Christ. In the other, it is internal and spiritual—the body of sin, the old man. As each is spoken of as having a body, so each body is represented as composed of members; in the one case, external and material as before, in the other case, internal and spiritual, i. e. various and deep-rooted habits of sin, to be eradicated by a process as painful as to cut off a right hand or foot, or to pluck out a right eye. Thus we have the body of sin, and its members, the old man and his members, which are the same as the flesh, with its affections and lusts.

All these then are spoken of as to be crucified, eradicated, and destroyed; but as the work is excessively painful, and flesh and blood shrink from its thorough execution, the example of Christ, as enduring intense pain in his flesh, i. e. his body and members, in the agonies of crucifixion for us, is presented as an example for us to imitate, in our moral crucifixion for him. And we are ad-

jured, in view of such an example, such love for us, and such deep present interest in us, to arm ourselves with the same resolute purpose to suffer for him, in crucifying and destroying the flesh. This entire train of thought is fully set forth in 1 Pet. iv. 1: "Forasmuch then as Christ hath *suffered for us* in the flesh, arm yourselves likewise with the same mind (i.e. summon all your energy to suffer for him in the flesh); *for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin.*" In other words, he who hath crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts thereof, hath ceased from sin. Only the internal sense is here possible; for crucifying the flesh, in this sense, does destroy sin; bodily suffering does not. The final result is then stated: "that he no longer should live the rest of his time in the flesh (i.e. in the body, or in this world), to the lusts of man, but to the will of God." Here then we have the work to be done—to crucify the flesh, and the example of Christ in suffering, the fact that it was for us that he suffered, and his earnest desire that we should indicate the same fortitude in suffering for him, in order to become holy, and live in this world for God, and not for man. Thus the appeal is thorough and complete. And how great its power! Christian, are you relaxing your efforts to subdue sin? Do you say, It is too painful, I cannot endure it? But Oh, think again. Did Christ, your Saviour, suffer so much that you may be forgiven, and be restored to holiness, and does he earnestly desire it? has he fixed his heart upon it? is he deeply grieved at your negligence and sloth? Will you not then arouse yourself at once? Think of the fortitude and firmness with which he armed himself when he suffered for you; and arm yourself with the same mind to suffer for him, in becoming holy, which he manifested in suffering that you might become holy.

This mode of speech is carried out in other parts of Scripture, in great minuteness of detail, but always on this principle, that the sufferings of Christ are supposed to be fully before the mind, as an object of daily meditation and imitation, and that whatever took place naturally in connexion with the sufferings of Christ,

has something to correspond with it spiritually, in its connexion with the sufferings of believers. Thus :

## CHRIST.

1. Christ suffered naturally.
2. Christ in his flesh, i.e. body natural.
3. The members of Christ's body were crucified.
4. Christ's body died entirely. All natural life was totally extinct.
5. Christ's natural death was for sin.
6. Christ was buried naturally, and became invisible in the grave.
7. Christ rose naturally, and appeared in new external glory.
8. It was the mighty natural power of God that raised Christ.
9. Christ after his resurrection sat down in heavenly places, bodily.
10. Christ dies naturally no more ; death hath no more dominion over him.

## THE BELIEVER.

1. The believer suffers spiritually.
2. The believer in his flesh, i.e. body of sin.
3. The members of the body of sin are to be crucified.
4. The body of sin, the old man, the flesh, is to be entirely destroyed.
5. The believer's spiritual death is to sin.
6. The believer is to be buried spiritually and to become invisible in his old character.
7. The believer is to rise spiritually and appear in a new, holy, glorious, spiritual character.
8. It is the mighty power of God *through faith* that raises the believer.
9. Believers sit down *by faith* in heavenly places, after their resurrection.
10. Believers die in sin no more ; death spiritual hath no more dominion over them.

This process is sometimes stated antithetically, and in separate



parts, but it is also expressed in abbreviated forms of speech formed by compounding the word denoting the action with *σύν*, e. g. *συνπάσχω*, *συσταυρώω*, *συναποθνήσκω*, *συζωοποιέω*, *συνεγείρω*, *συχχαλίζω*, etc. ; in all which cases is implied, I do or suffer that spiritually, which Christ did or suffered naturally. So believers are said to suffer, be crucified, die, be buried, be restored to life, be raised, sit in heavenly places, and live for ever *with Christ*, i. e. spiritually, as in his case naturally.

The reason of this is to be found in two facts.

1. Christ suffered, died, etc., naturally, in order to secure, not only forgiveness, but also these very spiritual changes in us, and it is the power of his example and love which in fact produces them. As Christ, therefore, had all these things in view, when he suffered, and as his sufferings rendered them sure, the spiritual sufferings of believers are looked on as virtually included in the natural sufferings of Christ : their death *to sin* in his *for it*—their spiritual burial, resurrection, and eternal life, in his natural burial, resurrection, and eternal life. For surely one series did involve and render certain the other ; and so when one came to pass actually, the other did virtually.

2. The ardent love to Christ, which ever glowed in the breast of Paul, led him to devise this mode of speech, as the best adapted to express his unutterable affection for his Saviour, his all-absorbing admiration of his character, and his infinite and intense desire to be in all things one with him. Hence, as the sufferings of his own adored Lord and Saviour passed every hour before his mind, an intense desire arose, as it were, to make them his own, that is, to identify himself with him, in absolute and perfect sympathy, and, especially, to admire, and adore, and imitate his character in that humiliation, and those sufferings which he underwent for us. But before he could thus perfectly sympathize with Christ, he must of course renounce and crucify entirely all former ambitions, selfish and worldly modes of feeling ; for he could not perfectly sympathize with such suffering love, till he was perfectly like him. Hence, the least remains of sin he regarded as

excluding him from a perfect experimental and sympathetic knowledge of the character of Christ ; and, by self-crucifixion, to reach this point of a perfect experimental sympathy in the absolute perfection of a suffering Saviour, was the summit of all his desires. Hear him as he exclaims : " I count all things loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Jesus Christ, my Lord, that I may know him and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death." And again : " I am crucified with Christ ; nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." And again : " God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world."—The various forms of this mode of speech, in all its range, are not the mere offspring of a luxuriant poetic imagination. Nor are they merely the intellectual play of a fancy, that delights to trace analogies, and amuse with alliterations. They are the sacred, elevated spiritual language of unutterable love, the full power and beauty of which no eye can see, or heart feel, that has never felt the emotions from which it sprang. Without them, it may seem like a mere heartless play of the imagination ; with them, it will at once be recognised as the spontaneous, irresistible gushing forth of the emotions of a heart, every impulse of which is towards Christ, every desire of which is to be like him in all things, and one with him in joys and sorrows, in life and death. And sad was that day for the primitive church, when her heart ceased to beat responsive to that of Paul, and darkness fell upon the deep spiritual import of his sacred words. Then, in a fatal hour, the mystery of iniquity began to work ; and soon, regeneration, by an external form, and mystic, hidden influences, usurped the place of the real crucifixion of the body of sin.

To illustrate these principles by quotations in detail, would exceed my limits. I shall only refer to the following passages of Scripture, on which they are based, and which, in order to see the whole truth on the subject, ought to be carefully examined.

In Eph. i. 19–23, and ii. 1–7, natural death, resurrection, etc., in Christ, are viewed analogically with death in sin, resur-

rection from sin, etc., in believers ; and the power of God, raising Christians by faith, is compared to his natural power in raising Christ, and is said to be analogical to it ; and the idea that believers are restored to life, rise and sit down spiritually in heaven, as Christ did naturally, and that these changes in him involved theirs, is expressed by συνεζωοποίησε, συνήγειρε, συνεκάθισε. In Phil. iii. 10-21, Paul desires to know fully, and in a spiritual sense,—that which corresponds by analogy to these natural changes in Christ,—1, sufferings ; 2, death ; 3, resurrection ; 4, experience of divine power ; and he shows how he aimed at the spiritual perfection, involved in a perfect similitude to the natural events—i. e. a perfect moral crucifixion, death, and resurrection)—though he had not yet attained, and was not yet perfect. There is not the least allusion to his own *natural resurrection*, here. That would take place of course, and without any effort on his part, and the law of analogy totally forbids such an interpretation. In Col. ii. 20, and iii. 1-4, we have, 1, *death* to the world with Christ ; 2, *a resurrection* with Christ, and a sympathy with the things where Christ is, producing an internal and hidden life in him. Both of these changes in the believer are internal and spiritual, and in Christ external.

See also Gal. vi. 14, 1 Pet. iv. 1, 2, Gal. ii. 19, 20, Col. iii. 5-14, Gal. v. 24. To these add Rom. vi. 1-13 and Col. ii. 11-13. Some of these have been referred to before ; and the last two contain the passages in dispute ; but I refer to them now, in order to present the Scripture evidence in a single group. One thing more deserves our notice in this place. Two spiritual states are sometimes used as analogical to the death of Christ,—one *death in sin*, as in Eph. ii. 1-7, and Col. ii. 11-13, the other *death to sin* by moral crucifixion, as in Rom. vi. 1-13 and Phil. iii. 10-21. But in no case is the fundamental law of the analogy disregarded, i. e. that the states or changes in believers are spiritual and internal, those of Christ natural and external. In the sense of death in sin, moreover, they are never said to be lead *with Christ* ; for, to secure such a death in them, he did not

aim ; but their death in sin is merely spoken of as calling for the exercise of the mighty power of God to raise them up, just as Christ's natural death demanded almighty natural power in order to raise him up.

The inferences which I draw from this exhibition of the *usus loquendi*, are these :

1. The general law of analogy demands the internal sense throughout the whole of Rom. vi. 1-13 and Col. ii. 11-13. Look at the preceding columns of parallel analogies. Of these all but 6 and 7 are undeniably internal and spiritual on one side, and external and natural on the other. By what law can 8 out of 10, in a connected series, be internal and spiritual, and the other two external and physical ?

2. Of these two, one—resurrection—is clearly proved, in the analogous passages, to be used in a spiritual sense. See Eph. ii. 5, 6, and Col. iii. 1. Does not the *usus loquendi* then demand that sense here ?

3. The resurrection in Col. ii. 11-13 is proved, by internal evidence, to be spiritual ; for it is *by faith*. Compare this now with precisely the same idea in Eph. i. 18-20, and ii. 4-6, Phil. iii. 10, 11, Col. i. 3 ; and who can doubt ? So in keeping believers, God exercises his mighty power *through faith*, 1 Pet. i. 5 : Ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ προϋρουμένων διὰ πίστεως, εἰς σωτηρίαν. So in Col. συνηγέρθητε διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ Θεοῦ denotes : “ ye were raised with him, by that faith, through which the power of God exerts itself.” Of course, if the resurrection is spiritual, so is the burial.

4. In the phrase, θάνατον αὐτοῦ, in Rom. vi. 3, the law of analogy requires αὐτοῦ to be regarded as the genitive of similitude, i. e. a death like his, or analogical to it. This use of the genitive is exceedingly common ; as in Jude 11, the way of Cain, the error of Balaam, and the gainsaying of Core mean a way, error, and gainsaying, like that of Cain, Balaam, and Core. So in Luke xi. 29, the sign of Jonas, the prophet, is a sign like that of Jonas, the prophet ; for in fact it was the burial of Christ three days and

nights. But to put it beyond all doubt, in v. 5 it is expressed in full—τῇ ὁμοιότητι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ—"the likeness of his death," i. e. a spiritual death, like his natural death.

5. Finally, the *usus loquendi*, as it regards both spiritual baptism, and spiritual crucifixion and death, authorizes and requires us thus to interpret Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12.

Know ye not that so many of us, as have been purified into Christ (i. e. truly united to Christ by the forgiveness of sins), have been, by the forgiveness of sins, subjected to a spiritual death, like his natural death? Therefore as he was naturally buried, so are we spiritually buried by that forgiveness of sins, which subjected us to a spiritual death. That, like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. Rom. vi. 3, 4. As he was buried naturally, so were ye spiritually buried in the forgiveness of your sins, in which ye also rose spiritually as he did naturally, by that faith through which is exerted the power of that God, who raised him from the dead. Col. ii. 12. From the whole context, nothing can be more certain than the spiritual sense of this passage. We have, in v. 11, internal circumcision, and putting off the body of the flesh; in v. 12, a resurrection by faith; in v. 13, an internal death in sin and an internal restoration to life. Who then can have the least ground for calling the burial an external burial? So Rom. vi. 6. Paul expressly states that all that he has said of the death of the believer is to be understood of the death of the old man, and the destruction of the body of sin. But of course the burial and resurrection are as the death.

§ 34. *Argument from the congruity of the interpretation with the general system of truth.*

The system of truth is but one. Hence all truth is consistent with itself; and the more we investigate its minute relations, the more are we impressed with a conviction of its universal harmony. It is this perception of congruity in ten thousand minute particulars, which produces what we call a sense or feeling of

verisimilitude. And as the operations of the mind are often so rapid as to elude analysis, it gives rise to what may be called a pre-sentiment of truth, even before investigation. Nor is this to be despised. In any mind familiar with the great outlines of truth, such rapid perceptions of the agreement or disagreement of a given view with those great outlines, have a real and logical basis, as investigation seldom fails to show. But when investigation has taken place, they can be stated and exhibited in their true relations. Some of the incongruities of the external system of interpretation with the existing system of truth, I shall proceed to state.

1. It is incongruous to take so much notice of one external institution, and to say nothing of the rest.

2. It is incongruous, if only one is taken, to notice one which is less adapted to exert a great moral influence, and not to notice one more adapted.

3. It is incongruous for Paul to make so much of any external rite, and especially of this.

4. It is still more incongruous for Jesus Christ to do the same.

5. It is incongruous to establish one institution to commemorate the death of Christ, and then intrude on its province by another established for a different end.

As has been stated, the external interpretation rests the reforming power of the gospel, in a great degree, on the influence of profession and promises connected with an external rite, or on its influence in presenting truth to the mind. And are there no other institutions that have the same external power? Are there no solemn vows around the Lord's table, and no intensely affecting truths as to the death of Christ, inculcated by it? Does the Sabbath declare nothing of a heavenly rest, nor bid man to die to the world? Has the ministry and the preached word no reforming power? Why say so much of the "holy tendency" of immersion, and omit all these?

But if any one of these was to be selected, why choose that one which occurs but once in the life of a believer, and omit the oft-



recurring influence of the Lord's Supper, and the solemn promises, renewed with increasing fervency, from year to year, till death closes the scene? Why say so much of the weaker, and yet wholly omit the stronger moral power? Is there indeed in this one rite a secret mystic influence, as the Fathers thought, operating with immense power, breaking down and destroying all sin, actual and original, at one blow? If not, and if it stands solely on the ground of moral influence, in impressing truth by symbols on the mind, then the selection of this, and the omission of the Lord's supper are truly incongruous.

But if we could expect such an effort to magnify an external rite from any one, we should least of all expect it from Paul, who regarded it, in comparison with the gospel, as of so little weight, that he thanked God that he baptized none of the Corinthians, but Crispus and Gaius and the household of Stephanas, and affirmed that God sent him not to baptize, but to preach the gospel, and who gloried in nothing, save in the cross of Christ. Is it possible that this same Paul has, in another place, attempted to refute a fundamental objection to this same gospel, by magnifying the influence of this same external rite? What! at one time ascribe to it in some way such prodigious power to eradicate sin, and then thank God that he did not administer it, and declare that he was not sent to do it!

Turn now to Christ, and hear him (Matt. xii. 7) rebuke the rigid construers of external observances, by the reproof: "If ye had known what that meaneth, *I will have mercy and not sacrifice*, ye would not have condemned the guiltless." Again, when Peter desired a more complete washing than the rest of the disciples (John xiii. 10), hear him declare that, to indicate complete purification, a washing of the feet is enough. And can we believe that this same Jesus inspired his beloved Paul to declare that purification cannot be acceptably signified in more than one way, and that one, immersion of the whole body?

Finally, the Lord's Supper was established to show forth the Lord's atoning death, until he should come. Baptism indicates

the actual purgation of the heart and conscience from sin, when the atonement is applied by the Holy Spirit. One indicates how redemption was procured; the other, how it is applied. One commemorates atonement by Christ; the other, regeneration by the Holy Spirit. But the external interpretation makes baptism a commemoration of three things—1, the natural death and resurrection of Christ; 2, the spiritual death and resurrection of the believer, and 3, the natural resurrection of the believer. Carson, p. 232. This is incongruous indeed. It is a manifest intrusion into the province of the Lord's Supper, and that without the least reason; and it nearly loses in ideas of death and resurrection, all reference to purity. In truth, it seems to immerse, and almost to bury out of sight, the main idea of the rite, and to bring vividly before the mind the fundamental ideas of another rite; so much so, that, in reading Prof. Chase's sermon on the design of baptism, one can hardly avoid feeling that it is even more a discourse on the design of the Lord's Supper, than a discourse on the design of that rite, which was peculiarly ordained to show forth the work of the Holy Ghost. Moreover, so far as it relates to purity, it is not the direct figure of the reality, but only the figure of a figure of the reality. *Purification* is the reality. But immersion, the Baptists all affirm, is the figure of *death*. But death is only a figure of the spiritual destruction of the old man, in which purification actually consists. But of purification it is no figure.

Such, then, are the inconsistencies and incongruities, which attend all efforts to force an external sense on the baptism and burial spoken of in these passages. But assign to them the internal and spiritual sense, and all is consistent and clear. For it rests the reforming power of the gospel on no external rite, and intrudes on none. Nor does it at all disagree with the known character and feelings of Christ or of Paul, but perfectly agrees with both; for it directs us at once to the internal power of a spiritual purgation of the soul, by the Holy Ghost, to unite to Christ, and thus destroy the body of sin. And it presents distinctly and fully to the mind, that in which Paul was wont most to glory—the cross of Christ—

and the energy of the gospel as the power of God to salvation, to every one that believeth.

§ 35. *Argument from the moral tendencies and effects of each mode of interpretation.*

The principles of this argument are plain. They are these. All truth, in its permanent influences, tends to holiness ; all error, to sin. Therefore, if we can show, *à priori*, that tendency to sin, in any view, or prove by an appeal to facts that it has resulted in sin, we are authorized to draw the conclusion, that the view is false. Nevertheless, in this mode of reasoning, great care is needed not to confound mere accidental sequences, with real and genuine effects. To guard against this, note the following facts :

1. Self-crucifixion is, of all things, most painful. From all suffering, men naturally shrink ; but much more from the internal pain and humiliation attendant on subduing sin, than from any other. Hence, to spare the old man, pilgrimages, fastings, flagellations, bodily sufferings of all kinds, and even death itself, are willingly endured.

2. Hence, in all ages a universal propensity to avoid the real and internal crucifixion of the old man, by a reliance on external forms of mysterious operation, or on an authorized ministry, or a primitive church, or solemn ceremonies, rather than on the simple and sure crucifixion of the flesh, with the affections and lusts thereof.

3. The most powerful system, by which the devil ever corrupted and destroyed the gospel of Christ, even the great mystery of iniquity, has its foundation on a skilful use of this tendency of the human heart. It is a system expressly designed to exclude spiritual crucifixion, that is, to exclude real holiness, and to replace it by a religion of ceremonies and forms.

4. The external interpretation tends naturally to that very view, for its obvious sense is to make external baptism the great destroyer of sin, and the great defence of the church against it.

5. By the Fathers, and even by Augustine, it was practically

so regarded. He did not, indeed, exclude the Holy Spirit, but regarded the water, when consecrated, as involving, in some mysterious way, his presence ; and though he threw out cautions against the grosser forms of baptismal regeneration, yet the practical influence of his urgent appeals to sinners, to come to the baptismal pool, and wash away all their sins, or bury the old man, etc. etc., could not possibly have but one result. Baptism became practically the great thing ; and on it, eternal life or eternal death seemed to hang. And in all this mournful process, the external interpretation of these texts is almost the great moving power of the whole. It is not wise to give to any one cause exclusive power in forming the papal system, but I hesitate not to say, that no one cause did more than *baptismal regeneration* ; and no one cause did more to develope and mature that doctrine, than the external interpretation of these texts. Of this fact, pages of proof are at hand, and, if any one desires, can easily be produced. But, to those who have examined enough to judge, no proof, I think, can be needed.

6. No modern corrections or limitations of the patristic interpretation of these passages have been able to neutralize or destroy the injurious tendency of the external view ; nor can it be done, so long as the great fact remains, that in an argument designed unanswerably to prove the sanctifying power of the gospel, an external rite comes where the internal energy of truth and the Holy Spirit ought to come. The external rite, if admitted at all with such a view, wrests and distorts the great outlines of the whole picture. It is not the glorious gospel that fills the mind, as held by all real Christians, but the peculiar solemnity, fitness, and significance of the form of immersion, or else the solemn promises made when immersed. And on a mind adverse to self-crucifixion, and tending to self-complacency and censoriousness, what must be the moral effect of such appeals as these : “ Yes, my brethren, we have been truly baptized. We have been *immersed*, and now the world looks to us for a proof of its sanctifying power ? ” Let it be granted that these things are not

always said in pride, but often in deep and humble sincerity. But what art can extract the venom they are adapted to infuse, or prevent the inevitable tendency to magnify certain forms, and to freeze the heart of Christian love to all who are without the range of those forms? In multitudes of noble spirits, I rejoice to record it, the last effect is not produced. But it is to be ascribed to other and powerful counteracting causes, whilst, where no such counteracting causes exist, the venom rages unchecked; and we are not obscurely told that it is at least uncertain, whether a person unimmersed, can ever enter the kingdom of God; and immersion, as of old, practically usurps the place of regeneration. Among the evangelical Baptists this, indeed, is not true; other causes prevent. But there have long been others who equal or even exceed them in their zeal for immersion, and the Mormonites are now to be added to the list. If there is a real sanctifying power in this view, why are such multitudes of men, in all parts of our land, so zealous for it, who yet give no signs of crucifying the flesh with the affections and lusts thereof? The fact cannot be denied. Why is it so? Is it not because it presents, *as a cross to be taken up, a mere external rite*, and promises, in some way, by the mysterious operation of a form, to enable them to escape the self-crucifixion they so much dread? And can holy men—men of prayer—sustain that very mode of interpretation on which it all rests, and not, whether they will or no, confirm such men in their views? Let all who are truly holy cut loose from this view, and soon the unholy will sink it by their own moral gravitation, and it will disappear.

On the other hand, the internal interpretation directs the attention of Christians directly to the interior, central, and fundamental work of self-crucifixion, under the influence of forgiving love, and declares that true and real forgiveness of sins, always indicates itself by the destruction of the flesh with the affections and lusts thereof, and stimulates and aids Christians, in the highest degree, by example, and gratitude, and sympathy between the believer and Christ.

It is no small loss then to the Christian world, not only to lose the whole power of these passages for good, but even to have them perverted for evil, or else so obscured in the smoke of controversy, that they produce almost no effect, except to awaken in the mind an anxiety to know whether they do mean immersion or not. Let them be redeemed from all perversion and controversy, and let them utter, in clear tones, the full heart of Paul, and they will arouse the whole church to the earnest pursuit of eminent holiness as with a trumpet call.

### § 36. *Objection from authority considered.*

The influence of authority, with many minds, is great; and I should not be surprised if some should try to urge the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, in view of opinions so numerous and respectable against this result.

To this with all deference I would make the following reply :

1. In a radical discussion of the question, *Are the majority right?* an appeal to names is totally illogical. This is manifestly a case of the kind.

2. In some cases, numbers are a presumptive argument of error, and not of truth; i. e. in the case of old errors, long established, and never thoroughly reinvestigated.

3. That this is a case of the kind, one striking proof will clearly show;—that every argument for the external sense, which I have found after extended search, has rested entirely on an obvious, yet fundamental *petitio principii*. I refer to the fact that in every case it has been assumed, without proof, or even an effort at proof, that the baptism spoken of is external,—just as if there were no such idea, in the word of God, as internal baptism, or as if it were of no importance, and, therefore, it is always *à priori* probable that whenever the word is used, the external rite is meant,—so probable that it may always be assumed without proof. Look now at the works of Prof. Chase, Dr. Carson, and Prof. Ripley, so often alluded to, and you find not even an effort to prove,



philologically, that the baptism is external. It is always assumed. And yet, as all know, this is a fundamental point in the whole discussion.

What then are the facts as they present themselves in the New Testament? They are these:

1. There is a baptism, infinitely more important than the external baptism, and of which the external baptism is but a sign.

2. In the spiritual baptism, a believer is actually purged from sin and guilt, by the Holy Ghost. In the external, the forgiveness of sins is openly announced to him, on the assumption that he has repented and believes, as he professes.

3. The person baptized is regarded as calling on the name of the Lord for forgiveness, and the baptizer as announcing his forgiveness in the name of the Lord. Acts xxii. 16.

4. In the case of internal baptism, there is no such external use of the name of God, but a real forgiveness resulting in actual union to Christ. Hence,

5. The form—*βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς ὄνομα Χριστοῦ*—is adapted to express the external baptism; *βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς Χριστόν*, to express the internal baptism, that actually unites to Christ.

6. To this view, all facts accord. For in every instance where *ὄνομα* is used, there is internal evidence in the passage to prove that external baptism is meant. Matt. xxviii. 19, Acts ii. 38, Acts viii. 16, Acts x. 48, Acts xix. 5, Acts xxii. 16, 1 Cor. i. 13, 15.

But in every case where *ὄνομα* is omitted, and *εἰς* precedes *Χριστόν* or *σῶμα*, denoting the spiritual body of Christ, there is internal evidence that external baptism is not meant, and that internal is meant. Rom. vi. 3, 1 Cor. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 27. In case of the first two, we have exhibited the evidence of the internal sense in the preceding argument, and in § 11. In Gal. iii. 27, the sense of *Putting on Christ* is fixed by Rom. xiii. 14, as denoting, not an external profession of religion, but a real assumption of a holy character, like that of Christ. See also Eph. iv. 24 and Col. iii. 10, 12, for a perfect demonstration of this sense. Be-

sides, it is utterly unworthy of Paul to say : “ As many of you, as have been externally baptized into Christ, have made a profession of religion,” but entirely worthy of him to say : “ As many as have been baptized into Christ spiritually, have really been by it changed into his image ;” and this is true of all who have been spiritually baptized, but of all who have been externally baptized it is not true ; yet Paul affirms it of all ; ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθησαν εἰς Χριστόν.

In 1 Cor. x. 2, εἰς τὸν Μωϋσῆν ἐβαπτίσαντο denotes neither Christian baptism nor external baptism ; but a throwing back the name of the antitype upon the type, from a regard to similar effects. Believers, by spiritual baptism, are delivered from Satan and united to Christ. The children of Israel were delivered from Pharaoh, and really united to Moses, as a leader and saviour, by the cloud and the sea. There was here *no external profession, but a real union to Moses* as a leader, effected by a separation and deliverance from Pharaoh. In all this, Moses was a type of Christ, and, therefore, the name of the antitype is thrown back upon this transaction, and it is called a baptism into Moses, but not into the name of Moses. On the same principle, i. e. regard to effects, spiritual baptism is called the antitype of the salvation of Noah and his family in the ark. For as one actually saved Noah in the ark, so the other actually saves believers in Christ.

If these facts are so, where is the *à priori* improbability that internal baptism is meant in Rom. vi. 3, which all advocates of the external sense have assumed ? The fact is that the improbability, from the very form of language, is altogether against external baptism ; and all, who assume it, not only do so without proof, but without the possibility of proof, and against clear proof to the contrary.

No more striking instance can be given of the influence of a technical and external use of a word, without any reference to its spiritual signification, to turn away the mind from the true sense of the word of God. For in Eph. iv. 5, 6, as well as in Rom. vi. 3, and 1 Cor. xii. 13, and Gal. iii. 27, the same cause has

entirely hid the true and spiritual sense, and put an external rite where the whole context demands the work of the Holy Spirit. One Lord,—even Jesus Christ who made atonement,—one faith, or glorious system of truth to be believed, and one regeneration,—the glorious result of the application of that truth by the Holy Spirit! How incongruous to place an external rite in such relations, and, especially, so to exalt external *baptism*, and to say nothing of the Lord's Supper!

Through the same external, formal habit of mind, the beautiful and spiritual sense of Eph. v. 26 has been lost, though the washing is expressly declared to be by the word of God—ἐν ῥήματι; and the spiritual sense of ῥῶα is overlooked, though God has expressly used it as a symbol of truth. “I will sprinkle *clean water* on you, and ye shall be clean.”

So also the spiritual sense of Titus iii. 5 is drowned beneath the flood of external baptismal regeneration, though the language is exactly adapted to express the beginning and progress of spiritual life, or regeneration and sanctification—ἡ πρώτη πλύσις ὁλοκαύστητος denoting the first, and ἀνακαίνισις πνεύματος ἁγίου the progressive sanctification, caused by abundant effusions of the Holy Spirit.

Finally, not only is it true that external baptism is not meant in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, but it is also true that there is no reason to think that any part of the language is taken from that rite. For,

1. Even had there been no external rite, but internal baptism only, the force of the analogy would have called for the use of burial in both of these passages. In speaking of the spiritual crucifixion, death, and resurrection of the believer, how could Paul help inserting burial?

2. The real origin of the language is obvious. *Christ was buried in fact*, as well as crucified, and the same series of events, that furnished to Paul all the rest of his figures, would naturally furnish this.

3. The genius and habits of Paul's mind demand this origin;

for it was not external baptism that was daily before his mind, but the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ.

4. The supposed connexion or similitude between the word βαπτίζω and burial, does not exist; for βαπτίζω means to purify, and, therefore, would not suggest the idea of burial. Such, then, is the proof of the position originally stated, that the *baptism, burial, resurrection, &c.*, spoken of in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, are all *internal*, and that the passage does not refer to the external rite at all, nor derive any of its language from it; but that the language would have been just as it is, if the rite had been administered by sprinkling alone, or even if there had been no external rite whatever.

#### § 37. *Apostolic practice considered.*

After what has been said, but few words are needed on this point. It is plain,

1. That to us it is of very little consequence, what their practice was; for the command was only to purify, and God attaches no importance to any one mode rather than another.

2. It is not possible decisively to prove the mode used by the apostles; for if going to rivers, going down to the water and up from it, &c., create a presumption in favor of immersion, so does the baptism of three thousand on the day of Pentecost, in a city where water was scarce, and of the jailor in a prison, create a presumption in favor of sprinkling.

And if a possibility of immersion can be shown in the latter cases, so can a possibility of sprinkling or pouring, be shown in the former.

3. The command being to purify, and the facts being as stated, the decided probability is that either sprinkling, pouring, or immersion, was allowed, and Christian liberty was everywhere enjoyed.

4. A tendency to formalism led to a misinterpretation of Paul in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12; and this gave the ascendancy to immersion, which increased, as before stated, till it became

general, though it was not insisted on as absolutely essential on philological grounds.

5. Various causes, even in the Roman Catholic church, at length produced a relaxation of this excessive rigor of practice. And most Protestants, at the Reformation, took the same ground. But,

6. A mistake in philology, after the Reformation, introduced a practice stricter and more severe than even that of the Fathers, and which reprobates Christian liberty on this subject, as a corruption of the word of God; because various causes induced even the Roman Catholic church to relax a little of the excessive strictness of antiquity. I know that all that comes from the Roman Catholic church is *à priori* suspicious. But bad as that church is, no one can deny that there is some truth there. The view I have advanced, I hold, not on her authority, but on its own merits. And I will not reject or deny *a truth*, even if it is found in a corrupt church.

### § 38. *Final Result.*

It appears, then, that the whole subject turns on three points : 1, the import of βαπτίζω ; 2, the significance of the rite ; 3, early practice. On each, the argument in favor of immersion rests on a *petitio principii*. 1. It is assumed as improbable that βαπτίζω can mean *purify*, without respect to mode, if it also means, in other cases, *immerse*. The falsehood of this assumption has been shown, the existence of an opposite probability proved, and the meaning *purify* clearly established by facts. 2. The improbability of *internal* baptism in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, has been assumed, and external baptism has also been assumed without proof. It has been shown that the external sense, and not the internal sense, is improbable, and that against the external sense there is decisive proof. It has also been assumed that the practice of immersion by the Fathers and others, is proof of their philology, and that, therefore, they must have regarded the command to baptize as a command to immerse. The falsehood of this assumption has

also been clearly shown. The result of the whole is, that as to the *mode of purification* we may enjoy Christian liberty ; and that immeasurable evils attend the operation of those principles, by which many are now endeavoring to bring the church upon exclusive ground. There is no objection to immersion, *merely as one mode of purification*, to all who desire it. But to immersion as the *divinely ordained and only mode*, there are objections, deep and radical. We cannot produce unity by sanctioning a false principle ; our Baptist brethren can, by coming to the ground of Christian liberty. The conclusion, then, to which I would kindly, humbly, affectionately, yet decidedly come is this: "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage."

The argument is now closed. I intend only to add a few words of a practical kind, as it relates to the translation of the Bible, the unity of the church, and Christian communion.

•

---

#### NOTE.

The reception of Dr. Carson's first reply to me, induced me to change the purpose announced at the close of the preceding chapter, and again to reinvestigate the whole subject. The result is contained in the next part.



## PART III.

FIRST REPLY TO DR. CARSON.

### CHAPTER I.

God in his providence seems to be exciting unusual attention to the long continued debate as it regards the mode of Baptism. On this subject, two opposing systems are in conflict. One based on the performance of a specific act—i. e. immersion—the other on indicating an effect, i. e. purification. Each of these systems tends to results peculiar to itself. By these results the true nature of each system will be evolved, and in consequence of them, its soundness will be tested. Such is God's mode of bringing false systems to a close.

#### § 39. *Present Position of the Baptists.*

The system based on the performance of a specific act, is evolved. Let us look at its results, as seen in the present position of its advocates.

The denomination of Evangelical Baptists is large, universally diffused, and very active. It is in all the movements of the church, a constantly operating force. Of course the position they assume as it regards other denominations, is a matter of no small consequence. They have it in their power universally to affect the tranquillity of Zion. We shall therefore briefly consider the position which they do in fact assume. This can easily be inferred by carrying out logically the following principles,—that baptism is essential to church membership, and that the command

to baptize is a command to immerse. From these principles, they infer,

1. That all other denominations are unbaptized, because unimmersed, and that they are therefore in a state of disobedience to God.

2. That other denominations cannot be recognised and treated by them as members of the Church of Christ, because unbaptized, and are therefore to be excluded on this ground, from communion with them at the table of the Lord.

3. That other denominations are guilty of mistranslating the word of God, or at least of covering up its sense on the subject of baptism.

4. That to the Baptist denomination is assigned the great work of giving a correct translation of the Bible to the world, and of restoring the Gospel to its primitive purity and simplicity.

These positions are not with them mere points of theory, but have been of late, with increasing vigor and decision, reduced to practice. They have also assumed a tone of uncommon decision and boldness in announcing their principles, as if their correctness were beyond all question. Nay, too often have many of them spoken with contempt and ridicule, not to say insolence, of those who hold the opposite opinions, as if they were holding on to exploded errors, in face of all the learning of the modern world, and even against their own better knowledge.

Prof. Eaton, of Hamilton Baptist Institute, in his speech before the Baptist Bible Society, at their anniversary of 1840, says, Report p. 74—"The translation" of the Baptist Missionaries "is so undeniably correct," that its incorrectness could not be "pretended," without committing the objector's character for scholarship and candor. "Who are they, sir," said he, "who cavil about the plain meaning of the original word whose translation is so offensive? Are they the Porsons, and the Campbells, and the Greenfields, and such like? No, sir. But the cavillers are men who, whatever may be their standing in other respects, have no reputation as linguists and philologists to lose. There really can

be no rational doubt in the mind of any sound and candid Greek scholar, about the evident meaning of the word in question. I venture to say, at the risk of the little reputation for Greek scholarship which I possess, that there are no words of plainer import in the Bible. 'The profane tampering which has been applied to these words,' &c. &c. See Hall's Baptist Errors, p. 39, for the preceding quotation—a very able work.

Mr. Hinton, after an argument on the import of the word βαπτίζω, and a professed history of the origin and progress of pouring and sprinkling, says, p. 196, 197,—“ May I respectfully ask the pædobaptist who reads this volume (Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Congregationalist, or Methodist), 1. Whether he has not been *kept in ignorance* of these facts? 2. Whether those clergy who withhold these facts from their flocks, do not take upon themselves an undue and dangerous responsibility? 3. Whether he will have independence enough to take every adequate means to ascertain if these statements can be denied? And finally, if they cannot be gainsayed, whether he will dare to remain unbaptized, and therefore in a state of disobedience to the King of kings?”

On the 28th of April, 1840, The Baptist American and Foreign Bible Society passed the following resolution: “ Resolved, that by the fact that the nations of the earth must now look to the Baptist denomination ALONE for faithful translations of the word of God, a responsibility is imposed upon them, demanding for its full discharge an unwonted degree of union, of devotion, and of strenuous, persevering effort throughout the entire body.” Moved by Prof. Eaton, seconded by Rev. H. Malcom.

In their Report, this Society stigmatize the translations of all other denominations, as “ versions in which the real meaning of words . . . is PURPOSELY KEPT OUT OF SIGHT, so that Baptists cannot circulate faithful versions . . . unless they print them at their own expense.” They assert, p. 45, “ It is known that the British and Foreign Bible Society, and the American Bible Society, have virtually combined to obscure at least a part of

the divine revelation, and that these Societies continue to circulate versions of the Bible, unfaithful at least so far as the subject of Baptism is concerned.”—Hall on Baptism, pp. 27, 28.

Again, Prof. Eaton says, Report, p. 79, “Never, sir, was there a chord struck that vibrated simultaneously through so many BAPTIST hearts from one extremity of the land to the other, as when it was announced *that the heathen world must look to THEM ALONE for an unveiled view of the glories of the GOSPEL OF CHRIST.*” “A deep conviction seized the minds of almost the whole body, that they were DIVINELY AND PECULIARLY SET for the defence and dissemination of THE GOSPEL as delivered to man by its heavenly author. A new zeal in their Master’s cause, and unwonted kindlings of fraternal love glowed in their hearts; and an attracting and concentrating movement, reaching to the utmost extremity of the mass, began and has been going on and increasing in power ever since.”—Hall’s Baptist Errors, p. 38.

More facts of a similar kind can be found in a correspondence between the Rev. J. Davis Gotch, of the Baptist denomination, and the Rev. T. Milner, a Congregational minister, in which the latter declines attending the celebration of the first half-century since the commencement of Baptist missions, and assigns as a reason the ground taken by the Baptists towards other denominations. See London Congregational Magazine, and the New England Puritan for August 18, 1842.

Indeed, their whole body has been rallied by a universal impulse, as if on the eve of a general victory, and as if their triumph was destined to usher in the glories of the millennial day.

#### § 40. *Inferences from the opposite system.*

The logical consequences of the other system remain now to be stated. These can easily be inferred from its fundamental position, THAT THERE IS NO COMMAND TO DIP OR IMMERSE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, BUT SOLELY A COMMAND TO PURIFY, IN THE NAME OF THE TRINITY; and that each denomination may select for

itself what it deems the most decorous and appropriate mode of fulfilling this command. This, if kindly received, is a conciliating view, and tends to unity ; for it gives Christian liberty to all. So I presented it, and I hoped for it a kind and a candid reception. My hopes have been disappointed. Efforts have been made to suppress it, by affected contempt of the view, and its advocate. Or it has been rejected with scorn, attended by uncalled for personal attacks upon the intellectual and religious character of its advocate. This I deeply regret, for I wrote with feelings of great kindness towards the Baptist denomination, and strong desires for unity in the love of Christ. But perhaps I ought not to be surprised. If the view I advocate is correct, *close communion must die*, and all the charges of Baptists against other denominations must be retracted, and their course as to the translation of the Bible, and the Bible Society, retraced. At all events, union and conciliation they reject ; they still continue their attack. Hence logic must have its course.

Of this system, the logical consequences are clear, and no Christian charity calls for their suppression. I announce them soberly, calmly, and yet decidedly, and as in the presence of a holy God.

1. That other denominations are not unbaptized, though unimmersed, because they are purified.

2. They are not substituting human forms in place of a commandment of God—nor are they in rebellion against God.

3. There is no good reason to exclude them from the table of the Lord—nor

4. Are they guilty of mistranslating or obscuring the word of God.

5. The Baptists mistranslate the word of God—not only concealing its meaning, but putting in place of it, one entirely foreign to the mind of the Holy Spirit.

6. They are not divinely set apart to the great work of giving correct translations of the Bible to the heathen world ; on the other hand, they are the only denomination who are combined systematically to mistranslate it, and to hide its meaning from the world.

7. They are guilty of teaching for doctrines, the commandments of men, and because others will not comply with uncommanded external forms, of charging them with rebellion against God, and of excluding them from the table of the Lord.

8. For the sake of this same uncommanded form, they have divided the Bible Society, and do still divide and agitate the church of God.

If the position on which this system rests is true, it needs no labored argument to show that these things are so. They are but its logical and necessary consequences. As such, I announce them.

In one point, however, this system does not reverse the position of our Baptist brethren. It does not pronounce them unbaptized, nor exclude them from the table of the Lord. It admits that immersion is baptism, not indeed because it is immersion, but solely because it is one mode of purification.

#### § 41. *Translation of the Bible.*

Upon the question of translation, however, a few words may be needed. I remark, then, that to transfer words from one language to another, is not to mistranslate, but simply to take a word from the stores of one language, and by it to enrich those of another. The sense of such a word is to be fixed, as is the sense of all other words, by the association of ideas. For example, to dip, is of Saxon origin, and belongs to the native stores of our language. On the other hand, the word *immergo* did not belong to our language, but to the Latin. At length, from a form of this verb, the word *immerse* was transferred to our language, and *immersio* was transferred as *immersion*. In like manner, *baptize* and *baptism* have been transferred from the Greek. But these are not all. Characterize, scandalize, &c., have been transferred in the same way. Thus, also, the words, the Christ, the Messiah, and Jesus, have been transferred from the Hebrew and the Greek, meaning the anointed one, and the Saviour. Shall a clamor, then, be



raised, because immersion, Messiah, Christ, and Jesus, have not been translated, like that which is made about not translating baptize? And shall we *translate* scandalize and characterize?

But it may be said that in the case of these words the association of ideas has done its work, and that their meaning is so fixed that they have become a part of our language. True, and what hinders the same result as to *baptism* and *baptize*? Not the fact that they are transferred words, but that a controversy exists as to their meaning in the original, so that the natural operation of the association of ideas has been, and still is, interrupted. Let the controversy cease, let all think correctly as to the import of the Greek words, and baptize and baptism will soon become as significant as catechize and catechism, or exorcise and exorcism, or even as immerse and immersion.

All will know that BAPTISM means A SACRED PURIFICATION OR CLEANSING, and that BAPTIZE means TO PURIFY OR CLEANSE. And there are certainly advantages in not translating, but in transferring this word. Sacred purification will then have, in all languages, one and the same sacred name. This, like Jesus, and Christ, will be known and read of all men, in all languages, as denoting either an *external* sacred purification, or that one sacred purification *of the Spirit* which it symbolizes, and which is by the apostle associated with one Lord and one faith.

But if the word βαπτίζω is to be translated and not transferred, it should by all means be translated PURIFY and not IMMERSE. To translate it immerse, is but to perpetuate error and sectarianism, by a false translation of the word of God.

### § 42. *Commandments of Men.*

As to teaching for doctrines the commandments of men, this is plain, that if God has commanded only the genus, no one has a right to limit the command to the species. If he says, go preach, no one has a right to limit us to one specific mode of going. If he says, cultivate the earth, no one has a right to limit us ex-

clusively to digging, or to ploughing. So if he commands "*purify*," no one has a right to limit us to immersion, as the only mode. It is not indeed wrong to immerse, but to insist on this as the only mode, is wrong. And to yield to such a demand, is to sanction a groundless usurpation over the consciences of men. This is our answer to the inquiry of our Baptist brethren, "Why not join us and be on the safe side, and thus unite the church? for you all admit that immersion is baptism." We reply, we might not in certain cases object to immersion, if it involved no concession of principle; but if it does, we will not give place by subjection, no, not for an hour, that the truth of the gospel may continue with us. All who come to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they may bring us into bondage, we shall fearlessly resist, relying on the Spirit of God for his guidance and aid. Such are the opposing systems and their consequences.

§ 43. *State of the Controversy. Dr. Carson's Reply.*

It is an entire anomaly in the history of controversy, that consequences so vast should depend upon the meaning of a single word, yet such is the fact. All of these consequences hinge upon the meaning of the single word βαπτίζω. And as to this word, the whole question turns upon the simple inquiry: was there a transition in βαπτίζω from its primary sense to immerse, to the secondary sense to purify, irrespective of mode, and is that the sense in the command?

Now the possibility of such a transition cannot be denied. For, as I have shown, nothing is more common than such changes. And of the fact that the change did take place, I have alleged what seems to me unanswerable proof.

If, therefore, my premises cannot be overthrown, the conclusions above stated of necessity follow. I had supposed that a position so serious in its bearings, would be at once and severely scrutinized in this country, but it has not been. A short time since, however, I heard, on coming from the west to the east, that

Dr. Carson, of Edinburgh, had published a reply, and hoped soon to see it republished in this country. At last, I read in the *Christian Watchman*, a notice taken from an English Baptist magazine, stating in substance that Dr. Carson, the celebrated Greek scholar, had totally annihilated my arguments. That they were both dead and buried, and that no one dared to appear in their defence. The editor of the *Watchman* also remarked that this might be necessary in England, and that Dr. Carson, with his vast stores of learning, was just the man to do it, but that in this country it was needless. My pieces are very harmless here, and would not probably have been noticed but for the respectability of the periodical in which they were published. As, therefore, our American Baptists are, in the judgment of this editor of one of their leading papers, so superior in intellectual acumen to those of Great Britain, I concluded that Dr. Carson's reply would not be republished in this country at all, and after vain efforts to obtain a copy of it, I at last was obliged to send for it across the Atlantic. I did not see it till I had finished the whole preceding discussion, and hence I lost the advantage of certain lessons in rhetoric and logic, which, as I discover, Dr. Carson prepared expressly for my benefit.

I am glad, however, to receive it even at this late hour. Dr. Carson writes evidently under great excitement, but puts forth all his energy to defend his positions. And in reviewing his reply we shall be called to try the solidity of the foundation on which my whole argument rests. Dr. Carson, if any one, can destroy them, and if he fails, his cause is lost.

As Dr. Carson's reply has not been republished here, I must needs give some account of it to my readers. It is a pamphlet of 74 pages, devoted entirely to the examination of my first two numbers. These, it seems, were republished in England under a mistaken impression that the discussion was completed, and Dr. Carson answered them as if they were a full exhibition of all the evidence I had to produce. Hence, he answered an incomplete work; and yet his reply considers all the *principles* involved in a

thorough discussion of the subject. It may be viewed in two lights—as a specimen of Rhetoric, or of logic.—In both lights I shall consider it.

Much of it has nothing to do with logic at all. All this I shall put under the head of rhetoric. And, as this is the most striking part of the performance, and that in which its greatest power lies, I think it well to bestow on it particular attention.

#### § 44. *Dr. Carson's Rhetoric. Its Influence.*

In this part of the work, Dr. Carson makes a very strong appeal for sympathy to his readers, in the unparalleled trials in which my work has involved him.

His own view of the case is this.

His gentle spirit shrinks from the use of severe language towards others, even in exposing their errors, but an imperious sense of duty urges him on to discharge the painful task. "I have no wish," he says, "to be severe," p. 437. "It is painful for me to use the knife so freely; but I must, for the sake of the Christian public, find out the disease under which my patient labors. It is better that one delinquent should suffer, than that a multitude should be drawn into error by his example," p. 435. "It grieves me to be obliged to write in this manner, but I cannot avoid it," p. 469. The passages, to utter which, caused such grief to his gentle spirit, are these:

"Ignorant persons, in reading Mr. Beecher's work, will think that he is a deep philosopher, and that he is a profound philologist. But the smallest degree of perspicacity will enable any one to see that his philosophy is very shallow sophistry. No man ought with impunity to be allowed to trifle so egregiously with the disciples of Christ, and with the awful commandments of the eternal Jehovah, p. 437." "Is it not astonishing that gentlemen in eminent situations, will risk the character of their understanding, by pouring forth such crudities?" p. 435. "The author's philosophy is false, absurdly and extravagantly false. He gives us eight

lines of philosophy. I will give a premium to any one who will produce me a greater quantity of absurdity in the same compass, under the appearance of wisdom. The only merit this nonsense can claim, is, that it is original nonsense," p. 469. To be compelled to utter such language as this, concerning a Christian brother, must indeed be painful to a tender spirit, like Dr. Carson, especially, as it is so liable to be misunderstood and ascribed to an entirely different frame of mind—for it is not obviously and upon the surface, the language of grief. And if it is so painful to be compelled to utter a little of such language, what must be the suffering involved in the necessity of using it almost from the beginning to the end of a pamphlet of 74 pages; especially as he is called to the painful duty of charging upon a Christian brother, or upon his opinions, not only folly, stupidity, and nonsense, but also dishonesty, obstinacy, fanaticism, heresy, infidelity, and blasphemy? Indeed, there are cases in which, according to his own account, his trials exceed in severity those of the patriarch Job, and even exhaust his patience, great as it is. "It requires," says he, "more than the patience of Job, to be able to mention such an argument without expressing strong feelings," p. 434. "Am I to war eternally against nonsense?" p. 438. "I am weary with replying to childish trifling," p. 463. "It is sickening to be obliged to notice such arguments," p. 464.

His trials, indeed, must be severe, especially when we consider how far he is removed from all such intellectual and moral defects. I had spoken of a certain mode of reasoning, and said, "It assumes a violent improbability of the meaning in question, and resorts to all manner of shifts to prove the possibility of immersion, as though that were all that the case required." This is quite too much for Dr. Carson. "What shall I say of this?" he exclaims. "Is it calumny, or is it want of perspicacity? Assume! I assume nothing, Mr. President Beecher, but self-evident truth. My reasoning does not rest at all on assumptions. . . . *All manner of shifts!* I repel the charge with indignation. I never used a *shift* in all the controversy I ever wrote,"

p. 454. Again: "I have no theory to support. I never use theories in ascertaining the truths and the ordinances of Christ. I interpret by the laws of language," p. 445. "I never press an argument a hair's breadth further than it can go." "Fear of the result never in a single instance prevented me from admitting a sound argument. I do not fear the result; for truth is my object wherever it may lie," p. 432. On all these points, Dr. Carson is no doubt a competent and an impartial judge; and if so, it must indeed be an intolerable trial to be called on to deal with one who is "the dupe of his own sophistry, and that a sophistry childishly weak," p. 466, and whose mode of reasoning he cannot dignify with any other designation than that of perverse cavilling, p. 459. In reasoning with whom, he is called on to put obstinacy to the blush, and to overwhelm it with confusion, p. 456. Who proves himself ignorant of one of the fundamental laws of controversy, p. 451. Who gives the lie to the inspired narrator, p. 450. Whose artifice is just that of the Socinians, and a dishonest and uncandid way of escaping, p. 449. Whose rhetoric is Gothic rhetoric, p. 448. Who has not a soul for philological discussion, p. 441. Who is emboldened by his excessive deficiency in *perspicuity*,\* p. 441. Who uses resources of which no sound philologist would think of availing himself, p. 440. Whose argument proceeds on an amazing want of discrimination, p. 439. Whose cavilling is unworthy of a candid mind and a sound understanding, p. 438; than whose arguments nothing can be more extravagantly idle, p. 438. Whose arguments and objections are mere trifling, p. 436. In whose ideas there is great confusion, p. 436. Whose reasoning is to him a perfect astonishment, so that he has greater difficulty in conceiving how it can have force on any mind, than he has in refuting it, p. 435; and, in fine, whose argument manifests such a want of discrimination and such a confusion of things which differ, that the mind on which it has force, must be essentially deficient in those powers that qualify for the discussion of critical questions, p. 434.

---

\* In the last edition "*perspicacity*."



Dr. Carson, indeed, being excessively good-natured, p. 453, has undertaken to give me lessons in rhetoric and logic, pp. 434 and 471, and is encouraged to think that he has forced one of his distinctions into my head, p. 471.\* But shortly after he seems discouraged again, and exclaims: "*Will!*† (i. e. shall) I never be able to force this into the mind of my antagonist? If he would allow himself to perceive this distinction he would be delivered from much false reasoning. I will then try to make the thing plain to every child," p. 471. Surely this is exemplary patience and condescension.

Dr. Carson also seems to be distressed with a strange apprehension that, after all, my reasonings will affect the public mind extensively. They are indeed folly to him, but all do not possess his "perspicacity." "Careless readers will imagine that there is wonderful acuteness in Mr. Beecher's observations," p. 455. "Half learned people will think that this account of the phenomenon is an unparalleled effort of philosophy, and thousands will rely on it who cannot pretend to fathom it," p. 469. It must be painful to Dr. Carson to have so low a view of the capacities of other minds in comparison with his own, for he says, that "the smallest degree of perspicacity will enable any one to see that his (my) philosophy is very shallow sophistry," p. 437.

However, out of compassion for the ignorant and those that are out of the way, he engages manfully in the work of exposing my sophistry, and, according to his own account, with very gratifying results. His grief at the necessity of dissecting me has passed away, and in rapture he exclaims: "I have now examined Mr. Beecher's arguments, and there is not a shadow of evidence that the word baptism signifies purification. I have met everything that has a shadow even of plausibility, and *completely dissected my antagonist*. Am I not now entitled to send purify to

---

\* "Made it clear to my opponent," in 2d Edition.

† "Shall," 2d Edition.

the museum as a *lusus naturæ*, to be placed by the side of its brother *pop* ?" P. 475.

It would be cruel indeed to deny to Dr. Carson this small consolation as a reward for all his sufferings and labors. But I greatly fear that new conflicts await him before he can wear undisturbed the victor's crown. Such is Dr. Carson's rhetoric.

Let us now briefly consider its influence. On a certain class of minds it will produce revulsion and disgust. Can that be a true cause, they will exclaim, that needs to be defended by such weapons? Are these the teachings of the Spirit of God? Is this the meekness and gentleness of Christ? I will do the honor to my Baptist Brethren to believe that there are many, very many of them, who can feel no sympathy in such things. Their own spirit, their own style of writing, forbids the idea. Nothing of this kind have I ever seen in the writings of Professor Ripley, or Professor Chase, or President Sears. I do not, indeed, agree with them in opinion. But in any discussion with them I should confidently expect to find in them the honor and magnanimity of gentlemen, and the meekness and gentleness of Christ; and I rejoice to believe that those of the Baptists who sympathize with such men as these, are not few, and that their influence is not small; and until they disavow it, I will do them the honor to believe that their deep dislike of the spirit of Dr. Carson's reply is the real reason that it was not republished in this country. When I hear them state that they approve the spirit of that work I will believe that they do, but never till then.

But the moral effects of Dr. Carson's reply, and of all his writings that I have seen, on another class of minds, I do fear. Novices, easily puffed up with pride, and predisposed to arrogant assumptions of superior intellectual power, and to contempt of their opponents, and all violent and heated partisans, will find Dr. Carson's rhetoric exactly to their taste. To use it requires no meekness, no forbearance, no humility, no aid of the Holy Spirit. The carnal mind will readily receive Dr. Carson's seed and bring forth an abundant crop. And partisan Christians, in

whom the flesh is strong and the spirit weak, will come under its full power. Nor is this power small. It may be seen at this hour, in the style of a certain class of Baptist writers, in all parts of our land. There is in them a lofty tone, and a spirit of contemptuous invective, and of fierce attack, that distinctly characterize the Carsonian school; and even in Christian newspapers we read of scalping their antagonists. This to be sure is an improvement on Dr. Carson's favorite figure of dissection, but the father of such a school must not be surprised if his children excel him: for the field opened is boundless; and such contemptuous expressions as "baby sprinklers," &c., will soon not be deemed sufficiently spirited and energetic to meet the exigencies of the case, and each new combatant will resort to the boundless stores of the Carsonian school.

If this were the first instance in which Dr. Carson had dealt in this style of rhetoric, I should regard it less; but it is not. It pervades all his writings that I have seen. Says an English author (Andrew Carmichael), "If they have not wholly and to a point embraced his views, they are paradoxical, foolish, arrogant, untaught, impious, wicked, silly, presumptuous Protestant theologians; supporters of a very unholy cause; crude theorists, Pharisees and blasphemers. Yet, the person who can heap these epithets upon others, can venture to make this acknowledgment of himself:—*My way* is to endeavor to find what the Scriptures say, and to this I make every human dogma to bend. I will not allow philosophy herself to prate on the things of God." If Dr. Carson should plead that he was writing against Unitarianism, or loose views of inspiration, as his justification, I have only to ask: When was not the cloak of zeal for God and the truth, thrown over a bad spirit? This is no way to check error. It will confirm twenty Unitarians or sceptics, where it convinces one. For they will ask: Can that be the truth that breeds such a spirit?

Nor can any denomination long tolerate such a spirit in its writers with impunity. It may assume the form of zeal for God and the truth. It may delude multitudes with the idea that they

are especially designated by God for the great work of defending the gospel. But this fire is not from the altar of God. It is a strange fire. And let those who offer it take heed, lest fire go out from the Lord and devour them. And if the leaders of the Baptist denomination in this country, have any regard to their own moral soundness, let them stand between the living and the dead, and pray that the plague may be stayed; and everywhere meet a spirit so unholy, with stern and emphatic rebuke. It may be of great use in rallying a party for a partisan warfare. It may for a time augment sectarian power. But it is no preparation for the coming of the Son of God. It is no preparation for the baptism of the Holy Ghost and of fire.

§ 45. *Dr. Carson's Logic. Preliminary Remarks.*

We have considered Dr. Carson's rhetoric. Let us now look at his logic. In doing this I meet with two embarrassments: 1. His work has not been republished in this country. Hence I shall direct my attention at present mainly to principles, as my readers can better comprehend these than details.\* 2. I have already virtually answered nearly all of it in my last two numbers, though not having seen the work itself, I did not aim to answer it, and hence the application of the various parts of my discussion to Dr. Carson's positions may need to be pointed out. But as I have not room to attempt this, I shall trust to the intelligence of my readers to do that work.

All of Dr. Carson's reply may be considered as relating either 1, To principles; or, 2, To fundamental arguments; or, 3, To subordinate points; the truth or falsehood of which is of some consequence, but not essential to the main question. Dr. Carson seems to labor very hard to accumulate upon me errors of all sorts, for the purpose, it would seem, of destroying my reputation as a scholar, by repeated charges of folly, stupidity, nonsense, &c. Often the errors charged are upon minute points, not at all essential in

---

\* It has since been republished.

the decision of the main question. But they give him a fine opportunity of setting forth my amazing want of perspicacity. Such charges of error are a kind of logical mosquitoes. They have a sting ; they irritate ; but they have no fatal power ; and are so numerous and minute that there is no time to pursue them, and little is really gained by their destruction. In the refutation of such charges, I shall not waste the time of my readers. If the main points are decided in my favor, they will die a natural death. I shall therefore first consider the question of principle, and then look at the fundamental arguments in the case.

Careful reasoners are wont to examine principles, and state definitions clearly at the outset. Dr. Carson ought to have done this. I stated clearly and fully my principles at the outset, presented definitely the point to be proved, and the nature of the proof required. Does Dr. Carson carefully examine this part of my argument ? Not at all. He merely alludes to it for the sake of saying that he has no objection to much of it, and that I borrowed all the truth of it from him ; and then passes on to his attack upon my examples. Does he anywhere fairly and fully meet and discuss my principles ? Not at all. Let me then begin by considering both his principles and mine.

#### § 46. *Dr. Carson's System, and Canons.*

I will therefore now endeavor to do what Dr. Carson has nowhere done, to collect the scattered fragments of his system, and to present them in one view ; for, above all things, it is essential to have clear views of the points actually in debate. Dr. Carson's system then involves four parts.

1. To establish clearly that βαπτίζω actually has the sense immerse in many instances.
2. To assume a canon of proof as to a secondary sense.
3. To provide a set of principles for testing all alleged secondary senses, to see if they cannot possibly be reduced to the primary sense.
4. If it is possible, then to overrule all probabilities of a secondary sense, by what he calls the

testimony of the word βαπτίζω, of which the primary sense has been established. With the results of this process he is remarkably well satisfied. In his preface, he says, "My dissertation on the import of the word βαπτίζω I submit with confidence to the *truly learned*. If I have not settled that controversy, there is not truth in axioms." Dr. Carson has chosen to disregard the advice of an ancient king: "Let not him that girdeth on his harness, boast himself as he that putteth it off." Whether he has done wisely in so doing, the result will show. Let us examine his process a little more in detail.

In establishing the first point, Dr. Carson has laid out much needless labor. No one, so far as I know, ever denied it. Yet Dr. Carson, in his work on baptism, has accumulated passage on passage, as if the whole world denied that βαπτίζω ever means to immerse, till he thinks his position impregnable. Having thus firmly established what no one denies, Dr. Carson next lays down his canon as to proving a secondary sense. P. 72. "I will here reduce my observations on this point to the form of a canon. When a thing is proved by sufficient evidence, no objection from difficulties can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility." The "*thing*" in this case is of course the primary sense of βαπτίζω. For though the canon is general in form, yet it is made for a specific case. But the canon in its general form looks plausible, because it includes unlike cases, and is true of some, and not of others. If a *particular fact* is proved by sufficient evidence, as for example, the being of a God, or the inspiration of the Scriptures, we are not to reject *that fact* on account of difficulties. So if the meaning of a word in a particular passage is fairly proved, we are not to reject it in that passage, because of difficulties. But proof of the meaning of a word in one passage, is not of course proof of its meaning in another; because the meanings of all words are liable to change. Now, in all places where the meaning immerse has been proved by Dr. Carson to belong to βαπτίζω, I do not deny that it so belongs. But this is not proof of its meaning in all other cases. Its meaning in



each case must be decided for itself. Dr. Carson's canon then, so far as it applies to the case in hand, is merely this: where one meaning of a word has been proved in *certain cases*, no difficulties can be admitted as decisive against retaining it in *other cases*, unless they involve an impossibility. Here it is then, in all its nakedness. He attempts, indeed, to put this alongside of the impropriety of rejecting proof of the being of a God, and the inspiration of the Scriptures on the ground of difficulties. But who cannot see that the cases are totally unlike? If we admit a new meaning to the word βαπτίζω, on the ground of difficulties, we do not reject the old meaning in cases where it has been proved to exist; we merely prove that in other cases another meaning co-exists with it. If, on the ground of difficulties, we reject the being of a God, or the inspiration of Scriptures, we reject the identical thing which we had before proved true. Dr. Carson's canon then is in brief this: "We cannot admit a secondary sense of βαπτίζω, unless we can prove that the primary sense is impossible," *Carson*, p. 493, and it is in this form that he everywhere reduces it to practice. Dr. Carson next proceeds to lay down canons of trial by which to test alleged secondary senses, in order to discover whether the impossibility of the primary sense which he claims as essential, actually exists. Of these the most important are these:

1. P. 90, "I assert that in no language under heaven can one word designate two modes;" e. g. βάπτω cannot signify both dip and sprinkle. This he avowedly asserts, "without reference to the practice of language, on the authority of self-evident truth." Another form in which he states it is this: "*A word that applies to two modes can designate neither.* The same word cannot express different modes, though a word not significant of mode may apply to all modes;" e. g. wash, stain, wet, purify, are effects which may be produced by pouring, dipping, or sprinkling. "But modes are essentially different from each other, and can have nothing in common. One word then cannot possibly distinguish them. The name of a mode is the word which expresses

it, as distinguished from other modes. But it is impossible for the same word to express the distinction of two modes. It might more reasonably be supposed, that the word *black* may also be employed to signify the idea denoted by *white*, as well as the idea which it is employed to designate, because black and white admit of degrees: but there are no degrees in mode," p. 90. All this is avowedly *à priori* reasoning, not deduced from facts, but resting on the assumption that it is impossible so to use a word, or at least absurd, and therefore no word is in fact so used. If this is so, it is easy to compel the disciples of Dr. Carson to renounce immersion as the sense of baptism.

Perfundo is used, beyond all doubt, to denote not only pouring but sprinkling. In the 4th book of the Georgics, line 384, Cyrene is represented as thrice sprinkling the burning fire with liquid nectar, and thus causing it thrice to blaze on high. "Ter liquido ardentem *perfudit* Nectare Vestam." The sprinkling of dust on the head of old Latinus is denoted by a participle of the same verb, *Æn.* xii. 611. "Canitiem immundo *perfusam* pulvere." *Æn.* x. 520, it is used to denote the sprinkling of the blood of slain captives on the funeral pile of Pallas. "Perfundat sanguine flammas." Hence to sprinkle is given by Adams, Gesner, Ainsworth, Facciolatus and Forcellinus, and Leverett, as one of its senses. It is also the word used to denote clinic baptism by sprinkling.

And yet Lactantius defines baptism by this word—*Institutes*. book iv. chap. xv. He states that Christ was purified (*tinctus*) in the river Jordan, to remove not his own sins but those of human nature, so that as he had saved the Jews, by being circumcised, he might save the Gentiles by baptism, that is, *by the sprinkling of purifying water*. "Sic etiam gentes *baptismo*, id est, *purificationis perfusione* salvaret." Now even if Dr. Carson's disciples were disposed to reject the sense to sprinkle in the passages first quoted, and to insist on the sense to pour around, or through, or over, still it will not help the matter. For the mode to pour is as unlike immersion as the mode to sprinkle.

Hence "perfusionem" cannot be rendered by immersion, Dr. Carson being judge, and baptism is either sprinkling or pouring by the express definition of Lactantius.

I say this is so, reasoning on Dr. Carson's canon. But the fact is, that perfundo is used to denote actions involving three unlike modes, viz. sprinkling, pouring, and immersion.

Its use to denote sprinkling I have illustrated where dust is sprinkled on the head, or wine or blood on the fire.

Horace uses it to denote pouring cold water on a man by an angry woman who has refused him entrance at the door, Sat. ii. 7, 91. "*Repulsum foribus perfundit gelida.*" But when a horse immerses himself in a river, or when shepherds immerse their sheep to wash them, the same word is used.

"*Fluviis perfundunt pecus magistri,*" Virg. Georg. iii. 446. "*Equus assuetus aquæ perfundi flumine noto,*" Æn. xi. 495. In this last use, the water is neither poured nor sprinkled. The object to which the word is applied is immersed in the water.

I am aware that such passages may be translated by introducing an effect of immersion, as for example washing, or thoroughly wetting. Yet even this would be no relief to the disciples of Dr. Carson, for unless they can make out immersion as a sense of "perfusionem," his theory as to the meaning of baptism is lost, by the express definition of Lactantius. If they can make out that sense by the aid of passages similar to those last quoted, then his canon is lost. In fact both are lost, at any rate.

For the principle on which this *à priori* canon is based is false. It assumes that the same word cannot be used to designate things utterly unlike; "modes," he says, "are essentially different from each other, and can have nothing in common: one word then cannot possibly distinguish them." And is not rapid motion essentially different from absolute rest? And do we not say to denote absolute immobility, "he stood like a post?" And yet Job says, "My days are *swifter than a post.*" Job ix. 25. And does not Jeremiah say "one post shall run to meet another?" Jer. li. 31. Shall we then say that one word cannot distinguish

ideas not only so unlike, but so directly opposite, and therefore the word *post* is not so used?

Again, the Latin word "*inducere*" is used to denote the marking down, or recording of items in an account; "*inducere pecuniam in rationem*," to charge money in an account, Cic. And yet the same Cicero uses the word *inducere* to denote the erasure of what is written, as "*inducere Senatus consultum, seu locationem*," to erase a decree of the Senate, or a lease; also, "*inducere nomina*," to erase names. This use arose from the fact that writings on wax tables were erased by drawing the wax over the tablets. But shall we say the same word cannot possibly distinguish ideas so opposite as to introduce into a record, and to blot out from a record, and therefore *induco* is not so used?

Can anything be more opposite than to cut or tear roughly, and to smoothe and polish? And yet the word to mangle is used to denote both. The mangled body of a soldier might repose in nicely mangled linen sheets.

The truth is, common sense and the context always guide us, in such cases, and the actual usages of language refuse to be bound by *a priori* canons as to what is possible or impossible.

2. In certain situations, two words, OR EVEN SEVERAL WORDS, MAY WITH EQUAL PROPRIETY FILL THE SAME PLACE, THOUGH THEY ARE ALL ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT IN THEIR SIGNIFICATIONS, p. 57; e. g. a man who is immersed, and is wet, and washed, and purified by it, may, in describing the transaction, say truly, I was immersed; or I was wet; or I was washed; or I was purified; and yet it does not follow that all of these words mean the same thing. Hence if, in describing the baptism of Christ, it is said he was purified; it does not follow of course that purify is a synonyme of baptize. It may be that it is merely used in its place. Dr. Carson introduces this canon with great authority: "I do not request my readers to admit my canon. I insist on their submission: let them deny it if they can." Dr. Carson obviously looks upon this as a profound and original view; for he says, "it is from *ignorance* of this principle that lexicographers have

given meanings to words which they do not possess," p. 57. Its truth I do not deny; of its profundity and originality let others judge.

3. "One mode of wetting is figured as another mode of wetting by the liveliness of the imagination," p. 38; e. g. "A cold shuddering dew dips me all o'er,"—MILTON. This canon is designed to exclude the meaning to wet from βάπτω, in the case where it is said of Nebuchadnezzar: ἔβραψεν ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, i. e. his body was wet by the dew of heaven; according to Dr. Carson, his body was *dipped*, is a lively and imaginative mode of expressing his *thorough wetting* by the dew; which in fact was not a dipping. This canon exhausts its full force in a vain effort to dispose of this passage.\*

4. "Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its particular figures; but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance." Reply, p. 436. This canon is introduced, as we shall see in its place, to repel my allegation that there are no examples in the use of language to justify the figure, "immerse in the Holy Spirit."

5. We are to distinguish between the nature of the rite and the meaning of its name: e. g. when Chrysostom says, "Christ calls his cross baptism, because by it he purified the world;" he may refer not to the import of the name of the rite, but to its nature as a rite of purification. "It is quite immaterial whether the idea of purification be found in the name or in the nature of the ordinance."—Reply, p. 471. Such are Dr. Carson's leading canons of trial.

It is plain on looking at them, that they are all designed for one end, to explain away alleged secondary senses, by proving that the primary *may be* retained; they do not prove that *it is* retained, but that it *may be*,—that we are not compelled to admit a secondary sense.

Dr. Carson's final step is to introduce what he calls the testi-

---

\* The preposition ἀπὸ forbids this interpretation.

mony of the word βαπτίζω itself; i. e. the fact that it clearly has the sense immerse in *other cases*; this, and the fact that it *may have it* in this case, proves that *it actually has it*, however improbable it may be, from the nature of the subject spoken of.

But Dr. Carson commonly takes this last step, by assuming the very point in debate; i. e. that he has proved that the word βαπτίζω *never* means anything but immerse, in the whole range of the Greek language; when the very question in debate is: Has it not another meaning? For,

1. He has made only a limited examination of the uses of the word. Quite large, indeed, in one view of the matter. Far larger than was necessary if he merely aimed to prove that immerse is a meaning of βαπτίζω. But if he aimed *to exclude every other meaning*, far too limited. The word βαπτίζω and its derivatives occur in the writers of ecclesiastical Greek ten times, not to say a hundred times more frequently than in all the classic Greek writers taken together. For as a leading ordinance of Christianity, through which the forgiveness of sins and eternal life were supposed to come, baptism was to them a subject of deep and incessant interest; it filled all their thoughts—it gave color to all their emotions—it pervaded all their voluminous works. For successive folio pages, βαπτίζω or its derivatives meet the eye incessantly on every page. In them also the word is used with direct reference to the Christian ordinance of baptism—so that nothing can be more in point than their testimony. And Dr. Carson earnestly maintains that they must have known the sense in which it was used by the apostles. Yet from this part of the language, in his work on baptism, he produced few examples, yea, I had almost said none. Nor have I yet been able to find any proof that he had ever read the Greek Fathers on this subject—I do not say that he had not, but merely that he has made assertions that I know not how to explain if he had, as I shall soon show.

2. On this limited examination of the uses of the word, he has based the affirmation that he has “by the use of language FOUND



that the word has this meaning (i. e. immerse), and no other." He says he has *found* this to be so. What does this mean? Has he examined every case of its usage in the Greek language? He does not pretend it. Nay, he clearly declares that he has not. "I regret," he says, "that I have not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language." (On Baptism, p. 24.) How, then, did Dr. Carson *find* that the word βαπτίζω means immerse in passages which, even according to his own showing, he never saw? There can be no way except that in which he establishes one of his canons, p. 90: WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE PRACTICE OF LANGUAGE AND ON THE AUTHORITY OF SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH!! 'Truly this is a convenient way of settling the meaning of words. If this is not the way in which Dr. Carson has found out the meaning of βαπτίζω in cases which he has never seen, I wait to learn by aid of what undiscovered principle he has found it.

3. Upon a basis so frail Dr. Carson, with unparalleled boldness, makes assertions as to the use of the word in the whole range and history of the Greek language. P. 448, "Immersion is the only meaning of the word in every instance in the whole compass of the language." P. 449, "I tell Mr. Beecher it never signifies to purify. My authority is the practice of the Greek language." P. 464, he calls this "the *ascertained* meaning of the word." P. 451, "its established meaning."

4. Incredible as it may seem, yet it is true, that on an assumption so totally devoid of proof, on such a mere *petitio principii*, Dr. Carson's whole argument against me is based. Having *thus* found out and ascertained the meaning of the word, he calls it "the testimony of the word known by its use," p. 451; "the authority of the word," p. 452, and gravely informs us, p. 459, that "probability, even the highest probability avails nothing against testimony;" and p. 464, "to allege probability against the ascertained meaning of a word, is to deny testimony as a source of evidence, for the meaning of testimony must be known

by the words used." But what is this testimony? Is the word βαπτίζω a living intelligent being? Is it conscious of its own meaning? Has it testified to Dr. Carson as to its universal use? If not, and if Dr. Carson has seen but a few out of the multitude of its usages, how dares he to call the little that he has seen, the universal, absolute, and exclusive sense of the word, and then to personify it, as a witness in a court of justice, swearing down all probable evidence by direct testimony? Never was there a more perfect illusion than such reasoning as this. It is neither more nor less than proving the point in question by incessantly and dogmatically assuming it. For until he has first assumed, without proof, that he has "found" or "ascertained," that βαπτίζω means immerse, and nothing else, "in every instance in the whole compass of the language," even in those cases which he never saw, how can he make the word testify to that point?

And yet this is his all-subduing argument in every case. First, by his canons of trial he makes the sense immerse possible, and then brings forward his witness, βαπτίζω, to testify that it has but one sense in the whole range of the Greek tongue, and that one immerse. He compares, p. 449, the meaning that he claims, to a client *whose title to the whole estate is in evidence*. P. 451, "The couches were immersed, because the word has this signification and no other." P. 450, "To deny this is to give the lie to the inspired narrators. The word used by the Holy Spirit signifies immersion, and immersion only." P. 453, "In fact, to allege that the couches were not immersed, is not to decide on the authority of the word used, but in opposition to this authority, to give the lie to the Holy Spirit. Inspiration employs a word to designate the purification of the couches which never signifies anything but immerse. If they were not immersed, the historian is a false witness. This way of conferring meaning on words is grounded on infidelity." Again: "When the Holy Spirit employs words whose meanings are not relished, critics do not say that he lies, but they say what is equal to this, that his words

mean what they cannot mean. [This is a respectful way of calling him a liar.']\* I had said, Bib. Rep. April, 1840, p. 359,† "The question is not : Will we believe that the couches were immersed, *if the Holy Ghost says so*, but this, *Has he said so?*" and I decided that he has not. This, according to Dr. Carson, is a respectful way of calling him a liar. Now, in reply to all this, I totally deny Dr. Carson's whole ground work, in general, and in particular—in the whole, and in all its parts. There is no such testimony of the word βαπτίζω, as he alleges. It is all a mere fiction of Dr. Carson's, sustained by no evidence but his own unproved assertion. It is a mere dream. Does Dr. Carson allege passages in which the meaning immerse clearly occurs? I do not deny the meaning in those cases: in other cases I do deny it, and claim that there is satisfactory evidence of another sense. And am I to be answered by such a mere figment as an alleged testimony of the word as to its own use in all cases in the whole language, when in fact all that this testimony amounts to, is Dr. Carson's unproved assertion? And on such grounds as these, am I to be charged with giving the lie to the Holy Spirit? And yet, this is the whole foundation of Dr. Carson's argument against me. His whole logical strength lies here. This mere petitio principii, dressed up in all shapes, and urged with unparalleled assurance, figures from beginning to end of his reply. In this consists its whole heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and life. It has no energy that is not derived from this.

Such, then, are Mr. Carson's principles—such is his system, and such the mode in which he applies his principles.

§ 47. *My Principles—How Dr. Carson represents them.*

Of my principles he speaks fiercely; and calls them false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth. It is important, then,

\* This sentence is omitted in the last edition of Dr. Carson's reply to me.

† See § 14.

to inquire what are they ? and has Dr. Carson truly represented them ?

In answer to this, I reply, he has not.

He has nowhere fairly stated or answered my principles at all ; and no one from his reply could imagine what they are. What then has he done ? He discusses no principles at the outset. He merely says that I have proved no secondary sense of βαπτίζω, and that “ my dissertation is no more to critical deduction than Waverley or Kenilworth to history. Indeed the relation is not so true ; it wants that verisimilitude which is to be found in the novels of the illustrious Scott. To the ignorant there is an appearance of philosophy and learning, but sound criticism will have little difficulty in taking the foundation from under the edifice which he has labored to erect,” page 429. He then takes up the passages on which I rely, and proceeds, *in his way*, to take out the foundation. That is, he assumes the truth of his own principles, though I had proved them to be false—suppresses or misrepresents mine, and then declares that all the evidence I have adduced is no proof—and is filled with unutterable amazement at my excessive want of perspicacity, etc. All of which amounts to merely this, that I rely on arguments which his principles reject, but which are sound and unanswerable according to my own. In other words, though I have proved his principles to be false, yet because I do not see with his eyes, therefore I do not see at all, but am stupid, blind, etc.

At length, on p. 464, he thus represents my principles.

“ Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth—namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability of the thing related independently of the testimony of the word.”

Dr. Carson does not pretend that this axiom is stated in my words ; but he gives it in his own words, and in italics too, as a condensed summary of my principles. To all this I have but one

reply to make, and that is a direct denial. I reject this statement of my views, as entirely delusive, and totally unfair. Do I indeed avowedly disregard the authority of the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, in assigning meaning to words? All my principles are avowedly derived from the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, and rest upon this use.

What I actually do is this. In assigning a secondary meaning to words, I regard three things at least, and not one alone. I regard, 1. General laws of language, established by examples. 2. The original and primary sense of particular words. 3. The circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of. It is by considering all these that I decide when a word has a secondary sense.

#### § 48. *True Statement of my Principles.*

My principles are fully and carefully set forth in §§ 1-7, occupying in all nearly 18 pages. No one who will carefully read them, can mistake them, or think that I hold the views ascribed to me by Dr. Carson. I cannot again go over all that ground; but for the sake of perspicuity, I will here briefly recapitulate the most important of my principles.

1. In assigning secondary senses, we are to be guided, as just stated, by general laws of language, the primary meaning of the word, the circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of.

2. One of these general laws is, that, inasmuch as in all languages, a large number of words have left their primary sense and adopted secondary senses, it is never *a priori* improbable that the same should be true of any particular word.

3. But whilst such transitions are common in all words, they are particularly common in words of the class of βαπτίζω, denoting action by, or with a reference to a fluid. This is owing to the fact, that the effects produced by the action depend not on the

action alone, but on the action and the fluid combined, and of course may be varied as the fluid or its application varies. And this I illustrated at great length, by acknowledged examples of the use of language in the case of cognate words.

From this I inferred that the usages of languages create no probability against a secondary sense of the word βαπτίζω, but that the probability is decidedly in its favor. Still further, I alleged,

4. That the existence of manners and customs tending to such a result, renders such a result still more probable; and that among the Jews such manners and customs did exist.

5. That this probability is still more increased according to the laws of language, by the fact that βαπτίζω refers to the work of the Holy Spirit, and that this is to purify, and that no external act has in itself any fitness to present this idea to the mind. For the effects of pouring, sprinkling, and immersion, depend not on the act, but on the fluid. The act being the same, ink, or oil, or wine, or pure water, or filthy water, would produce effects entirely unlike. The law of language in this case is, that in the progress of society new ideas produce either new words or new senses of old words—and that βαπτίζω, when applied to the operations of the Holy Ghost, was applied to a subject of thought unknown to the writers of classic Greek, and therefore had probably undergone a change to qualify it for its purpose, i. e. to designate his peculiar work.

Now all of these principles relate to general laws of language, and in proof of them I appealed to acknowledged facts in the use of language.

But I clearly stated that these principles do not of themselves prove that βαπτίζω means to purify, but merely open the way for such proof, and enable us to decide what, and how much proof is needed in order to prove the point. I also definitely stated that it was to be proved as other facts are, i. e. by appropriate evidence.



And here comes up the real ground of difference between Dr. Carson and me. This point deserves particular attention. The whole stress of this part of the battle is concentrated here.

1. Dr. Carson assumes, against all these previous probabilities, that a secondary sense in the word βαπτίζω cannot be established except by the highest possible proof, i. e. a case in which the primitive sense is impossible. This I totally deny, and maintain that a lower degree of proof is amply sufficient to establish a meaning, which the laws of language have already rendered so probable.

2. Dr. Carson totally disregards not only the lower degrees of moral evidence, but the laws of cumulative evidence also. He takes each passage separately, and if he can prove that it does not come up to his canon of proof, i. e. if it cannot be shown that the sense immersion is impossible, he sets it aside as a cipher, and so of every other one in detail. He then says, "each of the cases considered separately is nothing; all taken together, then, must be nothing. It is the addition or multiplication of ciphers."

—*Reply*, p. 465.

All this I totally deny, and maintain that it is entirely at war with the laws of moral and cumulative evidence. Because the reasoning of philology is not demonstrative, but moral and cumulative, and an ultimate result depends upon the combined impression of all the facts of a given case as a whole, on the principle that the view which best harmonizes all the facts, and falls in with the known laws of the human mind, is true.

And where many separate and independent facts all tend, with different degrees of probability, to a common result, there is an evidence over and above the evidence furnished by each case in itself, in the *coincidence* of so many separate and independent probabilities, in a common result. And to prove that each may be explained otherwise, and is not in itself a demonstration, cannot break the force of the fact that so many separate and independent probabilities all tend one way. The probability thus produced, is greater than the sum of the separate probabilities; it

has the force of the fact that they coincide, and that the assumption of the truth of the meaning in which they all coincide, is the only mode of explaining the coincidence.

Any one of the following facts may be true of a young gentleman and a lady, to whom it is not improper or improbable that he should be married, without giving reason to believe that they are engaged. They may be seen walking together in one instance, or riding together, or in a store together, or looking at furniture together, or they may exchange letters in one instance with each other, or they may be seen examining a house together ; and each act may be such as not to prove an engagement ; but can all these acts take place in connexion with each other, and each be oft repeated, and yet furnish no higher proof of an engagement than any one alone ? Shall we say each is nothing, and therefore all taken together are nothing ; it is the addition or multiplication of ciphers ?

So, if there is no reason why βαπτίζω should not have the sense purify, and a strong probability that it should, and innumerable facts on all sides create each a probability of it, is the existence and coincidence of all these facts nothing, because each by itself does not demonstrate it ? Such is Dr. Carson's position—such is not mine. Who is correct let the universal opinions and practices of mankind, and the laws of circumstantial evidence in all courts of justice, decide.

Such, in short, are my principles, and my whole argument, tested by these, is sound and unanswerable. Dr. Carson in replying to me, ought first to have stated them clearly, and to have shown their falsehood, if he could. This he has not done, nor attempted to do, and that for the best of all reasons, they admit of no reasonable denial, and they cannot be disproved.

#### § 49. *Dr. Carson's Course and his Objections.*

What then does Dr. Carson do ? Hear him, p. 429. " To much of the former part of the work I can have no possible ob-

jection, because it is a mere echo of MY OWN philological doctrines, illustrated with different examples. In a work controverting the conclusions which I have drawn in my treatise on baptism, it surely was very unnecessary to prove that words may have a secondary meaning wandering very far from their original import. Can any writer be pointed out who has shown this more fully than I have done? I do not question this principle. *I have laid it down for him* as a foundation." We have here an admirable specimen of Dr. Carson's usual modesty and humility. Does Dr. Carson indeed regard himself as the father of the doctrine, that words may have a secondary meaning wandering very far from their original import? If not, why does he call it his own philological doctrine? It is *mine* as truly as *his*. Does he indeed think that *he* has laid it down for me as a foundation? My teachers in college, yea, in my childhood, had anticipated Dr. Carson in that work. Even in my sophomore year, it never occurred to me that this was a discovery, a new idea. On what other principle have all sound modern lexicographers and commentators ever proceeded? I stated it, not because I deemed it a new idea, but because I did not. Because I considered it a first principle of common sense on the whole subject. I was, indeed, surprised to see it fully recognised by Dr. Carson; Baptists are so prone to forget it. But I should as soon think of calling the doctrine that there is a God, or that every effect must have a cause, my own doctrine, as to call the doctrine that words may have a secondary sense, MY OWN.

But Dr. Carson says, "to much of the former part of the work I can have no possible objection." Very well. Of how much is this true? He does not say; he implies that to some, he does object, but does not say to what. This again is a prudent silence. It would not answer to state fairly, and in my own words, what he does object to. For the mere statement of the principles on which my argument rests is their proof. And they are entirely fatal to his cause.

What then does he do? He proceeds to the discussion of the

passages alleged by me, and silently assuming the truth of his own positions, in cases where we differ, he charges upon me ignorance of the laws of controversy, want of perspicacity, heresy, nonsense, blasphemy, etc., because my conclusions do not agree with his premises, though they follow irresistibly from my own. Would it not have been much better to show that my premises were false? Alas! that he could not do. Being determined not to admit the truth, he did the only thing that remained, first to misrepresent, and then to deny it.

Let it not then be forgotten that the real question at issue is not this, Shall a secondary meaning of βαπτίζω be admitted from mere views of probability, without reference to the usages of language, or to the primary meaning of the word? but this: A certain secondary sense of βαπτίζω being probable according to the laws of language and of the human mind, how much evidence is needed to prove it, and of what kind shall it be? Dr. Carson says, an impossibility of the primitive sense in some one instance, and rejects all degrees of probability below this, as ciphers. I deny the necessity of such proof, and allege that a proof may be made out by lower degrees of probability, so coinciding, as to form a cumulative argument on the principles of circumstantial evidence.

But Dr. Carson may say that these degrees of probability arise, not from the words of the record, but from the nature of the thing spoken of. True, they do; and so does the impossibility that he demands. Why is it impossible to immerse a lake in the blood of a mouse? Not the word βάπτω, but the nature of things forbids it. Why is it highly improbable that all the Jews immersed their couches? Not the word βαπτίζω, but the nature of things, makes it highly improbable that such a practice was ever universal *among all the Jews*, though it is not absolutely impossible. Does Dr. Carson mean that, in assigning the meaning to words, we are not to regard the nature and properties of the things spoken of *at all*? Or that we are to regard them only when they render a particular meaning *impossible*? But why this distinction? On

what is it founded ? Here are nine cases in which a given secondary meaning is probable, in different degrees, rising one above another, till at last we reach a tenth, in which no other meaning is possible. Here, says Dr. Carson, is something worthy of being regarded ; but all the nine preceding degrees must be dismissed as ciphers. Is this sound philosophy ?

But Dr. Carson says that my principle is the same with that of the Unitarians. I reply, so is his. My principle is, that in assigning secondary meanings to words, we are to regard the nature of the things spoken of ; and this is his,—and it is also a principle of the Unitarians, and of all persons of common sense. Does a truth cease to be a truth because Unitarians hold it ?

But Dr. Carson says that, on the ground of *probabilities* derived from the thing spoken of, Unitarians and Neologists explain away the word of God. So they do on the ground of *possibilities* derived from the nature of things spoken of. Has Dr. Carson never heard the argument, that three persons *cannot* be one God ? and that the word God is therefore to be taken in a lower and secondary sense, when applied to Christ ?

And will he reject a true principle of interpretation because it may be and has been falsely applied ? The principle is true, let it lead to what results it may, that in the interpretation of all language we must look to the things spoken of, and regard all that we know of their nature, properties, and laws, and not needlessly involve a writer in a contradiction of any of them ; and especially is this true of the word of God, for it is inspired ; and he who made the laws of mind and matter is not to be represented as contradicting them in his word. And yet, what principle have Unitarians employed more than this, against the Trinity ? Is it then a Unitarian principle ? Nay, rather it is a true principle ; falsely applied, indeed, but still true.

So the principle of regarding probabilities derived from the nature of the subject, in assigning secondary senses to words, may be abused ; yet it is nevertheless a true principle, and one of vast importance.

We are also to regard the primary meaning in assigning secondary senses. It would not be rational to assign to βαπτίζω the sense to sing or dance, because no law of the mind, and no circumstances, manners, or customs, led from the sense immerse to them, and no analogy illustrates such a transition: they are, *à priori*, and in every respect improbable. It is not so of the sense to purify. It denotes an effect of immersion in pure water. Such a transition is natural, it follows the analogy of language, and circumstances render it probable; of course it admits of an easy proof by probabilities derived from the nature of the thing spoken of.

Such is my answer to Dr. Carson's vaunted argument from the Columbo bridge. The case is this: Near Columbo is a school, on the bank of a river; over this river is a bridge of boats. It is related by Whitecross, that certain boys, too poor to pay the toll, were accustomed to swim across the river to attend the school. Here, says Dr. Carson, according to Mr. Beecher's philology, if we had only a general statement of the fact, that the boys so swam, a foreigner must take swim as meaning to walk over a bridge of boats, for it is entirely improbable that the boys would swim when there was a bridge. To this I reply: Dr. Carson admits that no one who reads the whole story in Whitecross could make such a mistake. For he tells us that they *did not* cross the bridge, and why;—and why they swam, and carried their books, and how. As to βαπτίζω, we have the whole story. If we had but a part of the story, as to the boys, still I reply, there is no relation between the sense *to swim*, and the sense *to walk on a bridge*, such as exists between *immerse* and *purify*. Immersion in pure water tends to produce purification. Does swimming in a river tend to produce walking over a bridge? Dr. Carson alleges that words denoting unlike modes, have nothing in common. How then can swimming in water, tend to the sense walking on a bridge? Can Dr. Carson refer me to such a transition in the whole range of the Greek language, or any other? Why then does he set this forth as a case parallel with mine, and



adapted clearly to show my folly? Yet he exults as if this case were an end of all controversy, and refers to it in his reply again and again. Miserable is that cause that drives its advocates to such shifts as these.

### § 50. *Appeal to Facts.*

But all principles are seen most clearly in the light of facts. To them then let us turn.

Clemens Alexandrinus (p. 387, Lugduni Batav. 1616) says, ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἶη ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐκ Μωϋσέως παραδεδομένη τοῖς ποιηταῖς ὧδέ πως :

‘Ἡ δ’ ὑδρηναμένη καθαρὰ χροῖ εἶματ’ ἐλοῦσα (Odys. iv. 759).  
ἡ Πηνελόπη ἐπὶ τὴν εὐχὴν ἔρχεται—Τηλέμαχος δὲ

Χείρας νιψάμενος πολὺς ἄλως εὐχετ’ Ἀθήνῃ (Odys. ii. 261.)  
“Εθὺς τοῦτο Ἰουδαιῶν ὥς καὶ τὸ πολλαῖς ἐπὶ κοίτῃ βαπτίζεσθαι.

On this I remark,

1. That Clement is in the context speaking of Christian baptism.

2. He states that “that may be an image of baptism which has been handed down from Moses to the poets, thus—

Penelope having washed herself, and having on her body clean apparel, goes to prayer, and Telemachus having washed his hands in the hoary sea, prayed to Minerva. This was the custom of the Jews that they also should be often baptized upon their couch.”

Let us now look at the nature of things. Here is before us, as a nation, the Jews. They were accustomed to recline on couches at meals. These couches were large enough to hold from three to five persons. Clement states that it was their custom to be baptized often upon their couch. We know that as a matter of fact it was their custom to wash their hands often during their meals, whilst reclining upon their couches—and the frequent immersions of men on a couch during their meals, is an

unheard of thing. We look at the context. He had just spoken of Telemachus as washing his hands—using *νίπτω*—and of Penelope as washing herself, using *ὀδγαίνω*, a word perfectly generic, and no more limited to one mode than our word wash. We look further on, and we find that these are spoken of as an image of baptism, handed down from Moses to the poets. We reflect that these are rites of purification, and that Clement had been speaking of purity as essential in order to see God. And can we longer doubt? Washing the hands is a purification. Pilate used it to denote his innocence. The Psalmist says, I will wash my hands in innocence. All things point us to purity and purification. The sense is *à priori* probable—we adopt it. We believe that the Jews were in the habit of purifying themselves often upon their couch at meals, just as Telemachus did, that is, by washing their hands.

But was it not possible to have a fixed pulley over each couch in the dining-room, and ropes attached to the corners of the couch, and a baptistery in the floor below, covered by a trap door, and was it not possible to elevate the couches, open the trap doors, and immerse guests and couches together, and to do it often during the same meal? But it would be excessively inconvenient. No matter for that, what will not superstition do? But washing hands is spoken of as an image of baptism. No matter, it is an image of it as to its nature, whatever may be the meaning of the name. (We shall hereafter see how much use Dr. Carson makes of this distinction.) Now all this may be said. Dr. Carson on his principles is obliged to say it. But whom will it convince? None but the man who has a cause to maintain, which is lost so soon as he admits that the word *βαπτίζω* means to purify, irrespective of mode.

Now in this case, the probability is so high as to produce on every disinterested mind the impression of certainty, yet because it does not reach Dr. Carson's arbitrary canon, it is to be rejected as a cipher. But who will dare to reject it? After the violence

of party spirit has put forth all its energies, common sense will certainly resume her sway, and cover all such evasions with merited disgrace.

Let us look at another case.

Justin Martyr (p. 164. London 1772) says, τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἔχει νοῦ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, ὃ τὴν σάρκα καὶ μόνον τὸ σῶμα φαιδρύνει; βαπτισθῆτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας, ἀπὸ φθόνου, ἀπὸ μισοῦς καὶ ἰδοὺ τὸ σῶμα καθαρόν ἐστι. “What is the profit of that baptism which purifies the flesh and the body alone? Be baptized as to your souls, from anger and from covetousness, from envy and from hatred, and lo! your body is pure.” We look at the nature of things. An actual immersion for the sake of purity does not belong to the mind. We look at the usages of language. The mind is never spoken of as figuratively immersed, for mental purity. It is spoken of as immersed in cares, troubles, pollution, &c. We look at the language used. βαπτίζω is followed by ἀπὸ preceding that from which the mind is to be cleansed—this suits the sense to purify, but not the sense to immerse. We say naturally be *purified from* anger—not be *immersed from* anger. We look at the context. Justin had been speaking of the atonement of Christ, and of its power to cleanse from sin. He had just spoken of the passage in Isaiah, wash you, make you clean, as referring to baptism. He has spoken of purifying, washing, cleansing, in various forms, but has used no undisputed equivalent of immersion, such as καταόύω. Whether then we look at the nature of things, or the general usages of language, or the particular language of this passage, or of the context, all tends to one result. All things, with united voice, call out for the sense to purify. And it is the sense; and the true translation of the passage is this: “What is the profit of that purification, which purifies the flesh and the body alone? Be purified as to your souls, from anger and from covetousness, from envy and from hatred, and lo! your body is pure.” And long after all the efforts of party spirit to wrest it to any other sense

have found an ignominious grave, it will stand in its native simplicity and beauty, satisfying and delighting every candid mind by its inherent and self-evidencing power of truth. Another sense can indeed be forced on these words by the violence of arbitrary canons of logic and rhetoric. But the laws of language, and of the human mind, though for a time suppressed by force, cannot die. They will break through all rhetorical and logical chains, and assert and make good their indefeasible claims.

I do not advocate these principles so earnestly because there are no passages that can meet Dr. Carson's highest claims,—in my second book I have produced such, and I have many more to produce before I close,—but because I wish to repel his unreasonable claims of evidence, and to restore the usages of language to their true and inherent liberties, against his violence and force.

The human mind is an instrument of wondrous delicacy, and language is its mirror. The slightest influence of taste, circumstances, and subjects of thought, affect its meaning. The manner in which it passes from sense to sense, in the use of words is to be ascertained by observation, and cannot be fixed *à priori*, by theory. And if it passes easily from sense to sense, in words of a given class, no man has a right to make the proof that it has so passed, difficult, yea, almost impossible, for party ends, and by arbitrary canons of evidence. Yet this, Dr. Carson has done. He has provided rhetorical and logical cords and chains, for forcing back and confining to the primitive sense, all usages of the word βαπτίζω which seem to have left it, and happy is that word which has energy enough to retain its inalienable rights of freedom, after he has laid his hands upon it.

§ 51. *Dr. Carson's Principles subvert themselves.*

But happily, Dr. Carson furnishes the means of destroying his own principles. I have said that his practice is against his own principles. “Does he not admit that βάπτω means to dye or

color when it is applied to the beard and hair? And is it impossible to dip these? Improbable surely it is, but not half so much as the immersion of couches." Hear his reply. "Here I am caught at last. Surely my feet are entangled in my own net. But let the reader see with what ease I can extricate myself. The assertion of my antagonist arises from his want of discrimination" (of course, as I happen to differ from Dr. Carson). "I admit that βάπτω has a secondary signification, because such secondary signification is in proof, and instances may be alleged in which its primary meaning is utterly impossible," e. g. the immersion of a lake in the blood of a mouse. "Show me anything like this with respect to βαπτίζω, and I will grant a secondary meaning. And as soon as a secondary meaning is ascertained on sufficient grounds, I do not demand in every instance a proof of impossibility of primary meaning before the secondary is alleged. The competition between rival meanings must then be determined on other grounds." So then all cases of probability are to be set aside as ciphers, till one case can be found to come up to Dr. Carson's canon; and, however numerous they are, to adduce them is only adding ciphers to ciphers, or multiplying ciphers by ciphers. But as soon as one case of the right kind is found, lo! all these ciphers at once assume a value. Dr. Carson is now willing to admit them on lower evidence. If he had not found the passage as to the lake and the mouse, or some one like it, he must have believed that the Indians *dip* their beards and hair, not that they *dye* them—but now it is easy to see that they do not *dip* them but *dye* them. Is this sound philosophy? If it is, Dr. Carson has dug a mine under all of his reply to me. All my cases of probability, according to him, are as yet ciphers. But I may find the lucky passage at last—and lo! they spring into life and put in their claims for a new trial. Can Dr. Carson refuse it? If not, then all his labor is in vain. He must do all his work over again, and judge on new principles and with new results. Let us try and see if we cannot find a passage.

§ 52. *Cases. Clinic Baptism. Purifying Agents.*

In Routh's *Reliquiæ Sacræ*, vol. iii. p. 48, occurs a passage from Nicæphorus, describing a clinic baptism, ὥστ' ἀποθανεῖσθαι προσδόκιμον ὄντα τὸ ὕδωρ αἰτήσαι λαβεῖν' ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κλίνῃ ἣ ἐκεῖτο περιχύθεντα δῆθεν ἐβάπτισεν. "So that he, expecting to die, asked to receive the water, i. e. baptism. And he baptized him, even upon his couch upon which he lay." Did he then take up couch, man and all, and immerse them? Dr. Carson must say yes, if it is possible—and is it not? But stay, there is still another word, περιχύθεντα, which expressly defines the mode. It is by affusion! So then we have at length reached the mark, and immersion is pointedly excluded, unless affusion or sprinkling is immersion. And now Dr. Carson's labor is all lost, and it will be doubly and trebly lost on his own principles, before I am through, for cases equal or superior to this in strength, abound. Will Dr. Carson say, that the phrase, εἴγε χρεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον βάπτισμα ὀνομάσαι, follows? It does, indeed, and implies a doubt of the propriety of calling such a transaction a baptism; but could there be any doubt of the utter impropriety of calling it an immersion? Is it, indeed, doubtful, whether pouring or sprinkling is immersion? Let Dr. Carson look at his own canon, and can he doubt? What then was the doubt? Whether such a transaction was a real *purification*, or *remission of sins*. This was the point on which doubt existed, as the question proposed to Cyprian, and his answer alike imply. The common mode of purifying, i. e. remitting sins, was by immersion. In the case of those who were in danger of death, another mode was used—all confessed that it was another mode. Did this, could it raise the question, whether two modes, by the confession of all totally unlike, were yet so nearly alike, that the name of one could be applied to the other? Or did it raise this question, whether the new mode was in fact effectual to absolve from sin, that is, was it an effectual purification, or remission of sins? It did, and Cyprian decided that it was. So then, no sense but purification is possible in this case.



So that this is the true translation of the passage: "He, expecting to die, asked to receive the water, and he purified him by affusion, even upon the bed upon which he lay—if, indeed, it is proper to call such a transaction a purification." All my so-called *ciphers* are, therefore, at once restored to their full and true value.

The expression, "asked to receive the water," seems singular. Its singularity will cease when we consider another usage of the fathers. They were accustomed to call water itself a baptism. So they called blood a baptism. On what ground? On the same ground on which Christ is called our sanctification and salvation, because he sanctifies and saves us. On this ground they called water a purification, because it purifies. It is a purifier. On what ground could they call water an immersion? It is not an *immerser*. It does not immerse us—others immerse us in it, and it purifies us. If the fact that others immerse us in water, justifies us in calling it an immersion, there is the same reason for calling it a sprinkling or a pouring—for others sprinkle us with it, or pour it on us. But what shall we say of blood? Was there a rite of immersion in blood? Men were purified by blood, but it was by sprinkling, not by immersion. Why then call it an immersion? Here all possibility of the sense immersion is cut off. The truth is, that by a natural metonymy, means of purification were called baptisms, i. e. purifications, transferring the name of the effect to the cause.

So Tertullian (p. 357. Paris, 1634) says, speaking of the water and the blood, "*Hos duo baptismos de vulnere perfossi lateris emisit.*" "These two baptisms he poured forth from the wound of his pierced side." Did he mean to say that Christ poured forth two immersions from his wounded side? or that he sent forth two purifications? So Augustine uses such passages as these, "*baptismus, id est aqua:*" again, "*baptismus, id est aqua salutis.*" Isidore Hispalensis (*Monumenta Orthodoxographa*, p. 1774), speaking of the water that flowed from the side of Christ, says, "*baptismus est aqua,*" and gives as his reason, "*nullum aliud*

est elementum quod *purgat* omnia.” That is, “water is a purification, because there is no other element that purifies all things.” Once more : air was regarded as a purifying element and a type of the Holy Spirit ; and thunder was regarded as a compound of water and air. The philosophy was false. But to what language did it give rise ? Maximus (p. 449, vol. ii. Paris, 1675) says, that sons of thunder means sons of Baptism. The reason is, ἡ βροντὴ συνίσταται ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος. Thunder is composed of water and air, and this he calls μυσταγωγία τοῦ βαπτίσματος, i. e. a mystic intimation of purification ; and sons of thunder means, on this ground, sons of purification. What has immersion to do with all this ? Again, Anastasius speaks of baptism as poured into the water-pots ; and the water-pots as baptized by pouring baptism into them, Bibliotheca Patrum, vol. v. p. 958. Does he mean that the pots were immersed by pouring immersion into them, or that they were purified by pouring purification, i. e. water, a purifier, into them ? This transaction he regards as a type of the baptism of the Gentiles. Did he suppose that they were to be immersed by pouring immersion upon them ?

These passages are in themselves sufficient to settle the case. But as Mr. Carson attaches so much importance to the proof of an impossibility of the sense of immersion, I will add a few more passages.

#### § 53. *Other Cases. Expiation by Sprinkling called Baptism.*

The passages now to be adduced are designed to prove this position ; that the fathers apply the word βαπτίζω to denote expiation by sprinkling, and, indeed, expiation however made, so that all the sprinklings and other expiations of the Mosaic ritual, and even of the whole heathen world, are spoken of as baptisms.

Before proceeding to adduce the passages, it will add to the clearness of our ideas, to recur to the usages of language on the subject of sacrificial purification, or expiation by atonement. We have seen, then, that ideas of absolution, expiation, forgive-

ness, are expressed in Greek by *καθαρίζω*, to make pure, to purify—also, that the actual removal of moral pollution by the truth and the Spirit are denoted by the same word. Now, in spiritual baptism, these things always co-exist, i. e. those who are forgiven are always made pure in fact, yet there is a logical distinction between the two ideas, and the word *καθαρίζω* directs the mind sometimes to one chiefly, and sometimes to the other. We see in English the same idiom in our use of the words clear and purge. They have a legal sense denoting to absolve, as when God says he will not clear the guilty; and sin or guilt are said to be purged away by the blood of Christ. So in law, we read of purging by an oath; and of compurgators, who freed accused persons from charges of guilt by an oath in their favor. In such cases the reference plainly is to acquittal from charges, not to an actual purification of the heart. The same idiom exists in the Latin words *lavo*, *purgo*—as *lavare*, or *purgare peccatum*—to give or to obtain pardon for sins. Thus, “*venis precibus lautum peccatum*”—you come to obtain by prayers the forgiveness of your sins. Literally, you come by prayers to wash, purify, or purge, your sin.

For these reasons I shall not hesitate, in translating the sacrificial sense of *καθαρίζω* and *βαπτίζω*, to use as equivalents the words purify, purge, wash, absolve, expiate, atone for, clear, acquit, forgive, &c., as the case may require.

The most striking case of absolution by sprinkling in the word of God is undoubtedly that in which the Israelites were saved by the sprinkling of the blood of the Paschal Lamb on their door posts. It was established to commemorate the redemption out of Egypt, and was the great type of atonement by the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world. In Ex. xii. 21–28, Moses directs as to the sprinkling of the blood with a bunch of hyssop, and says, when the Lord seeth the blood upon the lintel and on the two side posts, the Lord will pass over the door, and will not suffer the destroyer to come into your houses to smite you. And ye shall observe this thing for an ordinance for ever. This is the only case

of sprinkling the blood of a lamb by hyssop in the Old Testament, and in this case there was no bathing, washing, or immersion, as some allege in the case of sprinkling the ashes of a heifer by hyssop. I am so particular on this case, because Ambrose speaks of it directly as a baptism under the law. Much controversy has existed as to what the divers baptisms were of which Paul speaks. Of these Ambrose regards the sprinkling of the blood of a lamb with a bunch of hyssop as one,—vol. ii. p. 333. Paris, 1609. Speaking to the baptized, he says, “Ye received white garments that they might be an indication that ye have laid aside the garments of sin, and put on the chaste robes of innocence, concerning which the prophet said, thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop and I shall be cleansed. Thou shalt wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow.” *Adsparges me hyssopo et mundabor ; lavabis me et supra nivem dealbabor. Qui enim baptizatur, et secundum legem, et secundum evangelium videtur esse mundatus. Secundum legem quia hyssopi fasciculo Moyses adspergebat sanguinem agni ; secundum evang. etc.* “For, he who is *baptized*, both according to the law and according to the gospel, is made clean. According to the law, because Moses, with a bunch of hyssop, sprinkled the blood of a lamb. According to the gospel,” &c. Here his main position is that *baptized* persons are *made clean*, both according to the law and according to the gospel. Of course *there were baptized persons under the law*. Of these baptized persons Ambrose gives one example, to prove his main position. Who were they ? This is the point. Were they persons *immersed* ? or were they persons *purified*, i. e. *expiated* by the sprinkling of blood ? Plainly the latter ; for he refers to a case in which there was nothing but *purification*, i. e. *expiation*, by sprinkling the blood of a lamb, and he does not even allude to immersion at all ; and from these facts he proves that *baptized* persons were made clean. All this is plain, and forcible, and logical, if baptize means to purify, i. e. to expiate ; on any other supposition it is of no force at all. For suppose that Moses did sprinkle the blood of a lamb on the posts of the doors, and suppose

that it did make expiation, and thus purify the people and make them clean, it only proves that *expiated* persons were made clean ; but how does it prove that *immersed* persons were made clean according to the law ? It does not, it cannot—and thus the sense immerse is excluded, and no sense but purify or expiate is possible. This, then, is the sense of the passage : “ He who is expiated (or absolved) is made clean, both according to the law, and according to the gospel. According to the law, because Moses, in order to make expiation, took a bunch of hyssop and sprinkled the blood of a lamb, and according to the prophet, this makes clean (adsparges me hyssopo et mundabor) ; according to the gospel, because he is made whiter than snow *whose sins are forgiven*.” *Supra nivem dealbatur cui culpa dimittitur*. How clearly then does this passage exclude immersion as the meaning of baptism, and establish purification, or the remission of sins, as its religious sense. The same sense we shall soon see in the formal definitions of Athanasius, Zonaras, and Phavorinus. It is seen no less plainly in another passage of Ambrose : “ Unde sit *baptisma* nisi de cruce Christi, de morte Christi ?” vol. i. p. 356. “ Whence is *remission of sins*, except from the cross of Christ, from the death of Christ ?” “ Ibi est omne mysterium, quia pro te passus est. In ipso redemeris, in ipso salvaberis.” “ There is all the mystery, because he suffered for thee. In him thou shalt be redeemed ; in him thou shalt be saved.” How beautifully all of this applies to the remission of sins. It is *the remission of sins*, it is not *immersion*, that comes from the cross and death of Christ. Hence, we need not wonder to hear him speak of expiation by the sprinkling of the blood of the paschal lamb as a baptism, for it was a remission of sins ; and the sprinkling of the blood of the paschal lamb was the great type of the sprinkling of the blood of the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world. Here then, beyond all doubt, expiation by sprinkling is considered as a baptism under the law, and is one of the *διάφοροι βαπτισμοί* spoken of by Paul in Heb. ix. 10.

Nor is this the only case. Cyril of Alexandria, on Isa. iv. 4, vol. ii. Paris, 1538, speaks of the sprinkling of the ashes of a

heifer as a baptism. He is denying the power of mere external rites to purify the soul, and says, βεβαπτίσμεθα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐν ὕδατι γύμνω, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σπρίδω δαμάλεως—ἀλλ' ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρί. “We have been baptized not with mere water, nor yet with the ashes of a heifer, but with the Holy Spirit and fire.” This implies that externally there was a baptism by water; and therefore, just as clearly, that there was an external baptism by the ashes of a heifer. What was this? Let Paul answer: “The ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh.” If any one should say there was a rite of washing or bathing connected with sprinkling; I answer—Cyril, in a parenthetic explanation after δαμάλεως, evolves his own meaning too clearly to admit of denial—ἐξῆλθόντες οὖν πρὸς μόνην τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρίσθητε καθά φησιν ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος. “We are sprinkled to purify the flesh alone, as says the blessed Paul.” From this it is plain that the word βαπτίζω is here limited to the sprinkling of the unclean person by the ashes of a heifer. And no reference is made to any rite of washing or bathing, even if one existed.

According to Cyril then, the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer was an *external* baptism, but it did not effect real and spiritual purification, any more than a mere washing in water. The sprinkling of an unclean person with the ashes of a heifer was, therefore, another of the διαφόροι βαπτίσμοι of which Paul speaks.

The same Cyril, on Isa. i. 16, “wash you, make you clean,” considers it as a command to baptize, and says, τοῦτο καὶ ὁ πάλαι νόμος αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐν σκίαις διετύπου, ἔφη γὰρ, Num. viii. 6, 7. “This the ancient law imaged forth to them as in shadows, for he said, Take the Levites and cleanse them, and thus shalt thou do unto them to cleanse them: *sprinkle water of purifying* on them,” &c. There is no immersion or bathing here. But sprinkling alone, εἶτα ποιὸν ἔστι τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ ἁγνίσμου διδάξει λέγων ὁ σοφώτατος Παῦλος, Heb. ix. 13, 14. “What the water of purification is, the most wise Paul shall teach, saying: the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh.” In this Cyril saw baptism imaged forth as in a shadow; and this passage throws light on the preceding, and shows that in



all the various sprinklings of the old law, he saw some of the *διάφοροι βαπτισμοί*, of which Paul speaks.

Nor is this all. Tertullian speaks of the sprinklings and expiations of the heathen world, as the Devil's baptism, rivalling the ordinances of God. (*De Baptismo*, p. 257. Paris, 1634.) He first unfolds the purifying power of water (as we have seen he calls it a baptism on this ground), and then the various uses made of it by the Gentile world. "At the sacred rites of Isis, or Mithra, they are initiated by a washing [*lavacro*]; they carry out their gods with washings [*lavationibus*]; they expiate villas, houses, temples, and whole cities, by sprinkling with water carried around. Certainly they are purified [*tinguntur*] in the Apollinarian and Eleusinian rites, and they say that they do this to obtain regeneration, and to escape the punishment of their perjuries. Also among the ancients, whoever had stained himself with murder, expiated himself with purifying water. In view of these things we see the zeal of the devil in rivalling the things of God, since he also practises baptism among his own people—[*cum et ipse baptismum in suis exercet*.] What can be found like this? The polluted one purifies [*immundus emundat*]. The destroyer delivers. He who is under condemnation, absolves others [*damnatus absolvit*]. He will destroy, forsooth, his own work, washing away the sins which he inspires."

Tertullian here traces the purifier water through all its uses in the heathen world in purifying, whether by sprinkling, or in any other way, for absolution, or for cleansing. And he sums it all up as the Devil's baptism. Words denoting sprinkling, or purification, or absolution, pervade the whole passage—as *lavacrum*, *lavatio*, *aspergo*, *purgo*, *expio*, *abluo*, *emundo*, *absolvo*, *diluo*. But no word occurs denoting of necessity immersion. Dr. Carson may refer to *tingo*. I know that he has said in his work on baptism, p. 55, "Tingo expresses appropriately dipping and dyeing, and these only." Dr. Carson says this with his usual accuracy. Ovid was of a different opinion. Speaking of the ocean in a storm, he says, "*videtur aspergine tingere nubes*."—*Metamorph.* xi. 497,

498. Did Ovid mean that "the ocean seems to dye the clouds with spray," or "to immerse them with spray?" He means plainly "to sprinkle them with spray." He also uses the expression, "tingere corpus aqua sparsâ." (Fast. iv. 790. See Gesner on tingo.) Does this mean "to color or to immerse the body by sprinkled water?" And what mean the common expressions, tingi nardo, tingi Pallade, tingi olco? Is oil a coloring substance? or was it customary to be dipped in oil? We read of anointing with oil, or of pouring oil on the head. Who has recorded the custom of dipping in oil? Hilarius too, on Acts xix. 4, speaking of a spurious baptism, says, "non *tinctorum* sed *sordidati* sunt." Here the antithesis demands of us to translate, "they were not *purified* but *polluted*." Tingo, then, means to sprinkle, to wet or moisten, to wash, to purify—and in reference to baptism, this last is its appropriate sense. No word, then, occurs, denoting immersion. All kinds of purification and expiation are spoken of, including prominently those by sprinkling, and all are summed up as the Devil's baptism, i. e. the Devil's purification or absolution—and the closing contrast rests for all its force on assigning to the word this sense.

Nor was this idea of the Devil's baptism rivalling God's, peculiar to Tertullian. It is found also in Justin Martyr and Ambrose. After describing Christian baptism, Justin says, καὶ τὸ λουτρὸν δὴ τοῦτ' ἀκούσαντες οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τοῦ προφήτου κεκηρυγμένον ἐνῆργησαν βαντίζειν ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἱεῖρα αὐτῶν ἐπιβαίνοντες. "The dæmons hearing of this washing, or purification, proclaimed by the prophet, caused those entering into their temples to sprinkle themselves." He then mentions that they also used an entire washing of the body in certain cases. If the dæmons aimed to rival God's purification, they would naturally use sprinkling as well as bathing, for the Jews used both. But if they were merely trying to imitate God's immersion, why did they use sprinkling at all? Clemens Alexandrinus, as we have seen, takes the washing of hands by Telemachus and the Jews, as a baptism. And Justin as plainly regards sprinkling as part of the Devil's baptism.

Ambrose, taking a general view of Jewish and Heathen absolutions, thus sums up the whole matter—vol. ii. p. 355.

*Multa sunt genera baptismatum—sed unum baptisma clamat Apostolus. Quare? Sunt baptismata gentium, sed non sunt baptismata. Lavacra sunt, baptismata esse non possunt. Caro lavatur, non culpa diluitur, immo in illo lavacro contrahitur. Erant autem baptismata Judæorum, alia superflua, alia in figura.*” In order to translate this passage, we must notice that it is a contrast of ineffectual purifications with real purifications, i. e. remissions of sins. I translate it thus :

“There are many kinds of purifications ; but the Apostle proclaims one purification. Why ? There are purifications of the nations, but they are not purifications (i. e. remissions of sin). Washings they are—purifications (i. e. remissions of sin) they cannot be. The body is washed, but sin is not washed away, nay, in that washing sin is contracted. There were also purifications of the Jews : some superfluous, others typical.” Any one can see that the sense of this whole passage turns on assigning to baptismata in the second member of the antithesis, the sacrificial sense of *καθαρισμός*, i. e. absolution, or forgiveness of sins. The purifications of the Gentiles were not purifications for this reason ; they did not wash away sins. This is a good reason for denying to them the name purification in its highest sense. But it is no reason for denying that they were immersions. They could be immersions, whether they remitted sins or not—but they could not be real purifications unless they remitted sins. If any one wishes to feel the full force of this, let him try to translate the passage, and use immersions instead of purifications.

“They are immersions, but immersions they cannot be.” Why not ? “They are washings, immersions they cannot be.” Why not ? “The body is washed, but sin is not washed away ; nay, in that washing it is contracted.” But how does this prove that they are not immersions ? It proves that they are not purifications. With immersions it has nothing to do. The sense purify is then fully and incontrovertibly established.

§ 54. *Passage from Proclus.*

Let us now look at a beautiful passage in Proclus, which presents this import of the word to the mind in various relations, and with the clearness of a sunbeam—p. 280. Rome, 1630. It is in an oration on the Epiphany, and is an expansion of the ideas contained in the reply of John to Christ: “I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me?” In expanding this question, the Fathers took great delight, and their expansion always turned on the idea, how can the polluted purify the pure? How can one, under condemnation, acquit his judge? πῶς τοιμήσω βαπτίσαι σε; πότε πῦρ ὑπὸ χόρτου καθαίρεται; πότε πηλὸς πλύνει πηγὴν; πῶς βαπτίσω τὸν κριτὴν ὁ ὑπεύθυνος; πῶς βαπτίσω σε δέσποτα; μῶμον οὐ βλέπω ἔν σοι. τῇ κατάρᾳ τοῦ Ἀδάμ οὐχ ὑπέπησας, ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησας. Πῶς βαστάσει ἡ γῆ ὀρῶσα τὸν τοῦς ἀγγέλους ἀγιάζοντα, ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοῦ βαπτιζόμενον; πῶς σε βαπτίσω δέσποτα, τοῖς ἐκ γενέσεως μολυσμοῖς οὐ προσομιλήσαντα; πῶς οἷν ἐγὼ κατάρξυπος ἀνθρῶπος ἀγνίσω Θεόν; ! Θεὸν ἀναμάρτητον; βαπτιστὴν ἀπίστειλας δέσποτα, οὐ παρήκουσας τοῦ σου προστάγματος. I have abbreviated this passage somewhat, and yet, because of its beauty, and varied use of language, have retained more than I usually quote. Its main force lies in the expression, how shall I, who am under sentence of condemnation, purify, i. e. acquit my judge? πῶς βαπτίσω τὸν κριτὴν ὁ ὑπεύθυνος. How absurd, in such a passage, to inquire, how shall I, a culprit, immerse my judge? But take βαπτίσω in the sense purify, or acquit, and it at once harmonizes the whole passage. Nor is this all; the laws of antithesis demand this sense. Let us thus translate it. “How shall I dare to purify thee? When is the fire purified by the stubble? When does the clay wash the fountain? How shall I, a culprit, purify (or acquit) my judge? How shall I purify thee, O Lord? I see no fault in thee. Thou hast not fallen under the curse of Adam: thou hast committed no sin. How will the earth endure to see him, who makes pure the angels, purified by a sinful man? How shall I purify thee, O Lord,

who hast never participated in the pollutions of birth ? How, then, shall I, a polluted man, purify God ? The sinless God ? Thou hast sent me as a purifier, hast thou not disregarded thine own command ?” On this last sentence, the editor says : the sense is, as I infer, thou hast made me a purifier, that I should baptize, that is, purify, from pollution, and expiate those defiled by sin. But since thou art polluted by no sins, why dost thou command that I should expiate and wash thee, if there is nothing in thee to be washed away ? That is beyond the province of a baptist, i. e. a purifier. I have need to be purified of thee. The interchange of *ἀγνίσω* and *βαπτίσω* in carrying out the antithesis is no less striking. He uses *πῶς βαπτίσω* till near the close, and then exchanges it in the question for *ἀγνίσω*—*πῶς ἀγνίσω Θεόν* ; how shall I purify God—the sinless God. Yet, who does not see that the import of the question must be the same throughout the whole passage ? So the antithesis *τὸν ἀγιάζοντα ἀγγέλους βαπτιζόμενον ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοῦ*, requires *βαπτίζω* and *ἀγιάζω* to be taken in the same sense. This passage admirably illustrates the statements in § 28, 2. Giving to *βαπτίζω* the sense to purify, the passage is inimitably beautiful and brilliant. It loses all its beauty the moment we assign to it any other sense.

Have I not adduced evidence enough ? In any common case it would be enough, and more than enough. But strange as it may seem, the life of a whole denomination depends upon denying this sense of this word. Dr. Carson says, if it were optional, he would never immerse. So says Mr. Hague. And if this meaning is established, all pretext for a separate Bible Society is taken away. Nor will any valid reason for separate organic action remain. So fundamental an error will not easily die. It has, indeed, no logical life ; but it has an organic life of tremendous power. In numerous periodicals this denomination utters its voice. Hundreds of thousands hang on them for the truth ; and if they see it not in them, will not see it at all. They are the leaders. It is expected of them to defend the cause. And temptations, almost infinite, urge them not to see the truth. Be-

fore such temptations, they will fall, unless God, in his mercy, aid them by a full illumination of his Spirit. So may it be. But as things are, the work of adducing evidence must still go on.

§ 55. *Definitions of βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα.*

I remark, then, that the sense to purify is established by direct definitions of the Fathers, and of Greek Lexicographers, given in a manner most explicit and unambiguous.

On this point I shall first quote Basil. He is commenting on Is. iv. 4. "Οτι ἐκπλυνεῖ κύριος τὸν ῥύπον τῶν υἱῶν καὶ τῶν θυγατέρων Σιών, καὶ τὸ αἷμα Ἱερουσαλήμ ἐκκαθαριεῖ ἐκ μέσου αὐτῶν ἐν πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ ἐν πνεύματι καύσεως. "The Lord shall wash away the filth of the sons and the daughters of Zion, and shall purge the blood of Jerusalem from the midst of them, by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning." On this he remarks, Τῇανῶς τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἰωάννῃ ὁ λόγος προαγορεύει περὶ τοῦ κυρίου λέγοντι ὅτι αὐτοῖς ὑμᾶς βάπτισει ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ· περὶ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμᾶς βαπτίζω ἐν ὕδατι εἰς μετάνοιαν. "Plainly the word foretells the same things concerning the Lord, by John, who says, that he shall baptize you by the Holy Spirit and fire; but, concerning himself, he says, I, indeed, baptize you with water unto repentance." In one series of expressions, the words are, πλύνω and ἐκκαθαρίζω—in the other, βαπτίζω. Basil says that the import of both modes of expression is plainly the same. Nor is this all. He proceeds, ἐπεὶ γοῦν ἀμφοτέρω συνήψεν ὁ κύριος τὸ τὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς μετάνοιαν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ πνεύματος εἰς ἀναγέννησιν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀνίσσεται ἀμφοτέρω τὰ βαπτίσματα μήποτε τρεῖς εἰσιν αἱ ἐπίνοιαι τοῦ βαπτίσματος. "Since, then, the Lord has connected both (baptisms), namely, that from water to repentance, i. e. John's, and that from the Spirit to regeneration, i. e. Christ's, and the word (Is. iv. 4) alludes to both baptisms (i. e. Christian baptism, and that of fire), are there not three significations of baptism?" Here he first speaks of baptisms in the plural (i. e. the baptisms of John, of Christ, and of fire), and as, in some respects, alike, in



others unlike ; and this seems to call for a definition of the senses of the word. He says they are three, and proceeds to give them.

(1) ὁ, τε τοῦ ῥύπου καθαρισμὸς (2) καὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀναγέννησις (3) καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ κρίσεως βάσανος. 1. Purification from filth.

2. Regeneration by the Spirit. 3. Trial or proof in the fire of the judgment. These are three kinds of purification. One, ex-

ternal by water—the next, internal by the Spirit, i. e. regenera-

tion—the other, a purgation in the fires of the judgment day. To

this purgation by fire, the Fathers referred the words of Paul :

“ Every man’s work shall be made manifest, for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire ; and the fire shall

try every man’s work, of what sort it is ; if any man’s work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss ; but he himself shall be

saved, yet so as by fire.” The man *saved by fire*, is saved by

Basil’s third kind of purification. Concerning this, Hilarius says,

“ *per ignem purgatus fiat salvus,*” *being purified by fire*, he may be

saved. Hence, Basil refers a part of the purification to this

world, and a part to the next, but considers it all as baptism in

one way or another, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐκπλύνειν πρὸς τὴν ὥδε ἀπόθεσιν τῆς

ἀμαρτίας λαμβάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ πνεύματι καύσεως

πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δοκιμασίαν. “ So that

the expression to wash away (in Is. iv. 4) refers to the laying

aside sins in this world (by Christian baptism), but the expression,

spirit of judgment and spirit of burning, refers to trial by fire in

the world to come.” How unlike all this is to immersion, I need

that each sense is a purification, and neither an immersion? What more could be asked, or received, if asked? Surely he who will not believe this, would not believe, even though old Basil himself were to arise from the dead, and proclaim on the house tops, the meaning of βαπτίζω is to purify!

Nor is this all. Athanasius testifies explicitly to the same effect. Speaking of the expression: "he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit," he expressly states that it has the sacrificial sense to purify, i. e. to remit sins.—Montfaucon, *Collectio nova Patrum Græcorum*. Vol. 2, p. 27. Paris, 1706—and to express this sense, he uses καθαρίζω. His words are: Τὸ αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, τουτο δηλοῖ ὅτι καθαριεῖ ὑμᾶς. "The expression, he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, means this, that he shall purify, i. e. absolve you, or remit your sins." That this is the sense is plain, for he adds, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ τοῦ Ἰωάννου βάπτισμα τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὡς καὶ ἀφίεναι ἁμαρτίας ἐξουσίαν ἔχει. "Because the purification of John could not do this, but that of Christ, who has power to forgive sins." This last expression fixes the sense of καθαριεῖ, and thus the sense of βαπτίσει, to remission of sins, or sacramental purification. Athanasius, therefore, directly testifies, that this is the sense. Let us hear no more, then, of *immersion* in the Holy Spirit. Athanasius declares, that purification by the Holy Spirit is the sense.

Once more the lexicographers. Zonaras and Phavorinus define βάπτισμα thus, ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν δι' ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος—ἡ ἀνεκλήσις τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν—ἡ λύσις δεσμοῦ ἐκ φιλανθρωπίας δεδωρημένη. "The remission of sins by water and the Spirit—the unspeakable forgiveness of sins—the loosing of the bond (i. e. of sin), granted by the love of God towards man." These are obviously all equivalents of sacrificial purification, i. e. remission of sins. They would be perfect definitions of καθαρισμός.\* Are not two words synonymous to which the same definitions can be truly given?

---

\* See the passage from Ambrose § 53, at the end.

These definitions are not the mere opinions of Zonaras and Phavorinus. They are taken from the ideas of the Fathers, and nearly in their words. They also give definitions of the moral sense of βάπτισμα, i. e. moral purification—thus, ἡ ἐκούσιος συνταγὴ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν δευτέρου βίου, ἡ ἀνάλυσις (ἀνάληψις in Phavorinus) ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρείπτον. “The voluntary arrangement of a new life towards God, or according to the will of God. The releasing, or recovery of the soul (i. e. from sin), for that which is better, i. e. holiness.”

All this certainly denotes moral purification, or the restoration of the soul to a new and holy life. It is equivalent to Basil's second sense, ἀναγέννησις. These last definitions would be perfect definitions of καθαρισμός, as denoting moral purification. Again, I ask: Are not two words synonymous to which the same definitions can be truly given? Nor are these last definitions the mere opinions of Zonaras and Phavorinus. As before, they are taken from the Fathers, and are given in their phraseology and style. Is there no evidence in all this? Is it nothing that two lexicographers, writing in Greek, define βάπτισμα thus, and say nothing of immersion? Does this look as if immersion is the very essence of baptism, as some assert? Why is all this? The reason is obvious: they were giving the ecclesiastical, the religious sense of the word, and in so doing they could give nothing else. But who was Zonaras, and what the value of his lexicon? He was one of the four leading Byzantine historians. He wrote annals from the beginning of the world down to 1118. Also a commentary on the apostolic canons, decrees of councils, etc. He was first a courtier in the court of Alexius Comnenus, then a monk on Mount Athos. Of his history Tittman says, it is not surpassed by that of any Byzantine writer. Of his lexicon: “I consider it, after that of Hesychius, the most learned of all others that survive, the most copious and most accurate; so that by it we can correct and confirm Suidas, the author of the Etymologium, and others, and even Hesychius himself. Finally, it is invaluable for illustrating passages of authors—some before published, others pre-

served in him alone.” The question is not as to the taste and rhetorical excellence of Zonaras. It is this: Did not a historian who wrote in Greek, and was perfectly familiar with the writings of the Greek Fathers, and who wrote commentaries in Greek on the apostolic canons, did not he know what βάπτισμα means? And yet of immersion he says nothing; every definition is an equivalent of καθαρισμός. Does Dr. Carson say he is defining the nature of the rite, and not its name? I reply: the definition of Basil is not a definition of *the nature of one external rite*, i. e. *the rite* of Christian baptism. He is speaking of three baptisms, that of John, that of Christ by the Holy Spirit, and that of fire, at the judgment day. He cannot, therefore, be defining merely the *nature* of one rite. Besides, the rite of Christian baptism does not import trial in the fires of the judgment day. Baptism by water does not import baptism by fire. It is the word, therefore, and the word alone that Basil defines. Nor is the definition accidental, but deliberate and formal. He fixes his eye fully and intently upon the point. He brings up three cases in which the word is used. Purification is common to them all—purification by water, by the Spirit, by fire. There is a generic likeness but a specific difference, and so he defines: 1. Natural purification from filth—ὁ τοῦ ῥύπου καθαρισμός. 2. Spiritual purification, i. e. regeneration, ἡ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀναγέννησις. 3. Purgation by trial by fire, ἡ ἐν πυρὶ πύρι κρίσεως βάσανος. It hence follows that the name and the nature of baptism coincide, in import. Both denote purification.

15 δε

§ 56. *Proof from the use of Prepositions.*

But, as if to exclude all doubt, the prepositions that often follow βάπτισμα in patristic usage, require the sense purification, and exclude the sense immersion. They are διὰ, ἐκ, ἀπό, and in Latin, per. We find βάπτισμα διὰ πυρός, διὰ δακρύων, διὰ μαρτυρίου, δι' αἵματος, δι' ὕδατος. Purification by fire, by tears, by martyrdom, by blood, by water. Not immersion in fire, in tears, in martyrdom,

in blood, in water. We find βάπτισμα ἀπὸ or ἐκ πνεύματος, or ὕδατος, or πυρός, purification from or by the Spirit, or water, or fire. Not immersion in the Spirit, or water, or fire. So we find baptisma per aquam, purification by water—not immersion in it. In making these remarks, I have my eye on numerous passages which, did my limits permit, I would gladly adduce. But the idiom, I think, no one will dare to dispute; but one beautiful illustration of it I will give from a translation, in a commentary of Hilarius. He is commenting on 1 Cor. x. 1, ἐβαπτίσαντο ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, and says, “their past sins were not imputed to them, but being *purified by* the cloud and *by* the sea, they were prepared to receive the law.” “Non enim illis preterita mala imputata sunt, sed *per mare et per nubem purificati*, præparati sunt ad legem accipiendam.” Comment is needless. Who does not see that with him βαπτίζω means to purify in the sacrificial sense, i. e. to remit sins? Hence, he says *their sins were not imputed to them*, but they were *purified* by the cloud and the sea.

### § 57. *Argument cumulative.*

Any one of the cases I have adduced is decisive; but taking them as a cumulative argument, their force is irresistible. But the force of no one argument is greater than of that which is derived from the usages of language as to clinic baptism. Dr. Carson at least ought to feel this. He says that we may as well call black white as to call sprinkling or pouring immersion; and yet, a man not immersed, but only purified by affusion, is expressly said to have been baptized upon his bed on which he lay. Nor was this an unfrequent case. Hilarius says, on 1 Tim. iii. 12, 13—“non desunt qui prope quotidie baptizentur ægri.” “There are not wanting, almost daily, sick persons who are to be baptized.” Emperors were purified in this way. And yet, in formal histories in the Greek tongue, it is announced that they were baptized. Constantius, ἀποδνήσκων ἔδοξε βαπτίζεσθαι, “dying, thought fit to be baptized.” Theodosius the Great was thus

baptized by Ambrose, in his last sickness. Basil says that they were so baptized when they could neither speak, nor stand, nor confess their sins; and when those present could not tell whether they knew what was done to them or not. Gregory Nyss. calls it ἐντάφιον βάπτισμα—sepulchral baptism. In circumstances so entirely excluding all thought of immersion, yea, when it is expressly stated that they were not immersed, but that the rite was performed by affusion, it is said they were baptized. Did the Greeks proclaim a falsehood in their own tongue? Did they declare before heaven and earth that a man was immersed, when every man, woman, and child knew that he was not? Yea, did they declare it, when out of their own mouths they could be convicted of falsehood, for they themselves declared that he was not? How would it sound in English to say that a man was immersed by affusion or sprinkling? And would it sound any better in Greek? See § 28, Nos. 5, and 15.

But take the other view, and all is harmonious at once. A man sprinkled on his bed, was purified on his bed on which he lay. The sprinkling of water, or of blood, did purify. Hence, when Cyprian reasoned from the sprinklings of the Old Testament to prove that a man could be baptized, i. e. *purified* by sprinkling, his argument was in point. But on any other supposition it was totally devoid of force.

On this ground we see at once why Clement saw, in all the heathen purifications, an image of baptism handed down from Moses; and why he could say that it was a custom of the Jews to be baptized often on their couches. We see why Cyril could speak of baptizing with the ashes of a heifer, and Ambrose of baptizing by sprinkling the blood of a lamb with hyssop; and why water and blood were called baptisms, i. e. purifying agents, as before explained. We can see, too, why Tertullian and Justin Martyr looked upon all the aspersions and expiations of the heathen world as baptisms. Purifications they were. Immersions they were not. Finally, we see why Justin Martyr said: be baptized as to your soul from anger, &c., for to



purify the soul from anger, &c., agrees both with Scripture and common sense. To immerse the soul from anger is at war with both.

§ 58. *Dr. Carson's Canons cannot weaken it.*

It would be foolish, even if it were possible, to seek to destroy such a cumulative argument by trying to neutralize its parts in detail, according to Dr. Carson's principles. But it cannot be done. All of his canons and principles of trial are powerless here. I am not trying to prove that βαπτίζω means sprinkle or pour—but purify; and therefore the first touches me not. There is no room for his second canon, for my argument depends not on the use of καθαρίζω, in place of βαπτίζω, but on the use of βαπτίζω itself. There is no room for the third and fourth canons. For I do not deal in rhetorical uses of βαπτίζω but in plain prosaic definitions of it, and prosaic illustrations of those definitions. There is no room for his fifth canon, for there is clear proof that the name and the nature of baptism coincide. Wherever the Fathers see the thing purification, they give the name baptism, whatever the form. I stated at the outset, that by looking at the result and end of immersion in pure water, i. e. purity, the word would lose its modal sense, and pass to the sense to purify, irrespective of mode. And I have given most decisive proof that it did so pass. And this proof is strengthened by ten thousand facts on every side. I feel as though I had hardly begun to adduce the proof that exists on this subject. Indeed, no man can see it fully who will not leave the sultry regions of modern controversy, on this subject, and enter into the patristic world, till its languages, feelings, and usages rise from the dead and surround him, and impress upon his mind the whole scene. He will then find that the modern Baptists and the ancient Fathers live in two entirely different worlds.

The position from which the inferences in § 40 have been logically derived, has been established by evidence most clear

and unanswerable. It follows, therefore, that those inferences are also established as true ; and if so, their practical bearings are numerous, and momentous, and it might seem appropriate to disclose them here. But though the main position has been most clearly proved, yet its whole strength has not been presented, nor can it be till I have considered some of Dr. Carson's attacks on my former articles a little more in detail. In doing this I shall have occasion to adduce still further evidence from the Fathers, so various, pointed, and definite, that, in my judgment, not even a pretext for doubt will remain. Having done this, I shall close by a more full exhibition of the practical bearings of the results at which we have arrived. It was, indeed, my intention to finish the discussion in this article. But the reception of Dr. Carson's violent attack, and the general interest now felt in the subject, seemed to indicate the propriety, not to say necessity, of a discussion more thorough and extended than is consistent with the limits of one article.

## CHAPTER II.

AT the close of my last article I made the following remarks. "It was my intention to finish the discussion in this article ; but the reception of Dr. Carson's violent attack, and the general interest now felt in the subject, seemed to indicate the propriety, not to say necessity, of a discussion more thorough and extended than is consistent with the limits of one article." I proceed, therefore, to complete the discussion thus announced.

### § 59. *Reasons for a further notice of Dr. Carson.*

It may perhaps be alleged by some, that it is needless to take any further notice of Dr. Carson. For if his fundamental principles are false, as I have shown, then all that grows out of them is false, and therefore there is no need of exposing his errors in detail. Besides, the spirit of his work is so bad, that it cannot exert any power over a candid mind : indeed Dr. Carson has completely exposed himself, and totally destroyed his own power, by the manner of his reply. Besides, it is humiliating to argue with an antagonist who so far forgets the laws of honorable controversy, as to indulge in such assumptions of superior wisdom, and such gross personalities, as fill his reply. Such an antagonist is more properly answered by a dignified silence.

Such things may be said, and I freely admit with much plausibility ; indeed such considerations have often occurred to my own mind, in reading Dr. Carson's reply.

But it must be remembered that no organized body of men is willing to see the truth of principles which are at war with the fundamental principles on which they are organized ; and if

principles which they are unwilling to see, are established, they are always more desirous to overlook and forget them, than to apply them, and carry them out to their ultimate results. And if we would correct errors which are kept alive not by logic, but by organic power, we must not only develope principles, but seek from God the discretion and energy needed in order wisely and efficiently to apply them. Then, by his aid, may we hope to see such errors finally and thoroughly destroyed.

Moreover, the fact that a work is written in a bad spirit, is not always a sufficient reason for not giving it a thorough and detailed answer. The bad spirit of a work may operate in two ways. It may either react upon the author, and destroy his power, or it may infect and corrupt the body in whose behalf it was written, and bring them down to its own low standard. But so strong are the temptations of party spirit, and so powerful is the unsubdued pride of organized bodies even of good men, that a zealous partisan, though he writes in a bad spirit, is notwithstanding applauded and hailed as a leader, if he seems to argue the cause of the party with power. In short, organic bodies are always in danger of preferring intellectual power, and the victory of their own peculiar principles, to holiness and truth. And if they do, a work written with intellectual power, but in a bad spirit, will corrupt the whole body : like poison, it will diffuse itself through the whole system. Hence, to write in a bad spirit, is the highest sin which a man of great intellectual power can commit, for it is throwing poison most malignant into the very springs of spiritual life. Nor can any one body of Christians be corrupted, without endangering the spiritual life of others. For pride in one body tends to beget both pride and anger in all others, and to excite a spirit of bitter and malignant recrimination, by which the Spirit of God is grieved and provoked to take his flight.

In all such cases it is our duty to seek for grace and wisdom from God, not only to resist in ourselves the infection of the bad spirit which is poisoning the body politic, but also to destroy its malignant power, by stripping off the garb of piety in which it

seeks to veil itself, and exposing its true and pestilential nature. Then, by the blessing of God, will its infectious power be destroyed by the fire of divine truth and holy abhorrence, and thus will the moral nature of the community be restored to soundness, and the plague be stayed.

Had any person in the Baptist denomination undertaken to do this work in the case of Dr. Carson, it would have indicated a moral soundness in that body which would have been cheering to any holy heart. It is therefore with no small grief that I have noticed the fact, that on both sides of the Atlantic, some of the leading Baptist presses have bestowed on Dr. Carson's works on baptism, and especially on his reply to me, absolute and unqualified praise. Nor have I ever seen or heard even a subdued whisper of censure, or even a remote intimation that fully to sympathize with the spirit of his works would create the least danger to individuals or to the denomination. Indeed some have written as if they were so thoroughly infected and pervaded by that spirit, that no standard was left by which a bad spirit could be detected, and no moral energy remained by which it could be resisted or abhorred.

Indeed, if it were now the design of the admirers of Dr. Carson on both sides of the Atlantic, to recognise and exhibit him as the great leader and champion of the Baptist cause on earth, the great incarnation, so to speak, of the Baptist spirit and Baptist principles, they could not use towards him language of higher praise than they have already used.

The following piece exhibits the opinion of the Christian Watchman, the leading Baptist paper in New England, in connexion with the opinion of the London Baptist Magazine.

#### “DISCUSSION ON BAPTISM.

“The London Baptist Magazine for May notices a late pamphlet from the pen of Alexander Carson, the celebrated Greek scholar, entitled ‘Baptism not Purification,’ in reply to Edward

Beecher, President of Illinois College, who has undertaken to show that the word *baptize* is synonymous with the word *purify*. Mr. B.'s article, which was originally published in the *Biblical Repository*, was published in a separate pamphlet in England, and the reviewer, referring to this newly-received theory, says: 'Dr. Carson has seized it with both his hands, divested it of every particle of covering, torn it limb from limb, dissected it with the minutest accuracy, and then, without the slightest token of tenderness or pity, committed the fragments to the flames. If its admirers who extolled it so loudly in its prosperous days, now look on in silence, pronouncing no funeral panegyric, and leaving its relentless destroyer unpunished, it will give the public a poor opinion of the value of their friendship. We cannot follow Dr. Carson through his triumphant course. He shows, to use his own language, that Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth, namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of the language ascertained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability as to the thing related, independently of the testimony of the word.'

"Dr. Carson, with his vast critical resources, is the very man to perform such a work as this, and we have no doubt he has done it thoroughly; and, perhaps, it was needed in England, as quite a flourish of trumpets was made when this new theory was broached there, but it is scarcely needed in this country, for Mr. Beecher's theory is a very harmless thing here. It is probable that it would hardly have been noticed at all but for the respectability of the periodical through which it appeared."

In the preface to the American edition of his work on Baptism it is stated, "No one, it is believed, has made that deep and thorough research into the writings of the Greeks, in order to settle the *usus loquendi* of the words βαπτω and βαπτίζω, as has Dr. Carson."

In the *Scottish Guardian* the following character of Dr. Carson is given: "As a profound and accurate thinker, an able meta-



physician, a close reasoner, a deep theologian, Dr. Carson can stand the ground against any rivalry." It is also stated in the papers, that in England the Baptist convention or general association has requested Dr. Carson to prepare a work on the Ecclesiastical Tradition of Baptism.

Mr. Hague, also, in his reply to Messrs. Cooke and Towne, speaks of Dr. Carson's acute mind in a manner adapted to convey high praise entirely unmingled with censure.

I have not the least disposition to depreciate the original powers of Dr. Carson. On the other hand, I think he does possess uncommon powers, of a certain kind. I would only remark, that the greater his powers, the greater his responsibility to use them aright, and the greater the danger to the Christian community if he employs them to disseminate false opinions and malignant emotions; and this, I am fully satisfied, he has done.

Notwithstanding, therefore, the bad spirit of his works, and the extreme weakness of his arguments, I think there are sufficient reasons for a further notice of his reply. Indeed, to treat it with contempt is virtually to treat with contempt the Baptist denomination itself.

Not that I suppose that there are not in that denomination many Christian brethren, whose spirit is entirely unlike Dr. Carson's, and not that I hold my Baptist brethren individually responsible for all that Dr. Carson has said and done; but after all that has been so publicly said by leading organs of the Baptist denomination, giving him a prominence as the advocate of their cause such as is given to no other man, and uttering no word of censure, I am authorized to regard him as the leading representative and expounder of Baptist principles in the present age. And he plainly writes as if this were his own view of the case.

Besides this there are other reasons for still more thoroughly examining Dr. Carson's grounds. He is so perfectly confident of his own correctness, that his statements are made in a bold, palpable, and definite form. He seems to be deterred by no fear, from making assertions the most rash and unlimited, if they are

needed to carry out his principles logically to what he deems the true results. Indeed his great power as a leader lies mainly in this, taken in connexion with the fact that he really does know more than those whom he leads.

In his works there is a great show of learning, and as we have seen he has, at least among his own denomination, the highest reputation as a learned man, and his assertions are made with an energy designed to be overwhelming and annihilating, and on his own partisans they have certainly exerted and still exert vast power. Thus it is that he carries his party with him. Now although this characteristic of Dr. Carson is productive of much evil, still it is not without its beneficial results; it tends to place the real points at issue in the clearest possible light, and to concentrate the whole energy of the mind on them. They become focal points of illumination, and burning points of discussion.

His universal affirmations as to the use of the word βαπτίζω in the whole range and history of the Greek language, we have already noticed § 46 near the close. No less definite and remarkable are his specific assertions as to the use of the word in the Fathers. I shall proceed to notice these, and then consider more in detail, his reply to my argument from Scripture, and from the Fathers.

#### § 60. *Dr. Carson's Remarks on the Patristic Argument.*

These relate to two points, their accurate knowledge of the scriptural *usus loquendi* of βαπτίζω, and the sense in which they actually understood and used it.

On the first point he states explicitly, that they could not be mistaken as to the apostolic *usus loquendi*. His words are these: p. 472. "They knew the meaning of the language which they spoke." P. 473, "To suppose that persons who spoke the Greek language might understand their (i. e. the apostles') words in a sense different from that in which they used them, would be to charge the Scripture as not being a revelation. Whatever was

the sense of the word must have been known to all who heard them or read their writings." The truth of this position I freely admit. It is clear that Patristic Greek is based upon the Septuagint and the writings of the New Testament, and it is no less plain that they had minutely studied everything in the Greek Scriptures that seemed to have any relation to the subject of baptism, so that nothing could be more interesting or instructive than a philosophical analysis of the formation of all parts of the language of the Fathers on the subject of baptism, from various passages in the word of God, supposed by them to allude to it, but which to us convey no such allusion. Inasmuch, therefore, as the Scriptures were written in the living language of the Greek Fathers, and all their idioms were by them so carefully studied, there can be no doubt that they used the word in its true and apostolic sense. Still further, the Latin Fathers who understood and read Greek, must also have used it in the same sense; and therefore the Latin Fathers, if any such there were, who did not understand the Greek well enough to judge originally and independently, must also have received it in the same sense, for the *usus loquendi* would be fixed by those who did understand it. Still further, all writings composed in the Patristic age, and ascribed to the leading Fathers, in order to gain authority by their names, must have used it in the same sense, for it was their aim both to be understood, and not to be detected by those for whom they wrote, and of course they must have used the word in its current and usual sense. For example, though the list of seven baptisms ascribed to Athanasius is probably not his, yet as it was written in his age and name, it truly represents the *usus loquendi* of that and also of preceding ages. Indeed, all of it can be found in substance in the authentic works of preceding Fathers, and in later days it re-appears in the authentic writings of John of Damascus. So, also, whether the commentary on some of the first chapters of Isaiah, found in the works of Basil, is the real work of Basil, or whether it was written, as Garnier judges, by

some Cappadocian ecclesiastic in the name of Basil soon after his death, and was taken chiefly from the works of Eusebius of Cæsarea and of Basil; still, as it was written in the name of Basil, and in the age of Basil, and was universally regarded as the work of Basil, and quoted as such, it must have correctly exhibited the *usus loquendi* of that age on the subject of baptism. In quoting it, I follow the universal ancient usage in speaking of it as Basil's work, though in truth the opinion of Garnier seems to me very likely to be correct. Still, however this question is decided, the worth of the testimony of the work as to the *usus loquendi* of βαπτίζω is not at all affected. Indeed, as is the case in the work ascribed to Athanasius, it but represents and embodies the usage of previous writers, such as Origen, Eusebius, and Basil, if the writer was not Basil himself.

Hence, if these views are correct, and of their correctness there can be no reasonable doubt, the materials are ample for settling the apostolic usage of the word in question: they include all the Greek and Latin Fathers, and all the works written in their name in their age. My only wonder is that Dr. Carson did not resort to them first of all, instead of laboriously examining the writings of authors who knew nothing of the rite in question, and had, so far as appears, never seen or read the Greek, either of the Old Testament or of the New.

Let us now consider Dr. Carson's statement as to the sense in which the Fathers understood and used the word βαπτίζω. After attempting to answer my biblical argument, he thus proceeds: p. 466, "Mr. Beecher next professes to find proof in the Fathers. Proof from the Fathers that βαπτίζω signifies to *purify*! As well might he profess to find in them proof for the existence of railroads and steam-coaches. There is no such proof. There is not an instance in all the Fathers in which the word or any of its derivations are so used. Without exception, they use the word always for immersion." This surely is sufficiently definite and explicit, but it is not all, for he afterwards teaches that to assert

otherwise is not only false, but also an act of presumptuous hardihood : p. 470, " What is the hardihood of men who can presume to allege the Fathers on the other side ?"

Those who have carefully examined the evidence which I have already adduced on this point, might be amused by the extreme ridiculousness of these assertions, if the subject were not too serious for ridicule. But assertions of this kind have a moral as well as an intellectual character, in the sight of God. Can any one believe that Dr. Carson had ever made the investigations necessary to qualify him to make such assertions ? And is this the way in which he is wont to make statements on subjects so momentous ? An extended circle of minds rely on him for information on topics beyond their reach. Over them his opinions and unlimited assertions have a sway almost absolute. And is this the way in which he uses his intellectual powers, and repays their confidence ? I hesitate not to say, that he could not more totally mislead all who rely upon him. Instead of that iron uniformity of use which he claims, there are few words which have in the Fathers a usage more diversified and various. I have hitherto aimed simply at one point, to prove that it has the usage that I claim. To exhibit all the Patristic uses of the word I have not attempted. And yet, perhaps, the time has come in which it ought to be done, for it will give a more elevated point of vision from which to survey the whole subject, and to study its symmetry and proportions. After adducing, therefore, some further evidence on the main point, I shall attempt to give a general view of the Patristic uses of the word.

### § 61. *Additional Facts.*

Compare, then, with Dr. Carson's contemptuous denial of my position, and his unlimited and overbearing assertions, the following passage from Ambrose, a Father who was not only a student of the works of Basil, but drew the materials of many of his own works from them. Apol. David, § 59, " Per hyssopi fasciculum

adspergebatur agni sanguine, qui mundari volebat typico baptis-  
mate." "He who desired to be purified with a typical baptism  
was sprinkled with the blood of a lamb by means of a bunch of  
hyssop." Compare this now with the passages from Ambrose,  
Cyril, and others, in § 53, and who does not see with absolute  
and intuitive certainty that baptism has the sense of sacrificial  
purification? Sprinkling with blood was a typical purification,  
but certainly it was not a typical immersion.

Indeed, so far did the Fathers carry the idea of sacrificial puri-  
fication, that they gave the name baptism to cases in which the  
expiated person was not touched by the purifying fluid. All that  
they required was, that it should be so sprinkled or otherwise  
used, that expiation should be actually made; whenever this was  
done in any way, they regarded the person as baptized, i. e. puri-  
fied, or expiated, or absolved.

Hence when the blood of the Paschal Lamb was sprinkled on  
the posts of the door, they regarded all in the house as baptized,  
i. e. purified or expiated by blood. So both Theodoret and Am-  
brose regard the purging with hyssop in Ps. li. 7. In the Septu-  
agint it is, Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop. They both  
applied it to baptizing, i. e. purifying by the blood of a lamb.  
Hence also one who wrote in the name of Chrysostom,\* speaks of  
the thief on the cross as baptized, because expiation was made for  
him by the water and blood that came out of the side of Christ.  
He also intimates in the same passage, that if there had been a  
shower of rain it would have been sufficient to baptize the thief,  
but as there was not, he was baptized by the issuing of water  
and blood from the side of Christ. All this is perfectly plain the  
moment we assign to βαπτίζω the sacrificial sense to purify. For  
the actual making of an expiation justified the application of the  
word to the person expiated, and also by metonymy to that by  
which it was made. And hence, as we have proved, Origen  
states in general terms that Christ calls the shedding of his blood a

---

\* Chrys. Vol. 2, p. 286. Venice. 1734.



baptism. Hence, also, as we have seen, the water and the blood that issued from his side were called baptisms. See § 52, also §§ 25, 26. Compare now Dr. Carson's positive and contemptuous assertions with all these facts, and what shall we say? It is not the province of the human mind to create facts in history or philosophy, but simply to discover and classify them. But Dr. Carson proceeds as if it were his province, by intense assertions, to create them. But after all his assertions, they stand calmly and simply just as they did before. I find in the Fathers no evidence at all of the existence of railroads and steam-coaches, but abundant evidence that βαπτίζω means to purify.

Let me now add some further evidence on the subject of moral purification. Repentance, sorrow for sin, the trials of God's providence, and the truth, all purify the mind from sin. They do not make expiation or atonement, but they purify in a moral sense. Accordingly, in the usage of the Fathers all these things are said to baptize. One writing in the name of Chrysostom enumerates five kinds of baptism.\* Of these I shall notice the baptism by the truth, and the baptism by fire. By fire he understands the trials of life by which God purifies his children, calling and choosing them in the furnace of affliction. In proof of this he refers to Is. iv. 4, "The Lord shall purge by the spirit of burning;" and Ps. lxvi. 10, "Thou, O God, hast proved us, thou hast tried us as gold and silver is tried." "For," says he, "as gold or silver is purified in the furnace, by consuming the dross, so a man, placed in the furnace of affliction, is sanctified by the removal of his sins." To be thus baptized, i. e. purified by fire, he regards as a peculiar privilege of the sons of God. "But the servants of the devil are not baptized by fire. Wherefore? Because he who is wholly polluted, cannot so lay aside his filth as to be made clean. Begin to wash a brick in water, does it ever become clean? No; but by stirring up the clay it becomes more polluted. For he is made pure in whom is something good,

---

\* Vol. 6, p. xliii. Opus Imperf.

by means of which he can be made pure." Now all this argument is powerless to prove that the servants of the devil cannot be immersed in fire. That can be done whether they are purified or not. The argument proves only that the servants of Satan are not purified by the fire of trial, because they are all dross, there is in them no gold to be purified. But the sons of God are purified by the fire of trial, because in them there is gold, and the fire of trial consumes the dross and leaves the gold more pure. Baptism by the truth he illustrates by a reference to John xv. 3, "Now are ye clean (*καθαροί*) through the word that I have spoken unto you." Faith purifies, it does not immerse.

Anastasius, Bib. Pat. vol. ix. 1030, says that he "should dare to call mourning, with reference to God, another baptism." In Op. Isaïæ Abbatis, Bib. Vet. Pat. And. Gallandii, vol. vii. p. 292, it is said, "Affliction with humility and silence is a baptism, for John was clothed in camel's hair, and had a leathern girdle around his loins, and lived in the desert, which is a sign of affliction and penitence, which purifies a man." In all these cases the idea of immersion is out of the question. The fire of trials, the truth, sorrow for sins as against God, affliction with humility and patience, all purify a man, but they do not immerse him. Hence in all these cases, the idea of immersion is absolutely and unquestionably excluded from the word baptism. No meaning but purification is possible.

I have before me six lists of different kinds of baptism, by six different Fathers, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Athanasius, Maximus, Isidore Hispalensis, and John of Damascus. The one passing under the name of Athanasius is probably not his, but is a decisive proof of the *usus loquendi* of the age, and it re-appears enlarged in the works of John of Damascus. The list of John of Damascus, I shall translate, and add to it remarks and illustrations as I proceed. It is found on p. 261, vol. i., of his works. —Ed. Paris, 1712.

1. "The first baptism was that of the deluge, for the expurgation of sin."

Of this Tertullian thus speaks, p. 259 : Paris, 1634. “ After the waters of the deluge, by which long continued iniquity *was purged away* (purgatus est), after *the baptism*, if I may so say, of the world.”

Augustine, Cyprian, and others, from a different point of view, call the deluge a baptism to those in the ark, because they were *purified* and saved, but not immersed, whilst those out of it were not purified, but were immersed, overwhelmed, and destroyed.

In each case, however, it is regarded as a baptism, solely as it was a purification, not because it was an immersion.

2. “ The second baptism is that by the sea and the cloud (τὸ διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς νεφέλης), for the cloud was a symbol of the Spirit, and the sea of the water.”

Here, as in other cases, the use of *δια* instead of *ἐν* should be noticed, as throwing light on the causative sense of *ἐν* after βαπτίζω.

Hilarius says expressly in giving the sense of 1 Cor. x. 2, they were *purified by* the cloud, and *by* the sea (*per mare et per nubem purificati*), ἐν τῇ νεφελῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἐβαπτίσαντο.

3. “ The third was that under the law. For every one who was unclean, washed himself (ἀπελούετο) with water, and washed (ἐπλυνε) his garments, and thus was prepared to enter into the camp.”

Here the idea is manifestly, not an immersion, but a complete purification, effected by washing both the body and the clothes. This view is confirmed by Theophylact, who says, on Jn. ii. 6 : “ The Jews daily washed themselves (ἀπεπλύνοντο), and thus purified, ate ; as for example, if they had touched a leper or a dead body, or had sexual intercourse, they washed themselves (ἀπελούοντο), as unclean.” Here he interchanges ἀπεπλύνοντο and ἀπελούοντο as equivalent. To denote the same idea βαπτίζω is also used.

Basil, commenting on Isa. i. 16, wash you, make you clean, says : “ This Scripture seems in words to contradict itself ; God first refuses to hear, and to forgive sins, and then says *wash* (Heb. כִּשְׁחֻ. Gr. λούσασθε), as if they could be purified.

One, however, relates to salvation by the Mosaic Law, the other by the Gospel. He here repeals the law, and introduces the Gospel. Shall we (says the Jew) perform legal rites? Nay, all are rejected. What then shall we do? *Wash* and make clean. Oh, yes (replies the Jew), Moses said something about *washing*, for he said, he who touches any unclean thing, and is polluted, shall *wash his garments* and *wash his body* with water, and shall be clean.

But in this passage (replies Basil), God does not say wash for every instance of pollution, but merely *wash* (λούσασθε). There is one washing—one purification—ἐν βάπτισμα, μία κάθαρσις.”

Here the Hebrew בָּטַח, and the Greek λύνω, and βαπτίζω as implied in βάπτισμα, are all undeniably used as synonymes.

On Heb. ix. 10, Divers Baptisms, Theodoret also uses βαπτίζω in the sense to wash. He says, concerning those polluted by an issue, or leprosy, or sexual intercourse, they washed themselves (ἐβαπτίζοντο) and were cleansed with sprinkling. Where, as Basil also does, he uses βαπτίζω as an equivalent of בָּטַח.

Theophylact says, on the same passage, if any one had touched a dead body, or a leper, or had an issue, “he washed himself, and so appeared to be cleansed”—ἐβαπτίζετο καὶ οὕτως ἐδοκεῖ καθαρίζεσθαι.

Chrysostom says,\* “The Jewish Baptism (βάπτισμα) purified from bodily pollutions, but not from sins that affected the conscience. It did not expiate adultery, theft, and other crimes; but if any one had touched the bones of the dead, or eaten forbidden food, or had touched lepers, he washed himself (ἐλούετο), and was unclean until evening, and afterwards he was clean.” For, says he, “‘he shall wash his body with pure water, and shall be unclean until evening, and then he shall be clean.’—Levit. xv. 7. Therefore the Jewish purification (καθάρσις) did not purify from sins, but from bodily pollutions alone.” In his premises he has βάπτισμα Ἰουδαϊκόν, in his conclusions καθάρσις Ἰουδαϊκόν, as its synonyme.

---

\* Vol. 2, p. 370. Paris. 1718. De Baptismo Christi.

All the Fathers in like manner take the divers baptisms of Ileb. ix. 10, to mean merely and solely *purifications of persons*, sometimes by washing, as in this case, at others by sprinkling of blood, or of ashes, as in the cases quoted from Ambrose and Cyril of Jerusalem. They also look upon the system as a system of purification, taken as a whole, including not only the washing of the body and of the clothes, but also sprinkling with blood and ashes. Taken in this broad sense, it is called *Ιουδαϊκὸν βάπτισμα*, or *Ιουδαϊκὸν καθάρισον*, or, as in this case, *βάπτισμα νομικόν*.

4. "The fourth baptism is that of John, which was introductory, and designed to lead those who were baptized to repentance, that they might believe in Christ, for, said he, I baptize you with water, but he who cometh after me shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, and with fire. John, *therefore, purifies beforehand by water*, to prepare the way for the Spirit"—(*προκαθαίρει οὖν ὁ Ἰωάννης ἐπὶ τὸ πνεῦμα διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος*).

5. "The fifth was the baptism of our Lord, wherewith he was baptized. But he is baptized, not as if he needed purification, but that he might take upon himself my purification, that he might bruise the heads of the dragons in the water, that he might immerse my sins, and bury the old Adam in the water, that he might purify the baptist, that he might fulfil the law, that he might reveal the mystery of the Trinity, that he might be a type and example of our baptism; but we are baptized with the perfect baptism of the Lord, that which is *by water and the Spirit* (*τὸ δι' ὕδατος τε καὶ πνεύματος*). Moreover, Christ is said to baptize with fire, because he poured out the grace of the Spirit upon the Holy Apostles, in the form of fiery tongues, as our Lord said, Acts i. 5, or else on account of the punitive baptism of future fire."

"The sixth baptism is that by tears and repentance (*τὸ διὰ μετάνοίας καὶ δακρύων*)—which is truly painful."

"The seventh baptism is that by blood and martyrdom—(*τὸ δι' αἵματος καὶ μαρτυρίου*), with which Christ was baptized for us. It is peculiarly honorable, inasmuch as he who is thus baptized (i. e. purified), is never polluted again."

“The eighth and last is not a salutary baptism, but one that is destructive of evil. For sin and evil can no more bear sway, but are punished for ever.”

To this list the author of the “opus imperfectum” on Matt. adds baptism by the truth, and baptism by afflictions, as stated above.

The usage of the preposition *δια* in Nos. 2, 5, and 6, should be compared with its use at the end of No. 4, as furnishing decisive proof of the sense of the word baptism in this whole list.

But still more decisive, and beyond all possibility of answer, is the passage which follows, designed to explain an assertion in No. 5, that Christ was baptized that he might *purify* the baptizer. The purification of John is thus explained: *ἐβαπτίσθη Ἰωάννης τὴν χεῖρα ἐπιθεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν θεῖαν τοῦ δεσπότου κορυφὴν, καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι.* John was baptized by placing his hand on the divine head of his master and by his own blood.

The Fathers held that Christ, by touching the waters, purified them, and gave them a purifying power.

So also they held that by touching John he purified him, and this purification by touch he expressed by *βαπτίζω*. Surely all idea of immersion is excluded here. Indeed he expresses the same idea by *ἀγιάζω*, in another part of the passage. Christ was baptized that he might purify (*ἀγιάζη*) the baptizer. John was also clearly regarded by the Fathers as purified by his own blood, not immersed in it.

From these lists we also learn that the eternal punishment of the wicked is a baptism, because it will purge the holy universe from sin. The flood was a baptism, for two reasons; it purified the world from sinners and sin; and it also purified and saved those in the ark. But the wicked, who were immersed by the flood were not baptized. So also the whole process of legal purification under the law, including the washing of the clothes as well as that of the body, was called a baptism. Viewing it as a complex whole, it was proper to call it a purification, but not an immersion. So too the washing of the disciples' feet by Christ is



regarded by another Father as a baptism;\* and by still another, the anointing of the blind man's eyes with clay and spittle, and his washing in the pool of Siloam, because the spittle of Christ purifies as well as the washing in the pool.†

What now shall we say to all these things? If Dr. Carson had asserted that the Mississippi ran from the Gulf of Mexico with an impetuous current towards the cold regions of the north, and there descended by one vast cataract towards the centre of the globe, and had charged all with presumptuous temerity who dared to call in question the truth of his assertions, he could not be more utterly at war with the facts of the case, than he is in his assertions as to the Patristic use of βαπτίζω.

### § 62. *Other Errors of Dr. Carson.*

It was with reference to assertions such as these that I remarked, that Dr. Carson had made assertions that I knew not how to explain if he had ever read the Greek Fathers.

Indeed, Dr. Carson has elsewhere made assertions as to other words with the same inexplicable disregard of facts. On p. 445, he thus speaks: "Mr. Beecher's criticism on the word (περικλυσάσθαι) here (Tobit vi. 2) employed for washing, is *entirely false*." I translated it to wash all around. He proceeds, "The simple word signifies to deluge, to overwhelm, to inundate, to flow over anything." "Mr. Beecher criticises from imagination, not from knowledge of the language. Has he justified his criticism by a single example?" He then remarks with great taste and refinement, "The word does not signify that the young man in bathing splashed about like a duck, or rubbed himself like a collier, but that he threw himself into the river, that the stream might flow over him." Again, "There is no friction nor hand-washing in this word. It performs its purpose by running over either gently or with violence." So much learned minuteness

---

\* Anastasius, *Bibliotheca Patrum* Max. vol. ix. p. 880.

† Ambrose, vol. ii. p. 1096; on Jn. ix. 7.

and such bold charges on me of inaccuracy, would lead an incautious reader to suppose that Dr. Carson must have first made sure his facts before daring thus to commit himself before the learned world. Indeed, when I first read his remarks it produced a temporary impression that I must be wrong, or he would not dare to make such assertions. But the moment I looked at facts, the illusion vanished. It is indeed true that κλύζω has, in some cases, the meaning that he assigns to it. But it is not true that it has not the meaning that I assign to it. The facts are these: 1. It is applied by Euripides to washing the body with sea water, where νίπτω also is applied to the same operation, which Dr. Carson admits denotes hand-washing.

2. It is applied to the washing of children, by Aristotle—τὸ παιδίον ὕδατι περικλύζειν—to wash the child all around with water.

3. In Geoponica 17, 22, it is applied to washing an ulcer by a fluid, ἑλκος κλύζειν ὕρῳ. Here is no deluging, overwhelming, or inundation.

4. Epiphanius applies it to the purifications of the Jews, κλυζόμενοι ὕρῳ, where deluging or overflowing is out of the question.—Vol. i. p. 26.

5. By Pollux it is applied to the washing of clothes, and also of cups, and is given as a synonyme of πλύνειν, and ῥύπτειν, and καθαίρειν, and their compounds with διά, ἀπό, and ἐκ. What can be more decisive?

6. It is applied to the washing of head, hands, and body, after an unlucky dream.

7. It is used by Plutarch to denote the washing off blood from armor, αἷμα τῶν ὀπλῶν ἔτι θερμὸν ἀποκλύζεται. Plut. 7. 283. 11.

8. It is applied by Lucian to an object wet or sprinkled on all sides with *spray*, by rapid motion through water *at rest*. ἀφρῶ περικλυζόμενον. Lucian, V. H. 1. 31. Here surely is no flowing of water over an object.

9. Like καθαίρω, it has a medical use to cleanse or purge—ιατροὶ πικρὰν πικροῖς κλύζουσι φαρμάκοις χολήν. Plut.—Physicians purge out bitter bile by bitter medicines. Indeed its medical use gave birth to our English word *clyster*.

10. All lexicographers of any note sustain my use of the word, e. g. Stephens, Scapula, Damm, Hedericus, Ernesti, Passow, Schneider, etc. etc. Hence it is plain that assertions more contrary to the fact than Dr. Carson's criticism on me cannot be made, even if I were to say that Dr. Carson criticises from imagination, and not from a knowledge of the language in translating ὕδωρ water or πῦρ fire. And whatever Dr. Carson's talents they cannot enable his character as an accurate scholar long to survive such criticisms as he has here given.

In like manner when I say that Josephus uses βάπτισις to denote the rite of baptism, Dr. Carson denies it, and says, "The ἡ βάπτισις is the immersing—βάπτισμός is the rite of immersion." And yet it must be notorious to any one who has ever read the Fathers, that they do not hesitate to use βάπτισις to denote *the rite*, in opposition to κατάδυσις, *the act of immersing*, as in Sozomen, *μία καταδύσει ἐπιτελεῖν τὴν θείαν βάπτισιν*. "To perform the *sacred baptism by one immersion*."

Many of Dr. Carson's assertions as to tingo, βάπτω, λούω, and νίπτω, are of the same kind. Indeed I do not remember that I ever read a writer, so many of whose most positive assertions were so totally at war with facts. But success in such an assault on facts is hopeless. The highest talents are entirely unequal to such a war.

### § 63. *General View of Patristic Uses of Βαπτίζω.*

But enough has been said to show the entire incorrectness of Dr. Carson's theories of the Patristic uses of βαπτίζω. I shall therefore conclude this part of the subject by a brief general view of what that usage is.

1. Of course I need not say that they sometimes use the word in the sense to immerse anything in water, or to denote the state of anything that sinks in the water or is overflowed by it. And also that from this are derived metaphorical uses to denote immersion in sorrow, ignorance, darkness, sin, pollution, afflictions, and

misery. All this I have before noticed at large. See §§ 3 and 4, 10 and 28.

2. To wash, implying an *effort to cleanse*, but not including the effect. In this sense they use it as a translation of the Heb.  $\text{רָחַץ}$ , just as they use  $\text{λούω}$ . In this case  $\text{βάπτισμα}$  is taken in connexion with  $\text{κάθαρσις}$  or  $\text{καθαρισμός}$ ; thus, commenting on Is. i. 16, Basil (as before stated, § 61), to denote the idea of washing, uses  $\text{βάπτισμα}$ , and to denote purification, he uses  $\text{κάθαρσις}$ . Basil thus reasons, as a Jew "Moses said something concerning washing ( $\text{λουτροῦ}$ ), for he who touched any unclean thing and was polluted, shall wash his garments and his body with water, and shall be clean." He replies. "But Isaiah, when he said wash you, make you clean, did not say wash you on account of every pollution; but simply wash. There is one washing, one purification."  $\text{ἐν βάπτισμα μίᾳ κάθαρσις}$ . In like manner Theodoret and Theophylact plainly use  $\text{βαπτίζω}$  in the sense to wash, in speaking of the Mosaic washings enjoined by the word  $\text{רָחַץ}$ . So in the Apostolic Constitutions we find washings and purifications expressed in the same way. For example in book vi. c. 20, and c. 30, and elsewhere, the phrase  $\text{συνεχῇ βαπτίσματα}$  clearly denotes frequent washings. Dr. Chase deserves great credit for his candor in so translating it, in his recent valuable edition of the Apostolic Constitutions and Canons. pp. 151, 161.

3. To *cleanse and purify by washing*, i. e. to wash, including the effect, and hence, in general, to purify in the most generic sense, either by water, or by truth, or by atonement and expiation, or by trials, or by mourning and sorrow. After what has been said there is no need to offer any proof of the real existence of this sense. But here it is peculiarly important to bear in mind the distinction between sacrificial purification, or expiation, and moral purification, or sanctification, to which I have so often referred. For without a clear apprehension of it, much of the language of the Fathers cannot be understood.

4.  $\text{βαπτισμός}$  and  $\text{βάπτισμα}$  by metonymy denote means of purification, e. g. water, blood, fire, oil, air, &c. § 52.

5. *βάπτισμα* is also used to denote, comprehensively, a system designed to effect purification in various ways, e. g. *βάπτισμα Μωϋσέως*, or *νομικόν* or *Ἰουδαϊκόν* which Chrysostom interchanges as synonymous with *καθάρσιν Ἰουδαϊκόν*, to denote not an act, nor one rite merely, but a complex system, involving and comprehending various kinds and modes of purification. So Basil says of the Jewish baptism, "it recognised a difference of sins, not forgiving all; it required various sacrifices, it made minute regulations as to purity, it separated the polluted and unclean for a time, it observed times and seasons." In all this he is plainly illustrating a system of purification involving many parts, but having one great end, i. e. to purify, either by expiatory sacrifices, or in some other way. So too, the baptism of John or of Christ is often used in like manner to denote a system of purification.

6. They also used it to denote, comprehensively, the actual processes involved in conferring absolution; e. g. if exorcism, divesting of all clothing, immersion, unction, and robing in white, the pronouncement of certain words, and a benediction, were supposed to be involved in conferring a legal and valid absolution, then the term *βάπτισμα* was comprehensively used to include all these processes. Any part of the process that purified was also called by the same name. So Origen speaks of baptizing, i. e. purifying with oil. And the Apostolic Constitutions speak of unction as a type of spiritual baptism, i. e. spiritual purification.

7. The result or effect produced by these processes, or symbolized by them, they also denote by the word baptism or purification, i. e. absolution, remission of sins. It is in this sense that Zonaras, in his Lexicon, defines baptism as being the remission of sins by water and the Spirit. This remission of sins was effected, in their view, not by any energy of the water in itself, but by some mysterious, sanctifying power given to it when the Spirit brooded upon it at the creation, or when Christ was baptized in it, or when the bishop or priest consecrated it, operating in concurrence with the energy of the Holy

Spirit, who, according to a divine constitution, diffused and exerted his mighty energies in and through the water. In this way, in their view, was effected the baptism of the Holy Ghost; and the superiority of the baptism of Christ to that of John lay in the fact that John used the simple fluid water, but in that of Christ, a compound fluid, so to speak, was employed, composed of sanctified water, and the influence of the Holy Spirit. On no topic is the eloquence of Chrysostom so fervid, as when he unfolds the purifying, nay, regenerating powers of this semi-material, semi-spiritual compound. As quick as the ocean extinguishes a spark that falls into it, so soon does this mighty compound extinguish the sins of the sinner that falls into it, and makes him pure as the angels and brilliant as the sunbeams of heaven. To symbolize this spotless whiteness of the soul thus miraculously and suddenly obtained, the baptized person was robed in purest white. His being stripped perfectly naked before immersion, was designed to give to the miraculous energies of the fluid full scope to penetrate every part of body and soul. And in the opinion of some of the Fathers, these waters also had a miraculous power even to heal bodily disease, of which they give us some examples, as true, no doubt, as all other of the lying wonders of that age of fraud and delusion. The word baptism, used in this sense, denoted not merely a transient act, but a permanent and abiding moral change effected by the rite. The soul was conceived of as invested in a robe of spotless purity. Hence baptism is likened to spiritual robes, and the Fathers speak of *putting* on the baptism of Christ, and of preserving their baptism unspotted. Origen preferred the baptism of blood to that of water and the Spirit, because few keep this unspotted till death, but the purity gained by the baptism of a bloody death is polluted no more. The leading idea in this usage of the word is a permanent state or character of purity, and not the act of immersion at all. Indeed, what sense is there in such an expression as keeping the act of immersion unspotted till death? The



act is soon over, and all possibility of polluting or making it pure is passed by. And yet Dr. Carson again and again asserts that baptism always denotes the mode of an act, and nothing else.

8. The word Baptism is also used as the appropriated name of the rite of Christian Baptism. In this case it approximates in its use towards a proper name, or a technical term, i. e. the attention of the mind is abstracted from the meaning of the word, though it is in fact significant, and is fixed upon the rite for which it stands. Thus to speak of the purification of baptism would not be tautology, but would denote the purification effected by the rite bearing that name.

9. Finally, the Fathers gave the name baptism to any transaction regarded by them either as typifying baptism, or producing similar effects; e. g. when Elisha raised the axe out of the water by throwing in a stick, Ambrose regards it as a baptism, because as the axe was immersed in the water, so was the sinner in sin—and as the stick raised the axe out of the water, so does baptism, i. e. remission of sins, raise a sinner out of his sins. The stick, according to him, is, of course, a type of the cross of Christ. So when Moses, by throwing in the branches of a tree, made the bitter waters of Marah sweet, Ambrose regards it as another kind of baptism, because as the branches made bitter waters sweet, so does baptism make sweet the bitterness of the human heart. Origen regards the passage of Elijah over Jordan, as he was taken up in a chariot of fire, as a wonderful baptism, because he thus passed over Jordan, and went to heaven; and baptism does something like this for the pardoned soul. Passing through the Red Sea was a baptism, because it purified the Israelites, and drowned Pharaoh, by immersion, just as the rite of Baptism purifies Christians, and leaves Satan and the old man immersed and strangled in the baptismal pool. The flood was a baptism, because it purified and saved Noah and his family—and also purified the world—and immersed and strangled the enemies of God—just as the rite of baptism purifies all who come by it, into the ark, i. e. the church—and as the waters of the

flood immersed, strangled, and purged off the wicked, so will an eternal baptism of fire purge out the wicked from the kingdom of God. They are the chaff to be burnt up with unquenchable fire, when the Redeemer thoroughly purges his floor.

Hence, in the days of the Fathers, the narrow view that βαπτίζω means only to immerse had no being. The great idea before their minds was purification or absolution. This they applied to means of purification, or a system of purification, or to the processes involved in being purified, or to the supposed result of these processes, or to the rites viewed as an ordinance of Christ, or to any supposed or real typical transaction producing what they deemed similar effects.

#### § 64. *General View Applied.*

By thus throwing off the shackles of arbitrary canons, and leaving the mind perfectly free to watch the actual evolutions of the facts of language in the writings of the Fathers, we find ourselves enabled to solve without difficulty all their various modes of expression. For example, when Photius says, αἱ τρεῖς ἀναδύσεις καὶ καταδύσεις τοῦ βαπτίσματος θάνατον καὶ ἀνάστασιν σημαίνουσιν, we see at once that βάπτισμα refers to the rite of absolution, and ἀναδύσεις and κατάδυσεις to acts involved in it. Thus “the three immersions and emersions of the rite of purification (or absolution) symbolize death and resurrection.”

Again Theophylact says, βάπτισμα ὥσπερ διὰ τῆς καταδύσεως θάνατον οὕτω διὰ τῆς ἀναδύσεως τὴν ἀνάστασιν τυποῖ. “As the rite of purification shows forth death by immersion, so by emersion it shows forth resurrection.”

Again he says, ἐν τρισὶ καταδύσει τοῦ σώματος ἐν βάπτισμα τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθηταῖς παραδέδωκε λέγων πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε, etc., Matt. xxviii. 19. He gave to his disciples one rite or ordinance of purification, by three immersions of the body, saying, go ye therefore and teach all nations, etc.

I would here call attention once more to the fact, that to de-

note the act of immersion *κατάδυσις* is used, reserving to *βάπτισμα* the sense purification or absolution as the name of the rite. But inasmuch as *βάπτισμα* could be used to denote the act of immersion, it was sometimes, though rarely, so used, of which in § 28, 4, I have given an example from the Apostolic Constitutions, Can. L. *τρία βαπτίσματα μιᾶς μυστήσεως* three immersions of one initiation. This was so clearly a departure from common usage, that both Zonaras and Balsamon deemed it worthy of a note. That of Zonaras I have given in the section referred to. That of Balsamon is this, *τὰ δὲ βαπτίσματα ἐνταῦθα ἀντὶ καταδύσεων ὑποληπτέον μοι*. This note is still more remarkable and decisive than that of Zonaras—for he merely gives it as his opinion that *βαπτίσματα* means immersions here—"It seems to me that *βαπτίσματα* is to be taken for immersions here." Indeed! If it never means anything but immersions, as Dr. Carson says, both the note itself and this modest expression of opinion are quite out of place. But Dr. Carson's theory of this word is entirely a modern invention. No one had ever dreamed of it in the patristic age. Balsamon well knew that in common usage *βάπτισμα* meant purification, and not immersion.

It may be well here to notice the sophistical reasoning by which the author of this canon endeavored to make out the doctrine of trine immersion. It was this: Christ did not enjoin it upon them to purify into his death, in which case there would have been one immersion, but into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; hence, it being assumed that immersion is the mode, there must be one act of immersion for each person. In this reasoning, *βαπτίζω* in the command retains its usual sense, but when from the three persons the inference is drawn that there ought to be three acts of immersion, it leaves its usual sense, and denotes to immerse, and this usage was thought by two Greek commentators, to be so likely to mislead as to need an explanatory note, to prevent confusion.

In Gregory Nazianzen occurs a striking passage, of peculiar interest, as showing at once that immersion was in fact the usual

practice, but not the meaning of the word : βάπτισμα καλοῦμεν ὡς συνβαπτομένης τῇ ὕδατι τῆς ἁμαρτίας—" We call it (i. e. the rite) baptism, i. e. absolution or purification, because OUR SINS are buried with us in the water." Whilst this clearly implies that in the rite THEY were in fact buried in the water, it no less clearly implies that it was not called baptism for this reason, but because THEIR SINS were buried with them. The burial of sins in the baptismal pool, was a common mode of expressing absolution or purification from sin, taken from Micah vii. 19, Thou wilt cast all their sins into the depth of the sea. So that the sense is plainly this : we call it purification, because, when we are buried in the baptismal pool, OUR SINS are buried with us, and we of course come out perfectly pure. If the word had meant immersion, he must have said simply : We call it immersion, because we are immersed.

We now come to a case of inconsistent usage, inconsistent at least with the present systems of philology. In a few cases Chrysostom uses the principle of a double sense in commenting on this word. Inasmuch as both meanings, i. e. purification and immersion, coexist in the language, and immersion was the common mode, on this principle the word can be expounded as having both meanings in one and the same place, in order to give greater fulness to the passage. At this we need not wonder in the Fathers. A certain class of modern commentators have not hesitated to do the same thing. On this ground Chrysostom in a few instances gives a two-fold exposition of the passage in which Christ says, I have a baptism to be baptized with, etc.

One exposition is based on the sense purification. As in Hom. 65, al. 66, on Matt.—Speaking of his death on the cross, he says he calls it baptism, βάπτισμα, indicating that a great purification, κάθαρμον, should be made for the world by the things then transpiring—De petit fil Zebedai. Vol. i. p. 520.

Again he says, "he calls it baptism, because by it he *purified* the world, and *not only so*, but on account of the ease of his resurrection, for as he who is immersed βαπτίζόμενος in water arises

with great ease, being nothing hindered by the nature of the waters, so he having descended unto death arose again with ease, for this reason he calls it baptism: and again, on Mark x. 39, "he calls his cross baptism, for as we are easily immersed and arise again, so he having died, easily arose again when he would." In § 26, p. 66, I have said, "Nor have I found any evidence that the passages in Luke xii. 50, Mark x. 37, 39, Matt. xx. 22, 23, were ever understood by any of the Fathers in the sense either of immersion or overwhelming." This usage of Chrysostom is an exception, and it is the only one that I have yet found. He plainly uses the word in both senses, purification and immersion. And yet even in these cases the sense purification can be retained as the name of the rite, and the illustration be taken from the well known mode of its performance, though the view that I have taken seems to me most likely to be correct. I have already twice stated that cases of inconsistent usage may exist, without at all destroying the force of my argument, § 27, page 66, and § 21, page 51; yet after extended research my greatest surprise has been, that I have found so few such cases. I have been surprised, because when I considered how general was the practice of immersion among the Fathers, and how natural it was that their practice should react upon their language, and that immersion was in fact an existing meaning of the word, it seemed strange to me that this meaning should so rarely be given to the word βαπτίζω in speaking of the rite. But when I reflected that the great idea of purification, i. e. absolution, or remission of sins, was ever uppermost in their minds, and that immersion, though the common mode, was not deemed essential to it, I saw a sufficient reason for reserving to βάπτισμα this great idea, and introducing the terms κατάδυσις and ἀνάδυσις to denote immersion and emersion.

The real nature of this idiom will become clearer by a passage of Gregory Nyssen, in which he uses κάθαρσις so as to show the force of βάπτισμα when used with ἀνάδυσις and κατάδυσις: "omitting things beyond our power let us inquire τίνος ἔνεκεν δι' ὕδατος ἡ κάθαρσις; καὶ πρὸς ποίαν χρεῖαν αἱ τρεῖς καταδύσεις παραλαμβάνονται

for what end is the rite of purification by water, and for what use the three immersions are employed?" All see in this case a usage of *κάθαρσις* exactly equivalent to the use of *βάπτισμα* just illustrated. The use of the preposition *διὰ* after *κάθαρσις* and equivalent words, illustrates the use of the same preposition after *βάπτισμα*, &c. I will by parallel columns still further exhibit this similarity of usage to the eye.

The following uses of *κάθαρσις*,  
*ἀγνισμός*, &c., are taken from  
Cyril of Alexandria :

τὸν ἀγνισμὸν δι' ὕδατος—  
τὴν κάθαρσιν δι' ὕδατος  
τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν  
τοῦ δι' αἵματος ἀγνισμοῦ—  
ἡγιασμένοι διὰ πνεύματος  
τὴν διὰ Χριστοῦ κάθαρσιν ἢ δι'  
ὕδατος τε καὶ πνεύματος  
ἀγάζων δι' ὕδατος

The following are from Gre-  
gory Thaum. Athanasius—  
Clemens Alexand. :

βάπτισμα διὰ δακρῶν  
βαπτίζειν δι' ὕδατος  
βαπτίζειν διὰ πυρὸς  
βάπτισμα δι' αἵματος  
βάπτισμα διὰ μαρτυρίου  
βαπτίζειν διὰ πνεύματος  
βάπτισμα νοητὸν διὰ πνεύματος—  
βάπτισμα αἰσθητὸν δι' ὕδατος.

This comparison of similar idioms could be extended to other prepositions, as *ἐν* taken in the instrumental sense as equivalent to *διὰ*—and also to the use of the dative in the instrumental sense after both words, showing by an extended induction of particulars such an exact similarity in the use of prepositions and cases after *βάπτισμα* and *κάθαρσις*, &c., as proves them at a glance to be synonymous, for the word *κατάδυσις*, immersion, is never followed by such prepositions and the dative case in such a sense. See also § 56, on the same point.

### § 65. *Commission to Baptize.*

I will conclude this general view by noticing its bearings on a question relating to the commission to baptize. It is this. Why is there a commission given to baptize in Matthew and Mark, and none in Luke and John? This is a question for those to answer



who deny the correctness of the view that I have given—for on this view it presents no difficulty at all. The reply is, that a commission to baptize is in fact a commission to purify, that is, a commission to remit sins—and in Luke and John, the disciples do receive a commission to remit sins. Luke xxiv. 47, 48,—“That repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations—and ye are witnesses of these things,” that is, that repentance and baptism should be preached in his name among all nations—for according to Zonaras and the Fathers, baptism is the forgiveness of sins by water and the Spirit.

This view of the passages in Luke and John occurred to my mind before reading the Fathers, as furnishing a test of the soundness of my views, and on reading them I found that they did in fact regard the commission to remit sins in Luke and John as a commission to baptize, as really as that in Matthew and Mark. They regarded it in short as merely another mode of expressing the same idea. In John the phraseology is different from that of Luke :—“Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained,” John xx. 23. In short, Christ died as the Lamb of God to take away the sins of the world, and the great business of the apostles was to publish to the world the great doctrine of the remission of sins, through his death, and the terms on which it could be obtained, and to establish the rite by which this purgation from sin should be shadowed forth and commemorated in honor of the Trinity, and especially of that Spirit by whom this atonement was made effectual to purge the conscience from dead works to serve the living God. “Go ye therefore, teach all nations, purifying them (that is remitting to them that repent and believe their sins) into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.”

§ 66. *Dr. Carson's dissertation on λούω.*

A few words ought here to be said on the meaning of the words λούω and λουτρών. I have affirmed that by their own force they

denote simply washing or purification, and not bathing. To prove this I referred, in § 16, to the fact that the vessels for washing the hands in the vestibules of ancient churches were called λουτήρες as well as νιπτήρες. Dr. Carson sees fit in view of this, to devote nearly nine pages to a dissertation on λούω. He opens his dissertation as follows, p. 66: "The philosophical linguist Dr. Campbell, of Aberdeen, in distinguishing the words λούω and νίπτω, makes the first signify to wash or bathe the whole body, the last to wash or bathe a part. This distinction has been generally received since the time of Dr. Campbell. Mr. Beecher calls it in question, yet he does not touch the subject with the hand of a master. He merely alleges an objection which he thinks calculated to bring confusion into what is thought to be clear; but he gives no additional light by any learned observations of his own. I shall endeavor to settle this question by evidence founded on the practice of language as well as the practice of the New Testament." Parturiunt montes! Dr. Carson is about to touch the subject with the hand of a master—and to settle the question!

Let us look at his results. He proves abundantly that λούω can be applied to bathing by immersion, which I never denied. Does he prove that it cannot be applied to sprinkling? Not at all. He asserts it, but nowhere proves it. I assert the contrary, and this is my proof: Porphyry asserts, in libel. de antro Nympharum, that it was customary for married women to purify maidens by sprinkling or affusion, before marriages, with water taken from fountains and living springs. Photius tells us that the water used for this purpose at Athens, was brought in a pitcher from certain fountains which he specifies, by the oldest male boy of the family. Here bathing by immersion, is excluded, and yet the water thus used is called λουτρόν, or λουτρά νυμφικά, and Zonaras defines λουτρά thus, τὰ εἰς λύσιν ἀγόντα τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας. Those things which produce the removal of impurity, that is, means of purification. The boy who brought the water was called λουτροφόρος.

Again, Basil applies the term λουτρόν to a clinic baptism by

sprinkling or affusion. The prætor Ariantheus, converted by his wife, was also baptized by her on his dying bed. Of this Basil says, letter 386,—He washed away all the stains of his soul at the close of his life by the washing of regeneration, λουτρῶ παλιγγενεσίας. There was no bathing by immersion; but sprinkling or affusion.

Again, in Corpus Hist. Byzant., Nicephoras Gregoras, Lib. 24, p. 573, Venice, 1729, uses λουτρόν to denote the complex rite of purification, including unction and the influence of the Holy Spirit. "Since it is customary with men to wash themselves with water and to anoint themselves with oil, God has joined to the oil and the water the grace of his Spirit, and made them (i. e. oil, water, and spirit) the cleansing of regeneration," λουτρόν παλιγγενεσίας—anointing with oil is a part of the process of purification—it is no part of bathing, and here λουτρόν must be taken in the most generic sense given to it by Photius, that is, a system of means of purification or a process of purification.

Dr. Carson hints that the λουτήρες in the temples might be for bathing the hands, and the νιπτήρες for washing them! p. 73. Here is the force of theory with a witness. Let us then listen to Julius Pollux, Seg. 46, Lib. 10, Cap. 10. The caption is, concerning vessels used in washing hands and face, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ νίπτεσθαι σκευῶν.

It is necessary, he proceeds, for one arising from sleep to wash his face, τὸ πρόσωπον ἀπονίπτεσθαι—here is no bathing as yet. Let a boy, he proceeds, bring an ewer or pitcher, and pour out fresh water κατὰ λέβητος ἢ λουτηρίου τινός, in a vessel or wash-basin. He justifies himself in using λουτήριον in this sense by quoting a line from Anaxilas, in which he says, in baths τοῖς βαλανείοις there are no wash-basins (λουτήρια), i. e. vessels for washing hands and face. Can λούω mean to bathe by its own force, when λουτήριον is thus used to denote a vessel in which to wash (νίπτειν) hands and face, and not only so, but is placed in pointed antithesis to bathing vessels? for in baths surely there are vessels for bathing, though there are none for face and hand-washing. Pollux also gives λουτήρ (the word quoted by me from the Fathers), as a synonyme of λουτήριον to denote a wash-basin, for washing

hands and face. All idea of face and hand *bathing* is therefore excluded.

Dr. Carson says, p. 67, that “*λούω*, like our word *bathe*, applies to animal bodies only—we do not speak of *bathing cloth*.”

Nevertheless, Origen applies *λουτρόν* to wood, and Gregory Nazianzen applies *λούω* to clothes, and to a couch—and Eupolis, see Pollux, applies *ἀλουσία* (i. e. want of washing) to a cloak. Surely these are not animal bodies.

Again, Dr. Carson says, p. 67, in order to justify the application of *νίπτω* to the whole body it must be all successively washed—as *νίπτω* involves friction or hand-washing. And yet Euripides applies it to bathing a whole herd of oxen in the sea, where friction, hand-washing, etc., are all out of the question. Strabo, too, applies it to the bathing of Diana in a river, where there was no probability of hand-washing.

Perhaps I have said enough to illustrate the nature of “the learned remarks of his own,” which Dr. Carson has added, and his mode of “touching the subject with the hand of a master.” I could add much more, did my room permit, and the patience of my readers allow. I will not complete the quotation with which I began, by adding, “*Nascitur ridiculus mus*,” but only state that I see no reason either to add to or take from my statement, after all of Dr. Carson’s effort to settle the subject.

Dr. Carson says, I added no learned observations of my own. I answer, the case seemed to me too plain to need any. Nothing is easier than to make a useless parade of learning. But it is of no use to waste time by needless citations to prove points which no one denies, and at the same time to deny points without proof, on which the whole question hangs.

I conclude then by saying, that *λούω* of its own force denotes to wash, or to purify; that in fact it is more generally used to denote a washing or purifying of the whole body, whether by sprinkling, affusion, or immersion—but that it is also applied to washing hands, face, and feet—also to wood, clothes, couches, cloaks, etc., though but rarely in this last sense.

*Νίπτω* applies generally to washing of hands, face, and feet,

also sometimes, but more rarely, to bathing the whole body, in the case of both men and animals. It is also often used by the Fathers, with its compounds, to denote the cleansing of the mind from sin, excluding the idea of hand-washing. Sometimes also it is applied to the washing of cups, vessels (σκευῆ), and tables.

Πλύνω is generally applied to clothes—but also to the body and all its parts, also to cups, metals, and various animal substances. Proof of all these statements is at hand, and could be produced, if needed. But I think that the case is clear enough as it is.

Dr. Carson's principles and general assertions, as to the Fathers, have passed under review ; let us next briefly notice his application of them to the details of my argument. I shall now consider the manner in which he has assailed the Biblical argument.

### § 67. *Dr. Carson's Attack on the Biblical Argument.*

The Biblical argument is contained in §§ 8—18. The course of the argument is this : (1.) In John iii. 25, the expression, a dispute concerning purifying (καθαρισμοῦ), proves that καθαρισμός and βαπτισμός are synonymous, when applied to the rite of baptism. (2.) This view explains the expectation that the Messiah would baptize, for it was foretold that he should *purify*, but not that he should *immerse*. (3.) In the baptism of the Holy Spirit, the subject, the agent, the means, and the effect, demand the idea to purify, and exclude the idea to immerse, for the subject is the spirit of man, the agent the divine spirit, the means spiritual, and the effect purity ; and in such relations the idea to immerse is absurd ; purify is the only reasonable sense. (4.) The end of baptism is to indicate sacrificial purification, i. e. the remission of sins. We should naturally expect to find this idea in its name, and we do find it so used as clearly to indicate that it has the sense καθαρισμός, i. e. sacrificial purification or remission of sins. (5.)

In the expression, divers baptisms, in Heb. ix. 10, the word *βαπτισμοί* is obviously taken in a generic sense to denote Mosaic purifications of any kind. (6.) The baptism of couches, in Mark vii. 4, 8, and the baptism expected of Christ, in Luke xi. 38, were obviously purifications merely, and not immersions. (7.) In speaking of the nightly baptism of Judith (Jud. vii. 7) in the camp of Holofernes, no doubt a mere purification is spoken of without respect to mode, and not an immersion. (8.) In referring to a baptism from a dead body (Sirach xxxi. 25), no doubt the word is used in the generic sense to denote purification. (9.) The account of purification from sin in the baptism of Paul (Acts xxvi. 16), and Peter's effort to guard the mind against the idea of mere external purification, and to direct the mind to the purging of the conscience by the atonement, show that purification was the usual religious sense of the word. (10.) In that part of the Greek language, in which alone we ought to look for decisive evidence on this subject, there is no opposing evidence to be found ; hence the case is decided in favor of the sense to purify, and against the sense to immerse.

In weighing the force of this argument it is necessary to remember, that, whatever the practice was in fact, even if it was immersion, it does not in any sense disprove this argument as to the meaning of the word ; but only shows that under a command to purify, they did in fact purify by immersion. But I do not at all concede that in the Apostolic days it was customary to baptize by immersion. The fact, I am persuaded, was directly the reverse. But I mention this consideration, that no illogical imaginations or associations of ideas may entangle the mind or break the force of the argument.

Let it also be borne in mind that the argument is strictly cumulative, and that its force is to be tested by the coherence and accumulated force of its parts.

How, then, does Dr. Carson attempt to answer it ? First, by attempting to break it up into disconnected fragments ; then, in each fragment trying to prove that the highest possible evidence



of my position is not given ; that the sense immerse is possible ; and then bringing in what he calls the testimony of the word βαπτίζω.

The illogical nature of this whole process I have fully shown. I have also, by evidence most unanswerable, shown that the word βαπτίζω does not in these cases testify as he alleges, but that it testifies directly against him, and most fully and decidedly in my favor. Hence,

1. On the ground on which I first put the argument, i. e. the principles of moral and cumulative evidence, it remains unanswered and with unbroken force.

2. On Dr. Carson's own ground it remains unanswered and with unbroken force. I add,

3. That the truth of every main point in the argument can be sustained by direct philological evidence from the Fathers, and that to any required degree of strength.

To illustrate this last assertion, let us consider the leading points of the argument.

1. Dr. Carson assails my argument from John iii. 25. He denies that the "question" spoken of had any reference to baptism at all. For example, on p. 432, he asserts that the question spoken of "was not caused by the concurrence of two claims to baptize ; for these claims are never mentioned with regard to the dispute. If we had not the document in our hands, we should be led to think from Mr. Beecher's representation, that the dispute was between the disciples of John and the disciples of Jesus with respect to conflicting claims between their masters ;" on p. 430, he says, "the dispute had no relation to the baptism of John and Jesus ; the dispute does not imply the existence of the baptism of Jesus, or even of himself." In various other forms and with great positiveness he repeats it. He also sharply asserts that the question concerning purification was not a question concerning baptism. On the other hand Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theophylact, expressly testify that the question concerning *purification* was simply and only a question concerning *baptism*. Chrysostom thus speaks, "That

the *baptisms*, i. e. of John and Jesus, did not differ in claims the context shows. What is this? There was a dispute between the disciples of John and a Jew concerning *purification*. For the disciples of John, being jealous of the disciples of Christ, and of Christ himself, when they saw them *baptizing*, began to dispute with those who were *baptized*, as if their own *baptism* was superior in its claims to that of Christ, and taking one of the *baptized* they tried to convince him, but did not succeed." In like manner, Theophylact says, on Jn. iii. 25, "ἐγένετο ζήτησις περὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος. There was a dispute concerning *baptism*, between the disciples of John, moved with rivalry, and a certain Jew. For the Jew placed the claims of the baptism of Christ before those of John, but the disciples of John gave the precedence to the claims of their master's baptism." Thus it appears, beyond all doubt, that the question concerning purification was simply and only a question concerning baptism. Nor is this all; as if to make assurance doubly sure, Theophylact, after having thus called the question a question concerning *baptism*, and then stated its point, proceeds next to call it a question concerning *purification*, and then to add as its synonyme *baptism*. He thus expressly gives βάπτισμα as an equivalent of καθαρισμός. For, after stating the subject of the question just as I do, he proceeds to say of the disciples of John, and the Jews, ζητήσαντες δὲ περὶ καθαρισμοῦ ἦτοι βαπτίσματος προσίασιν αὐτῶν διδασκάλῳ, "disputing concerning purification, that is, baptism, they came to their master." Nor are these words equivalent merely as names of the same rite, as Dr. Carson suggests, but they are equivalent in idea, as I have elsewhere often and fully shown. Hence purification is not a mere name of the rite, like "illumination," "anointing," "the gift," "grace," "the seal," &c. It is the meaning of the word baptism; and baptism is purification, and not immersion.

2. Again, Dr. Carson treats with very great contempt the second point, that this view explains, by a reference to Old Testament prophecies, the expectation that the Messiah would baptize. This I illustrated by a reference to Malachi. He

thinks the argument so contemptible that it "deserves no attention." "It requires more than the patience of Job to be able to mention such an argument without expressing strong feeling." "This argument manifests such a want of discrimination, and confusion of things which differ, that the mind on which it has force must be essentially deficient in those powers that qualify for the discussion of critical questions."

What, then, are the facts? They are these. The Fathers, in commenting on those passages in the Old Testament, in which it is predicted that the Messiah should purify, do regard them as predictions that he should baptize, and state explicitly that the words βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω mean the same thing. Of this, Basil's comment on Is. iv. 4, § 55, is an unanswerable proof. In the Old Testament it is said concerning the Messiah ἐκπλυνεῖ and ἐκκαθαριεῖ. In the New, John says βαπτίσει, and Basil says they mean the same thing; and then defines βάπτισμα as meaning καθαρισμός.

Nor is this all. Eusebius, of Cesarea, sustains the same view. Commenting on this passage, he says that the preposition ἐν is used in the causative sense, when applied to the Holy Spirit, not only in this passage, but in the New Testament too; for he says that the expressions ἐν πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ ἐν πνεύματι καύσεως, by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning, in Is. iv. 4, are equivalent to the expressions ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ καὶ πυρί, by the Holy Spirit and fire in the New Testament. Hence he pointedly excludes the idea of immersion in the Holy Spirit, and gives in its place purification by the Holy Spirit. The whole comment of Eusebius is this: "Observe whether this passage is not, to a remarkable degree, coincident in sense with the evangelic testimony concerning our Saviour. 'He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire;' for the expression 'by the spirit of judgment and the spirit of burning,' does not at all differ in sense from the expression by 'the Holy Spirit and fire.' In the one case (Is. iv. 4) fiery words reproving them, produced a purification

(κάθαρσιν) of sins, and in like manner, of our Saviour in the gospel it is said, he shall purify (βαπτίσει), not with water but by the Holy Spirit and fire."

In regarding Is. iv. 4, as a prophecy of baptism, Origen, Eusebius, Basil, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theodoret, all coincide. And just as clearly do Theodoret and Cyril of Alexandria regard Mal. iii. 3, to which I referred, as a prophecy of baptism; and the same is true of other passages in the Old Testament, in which it is foretold that the Messiah shall purify.

Inasmuch, then, as it was foretold that the Messiah should purify, and inasmuch as purify and baptize are, by the testimony of the Fathers, synonymous, it was of course foretold that the Messiah should baptize. And predictions that he should baptize, would of course awaken an expectation that he would baptize. Hence this expectation is accounted for as I stated.

In what manner he should baptize is not foretold, and no doubt all these predictions had primary reference to spiritual purification, and could have been fulfilled had no external rite of purification been ordained. But so soon as a rite of purification was established by the forerunner of the Messiah, it would at once call up to the minds of all, the great purifier, so long foretold, so long expected, and raise the inquiry, Is John he? If not, why does he purify?

And when the attention was thus aroused, it would of course lead John to unfold to the people the nature of that spiritual purification, of which his purification by water was but a type.

What struck my mind, was this. The language of the New Testament, as to baptism by the Messiah, is exactly such as is used in the Old Testament with reference to purification by the Messiah. In the Old Testament, a *purification* by the Spirit and by fire was spoken of; in the New, a *baptism* by the Holy Spirit and by fire. An immersion in the Holy Spirit and fire was manifestly absurd; hence I could not resist the conviction that the Old Testament and New Testament modes of expression were

equivalent. And it appears that this mode of reasoning led me to the truth, notwithstanding Dr. Carson is pleased to treat it with such utter contempt.

Indeed, I would not fear to risk the whole question on the comments on Is. iv. 4, of the six Fathers named above. In some minor particulars they disagree, some referring the purification by fire to this world, others to the world to come, some to literal fire, others to spiritual, but all agreeing in one point, that to baptize and to purify mean precisely the same thing. Even, therefore, though Dr. Carson should continue to despise this argument, still the truth will nevertheless continue to be justified of her children.

3. The testimony of the Fathers on the third point, the baptism of the Holy Spirit, is no less abundant. All the evidence produced on the last point applies with equal force to this, for it is to the baptism of the Holy Spirit, that they refer these predictions of purification in the days of the Messiah. Moreover, they saw types of this baptism in the fire that came down from heaven and consumed the sacrifice of Elijah, and in the fire kindled by Nehemiah, according to the 2d book of Maccabees, by sprinkling water.

Thus, said they, in the baptism of fire, a divine and heavenly fire descends from above, and enters into the heart, and purges out the dross of sin, and makes us pure.

Nor is this view sustained by the Fathers alone. It originates from the very nature of things. The Holy Spirit is neither figuratively nor literally a river, lake, or pool, but a living, intelligent being, from whom an illuminating and purifying influence goes forth, as light and heat from the sun. Hence we are not spoken of as immersed in him, but purified by him; hence, too, it is proper to speak of his influences as poured out or descending as the rain, or going forth as the light or fire.

A few illustrations of these views from Cyril of Alexandria must suffice. He refers, Mal. iii. 1—3, to the baptism of Christ, and thus proceeds: "This divine fire from heaven. that is, gracious

influence, through the Holy Spirit, when it enters into the heart, then, then indeed it cleanses away the pollutions of our former transgressions, and makes us pure (*καθαζόμενους*). This divine and spiritual fire the inspired John clearly announced, saying, "I indeed purify (*βαπτίζω*) you with water, but he shall purify you with the Holy Spirit and fire." Here the fiery influence is conceived of as coming from the Holy Spirit, and entering and purifying the heart. Moreover, Cyril here agrees with Origen, Basil, and others, in considering the language of John as referring to and taken from those passages in the Old Testament which predict of the Messiah, purification, and that alone. And Cyril oft repeats the same ideas in other parts of his works. But his comment on Is. iv. 4, is still more striking. He first refers the passage, as Basil does, to the baptism of Christ, and then explains the spirit of burning thus: "We call it grace which comes into us at the holy baptism, not without the agency of the Holy Spirit. For we are not baptized by mere water, nor by the ashes of a heifer (indeed we are sprinkled for the purity of the flesh alone, as says the blessed Paul), but by the Holy Spirit, and by divine and spiritual fire, which consumes all the pollutions of wickedness in us, and melts out the pollution of sin. Such a coming of our Saviour also, another of the holy prophets foretold, saying, "Behold he shall come as a refiner's fire, and as fuller's soap, and he shall sit and purify as gold and as silver." His reference to baptizing by the ashes of a heifer I have already noticed; and I now remark that through the whole passage he refers to a divine influence proceeding from God, which he calls spiritual fire, *πνευματικόν*, which enters the heart and consumes and melts out the pollution of sin. He also in this passage unites both Is. iv. 4 and Mal. iii. 1—3, as predictions of the baptism by the Holy Ghost and by fire, to be introduced by Christ.

But how does Dr. Carson hold his ground against my position, that the sense immerse is never transferred in any language to denote effects like the agency of the Holy Spirit? By giving me a lesson in Rhetoric. Let us hear it. "Mr. Beecher has adopted



some of my philosophical doctrines. I will give him another lesson which will prevent him from again alleging such an objection. Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its particular figures, but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance. It gives words a new application, but does not invest them with a new meaning. It is not then subject to the law of literal language, which for the sense of every word needs the authority of use. This I have established in my treatise on the figures of speech, in opposition to the common doctrine of the rhetoricians. With respect to the point in hand, I would maintain my ground if a single other example of the figurative use of this word could not be adduced." I do not doubt it. Anything sooner than to admit that βαπτίζω means to purify. But with all due deference to my teacher in rhetoric, I would say, that this lesson does not exclude my objection. He says metaphor may indulge itself wherever it *finds resemblance*. This is well said : it is the truth. But my objection is that *there is no resemblance* between the operations of the Holy Spirit and immersion. The Holy Spirit illuminates and purifies. Immersion as such does neither. It signifies mode, and nothing else—and it may pollute as well as purify. For this reason, I deny the propriety of its application to the Holy Ghost, and claim the sense to purify, for this is his glorious, grand, peculiar work. Dr. Carson's lesson in rhetoric, therefore, is of no avail.

4. No less clear is the testimony of the Fathers as to the fourth point, namely, that βάπτισμα denotes sacrificial purification, or the remission of sins. Indeed, I have adduced already so much of their testimony on this point, that to add anything more is needless. See §§ 25, 26, pp. 61–68, and §§ 53, 54, pp. 160–170. Dr. Carson is pleased to treat with great contempt my remarks in § 12, pp. 28–31, designed to illustrate the difference between sacrificial and moral purification. "Mr. Beecher," he says, "gives us a dissertation on purification which is no more to the purpose than a treatise on logarithms." That Dr. Carson did

not comprehend the nature or importance of the distinction made by me, or its extensive bearings in the discussion of the whole question, I freely admit. But ignorance and contempt of what we do not understand, are not arguments.

So far is it from being true that my distinction is nothing to the purpose, that on the other hand, without it, it is impossible that much of the language of the Fathers on baptism should be understood at all. Sprinkling with blood is not an immersion, nor is it a washing, nor is it in the common sense of the term a purification, for blood of itself defiles. But the shedding of blood secures the remission of sins, and the sprinkling of blood is an expiation, that is, a sacrificial purification. And if it were not for this view, the language of the Fathers, when they speak of sprinklings of blood as baptisms, could not be understood. But take this view and all is plain. Indeed, it furnishes an argument against the sense immerse, of irresistible power. And although this is not much to Dr. Carson's purpose, it is very much to mine. Let any one trace this usage out, in all its applications to the baptism of blood, and the Mosaic and heathen expiations, and he will then be able to judge, both of the indispensable necessity and extensive application of the principles laid down in the dissertation, in § 12, of which Dr. Carson speaks so contemptuously.

5. On the fifth point, the divers baptisms spoken of in Heb. ix. 10, the evidence from the Fathers is absolutely overwhelming. As we have seen, they include without hesitation all the sprinklings of the Mosaic ritual, whether with blood or with the ashes of a heifer. Indeed, one passage from Ambrose, of itself, were there no other, would be enough to settle this question for ever. *Apol. David*, § 59: "*Per hyssopi fasciculum adaspergebatur agni sanguine, qui mundari volebat typico baptisate.*" He who desired to be purified with a typical baptism, was sprinkled with the blood of a lamb, by means of a bunch of hyssop. Compare now with this, other similar cases in § 53, pp. 160-167, and all occasion for doubt must cease.

These are the leading and most important points in the biblical argument, and on these all the testimony of the Fathers is as full and explicit as could be desired.

I was particularly struck with the commentary of Theophylact on John iii. 25. I had not read it when I gave my view in § 8, pp. 22-25. And yet the coincidence is nearly as perfect as if I had taken his exposition as the basis of my own. It was peculiarly gratifying to me to find the argument from this passage so clearly and fully sustained by the Fathers, as it was by means of this passage, that the Holy Spirit, as I humbly trust, first gave me an insight into the true meaning of this word. Dr. Carson's only argument against this view is a series of unproved assertions; that the question about purifying was not a question about baptism, and that it had no reference to the claims of Jesus or John; and that the disputants said nothing to John as to the question about purification, but said one entirely different. In all this, not only are the Fathers against Dr. Carson, but the most mature results of modern criticism are against him. Schleiermacher, Wahl, Vater, Rosenmüller, De Wette, Bretschneider, Kuinoel, and even Professor Ripley himself, are against him on these points. They all agree that baptism was the subject of the question; and Rosenmüller, Vater, Kuinoel, and Schleiermacher, give baptism as the translation of *καθαρισμός*. Doederlein takes the same view. The following translation of the passage will present the true sense and the argument at once to the eye.

"After these things came Jesus and his disciples into the land of Judea, and there he tarried with them and *purified*. And John was *purifying* in Ænon, near Salim, because there was much water there, and they came to him and were *purified*. Therefore, there arose a question concerning *purification* between some of the disciples of John and the Jews, and they came unto John and said unto him, Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou bearest witness, behold the same *purifieth*, and all men come to him." As if Christ was improperly drawing men away from John's purification. In reply to all this, John

clearly avowed the superiority of Christ to himself, and justified his course.

Having considered the chief points, let us now review the remainder.

6. As to the baptism of couches, in Mark vii. 4, we have seen that the Fathers not only speak of this, but of baptizing men on couches; so that all possibility of evading the sense to purify is taken away. Moreover, in the Apostolic Const. vi. 6, a certain Jewish sect is spoken of, concerning whom it is said, "unless they baptize themselves daily they eat not, still further, unless they purify—καθαρίζουσιν—with water their couches, and plates, and cups, and goblets, and seats, they will not use them at all." That the author of these words did not believe in the immersion of couches, is plain from the fact that he obviously takes pains to use καθαίρω in place of βαπτίζω. That in this passage there is a direct reference to Mark vii. 4, is too plain to need proof. It is no less plain that in Luke xi. 38, the Fathers regarded the baptism required of Jesus as a purification, and not an immersion, for Theophylact says of Christ, that he was deriding their foolish custom of purifying themselves before they ate, and takes particular pains to substitute καθαρίζω in place of βαπτίζω. "Deriding their foolish custom, I mean their purifying—καθαρίζεσθαι—themselves before eating, he teaches that they ought to purify their souls by good works." He then adds, for washing the hands—νίπτεσθαι—by water, purifies the body only, not the soul. This use of νίπτεσθαι clearly denotes that Theophylact regarded the baptism expected of Jesus as a washing of the hands. More proof could be added, but surely this is enough.

No one can any longer doubt what is meant by baptizing from a dead body, in Sirach xxxi. 25, after reading in Cyril of Alexandria of a baptism by the ashes of a heifer. Cyril also uses καθαρίζω in the same relations. Ashes with water is a purification—καθαρίζω—to the defiled. Here, too, I remark, in passing, is an idiom of the same kind as that noticed in § 52, in which purifying agents are called baptisms. Here ashes with water is said to be a puri-

fication, i. e. a baptism. Dr. Carson's objection from λαύτηζόν I have fully answered.

Nor is there any reason to doubt the sacrificial sense alleged by me in Acts xxii. 16; and 1 Pet. iii. 21. Arise, be purified or expiated, is the import of the command, and refers manifestly to the rite. Wash away thy sins, refers as plainly to the result prayed for when the name of God was invoked, and which is shadowed forth by the rite, and in true believers comes to pass, i. e. the purification of the mind from sin. Dr. Carson says, this makes the pardon of sins to be conferred at baptism. So it is, if forgiveness is prayed for in faith. Sins are washed away by calling on the Lord for pardon, and the same is true of sins committed after baptism. We need forgiveness of sins daily, and daily we pray for it and receive it; and at the hour of baptism sins are no less forgiven, if the prayer of faith is offered, than at any other time, and the external rite is designed to announce and show forth this fact. This is not baptismal regeneration, nor anything like it. The *usus loquendi* is plainly on my side. Dr. Carson's philosophical and theological objections are of no weight. As to 1 Pet. iii. 21, the Fathers are decidedly against Dr. Carson. He says, "Noah and his family were saved by being buried in the water of the flood: and after the flood they emerged as rising from the grave." Now, it is not true, in fact, that Noah and his family were ever buried in the waters of the flood, nor that they emerged from them, nor did the Fathers ever so regard it. The wicked were buried in the waters of the flood. Noah and his family, according to the Fathers, were purified, and thus saved. See § 28, 6. So also Cyprian says, "*Qui cum Noe in Arca non fuerunt, non tantum purgati et salvati per aquam non sunt, sed statim illo diluvio perierunt.*" Those who were not in the ark with Noah, not only were not *purified* and *saved* by water, but perished at once by that deluge. According to the Fathers, those in the ark were saved by purification, those out of it were destroyed by immersion. All this perfectly accords with the *usus*

loquendi of βάπτισμα which I have clearly established, and with the obvious import of the passage.

§ 68. *Dr. Carson's Reply to the Arguments from the Fathers.*

Dr. Carson's mode of meeting my arguments from the Fathers (in § 21) next demands notice. "Well, how does Mr. Beecher bring out his proof? If the writings of the Fathers prove that they understood this word in Mr. Beecher's sense, must not Mr. Beecher prove this by alleging examples of the use of the word in this sense? Common Sense, What do you say? But Mr. Beecher attempts no such thing. He does not appeal to the use of the word by the Fathers, but to other words applied by the Fathers to the same ordinance." And yet my argument stands thus. "1. The earlier Christian writers do not so often use the word βάπτίζω, as some synonyme derived from the sense to purify, e. g. αναγεννάω as before stated. 2. They often use βάπτισμός in the legal and sacrificial sense, so as to exclude any idea but καθαρισμός. 3. They sometimes in describing the rite use καθαίρω or καθαρίζω alone." How then does Dr. Carson dare to say that I attempt no such thing as alleging examples of the use of the word? Do not the three examples from Chrysostom and Theophylact each contain the word βάπτισμός? And do I not argue to prove that it means purification? All this was before Dr. Carson's eyes. Nay, after six pages, he refers to it, and tries to answer it. Dr. Carson may be able to explain all this. I frankly confess I cannot. After this false statement of my argument, he proceeds: "Now I do not charge my opponent with dishonesty in the use of this argument. I do him the justice to believe that he is the dupe of his own sophistry. But it is a sophistry childishly weak. I have already disposed of this argument. It assumes as an axiom that words that apply to the same ordinance are identical in signification." To this I reply, I make no such assumption. My argument is moral and cumulative. If βάπτίζω means to purify, we should expect to find καθαρίζω and other synonymous words



used in its place. It would be strange if we did not. It could be used as an argument against us if it were not so. If we do, then this class of facts is as we should reasonably expect to find them. And this in its place and relations is a true and powerful part of a cumulative argument. Another view of the matter is indeed possible, for I never denied that one word *could* be used in the place of another, and yet not be synonymous with it. Thus in arguing on John iii. 25, there arose a question between some of John's disciples and the Jews about purifying. I first prove by the context that this dispute related in fact to baptism; and, inasmuch as καθαρισμῶν is used in its place, I infer *in view of all the facts of the case*, that κάθαρσις and βαπτισμός are synonymous, because all probabilities tend this way. I then remark—"It is of no avail to talk of possible senses. The question is not what is possible, but what is a rational inference from a fair view of the facts of the case; and this I do not hesitate to say is that βαπτισμός and καθαρισμός are synonymous." In this language I plainly intimate that another view is possible, but not probable. Hear now Dr. Carson: "I could admit that purification here refers to baptism specifically, and still defeat President Beecher. He has labored in vain. He builds on a false first principle. He assumes that if two words refer to the same ordinance, they must be identical in meaning. Nothing is more unfounded—palpably unfounded. There are situations in which two words may be interchanged at the option of the writer, while they are not perfectly synonymous. They may so far agree that they may be equally fitted to fill a situation, while each has a distinct meaning. This is so obvious a truth, that I am perfectly astonished that it should lie hid from the President of the College of Illinois," pp. 432-33. To this I reply, I had well weighed the principle before writing my articles. It is simply the second of Dr. Carson's canons of trial, as I have numbered them. No man who had ever noticed the pomp and authority with which Dr. Carson introduced it in his work on baptism as a profound discovery, could ever forget it again. I shall not pretend to de-

cide whether so profound a truth had lain hid from the world until Dr. Carson arose. I shall not dare to affirm that I had ever thought of such a thing before reading the pages of Dr. Carson. But surely after a repeated examination of his work on baptism, my ignorance must have been dispersed. And yet in full view of this canon, I dared to affirm, and do still affirm, that a rational inference from a fair view of the facts of the case is, that βαπτισμός and καθαρισμός are synonymous in John iii. 25, and βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω in the passages from the Fathers. I was not trying to render any other view *impossible*, but *highly improbable*, and this I did accomplish; and I have since shown by other evidence that what is announced as highly probable, in view of all the facts of these cases, is certainly true.

The fact is, that, through my whole argument, I avowedly reject Dr. Carson's demands as to the degree of proof needed, and claim decidedly and earnestly that I have proved the sense which I assign to the word, although another view is *possible*. I refuse to be cut off from using the lower grades of moral evidence. I refuse to give up the aid to be derived from a sense of propriety, beauty, harmony, and verisimilitude. I refuse to introduce into the world of rhetoric and taste, the iron rules of rigid demonstration. I insist that, in the interpretation of language, the mind shall be left open to the full power of all the influences that conspired to form that language. For example, in the exquisite passage quoted from Proclus, to translate βαπτίζω immerse, to a sensitive mind, alive to the beauties of style, would be worse than ten thousand discords in music. I refuse to be haunted by the ghost of an absurd canon of evidence through all the regions of poetry and eloquence, and compelled to reject all probable evidence of secondary senses, however striking, till I can succeed in hunting up one case of the impossibility of the primary sense. Whether I could find one such case or not, I did insist, and still do, that the laws of moral and cumulative evidence shall have their rightful sway, and that language shall not be tortured, wrested, and tormented for party purposes, and under the guise of zeal for the

glory of God, and with charges of childish sophistry, or of unitarian or papal reasoning, or even of blasphemy, and giving the lie to the Holy Ghost, merely because I duly regard rational probabilities in deciding the sense of words. As to the passages from Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Gregory Naz., in which I assign to βαπτισμός the sacrificial sense καθαρισμός, I have fully vindicated that sense in my remarks on the baptism of blood, in §§ 25, 26, pp. 61-68, and in the present article ; and to these remarks I refer the reader.

Let us now consider what Dr. Carson, with his usual urbanity, calls my original nonsense. Concerning this, he says, "He gives us eight lines of philosophy. I will give a premium to any one, who will produce me a greater quantity of absurdity in the same compass, under the appearance of wisdom. The only merit this nonsense can claim, is that it is original nonsense." With all due deference to Dr. Carson's award of the palm of originality to me, I am obliged to resign it to Basil, Clemens Alexandrinus, Jerome, and others of the Fathers ; for what I stated as philosophically probable, I find by their writings that they had seen long before me as a matter of fact. My eight lines of original nonsense are these : "In a case where analogical senses exist, one external and material, and the other spiritual, it is natural that they should run into each other, and terms applied to one, be applied to the other. Thus if βαπτίζω means to purify, then there is natural purification and spiritual purification, or regeneration, and there would be a tendency to use ἀναγεννάω to denote the latter idea, and also to transfer it to the external rite. And at first it would be so done as merely to be the name of the rite, and not to denote its actual efficacy."\* Hear now Basil : "Since, then, the Lord has connected both baptisms, namely, that from water to repentance, and that from the Spirit to regeneration, are

---

\* I retain this as I first published it. In this edition I state my original meaning more fully in § 19, to obviate the misunderstandings and false criticisms of Dr. Carson.

there not three significations of baptism, purification from filth, regeneration (*ἀναγέννησις*) by the Spirit, and trial, i. e. purgation by the fire of judgment. Here now the senses are analogical. Purification by water is external and material, purification by the Spirit is internal and spiritual, that is, it is regeneration. Hence also *βαπτισμός* assumes that sense, i. e. regeneration is one of its meanings: so Basil expressly testifies. Again, this name regeneration was transferred to denote the external rite, and yet so transferred as to be merely the name of the rite and not to denote its actual efficacy. Of this, the mere fact that it was applied to Christ, is proof enough. That he had no sin, and needed no spiritual purification, they all with one voice affirm, and yet they fully speak of him as regenerated. What sense is here possible but the sense baptize? Clemens Alexand., speaking of the baptism of Christ, says, *σήμερον ἀναγεννηθεὶς ὁ Χριστός*, Christ, being regenerated to-day, etc., and in the context interchanges that mode of expression with *βαπτισζόμενος*—so Jerome says of Christ that he was born of a virgin—and born again (*renatus*), of a virgin—i. e. John the Baptist. All then that I stated is true. *Βαπτισμός*, i. e. purification, has analogical senses, one external and material, the other internal and spiritual. Spiritual purification is regeneration. This became a sense of the word baptism. It was also applied to the external rite to denote its name, but not its efficacy. The view that I advocate explains all this. It led me to expect it; and facts are as I expected to find them. Hence to Basil and to the Fathers I must resign the palm of originality. I cannot, however, give them the premium for more nonsense than mine. Their nonsense and mine seem in quantity exactly to coincide. Dr. Carson's *à priori* reasonings against my views, are therefore merely reasonings against notorious matters of fact. This is as I expected. His principles are at war with facts; and to what else can they lead him? If then his reasoning is good, what has he proved? Simply that the actual facts of language, and the actual operations of the human mind, are nonsense. All this may be; and this state of things may call loudly for reform.

Let not Dr. Carson then be discouraged. It merely opens to him a new field of reform. Let him follow his high vocation, and having reformed philology, commentary, rhetoric, and logic, let him next reform the human mind itself, and human languages, the offspring of that mind. Then he will have all things to his liking. Then, and not till then, will his favorite principles have full scope. What kind of languages he will form it is not for me to say. I enter not a sphere so high. They may be the tongues of angels: certainly they will not be the tongues of men. As for me, I am willing to take facts as I find them, even at the hazard of being charged with nonsense, for so doing. I leave the tongues of angels to Dr. Carson. I am contented to study the tongues of men.

### § 69. *Result.*

The conclusion of the whole matter then is this. The testimony of the Fathers, according to Dr. Carson, is absolute and decisive, for they must have known the apostolic usage of the word; to say otherwise is virtually to say that the Scriptures are no revelation. But the testimony of the Fathers is as full against his positions, and in favor of mine, as is in the nature of things possible; and, therefore, the question is decided in my favor, and that not by the opinions of modern critics, but by men from whose opinion there is no appeal.

But before closing the argument, I desire to repeat what I have often said before, that I appeal to the Fathers simply as witnesses to the meaning of words. Many of their opinions which I have stated, as for example, those on baptismal regeneration, holy water, etc., are clearly false. But this does not at all invalidate or weaken their testimony as to the use of words, or hide the great fact, which blazes through their pages like the sun in mid heaven, that they habitually used βαπτίζω to denote purification of every kind. So that with the proposition, which I laid down at the opening of this discussion, I bring it to a close. § 3, pp. 7-11.

“The word βαπτίζω, as a religious term, means neither dip nor sprinkle, immerse nor pour, nor any other external action in applying a fluid to the body, or the body to a fluid, nor any action that is limited to one mode of performance. But as a religious term, it means, at all times, to purify or cleanse,—words of a meaning so general, as not to be confined to any mode or agent, or means, or object, whether material or spiritual, but to leave the widest scope for the question as to the mode. So that in this usage it is in every respect a perfect synonyme of the word καθαρίζω.”

This proposition I at first derived solely from an examination of the New Testament usage, and I here repeat it as a true view of the import of the language of that supreme law of the Christian church. And I value the appeal to the Fathers simply as helping us, by their testimony to the *usus loquendi*, to reach a true interpretation of the word of God. Such then, as I have just stated, is the religious usage of the New Testament, and if so, all attempts to enforce on the church obedience to a command to immerse, is a manifest invasion of the great principle of religious liberty. IT IS TEACHING FOR DOCTRINES THE COMMANDMENTS OF MEN.

### § 70. *Conclusion.*

With four remarks I will close.

1. The present position of the Baptist denomination towards the rest of their fellow-Christians on earth, is exceedingly dishonorable to God, injurious to themselves, and injurious to the highest interests of the whole Christian community.

2. There is no higher duty at this time resting on the church than that of bringing this long protracted and exceedingly injurious controversy to a close.

3. It can be brought to a close.

4. The responsibility of terminating it rests mainly, if not entirely, on the learned scholars and leading minds of the Christian world.



The truth of these propositions must be so obvious to every thinking mind, that I might almost leave them without remark. But to guard against all misunderstanding, I would remark, by way of more full illustration :

1. That to have real Christians, who agree in all fundamentals, divided in communion and action by a mere question of form, is, and must be, at all times, dishonorable and painful to God—for in practice it treats non-essentials as more important than essentials, and arrays holy men against holy men, to weaken each other's power, and injure each other's character and usefulness. And what more could even the devil himself desire ?

It is injurious to the Baptists, for it has injured them. Among them are eminently pious men, but a bad system has ensnared and betrayed them. How else can we account for it that they should have dared solemnly and formally to arrogate to themselves that they are DIVINELY AND PECULIARLY SET for the defence of THE GOSPEL, and that the heathen world must look to them alone for an unveiled view of the glories of THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST. Has it then come to this ? Take away immersion, and is the gospel shorn of all its glories ? Yea, is the gospel itself annihilated ? Is immersion the gospel ? What more can the most bigoted defender of baptismal regeneration and sacramental sanctification say than all this ? But do our pious Baptist brethren mean all this ? No ! a thousand times, no. They know and feel, as well as we, that immersion is not the gospel ? These facts only show, what all experience has shown, the danger of holding a system which makes a mere form of so much moment in practice, as to outweigh holiness of heart and of life. In spite of all reasoning and professions to the contrary, it will, as a general fact, concentrate on itself a disproportioned, an unhealthy interest, narrow the range of Christian feeling, chill it and check its expansion, and derange and distort the intellectual perceptions of the mind. Men of uncommon native nobleness of character, as Robert Hall, or men of great piety, may hold these tendencies of the system in check. But multitudes will not.

Taught to regard themselves as distinguished from the rest of the Christian world by a form, the spirit of formalism will have scope. The pernicious idea of divine favoritism, on the ground of forms, will grow up, and this will breed arrogance, censoriousness, exclusion, and the spirit of proselyting in its highest degree. Nor do I speak of tendencies merely ; these tendencies are embodied in public official results. How else can we account for it that even evangelical Baptists, not Campbellites or Mormons, but even evangelical Baptists, have dared to arrogate to themselves a peculiar divine appointment to defend and promulgate the gospel of Christ, and have dared to charge two leading Christian Bible Societies, the American and British and Foreign, as “virtually COMBINING TO OBSCURE a part, at least, of divine revelation,” and to say, that in the translation of other denominations, “the real meaning of the words is PURPOSELY kept out of sight ?” Is it no injury to pious men to be so ensnared and deluded by a false system, as to say and do such things as these ? These are not the promptings of their Christian hearts, for that they have Christian hearts I will not doubt. No ; it is the poison, the delusion of a false system that has done this.

No less is the Baptist system injurious to the highest interests of the whole Christian community. The implications of the Baptist system, and the proselyting spirit generated by it, and their charges on the rest of the Christian community, tend directly to irritate and alienate, to cherish the spirit of hostility, to nourish unholy controversy, to corrupt the love of truth by the desire of victory, and to breed an unchristian contempt towards our Baptist brethren, as exclusive, narrow-minded, and contracted. All this is wrong, and it is an infinite evil. Over it all true Christians ought to mourn ; against it they ought to strive and pray. But the Baptist system tends directly to produce it. For it is based on a mere external act, which has in itself no importance, except what is supposed to be created by a positive command. It is not like the law of God, and holiness, founded in the nature of things ; and yet it cuts with the sharp edge of exclusion, and

with charges of rebellion against God, as keenly as if it were as important as the being of God himself. Now, though to yield to temptation is wrong, and Christian endurance ought to rise superior to every trial, yet it is, and ever will be, an infinite calamity to the church, to be harassed and tried by a system so exquisitely adapted, both in theory and practice, to irritate and provoke; and the cessation of an influence so malignant, would be to the church almost like life from the dead. Of course,

2. There is no higher duty resting on the church, at this time, than that of bringing this long protracted and exceedingly injurious controversy to a close. The last great Papal war is coming on; our own civil and religious liberties are in danger; and is this a time still more to embitter the divisions of real Christians at home, and to sow the seeds of future discord, by translations unintentionally, but really erroneous, in all parts of the heathen world? The power of Satan's harlot church lies in organic unity on false and worldly principles. But still, unity gives power, and till the true church discovers the true law of Christian unity, and unites, the power of Satan cannot be, and will not be overcome. He knows the full worth of the maxim, divide and conquer. The worth of the maxim, unite and conquer, the church has yet to learn; and to learn it, and reduce it to practice, is the great work and duty of the present age.

3. This controversy can be brought to a close. The real issue is one and simple. False issues can be avoided. False principles rejected—and the real issue decided; for it all depends upon a simple question in philology, and, with regard to that question, there is abundant proof.

The settlement of this question has been greatly hindered by attempts to prove that βαπτίζω means to sprinkle or pour. I have never seen the least evidence that it has either of these meanings, and to attempt to defend the cause of sprinkling or pouring, on such grounds, is, in my judgment, to make a false issue, and in effect to betray the cause; and yet it has been often

done, and is still done. I shall not wonder if Baptists remain for ever unconvinced by such arguments as these.

The settlement of this question is also greatly hindered by admitting that βαπτίζω in the command, means to immerse, and yet claiming the right, on the ground of expediency, to practise sprinkling, because, in our judgment, it retains the essence of the command. Especially, if it is at the same time conceded that Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, relate to the external rite, and that the early church understood βαπτίζω as meaning immerse, and practised immersion for that reason. When all this is conceded, the whole question is conceded. It is perfect logical demonstration in favor of immersion. But I have abundantly shown that none of these things are so. Hence, to concede them, is to give up the whole question, and then on the grounds of expediency, to claim the right to alter a command of God. This is placing the defence of the right to sprinkle on a false principle, for no such right as is claimed exists. Nor shall I wonder if the Baptists remain for ever unconvinced by such reasoning as this.

The real and only issue is this. Is the command an open command? Is it a command to purify, or a command to perform an external specific act? One or the other it is. Which? If the latter, then let us all obey. If a command to purify, then let us all cease to dispute about forms, and obey in that mode which seems to us most significant, decorous, and solemn.

This brings the whole question to an issue, definite and simple, and as it regards every point upon which the issue depends, there is abundant proof, and that of a kind which is in its nature absolute and decisive.

4. The responsibility of terminating this discussion rests mainly, if not entirely, with the learned scholars and leading minds of the Christian world.

It depends upon a question in philology. On such questions original investigation is, and must be, limited to a few. It extends over a wide field, and calls for nice discrimination, and accurate principles of philology. Hence, the mass of the Christian com-

munity are peculiarly in the power of their leaders—and their leaders are exposed to peculiar temptations. By bold and united assertions, and by overlooking or suppressing evidence, they can keep their parties together, and inspire them with zeal even against the truth.

Hence, on no class of men do such responsibilities rest as on the learned leaders in this cause, to make themselves fully acquainted with the evidence on which a decision depends, to avoid all false issues, to reject all unsound principles, and sincerely and honestly, as in the sight of God, to meet the main question, avoiding all personalities, and all unchristian excitement, and suppressing and concealing no part of the truth. If they will do this, and look to God for the illumination and guidance of the Spirit, then he will cause the watchmen to see eye to eye, to lift up the voice together, and together to sing. If not, let them fear lest they become not merely blind leaders of the blind, but treacherous guides of confiding, but dependent minds. All error in the discussion of this subject is not on one side. There have been false defences of the truth, which need as really to be abandoned, as positive error. And a supreme regard to the glory of God should lead each to inquire, not how can I prove that all my past positions have been true, but how can I discover all errors which I have incautiously embraced, and retain the truth alone? So soon as leading minds agree on this point, the mind of the community will be at rest, and not till then.

Much evil has been done by speaking of this discussion as a mere dispute about forms, and as unworthy of the attention of an expanded and liberal mind. It relates, indeed, to a form, but, as I have shown, it affects immense spiritual interests, and it is in its essential nature a question in philology—to be decided just as all other philological questions are—and the real difficulty has been, not that it has been discussed too much, but that the discussion has not been sufficiently radical and extensive, and that much very important evidence has been sparingly used, if used at all. Let this state of things cease, and the sanctified intellectual ener-

gies of the Christian community be brought to bear on this subject with humble prayer for divine guidance, and the clouds of error will pass away.

The present state of things ought not to continue, nay, it cannot. The cause of God can never triumph whilst his church is so painfully divided, and her energies so paralysed, and so long as such errorists as the Campbellites and the Mormons are shielded, in their most pernicious formalism, on a point so vital to them as Baptism, by the influence of the Evangelical Baptists.

Nor does it seem to me possible that all leading minds, through power of conviction, should ever accede to the Baptist position in all its rigor and extent, giving to the word but one sense, and that to immerse; and making this an iron rule for translation and practice. It is a system more rigid than that of the Fathers, even in the ages of the highest formalism. So rigid a system never did prevail in the church, nor can I believe that it ever will. There are not the elements of logical proof in existence. It disagrees with all of our ideas of fitness; there is no reason to wish it true, and its fundamental position can be logically destroyed.

The position defended by me, takes nothing from any one but the right to think others wrong, and to censure and exclude them, and in itself considered, there is everything to recommend it. For

1. It is more adapted to the varying conditions of men, and to all changes of climate, times, seasons, and health.
  2. It is more accordant with the liberal and enlarged spirit of Christianity, as a religion of freedom, designed for all countries and all times.
  3. It better agrees with our ideas of what is reasonable and fit.
  4. It offers no temptations to formalism, nor does it tend to foster arrogance and exclusion.
  5. It is perfectly adequate to harmonize the church.
  6. It is susceptible of any necessary degree of proof.
- I have, by no means, exhausted the proof that exists, nor even



what I have on hand. To much I have not had time even to allude. But what I have produced is sufficient, I trust, by the blessing of God, to secure the end that I proposed, "to furnish some small share of the materials which God may use in producing the unity of his own church." But for faith in God, I never should have dared to undertake this work. But for his sustaining grace I could not have brought it thus far. Almost exhausted by efforts to sustain the college over which I preside, in a time of unparalleled pecuniary embarrassment, without an adequate library at the college, compelled to visit distant libraries, some more than a thousand miles distant, and to make researches at long intervals, loaded with pecuniary cares and anxieties, compelled often to write on journeys, in steamboats, and canal-boats, and taverns, no one can be more deeply sensible than I am of the necessary imperfections of my performance. Yet I have looked to my God to save me from hurtful error, and to guide me into the truth, and it is my humble persuasion that he has heard my prayer. To him, in conclusion, I commend all that I have written, imploring him to pardon all its imperfections, to correct all its errors, and to use all its truth to the glory of his own great and holy name.

## PART IV.

NOTICE OF DR. CARSON'S SECOND REPLY.

### CHAPTER I.

#### § 71. *State of the Controversy.*

THOSE who have read what precedes, will remember that Dr. Carson spoke of my proposal to derive evidence from the Fathers, that βαπτίζω means to purify, as follows :

“Proof from the Fathers, that βαπτίζω signifies to purify ! As well might he profess to find in them proof for the existence of railroads and steam coaches. There is no such proof ; there is not an instance in all the Fathers in which the word or any of its derivatives are so used. Without exception, they use the word always for immersion.” He says this as a scholar, professing to be “acquainted with the Fathers.”

Of the value of the testimony of the Fathers, he spoke as follows :

“They knew the meaning of the language which they spoke.” p. 472. “The sense in which it (βαπτίζω) was used by the apostles must have been known most assuredly to all that either heard them or read their writings. To suppose that persons who spoke the Greek language might understand their words in a sense different from that in which they used them would be to charge the Scripture as not being a revelation.” p. 473.

Here then, in this long debated controversy, was an issue finally presented which involved a final, absolute, and irrevocable decision of the question.

The Fathers were infallible witnesses. They have testified

explicitly, and abundantly. Dr. Carson says that *always, without exception*, they testify for immersion. I assert with equal confidence that they testify in favor of the sense purification.

From this issue I do not intend to be turned aside by Dr. Carson's innumerable and irrelevant personal attacks. It is of no great consequence to the church, or to the world, whether I have or have "not a head for the philosophy of language," on which grave point Dr. Carson gives us his opinion—p. 436. At least, if a Greek Father expressly defines βαπτίζω as meaning to purify, I can understand it, and quote it for the benefit of Dr. Carson and his disciples—and it is incumbent on them to show that the Father in question does not so define βαπτίζω, or to give up the controversy.

No question can be brought to an issue more direct, or more easily decided. The whole subject lies in a nut-shell. From this issue I do not mean to turn aside to the right hand nor to the left.

What then are the facts in the case? They are these: I brought forward, not from one, but from many Fathers, not merely one, but multitudinous testimonies, as explicit, and as direct as possible, that βαπτίζω means to purify.

I will mention a few of the items.

1. I quoted from Basil an express and formal definition of the word βάπτισμα, as meaning purification. In this definition he was professedly explaining the meaning of the word used by John in the days of Christ, and with reference to the institution of baptism. Evidence more unequivocal of the correctness of my position cannot be conceived. See § 55.

2. I had asserted that βαπτίζω was also used in the sense of καθαρίζω to denote sacrificial purification or the remission of sins. This assertion Dr. Carson ridiculed. In proof of its truth I quoted a comment of Athanasius on the words of John, in which he affirms that his words, he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, mean καθαρίσει ὑμᾶς, he shall purify you, that is, as he explains it, forgive your sins. § 55.

3. I quoted from the Lexicon of Zonaras written in Greek, his native tongue, a definition of βάπτισμα as meaning the remission of sins by water and the Spirit—which perfectly coincides with Athanasius. The same lexicon also gives to βάπτισμα the other sense of καθαρίζω, i. e. moral purification. § 55.

4. I quoted from Proclus a passage variously and beautifully illustrating and confirming the same sense; in this John is represented as using βαπτίζω in the sense to purify, to acquit, in stating to Christ the reasons of his reluctance to baptize him. § 54. How can I, a sinner, says he, purify, i. e. absolve my judge?

5. I quoted a passage from Ambrose on Jewish and heathen baptisms, in which, because their washings do not remit sins, he denies to them the name of baptisms, and says that they are merely lavacra. Of course he must use the word in the same sense as Athanasius, Zonaras, and Proclus. § 53.

6. I quoted from Ambrose a passage in which he calls sprinkling a baptism, § 61. Also another passage from the same Father, in which he speaks of a person sprinkled with blood as baptized according to the law, § 53. Here the sense purified is plainly demanded.

7. I quoted a passage from Cyril of Alexandria, in which he speaks of sprinkling the unclean with the ashes of a heifer, as a baptism—thus showing how he understood διάφοροι βαπτισμοί, in Heb. ix. 10, and βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ in Sirach xxxiv. 25.

8. I quoted from Tertullian a passage in which he speaks of the washings and sprinklings of the heathen as the devil's baptism, § 53.

9. I quoted a passage from Justin Martyr, in which he says, "be baptized, as to your soul, from anger, from covetousness, from envy, from hatred, and lo! your body is pure." Here the preposition ἀπὸ demands the sense purify—no less than the antithesis, *lo, your body is pure* (καθαρόν).

10. I argued from the use of the preposition διὰ after βαπτίζω, just as it is used after καθαρίζω. The sense immerse requires εἰς

or *εν*. We say to purify *by* or *with* water—to immerse or dip *into* water. Nothing can more clearly show that βαπτίζω has the sense of καθαρίζω, than its thus taking after it the preposition διά, and in Latin per, § 56, and § 64.

11. I quoted Basil, Eusebius of Cæsarea, Cyril of Alexandria, and others, to prove that the Fathers understood the verbs denoting to purify in Is. iv. 4, and Mal. iii. 1–3, in predictions of the coming of the Messiah, as equivalent in sense to βαπτίζω in the New Testament, as used by Christ and John. No evidence can exceed this in strength.

12. Dr. Carson denied and ridiculed my statement that in Jn. iii. 25, a question concerning purification was equivalent to a question concerning baptism. Against him I appealed to Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theophylact, and quoted from Theophylact, an express recognition of βάπτισμα as an equivalent of καθαρισμός.

13. I quoted the author of the opus imperfectum on Matthew, ascribed to Chrysostom—and showed that he calls *purification* by the word of Christ *baptism* by the word of Christ, referring to Christ's assertion, Now ye are clean καθαροί through the word that I have spoken unto you ; also that he calls purification by trials, baptism by trials.

14. I quoted Theophylact, as thus expressing the idea that John was *purified* by putting his hand on the head of Christ : “ John was *baptized* by putting his hand on the head of Christ.”

15. I quoted Theophylact to prove that in Luke xi. 38, the purification expected of Christ was a washing of the hands, and that εβαπτίσθη was used in the sense of purify. I quoted from the Apostolic Constitutions a proof that the same word as applied to couches, cups, &c., in Mark 7, means to purify.

I mention these cases not as at all exhausting the argument, but as specimens to illustrate the nature, the variety, and the power of the proofs adduced by me.

They are powerful not only in themselves, but, as a cumulative argument, of vast force. I have quoted not far from one hundred

passages from the Fathers to sustain my views—and they are from the Fathers of all ages—and they combine in one consistent and harmonious argument, and thus sustain each other with augmented power. It became Dr. Carson, of course, to meet and to answer this testimony, or else honestly and honorably to abandon his grounds.

What then has he done? He has written a nominal reply of nine pages and a half, in which, whatever else he has done, he has not either answered or professed to answer, these quotations from the Fathers, nor indeed the great mass of my quotations from them. That is to say, he has not stated either the quotations, or their import, and then tried to show that they do not prove what I allege. Not only has he not done this, but what is more, he has not even attempted to do it. Just at this auspicious moment, he makes the happy discovery that, “To prove that the Fathers understood the word (*βαπτίζω*) as immersion in reference to the ordinance of baptism, at any length, would be totally unsuitable to his present work.” p. 488.

That is to say, although the great end of his work is to prove that *βαπτίζω*, as used in the ordinance by Christ, means to immerse, and although he asserts that the Fathers do infallibly prove it, yet it is totally unsuitable to the great end of his work, to prove at any length this assertion, although upon it his whole cause rests.

Of what avail can it be now, for Dr. Carson to resort to offensive personal attacks upon my competency as a scholar, in the midst of such virtual and decisive confessions of entire defeat? Where was it ever heard of before, that a controversialist thought it totally unsuitable to prove his main position, at any length, by the strongest testimony conceivable, which lay before him in abundance, and devoted the greater part of a whole volume to testimony of little or no weight? If Dr. Carson had omitted the greater part of his prolix volume, as finally published by him, and fairly met and answered my quotations from the Fathers, and proved at *great length* that they testify as he asserts, he would



have done something very much to his purpose. As it is, he has virtually confessed that it is utterly beyond his power to do any such thing. This is very much to my purpose, but very little to his.

As a fair answer then, to my argument, Dr. Carson's last reply is unworthy of notice. It needs none. It is a mere confession of defeat.

### § 72. *Real Philosophy of Dr. Carson's Reply.*

Yet for certain purposes, it has its merits. There is in England and Ireland a large circle over whom Dr. Carson exerts immense influence, and who have never read my argument, and are never likely to read it. He is also eulogised in some of the British Reviews as well known in Scotland, England, and America, as "a first rate scholar, a sound philosopher, an irresistible reasoner, and a profound theologian, and with the strictest propriety designated as one of the first Biblical critics of the nineteenth century." At the end of the American edition of his work on Baptism, published by the American Baptist Publication Society, is quite a collection of such eulogies, by writers of different denominations, in which he is spoken of as in advance of his age in the philosophy of language, impartial, candid, honest, habituated to deep and searching thought, and with respect to metaphysical acuteness, the Jonathan Edwards of the nineteenth century.

In such circumstances, and with such a reputation, it would be easy for Dr. Carson entirely to destroy the influence of my argument on a large class of minds, and that without assuming the responsibility of answering it. This he could do by attacks on my capacity as a scholar, and bold and contemptuous assertions, without a particle of proof. And although nine pages would hardly furnish room even to begin to answer my argument in a manly and scholar-like way, still they would furnish abundant room for all the unproved assertions of which Dr. Carson or any one else happened to be in need.

Moreover, the very brevity of the reply, taken in connexion with its tone of supercilious contempt, would in many minds, marvelously augment the conviction that my argument was a very light affair, and scarcely deserved notice. So feeble would they regard it that a blow or two of Dr. Carson's club would easily finish it. Viewed, then, as a mere controversial manceuvre, and without any regard to a candid inquiry after the truth, Dr. Carson's reply has decided merits. In this view I do not at all despise it. It was obviously written for effect, and has exerted, and will, no doubt, continue to exert a great partisan influence through the whole Baptist denomination—most of whom will read Dr. Carson, and never see my argument.

### § 73. *American Baptist Publication Society.*

This effect may be anticipated with the more confidence from the fact that so respectable a religious body as the American Baptist Publication Society, have endorsed and republished his work, with the highest eulogies of it, and of its author.

His work, they tell us, is "not a local or temporary production, but one calculated for any latitude, and destined to live throughout all time," p. xlv. Again they say, p. xliii., "His mission is accomplished. His literary career has now terminated; but not before *his great task was done*. Death could not touch him, until he had put *the finishing hand* to this masterly production, in which his name and his memory shall live through all future time. He who, like Dr. Carson, has vindicated and rendered prominent an ordinance of Jesus Christ, by disentangling it from the web of human sophistry and perversion, has done better for the world than if he had founded a kingdom, and has reared for himself a monument more lasting than pillars of marble."

These eulogists seem to be nearly as well satisfied with Dr. Carson's spirit, as with his logic. Many, they inform us, have formed erroneous conceptions of his whole character, from the apparent harshness of his criticisms. They assure us that such

mistake the true origin of what may be called the *Attic salt* in writing. It proceeds, they inform us, from good temper, self-control, and coolness. "Anger and wrath evaporate in abuse. But no one will find this applied by Dr. Carson to his opponents. True, he will not allow *impertinent quibblers*, who, to support the system of their own party, continue still to argue against the clearest declarations of Scripture, to pass without rebuke. And where is the ardent lover of truth, who will not say that such ought to be rebuked and made to retire ashamed that the public mind may be no more darkened by their perversions?"

These honied words are not designed merely for my benefit. Dr. Wardlaw, Dr. Henderson, Dr. Miller, Dr. Dwight, Prof. Goodwin, Mr. Hall, Mr. Bickersteth, and others, come in for their full share. And that this may not be left to inference, they say, "We frankly confess that the more we read on the Baptismal controversy, the more our charity compels us to struggle against the conviction that forces itself on us, that on this subject it is not light that is most wanted, but *religious honesty*." The italics are theirs.

Who does not admire the combined wisdom and charity of this remarkable passage? Surely the true way to convert men to the opinions of Baptists, is kindly to inform them, that it requires a special effort of Christian charity to resist the conviction that they are such dishonest knaves, that argument is not what they need, but honesty. Not light, but to be rebuked as impertinent quibblers who ought to retire ashamed, that the public mind may be no more darkened by their perversions.

No wonder, that the authors of such an exquisite specimen of "Attic salt," should find little or nothing to censure in the spirit of Dr. Carson.

But my main object in making these quotations is, to show that all has been done by way of reply to me, that is to be expected. Dr. Carson read my argument, and replied as he saw fit; and his admirers in this country have endorsed his reply as sufficient, and more than sufficient. The great work of defending the

cause of immersion is done, and so done, that he who is not satisfied and convinced, does not need argument but honesty.

§ 74. *Motives to reply to Dr. Carson.*

In this state of the case, Dr. Carson's few pages of reply deserve more notice than is demanded by their intrinsic merit. True, they consist chiefly of assertions, which it belonged to him to prove, before a reply could be demanded of me. But as the Baptists have adopted and sanctioned them, as indicating their line of march if peradventure they should undertake a campaign, I shall take occasion still further to test my arguments in view of Dr. Carson's assertions as to the ways in which they might have been met, had it not been "totally unsuitable to the object of his work" thus to meet them.

I had anticipated with a natural interest, the results of the scrutiny of one who is considered by so many, the great master in the philosophy of language, the leader of his age, the Jonathan Edwards of the nineteenth century. But I was entirely disappointed. I had not conceived that anything so weak could proceed from him. I long said, can a reply be needed? But since not only the oracle has spoken, but the listeners, also, are re-echoing his reply, as the fitting close of his glorious defence of the great cause of immersion, I deem it proper to subject at least some of his oracular dicta to a thorough scrutiny.

I shall not, however, confine myself to Dr. Carson's last brief reply to me, but shall take occasion to review other statements in his whole work of nearly five hundred pages, and to introduce many facts which I had reserved, on the natural supposition that it might not be "totally unsuitable" to Dr. Carson's great defence of immersion to examine at length the testimony of those infallible witnesses, the Fathers, on that subject. But as no such examination is regarded as suitable to a defence of immersion, I shall continue to adduce from the Fathers new arguments in defence of purification. It is entirely suitable to my work, to prove at great

length, that the Fathers did understand βαπτίζω in the ordinance as meaning to purify.

§ 75. *Outline of Dr. Carson's Reply.*

I will first give a brief sketch of the contents of his reply. He begins by reiterating and trying to justify his charges of incompetency against me, and that on grounds exceedingly frivolous. He then informs us that nothing alleged by me at all affects his view of the testimony of the Fathers. He next insinuates, but does not affirm, much less prove, that the testimony adduced from them does not prove the meaning of the word at the time of the institution or commencement of the rite—an assertion directly at war with the facts just stated, from the Fathers.

He then asserts, with his usual courtesy towards all who happen to differ from him, "That the Fathers understood the word as immersion in reference to the institution of baptism, *no scholar ever questioned.*" If Dr. Carson had said this after fairly answering my arguments from the Fathers, it would have been less rude and indecorous. But to leave such abundant testimony of the Fathers totally unanswered, and yet to make such an assertion, is a course of proceeding which I am perfectly willing to leave to all candid and honorable persons, to characterize for themselves.

He then informs us, that to prove at any length that the Fathers understood the word as immersion, would be totally unsuitable to his present work. Dr. Carson, however, seems to think it quite suitable to his work, to go at great length into the testimony of men who never saw or read the Septuagint, or the New Testament. But when I bring proof from Greek authors, who compared the language of the Septuagint and the Greek Testament together, and stated what words in the Septuagint are synonymous with βαπτίζω in the New Testament, he then discovers that it is totally unsuitable to his work to prove at any length what they thought on the matter! Unsuitable to his work! If Dr. Carson's great end was to defend, at all hazards, the false position he

had assumed in his work, I agree with him that it would be totally unsuitable for him to investigate the testimony of the Fathers, at any length. The best course for him, no doubt, on that supposition, would be, to do as he has done ; that is, neither to quote nor to attempt to answer one of the positive testimonies of the Fathers, to which I have just referred. For example, if he had quoted the express testimony of Athanasius and Basil, that βαπτίζω does mean to purify, as used by John and Christ, it would have been totally inconsistent with all his positive assertions to the contrary, and with his ridicule and contempt of me for teaching the same thing.

But to abstain entirely from the use of such ample stores of proof as he declares to be treasured up in the Fathers, would have been too obviously absurd. Dr. Carson therefore tells us, "I shall submit two or three arguments, that, I hesitate not to say, will produce conviction on the mind of every unprejudiced reader." He then devotes three pages to a nominal argument from the Fathers, in which he is careful not to refer to pages, but merely asserts that certain Fathers use the word thus and so, and leaves his opponents to hunt out the passages, and test the correctness of his assertions and inferences.

Whilst thus engaged, he proposes, by the way, two modes of solving all the passages referred to by me. It is quite remarkable that these modes are entirely unlike each other, so that although the first as he asserts will solve all, and is therefore quite sufficient, yet, as if fearful to trust it, he soon produces a new and entirely different mode of solution, and boldly declares that this will solve all ; and yet, as if not quite confident in either, he declares that even if the Fathers do prove a secondary sense, it is nothing to the purpose. In the midst of such changing resorts, he is very careful not to put either of his modes of solution to the proof, or give any evidence of the truth of his sweeping assertions. The fact is, that both alleged modes of solution are baseless visions, and, what is more, they could not solve my quotations, if true, as in its place I shall prove.



Such is the course pursued by Dr. Carson, in meeting my argument from the Fathers. It is, as I have before said, clearly a virtual confession of defeat. He does not, indeed, at all abate the positiveness of his assertion, and the boldness of his tone. After so much insolence and boasting, no one would look for retraction or confession. But actions speak louder than words. No man, unless he was hard pressed, and destitute of all other resources, would ever pursue the course adopted by Dr. Carson.

The slight effort that he does make to prove his point from the Fathers, in order to escape the absurdity of entirely omitting those whom he declares to be the strongest witnesses in favor of his cause, is such an utter failure, that it is equivalent to another confession that his case admits of no defence.

To my exposure of the absurdity of his principles, he replies solely by falsely charging me with omitting an essential part, when any one who can read English, can see with his own eyes, that I printed in his own words, and fully answered what he charges me with omitting. This part of his reply is so feeble and so false, that I felt an emotion of shame for him, and for his cause, when I read it.

To my defence against various rude and indecorous charges, he makes merely a feeble show of reply, and retracts none of them.

He concludes his piece by repeating his attacks upon my competency as a scholar, and closes his glorious defence of immersion, in the following eminently Christian and courteous style.

“My antagonist may be a very ingenious man, and a very pious man, and, in many respects, a very clever man, but he has not a head for the philosophy of language: and I say this with as little bad feeling as I say that the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.” This is certainly an illustrious specimen of genuine *Attic Salt*. Dr. Carson, no doubt, has monopolized the science of the philosophy of language. To his stupendous attainments I make no pretence.

Having given this general view of his reply, I proceed to some of the details.

§ 76. *Question of Principles.*

I will first notice his reply to my exposure of his principles.

It is on his principles that Dr. Carson chiefly prides himself. He speaks as an eminent discoverer of principles, and lays down canons with great authority, and charges all the lexicographers and commentators with ignorance of them, because they assign to βαπτίζω a secondary sense. His admirers regard him as in advance of the age, as to the philosophy of language. I therefore took great pains to collect his principles, and reduce them to a system, which Dr. Carson never did. I stated them always in his own words. The main battle, in the present discussion, lies around the question what amount of evidence is necessary *to begin* a secondary sense, when the primary sense is known and established—e. g. : The primary sense of βαπτίζω being to immerse, what evidence is necessary *to begin* the proof of the sense to purify? Dr. Carson says, an impossibility of the sense to immerse in some one case. But, after that, he says that a lower degree of evidence is enough.

His principles as to *beginning a proof of a secondary sense*, I considered and exposed in § 46, to which I refer the reader. His admission that after the proof is begun, a lower degree of evidence is sufficient, I stated in his own words, in § 51, and showed that it leads to a logical destruction of his whole system.

Does Dr. Carson make any reply to this exposure of the *radical unsoundness of the principles of his system*?

The only reply that he attempts, is to charge me falsely with omitting that part of his theory which I stated in full, and thoroughly answered, in § 51.

His words, as stated by me, are these—"As soon as a secondary meaning is ascertained on sufficient grounds, I do not demand, in every instance, a proof of impossibility of primary meaning, before the secondary is alleged. The competition between rival meanings, must then be ascertained on other grounds."

Thus I stated his principle in his own words, and yet Dr. Car-

son dares to say, p. 492, "He leaves out an essential part of my canon. Impossibility is required only when a secondary meaning is not in proof. If in any occurrence in the language a secondary meaning is in proof, impossibility of primary meaning is not essential to warrant the application of a secondary meaning. I have again and again explained this doctrine;" and I, too, have stated it in Dr. Carson's own words. And yet thousands who confide in Dr. Carson's veracity, will read his charge, and believe that I did omit what Dr. Carson alleges, and will never know that I quoted it in his own words, and showed that it leads to absurdity, and to the overthrow of his system.

So far, then, as my exposure of Dr. Carson's principles is concerned, it remains entirely unanswered, and in full force. The candid reader can find it in §§ 46, 49, 51.

### § 77. *Additional Exposure of Dr. Carson.*

To that exposure, I will now add, that in it I gave Dr. Carson the benefit of a false statement, as to his own practice, which I left uncorrected.

He said that a secondary sense cannot be admitted till the impossibility of the primary is proved, in some one instance.

To this I replied, "It is against his own practice, in other cases. Does he not admit that βαπτω means to dye or color, when it is applied to the beard and hair? And is it impossible to dip these? Improbable, surely, it is, but not half so much so as the dipping of couches." To this he thus replies.

"Here I am caught at last, surely my feet are entangled in my own net. But let the reader see with what ease I can extricate myself. The assertion of my antagonist arises from his want of discrimination. I admit that βαπτω has a secondary signification, because such signification is in proof, and instances may be alleged in which its primary meaning is utterly impossible. When applied, for instance, to the lake, the immersion of a lake in the blood of a frog, is beyond the bounds of possibility.

Show me anything like this with respect to βαπτίζω, and I will grant a secondary meaning."

This implies that he begins his evidence for a secondary sense of βάπτω with the case of the lake and the frog. The reverse is the fact. He first establishes a secondary sense without any reliance at all on that case, and having thus established a secondary sense, he applies it to that case, to disprove the opinion of Dr. Gale, that βάπτω there means immerse, and not color.

On pp. 44, 45, he quotes passages containing βάπτω from Hippocrates, Arrian, Ælian, Nicolas of Damascus, and Æschylus, in not one of which is the sense immerse impossible if his various modes of evading a secondary sense in βαπτίζω may be applied.

In view of these passages, and these alone, he says, "These examples are *sufficient to prove*, that the word βάπτω signifies to dye in general, though originally and still usually, applied to dyeing by dipping. Having such evidence before my eyes, I could not deny this to my opponents, even were it a difficulty as to the subject of the mode of baptism. In a controversialist nothing can compensate for candor," &c.

And yet in all of these cases no impossibility of the sense immerse exists. Take the case from Hippocrates, which he produces first. He speaks of a liquid as dyeing garments when it drops on them thus, "When it drops on the garments they are dyed" (βάπτεται). How easy now is it to allege, in the manner of Dr. Carson, that the reference may be to an immersion in water, to wash out the stains produced by the dropping of the liquid on the garments! Is not this possible? If so, the word cannot have the sense to dye. The next case is the case of the Indians who are said to dye βάπτειν their beards. It will not be contended, says Dr. Carson, that they dyed their beards by immersion. But can they not dip their beards? If so, the sense to dye is excluded. Again he says that in Ælian βαφή, applied to the hair, "denotes dyeing in general, for hair on the head is not dyed by dipping." But cannot the hair on the

head be dipped? If so, dyeing is excluded. So the garment dyed by the sword of Ægisthus could have been dipped by it in blood, and the sense to dye is excluded. In the case of the lady to whose yellow locks, not colored by art, the word βαφαῖς is applied, all that is necessary is to resort to his rhetorical principles, and to quote from Milton "colors dipped in heaven," and then boldly to affirm that no man who has a soul, need to be told what is meant by such a beautiful catachrestic use of words, in which the term "dippings" is applied to what had not been dipped, on the ground of a perceived similarity of appearance.

And yet Dr. Carson, following the impulse of common sense, admits and defends the sense to dye, without reference to mode, in all these cases. He acts in so doing on my principles, and renounces and condemns his own.

On the same principles he discusses other passages, and then says, "Having found, *beyond reasonable doubt*, that βάπτω, in its secondary sense, is employed literally and properly to denote dyeing, even when there is no dipping, we are now prepared to examine the occurrence of the word in the battle of the Frogs and Mice, which has been so obstinately contested."

That is, he first settles the question as to a secondary sense on my principles, and then applies it to the case of the lake and the blood of a frog. Dr. Carson then has not "extricated himself. He is caught at last. Surely his feet are entangled in his own net." But even if he had escaped from this snare, it was but to fall into another, as in § 51, I clearly showed.

The truth is, that after all his boasting and the glorification of his friends, the fundamental principle of his system is so totally unsound that, when his common sense is not suppressed by what he deems the essential necessity of his case, he adopts secondary senses just as I do, and as is done by all other reasonable men.

Concerning the passages on which I have just commented he says, "candor cannot say that there is any such implication or reference" (i. e. to dipping), "from such examples it could not

be known even that *bapto* has the meaning to dip." And yet in every case the sense to dip is possible. The cases in which βαπτίζω has the sense to purify, adduced by me, are much stronger than any of these passages, and yet Dr. Carson will not admit the sense to purify, but employs the whole power of his ingenuity, and that is not small, in devising modes of evasion.

### § 78. *Begging the Question.*

In my exposure of Dr. Carson's principles in § 46, I showed that he had begged the question. He boldly declares again and again, that βαπτίζω means to immerse in the disputed passages in the New Testament, because it has this meaning "*in every instance in the whole compass of the language.*" In fact his whole argument is based on a constant reiteration of this assertion.

This I called a bold and dogmatical begging of the question, because it assumes the very point in debate, and does this when it is notorious that thousands of cases of the use of this word exist which he has never seen.

To this he replies, "On this ground universal use could not be assumed with respect to any word, for all the instances in which any word has been used can never be produced." I reply, *then do not assume it*: no man has any right in such an argument to assert concerning what is so notoriously mutable as the sense of words, more than he knows and can prove. He may on evidence assert general use, or extensive use, properly enough. But when a man makes such an assertion as that the word βαπτίζω means immerse in Mark vii. 4, because "immersion is the only meaning of the word in every instance in the whole compass of the language," p. 448, he plainly asserts what he does not know unless he has seen every instance, and he just as plainly begs the question in debate. For this reason I again assert that Dr. Carson's replies to me, and to all his antagonists, are based entirely on the all-pervading begging of the question pointed out by me in § 46.



§ 79. *My Principles.*

Dr. Carson charged me with using a Unitarian canon. To this I replied that he used the same canon that I did, and that all persons of common sense employed it. The canon was this, "that in assigning secondary meanings to words, we are to regard the nature of the things spoken of." § 49.

That he used it I proved, because he admits that a secondary sense may be adopted when the nature of the thing spoken of renders the primary sense *impossible*. Thus he says that to immerse a lake in the blood of a mouse is impossible. *The nature of the thing spoken of* renders it impossible. Hence Dr. Carson regards the nature of the thing spoken of as well as I in giving secondary senses. The only difference between him and me is, that I regard the nature of the thing spoken of, to a greater extent than he professes to do. If it renders the primary meaning *highly improbable* I regard it, even if I have not found one case of actual impossibility. But till Dr. Carson can find one such case, he professes to regard all degrees of improbability, however high, as nothing—as mere ciphers. I called this absurd, because the mere finding afterwards of one case of impossibility cannot re-act so as to change fifty mere ciphers into fifty significant figures, each one of great value. Yet Dr. Carson does and must go on rejecting probability after probability, no matter how high, no matter in how many cases. But if, at last, he finds one case of actual impossibility, then each case which was before a mere cipher now becomes a significant figure of great value. Such a course of proceeding I call absurd, and maintain that all degrees of probability are to be regarded as they arise, and that the recurrence of frequent cases of strong improbability creates a cumulative argument of force enough to decide the question.

To the allegation that the Unitarians can reason against the true sense of the words of the Bible on the ground of probabilities derived from the nature of the things spoken of, I replied, that they can do the same on the ground of possibilities derived from

the nature of the things spoken of: e. g. They do say it is *impossible* for three divine persons to be one God. So that my principle is essentially the same with Dr. Carson's, and the extent to which I apply it does not make it any more justly liable to objection than his is.

I think that all candid persons will regard this as a perfect defence. How does Dr. Carson reply to it? He does three things. He omits to state the vital part of my defence. He asserts that I have not discrimination enough to know that such a defence was necessary as he suppresses. He redoubles his assertion that my canon is a Unitarian canon, at the same time making no effort to prove his assertion, and of course making no answer to my suppressed defence. It requires uncommon skill to combine so much misrepresentation in so small a compass. Let us examine his words.

"I have charged President Beccher with using a Unitarian canon. How does he repel the charge? He tells me that a good canon is not the worse for being used by Unitarians." True, but is this all? Did I not also say, *and prove*, that my canon was a good canon because Dr. Carson and all persons of common sense acted on it? *Is not this the very essence of my reply?* Of what use would it be to say that a good canon is not the worse for being used by Unitarians, unless I first showed that my canon was a good one, by the fact that all others used it, not even omitting Dr. Carson. This, therefore, is the essence of the argument—yet he entirely omits it, and states what is no argument, as if it was all my reply.

But this is only the first step. He proceeds, "I redouble the charge," that is, of using a Unitarian canon. He then defines the nature of a Unitarian canon. "A Unitarian canon is not a sound canon employed by Unitarians as well as others. A Unitarian canon is one which, if admitted, would prove Unitarianism." The import of his redoubled charge, then, is, that I use a canon, not sound, not used by others as well as Unitarians—and a canon which will prove Unitarianism if admitted. These certainly

are grave charges, and demand proof. What proof does Dr. Carson give? Not a syllable, but his redoubled assertion. And inasmuch as he has entirely suppressed my proof to the contrary, many will take his redoubled assertions for confirmation strong as Holy Writ. But this is not the end. He winds up with his usual homily on my want of discrimination. "What a want of discrimination is this defence! A canon that is sound ought to be used by all." Thus asserting that it is truly amazing that I had not sense enough to know that. This goes far beyond suppressing my defence. He not only suppresses it, but expresses his amazement that I have not sense enough to know that it was necessary. This, too, is equivalent to an assertion that I never made it! Let now Dr. Carson's admirers blush for him, when they remember that I not only asserted but proved that my canon was used by all persons of common sense, not excepting Dr. Carson himself. In like manner, when I charged on him a gross misrepresentation of my principles—what is his reply to a charge so serious? "He complains that I unjustly represent him as founding on probability independently of the meaning of the word. I reiterate the charge." This is a fair specimen of Dr. Carson's general course. His example says to all his admirers "never confess—never retract—all that is necessary is to reiterate the charge—thousands will see and believe you who will never see or hear of any reply." Will they eulogize and adopt such an example?

But he proceeds, "Does he not perceive that by the meaning of the word I understand a previously ascertained meaning? To this he does not even pretend. I found all on meaning previously ascertained; this is a fundamental difference between him and me." I reply—when in the first instance he admits that βάπτω means to color, does he found on a previously ascertained meaning? No: he founds, as I have shown, on the nature of the thing spoken of. He *departs from a previously ascertained meaning on that ground, and introduces a new one.* With regard to βαπτίζω I act on the same principles; hence, there is not a funda-

mental difference between us. It is only a difference as to the degree of difficulty in retaining the original sense, which is necessary, in order to authorize us to introduce a new and secondary sense.

It is true, that I do not, like Dr. Carson, profess to reject all probabilities, even the highest, till I can find a case in which the original meaning is impossible; it is true, that I give much weight to a cumulative argument involving a combination of probabilities. But this is not all that I do. I regard, as I stated at large, three things at least: 1. General laws of language as to similar changes, in analogous cases, ascertained by acknowledged examples. 2. I regard the original and primary sense of the word, in order to see what effects flow from the action indicated by it in different circumstances, and to what changes it would naturally be subject. 3. I regard the circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of. Unless a man states all this in representing my principles I regard him as misrepresenting me. Do Dr. Carson's words truly represent all this? He says,

“Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth, namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document not from the authority of the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability of the thing related, independently of the testimony of the words.”

This implies that I regard the probability of the thing related alone, and do not regard the general laws of language in similar and acknowledged changes—and that I do not regard the primitive sense of the word, which is false. Is there no misrepresentation in such suppression?

Dr. Carson knows how important an influence the primitive sense of the word exercises on the formation of secondary senses. On p. 53, he says, “If the word ( $\beta\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega$ ) originally meant pour, or sprinkle, no process can be supposed by which it can come to mean to dye. Upon our view there is a connecting link which

joins these two meanings together notwithstanding their great diversity." And does not a similar connecting link join the primary sense of βαπτίζω to the sense to purify? I do not then regard the probability of the thing, narrated alone, and independently of the primary sense of the word. The primary sense of the word itself renders the secondary sense which I claim, highly probable, as I have elsewhere shown.

But is it not strange that Dr. Carson did not see that he was open to a fatal retort? Just put possibility in the place of probability, and it will thus read, "Dr. Carson, in assigning to βάπτω the sense *to dye*, proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth, namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of language ascertained by acknowledged examples, but from views of the *possibility* of the thing narrated, independently of the testimony of the word"—e. g. : Unitarians say, three persons cannot be one God; Infidels say, Jonah could not have lived three days in a whale's belly; water enough to flood the world, above the tops of the highest mountains, could not be found, &c. &c.; hence we are not to interpret the words as meaning such things. But I do not make the retort. Dr. Carson's procedure is sound, as far as he goes, even if infidels abuse it. He is in error only in professing to refuse to regard probabilities according to their true worth.

In reply to my statements as to the cumulative argument, composed of many independent cases of probabilities, he says, "in defending the combination of his probabilities, he makes a distinction as to the nature of the subjects." What this alleged distinction is, and what it has to do with the case in hand, he does not explain; that I make it, he does not prove. I deny that I make any such distinction. He proceeds, "but on all subjects nothing is nothing" (no one will be hardy enough to deny this); "and IF I have proved that the probabilities are nothing separately, nothing must they be in combination." True, if you have proved it. But you have not proved it, but only asserted it, without

an effort at proof. Is not this an illustrious specimen of reasoning?

But even if I do not make a distinction as to the nature of the subject, Dr. Carson does, for he proceeds, "Besides, the probability that, independently of testimony, a thing was done in a certain way, is a very different thing from the probability that a word has a certain meaning. That A. killed B. may be very probable from many circumstances, but the moment that A. proves an *alibi*, or that it is proved that C. is guilty of the murder, all the previous probabilities are of no account." Now suppose all this to be true, what is it to Dr. Carson's purpose? If the probability that a thing was or was not done in a given way, is a very different thing from the probability that a word has a certain meaning, then what bearing has the supposed case on the point at issue, which is the probability that a word has a certain meaning? If it has any force, it is against Dr. Carson. I admit that previous probabilities that A. did a certain act may be destroyed by positive testimony that he was not where the act was done, or that another did it. Does it therefore follow that the probability that βαπτίζω has a given sense in a given case, can be destroyed by an *alibi*, or by proving that some other word has that sense? Dr. Carson must say that the cases are unlike. Of course it does not follow. Why then did he adduce the case? There are no such ways of destroying the probability that βαπτίζω, in certain cases, means to purify, and his own statement shows it. And is it possible that a man of such astonishing "perspicacity" and "discrimination" has been fairly detected in reasoning against himself?

Such is Dr. Carson's mode of meeting my refutation of his principles, and defence of my own. I have one thing to add—his reply indicates both agitation and confusion. He has written with no continuity or system, on the fundamental question of principles. Two paragraphs on that question occur on p. 492. Then topics of all sorts follow. Then, on the top of p. 494, comes in another paragraph. He then goes off to other topics.



Then, in the middle of the page, is another paragraph. Then he goes off to other topics. Then, at the bottom of the page, is the concluding paragraph.

The Sybil's leaves, scattered by the wind, and gathered up at venture, were not more confused than the arrangement of Dr. Carson's thoughts, on the subject of the principles of language.

If "he had a head for the philosophy of language," he seems at least to have had no head for the philosophy of arrangement. Instead of the light of well arranged reasoning, we find nothing but the scattered dust of false statements, and misrepresentations.

### § 80. *Argument from Prepositions.*

I have already remarked that Dr. Carson has made no reply to the argument from the use of the same prepositions after βαπτίζω as after καθαρίζω. His course, on this part of the argument, deserves particular notice. He is, for the most part, entirely silent. To the greater part of the argument, nothing could be said, and therefore he was silent. But one remark occurred, concerning the use of ἐκ after βάπτισμα, on which he thought he could convict me of an inaccuracy, and, in a moment, he seized on this, and reiterated his attack on my competency. "This," says he, "is an error that no philologist could hold." "Any person who has ever passed the threshold of the temple of philology must know," &c. "Had I no other evidence that the President, however great a man he may be in other respects, is not a philologist, I could take his measure from this single observation." P. 493. The controversialist, who, like Dr. Carson, habitually indulges in this mode of assailing those who happen not to agree with him, ought himself to be infallible. But if he not only refuses to meet the argument as a whole, but blunders in assailing even his one selected point of attack, then let him not expect to escape the natural recoil on himself. Whilst he attempts to take my measure, let him not be surprised if others measure him.

Before repelling this attack, I shall take occasion to state more

fully the nature of the argument from prepositions, and to illustrate and confirm it by additional examples.

When considering the source from which purification proceeds, none can deny that the prepositions *ἐκ* and *ἀπό* often follow *καθαρίζω*. Thus Chrysostom (Hom. 6, in Math.) says—ὥσπερ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος, οὕτω ἀπὸ δακρύων καὶ ἐξομολογήσεως καθαιρόμεθα πάλιν, i. e. as we derive purity in the first instance from water and the Spirit, so, if we sin afterwards, we again derive purity from tears and confession. Here both *ἀπό* and *ἐκ* follow *καθαίρω*, to purify. With this compare the use of *ἀπό* after *βάπτισμα*, in Origen—μακάριος ὁ μὴ δέόμενος βαπτίσματος τοῦ ἀπὸ πυρός. Happy is he who does not need that baptism, i. e. purification, which is to be derived from fire. Compare also the language of Basil, on which my remark was based, τὸ (βάπτισμα) ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς μετάνοιαν καὶ τὸ (βάπτισμα) ἐκ πνεύματος εἰς αναγέννησιν. The Baptism, i. e. purification, which is derived from water unto repentance—the baptism, i. e. purification, which is derived from the Holy Spirit unto regeneration. With this, next compare Basil's assertion, shortly after, that those who have sinned in a less degree *δέονται τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος καθαρισμοῦ*, need the purification derived from water—but those who have committed aggravated sins need *τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πυρός καθαρισμοῦ*, the purification which proceeds from fire; let him also remember that in this connexion Basil defines *βάπτισμα* as *καθαρισμός*, and who can doubt what is the force of *ἐκ* in the phrases *βάπτισμα ἐξ ὕδατος* and *βάπτισμα ἐκ πνεύματος*? The prepositions that follow the sense immerse are *ἐν* or *εἰς*; these are omitted; those that follow *καθαρισμός* are *ἀπό* and *ἐκ*; these are both used after *βάπτισμα*, and I declare them to be at war with the idea of immersion. But let us not stop here. Let us look at the other prepositions which follow *καθαρισμός*. I remark, therefore, that before the word denoting the pollution from which we are cleansed, *ἀπό* is used in connexion with *καθαρίζω*. Thus Paul, in 2 Cor. vii. 1, says—καθαρίσωμεν ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος—Let us purify ourselves *from* all pollution of the flesh and the Spirit. So Heb. ix. 14, αἵμα Χρισ-

τοῦ καθαρῆς τὴν συνείδησιν ἰμῶν ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων—The blood of Christ shall cleanse your conscience *from* dead works. Compare now the use of ἀπό to denote the same thing after βαπτίζω in Justin Martyr—βαπτίσθητε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς, ἀπὸ φθόνου, ἀπὸ μισοῦς. Be baptized as to your soul from anger, envy, hatred, &c. Who does not see that the preposition ἀπό, so used, demands the sense “be purified mentally from anger, envy, hatred, and lo! your body is pure!”

The preposition ἐν, after βαπτίζω, is ambiguous. It may be used to denote *in* or *by*. But διὰ, followed by the genitive, is not ambiguous; it denotes that by which an effect is produced. Hence it follows καθαρῆς, to denote that by which purity is produced. Hence, in the account of baptisms ascribed to Athanasius, this language occurs—πολλοὶ διὰ πταισμάτων μολύναντες τὸ ἅγιον βάπτισμα διὰ δακρύων καθαρίσθησαν. “Many, who had by sins defiled their holy baptism, have been purified by tears.” But the same author describes the sixth baptism on the list as τὸ βάπτισμα διὰ δακρύων. Who can help seeing that διὰ, so used, demands the sense purification by tears, in the last case just as in the first? The sense immersion would demand ἐν, i. e. immersion in tears, and cannot be followed by διὰ in the same way as καθαρῆς.

This use of διὰ with the genitive after βαπτίζω, is very extensive. But in Gregory Thaumaturgus occurs a case of peculiar power. He believed that Christ, in fact, was immersed, but he does not employ βαπτίζω to convey this idea, but καταδύω. Thus he represents Christ as saying to John—καταδύσον με τοῖς Ἰορδάνου ἕεσθροισι. “Immerse me in the streams of Jordan.” But after βαπτίζω he uses διὰ with the genitive, so as to demand the sense to purify—βάπτισόν με τὸν μέλλοντα βαπτίζειν τοὺς πιστεύοντας δι’ ὕδατος, καὶ πνεύματος, καὶ πυρός. “Purify me who am about to purify those who believe *by* water, and the Spirit, and fire.” He then changes the construction; instead of διὰ with the genitive, using the dative in the causative sense, as an equivalent, and in apposition, and thus proceeds—ὕδατι δυνάμενῳ ἀποπλύναι τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὸν

βόρβορον, πνεύματι δυνάμενῳ τοὺς χοϊκοὺς πνευματικοὺς ἀπεργάσασθαι, πυρὶ πεφυκότι κατακαίειν τὰς τῶν ἀνομημάτων ἀκάνθας—"by water, I say, which is able to wash away the filth of sin, by the Spirit, who can make the earthly spiritual; by fire, whose nature it is to burn up the thorns of sin." Here he exhibits the purifying energy of the water, the Spirit, and fire, by which Christ was to purify believers, not in which he was to immerse them; the construction and scope forbid and exclude the idea of immersion.

This use of *διά* after βαπτίζω occurs very impressively in the Acta Passionis S. Pamphillii Martyris. The writer, speaking of two who were burnt to death, says, *δυεῖν τῷ διὰ πυρὸς βαπτίσματι τελειοθέντων*. They two being perfected by the purification *by* fire—Gallandias Bibliotheca, Vet. Pat. Venice, 1765. Vol. iv. p. 43.

Eusebius, Hist. Ecc. Lib. 6, Cap. 4, says of a female catechumen, who was burnt before her baptism by water, *τὸ βάπτισμα τὸ διὰ πυρὸς λαβούσα τὸν βίον ἐξεληλύθεν*. "She received the purification which is *by* fire, and departed from this life."

John of Damascus, Paris, 1712, Vol. i. p. 261, says of the sixth baptism, that it was *τὸ βάπτισμα διὰ μετάνοιας καὶ δακρύων*. A purification *by* repentance and tears; not an immersion in repentance and tears. After referring to John's statement, I baptize you with water, but he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, he adds, *προκαθαίρει οὖν ὁ Ἰωάννης ἐπὶ τὸ πνεῦμα διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος, therefore John purifies* beforehand *by* water, to prepare the way for the Spirit. When βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω thus in the same way take after them *διά* with the genitive, and καθαρίζω, as here, takes the place of βαπτίζω, who does not see that the words are synonymous?

Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nazianz., and Clemens Alexand., furnish passages which will place the argument from prepositions in a still more striking light.

Gregory Nazianz., vol. i. p. 641, thus speaks of baptism, "Inasmuch as we are composed of two natures, the body and the soul, the one visible, and the other invisible, purification is of two kinds (*διττῇ καὶ ἡ καθαρισίς*), that is, by water, and by the Spirit

(δι' ὕδατος τε φημί καὶ πνεύματος), the former being received visibly and bodily, the other concurring invisibly and spiritually, the one being typical, the other real and effectual, purifying the depths of the soul."

In the same strain speaks Cyril of Jerusalem, p. 15 ; Catechesis 3 ; Paris, 1631.

"As man is of a two-fold nature, being composed of body and spirit, so also is purification of two kinds (διπλοῦν καὶ τὸ καθάρσιον), one spiritual, by that which is spiritual, the other bodily, by that which is material ; the water purifies the body—the spirit seals the soul."

In striking correspondence with this, Clemens Alexand., vol. 2, p. 988, declares that baptism is of two kinds (τό βάπτισμα ὃν διπλοῦν αναλόγως), one material, by water, the other spiritual, by the Spirit (τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν δι' ὕδατος τὸ δὲ νοητὸν διὰ πνεύματος).

So then, Gregory Nazianz. speaks of διπτὴ καθαρσις, Cyril of διπλοῦν καθάρσιον, and Clemens, of διπλοῦν βάπτισμα. In each case one of the two kinds is material, and the other is spiritual, analogous to it. The purification is δι' ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος—the baptism also is δι' ὕδατος and διὰ πνεύματος.

Nothing can more clearly show that the sense of βάπτισμα is not immersion, but purification. Had it been the design of the writer to describe two kinds of immersion, one in water, and the other in the Spirit, he would have used εἰς or ἐν, and not διὰ.

Here then is unanswerable proof that καθαρσις, καθάρσιον, and βάπτισμα, are in these passages used as synonyms.

The analogy between spiritual purification and material purification, is by Clement viewed in this case as corresponding to the analogy between spiritual and material fire ; for as material water quenches material fire, so does the Spirit, when it purifies the mind, defend it against spiritual fire.

He also elsewhere traces the analogy between heavenly spiritual water, and earthly material water—the latter purifying the body, the former the soul.

Such being the facts, it needs no argument to show how these

writers understood the contrast between the baptism of John and of Christ. "I indeed *purify* you by water, but he shall *purify* you with the Holy Ghost," must have been the sense attached by them to the passage.

The fact that ἐν here follows βαπτίζω, and that in itself it can be rendered either BY or IN, emboldened Dr. Carson to claim that the sense is, to immerse in water, and in the Holy Ghost. Against this view Eusebius of Cesarea expressly testifies. He first declares that *εὐχαριεῖ ἐν πνεύματι*, in Is. iv. 4, does not differ in sense from *βαπτίσει ἐν πνεύματι* as used by John, and then adds, "In the one case (Isaiah iv. 4), fiery words, powerfully affecting them, wrought in them a purification from sin. In like manner it is said that the Saviour would *purify* (*βαπτίσειν*), not with water, but with the Holy Ghost, and with fire." Nothing can be more explicit. He thus removes the ambiguity of ἐν after βαπτίζω, and gives to the dative preceded by ἐν the same causative sense which is indicated by διὰ, and the Genitive, just as in the sentence last quoted from Gregory Thaum, the causative sense was given to the dative without a preposition, as equivalent to διὰ with the genitive. Thus are our translators defended for rendering the passage, I indeed baptize *with* water, but he shall baptize *with* the Holy Ghost, instead of immerse *in* water and the Holy Ghost, as Dr. Carson claims.

Thus plain is it that βαπτίζω is used with the same prepositions as are used with καθαρίζω, and that these prepositions demand the sense to purify in both cases alike, and in both exclude the sense to immerse.

### § 81. Dr. Carson's Magnanimity.

This argument I indicated briefly in § 56; and in § 64, at the close, I illustrated the similar use of διὰ after βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω in parallel columns, also in § 50 I illustrated the use of ἀπό after βαπτίζω, by Justin Martyr. I regard it as an argument, of itself perfectly decisive and unanswerable.



Passing by all this, Dr. Carson selects from § 55 the assertion that Basil uses ἐκ after βάπτισμα, a preposition at war with the idea to immerse. Here he calls to mind the English phrase to dip *up* a bucket of water, used, he thinks, by Dr. Miller, and says that on the same principle it could be proved that dip does not mean immerse. "Let a foreigner interpret this on the principle of President Beecher. *Up*, says the critic, signifies ascension; dipping, then, cannot denote immersing, for this implies sinking. The preposition is at war with immerse as the meaning of the word dip. Dip must then signify to raise, or draw, or lift, not to immerse—and this critic would know English as the President knows Greek."

This is a fair instance of Dr. Carson's mental enlargement. He merely picks a single flaw at most, but does not touch the argument as a whole. Before him is Basil's explicit definition of βάπτισμα as meaning purification. Of this he says nothing. But an imaginary error as to ἐκ gives him a chance to reiterate his attacks on my capacity; it cannot be passed by. But he does not even here find one flaw. He does not prove that the preposition *up*, can follow the idea to immerse—for either that mode of expression is elliptical, and is what grammarians call a constructio pregnans, so that *up* belongs to a verb implied, or else the verb *dip* has changed its sense, and does not mean immerse. When men speak of *dipping* water, or of *dipping out* water, do they mean that the water in question, and which is said to be dipped, is immersed into water or into anything else? Directly the reverse. It is taken out of water. Surely there is no immersion in taking water out of water. But as it is taken out *by dipping a vessel in*, it is said to be *dipped out*, that is *taken out by dipping*. To dip out water, then, is to dip a vessel into water and then take out what enters it. So to dip up a bucket of water, is to *dip* a bucket into water and fill it, and then *raise* it *up*. *Up*, then, does not belong to dip. For it is absurd in the very nature of things to say that the preposition *up* can indicate the downward motion of immersion. It indicates the upward motion of a bucket which has been filled by first dipping it downward into water.

And in one case Dr. Carson himself finds occasion to resort to the same principle. I had urged the use of *ἀπό* as at war with the idea immerse in the expression βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ, baptized from a dead body. He immediately resorts to ellipsis and a pregnant construction. He asserts the sense to be, immersed in water, and thus purified from the pollution contracted by touching a dead body. Thus he connects *from* with *purified* instead of *immerse*. Why then did he not see that an ellipsis could connect *up* with a verb denoting ascent, and *dip* with a preposition denoting descent? The same solution must be given to the case alluded to by him in 2 Macc. ch. i. v. 21, where ἀποξέπτω is translated in our English version, draw up. In this case βύπτω implies that a vessel was to be dipped into the water, and *ἀπό* that its contents were then to be removed from it and lifted up. But who does not see the absurdity of the idea that the preposition *up* can denote downward motion? Did a sane man ever speak of a stone as sinking *up* to the bottom of a lake, or of immersing a person upwards to the bottom? So long, then, as *dip* means to immerse, *up* cannot indicate the motion denoted by it.

A similar pregnant construction is found in the phrase to bury from a house, denoting to carry the body from the house, and bury it. From refers to the verb of motion implied. So in Greek, λῆς ἐφάνη εἰς ὁδόν, literally a lion *appeared into* the path—that is, *came into* the path and *appeared*. All who have read the recent results of German grammarians, know how decidedly they refuse to connect prepositions with verbs whose idea of motion or of rest, does not correspond with the sense of the preposition, resorting to the constructio pregnans to escape the anomaly.

In the words of Dr. Carson, "I cannot pursue this subject here, I shall merely suggest it to literary men." I will, however, add, that "any person who has ever passed the threshold of the temple of philology must know" that such pregnant constructions are exceedingly common, and those who have not studied them enough to know it, I would refer to Winer's and Stuart's Grammars of the New Testament, and Kühner's Greek Grammar.

Dr. Carson, in view of such criticisms, had no excuse for taunting me or any one else with "schoolboy criticism."

§ 82. *Dr. Carson's first alleged mode of solving all my quotations from the Fathers.*

I have remarked that Dr. Carson has adopted two unlike theories, and boldly declared that each will solve all the facts produced by me from the Fathers. I will now state the first.

This is advanced in endeavoring to explain why the Fathers called clinic sprinkling or perfusion, in case of the sick, baptism. His theory is this,—“Cyprian calls perfusion the *ecclesiastical baptism*, as distinguished from baptism in the proper sense of the term. The persons perfused in their beds on account of sickness were not supposed to be properly baptized; but they received the ecclesiastical baptism, that is what the church, in such cases, admitted as a valid substitute for baptism. This fact is conclusive, and will afford an answer to all the passages referred to by President Beecher, to prove a secondary meaning in the use of the word among the Fathers. It was not a secondary meaning because it never went into general use; but it is called a baptism because it served the same purpose.”

The amount of this is, those things which the church received as valid substitutes for immersion, were called immersion because they served the same purpose. Now admitting this to be true in fact, which it is not, how far would it apply? How many valid substitutes for immersion did the church in her administration of baptism admit? I answer one, and one only, and that is perfusion or sprinkling in case of sickness. This solution, therefore, cannot extend beyond the case of clinic baptism, even if true. How then can it solve all my examples? How can it meet my argument from the use of prepositions? How can it explain the definitions of Basil, Athanasius, and Zonaras? How can it explain the fact that the sprinkling of blood, and the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer, are called baptisms? Did the primi-

tive church sprinkle with blood or with ashes, and deem them valid substitutes for immersion? Did they regard repentance and tears as a valid substitute for immersion? Did they regard purification by future fire as a valid substitute for immersion in this world? Did they regard purification by the truth, or by afflictions, as a valid substitute for immersion? But I need not proceed. It might seem as if Dr. Carson made the assertion that this theory will solve all facts, merely for effect, for he does not try to solve by it a single example except the cases of clinic baptism, and to none others can it even in pretence be applied. It begins with them, and from the very nature of the case it ends with them. But in its place I shall show that the theory itself is false. I proceed to the second theory.

### § 83. *Dr. Carson's second mode of Solution.*

This theory is taken from the fact that Justin Martyr calls circumcision a baptism. Thus speaks Dr. Carson. "He sometimes also speaks of circumcision as a baptism, or as agreeing in the emblem, though altogether different in the things and in the words that designate them." He then proceeds, with a pompous implication of his own superior knowledge and of my ignorance, thus to admonish me. "Let President Beecher study this, and it will show how the Fathers can call various things by the name of baptism, without importing that they are included in the meaning of the word. All his examples may be solved by this single fact."

Let it now be noticed that this theory abandons the ground of the former theory. That the church admits a thing as a valid substitute for immersion is not now the reason why it is called baptism, but the fact that it *agrees with baptism in the emblem*. Hence rites never used by the church and not admitted as a substitute for baptism, as, for example, circumcision, can be called baptism. Let us examine this second theory.

What then does Dr. Carson mean by agreeing in the emblem?

According to authorized usage, an emblem is a visible object or act, which represents another thing to the mind. A balance is an emblem of justice, a crown, of royalty, white robes, of moral purity, sprinkling or washing with pure water, of purification. Taking the term in this sense circumcision does not agree in the emblem with immersion, for the emblematical acts in the two rites are entirely unlike. So is the act of immersion in water entirely unlike the act of pouring, or of sprinkling with blood, or water, or ashes. Taking the word emblem then in its true and proper sense, immersion agrees in the emblem with nothing but immersion. It is perfectly unique.

But there is reason to believe that Dr. Carson here uses the word in a new and peculiar sense, i. e. to denote that which the emblem represents. He does not indeed so define the word, but although it is possible that Dr. Carson has written what is so obviously false as the preceding statements would imply, taking the word emblem in its proper sense, yet it is not probable, and on the ground of so strong an improbability I depart from the primary sense of the word, and introduce a secondary sense. On p. 465, he clearly uses the word in the same sense, speaking of purification as "the emblem of the ordinance," that is, "the thing emblematically meant by the ordinance." On p. 386, he seems also to use the word in this sense, stating that "the application of water under the law and under the gospel has the same emblem of purification," that is, it has purification in each case as the thing emblematically represented. It is curious enough to remark that from this new and peculiar use, he passes in the next sentence to the true and common use, speaking of a burial in water as an emblem of Christ's burial as well as of purification. Here emblem denotes the emblematic act, and not the thing emblemized. Let this change of sense in so definite and well established a word as emblem, teach the friends of Dr. Carson the great ease with which new senses of words are introduced, and the strong tendency of the human mind to introduce them, and that the same word can be used in different and even anti-

thetic senses in the same page, or even sentence—for no senses can be more essentially different than the emblematical act, and the thing of which it is an emblem.

Taking the word emblem in this new sense, it is true that since both circumcision and immersion represent purification, they so far “agree in the emblem,” i. e. in the thing emblemized. In this sense also, immersion “agrees in the emblem” with sprinkling, whether with water, or with blood, or with the ashes of a heifer; it also agrees with perfusion. And from this agreement in the thing emblemized, Dr. Carson infers that the Fathers can call these rites baptisms (i. e. immersions), without importing that they are included in the meaning of the word, just as circumcision is called a baptism, though the act in circumcision differs from the act in baptism, and the meaning of the word circumcision from that of the word baptism. He calls on me to study this fact, and asserts that it alone will solve all my examples.

I have before studied the fact, and have since studied Dr. Carson's doctrine as to the thing emblemized by immersion, and the result is that, Dr. Carson himself being judge, this fact will solve none of my examples, but is an unanswerable argument against him. For according to Dr. Carson's own views, no rite of purification which omits immersion, can so far agree with the rite of immersion in the thing emblemized, as to justify the application to it of the name immersion; for,

1. Death, burial, and resurrection, are an essential and inseparable part of the thing emblemized in the rite of immersion.

2. The act of immersion emblemizes nothing else but death, burial, and resurrection.

3. The name immersion was chosen instead of purification, in order to direct the mind to these ideas.

4. Hence, on Dr. Carson's own grounds, it is absurd to transfer such a name to any rite which excludes immersion, and, of course, all which immersion, as such, symbolizes.

That these are Dr. Carson's views, his own words shall prove, p. 475. “Though the rite of baptism is an emblematical purifi-



cation, yet purification is not the only thing represented by the emblem. The communion of the believer with Christ, in his death, burial, and resurrection, and his salvation by that union, and only by that union, is also represented. *Katharismos, then, was not suitable as the appropriated name of the ordinance.*"

Here we are told that death, burial, and resurrection belong to the thing emblemized by the rite of immersion, as really as purification. He then tells us why this particular name of the rite was very important. A name so generic as purification could not represent them. The specific term immersion was needed. Again, p. 153, "Death, burial, and resurrection, we do not consider as the primary meaning of baptism; and washing away sin a secondary meaning. *It takes both to make one meaning.* It not only signifies washing away sin through faith in the blood of Christ, but denotes that such sins are washed away by our fellowship with him in his death. Washing away of sin is the thing which it always signifies; but this is not the whole of its meaning. It is then to no purpose that Dr. Wardlaw insists that *sprinkling* and *pouring* may be an emblem of cleansing. They are no emblems of death, burial, and resurrection, which are figured in baptism."

Hence, the ideas, death, burial, and resurrection, are not separable from the thing emblematically meant in baptism, and as it regards these ideas, no rites that omit immersion "agree in the emblem" with the rite that includes it.

Again, the name immersion indicates these peculiar ideas alone, and does not indicate purification, and no act but immersion can designate these ideas. P. 439: "It is *the water* in baptism that denotes purification, not *the name* of the rite. *Immersion* is an emblem of the believer's communion and oneness with Christ, in his death, *burial*, and resurrection. If mere purification were designated by baptism, *sprinkling* or *pouring* might have been used as well as *immerse*. But immersion represents the whole spiritual body of Christ as dying with him, *buried* with him, *risen* with

him. As members of the body of Christ, they have done and suffered whatever Christ has done and suffered for them. True views of the import of baptism are essentially connected with clear views of the gospel."

Nothing can more clearly set forth the great importance of the word immersion, and also of that which is emblemized exclusively by the act of immersion. The omission of this part of the emblem throws out of view the great truths of the gospel, which it symbolizes. Of course this part of the emblem is absolutely essential.

Hence, p. 381, he says,—“The immersion of the whole body is *essential to baptism*, not because nothing but immersion can be an emblem of purification, but because immersion is the thing commanded, and because that, *without immersion, there is no emblem of death, burial, and resurrection, which are in the emblem, equally with purification.*” And p. 388, he says: “Immersion is commanded because of its symbolical meaning,” and is “essential.” What I have said is then plainly true, viz. according to Dr. Carson.

1. If the thing emblemized by immersion is taken as a whole, no rite that omits immersion, does or can agree with it in the emblem. Essential parts are excluded, viz. death, burial, and resurrection.

2. These excluded parts, according to Dr. C., are not separable from the thing designed to be emblemized. They belong to it as essentially as does purification.

3. The name immersion was chosen and given with the special design to fix the mind on death, burial, and resurrection, which purification could not do.

Immersion, then, if Dr. C. is right, is the specific name of a peculiar kind of purification, and is totally unfit to be used like a generic name, and as such applied to any and every rite that symbolizes purification, and that alone.

And yet the facts are these, that the Fathers did call sprinkling

with blood, or water, or the ashes of a heifer, baptism. That they called pouring a baptism, and that they called circumcision a baptism.

My solution is this ; baptism has the sense purification, and is a generic term, and includes all species of purification, however unlike in form, and can therefore be applied to them all.

Dr. Carson's is this ; immersion is the name of a complex rite of purification, in which the water is the only emblem of purification, and the act immersion is not an emblem of purification at all, but of death, burial, and resurrection, and was chosen for this end, and yet this name may nevertheless be applied to all rites of purification, although they exclude immersion and all the ideas of which it is an emblem.

The bare statement of this theory is enough to show how utterly absurd it is.

According to my solution, we apply the name of a genus to any species comprehended in it. This is natural, and in accordance with daily use. We call the oak, the pine, the apple, and the orange alike trees.

But Dr. Carson transfers the name which, according to him, denotes that which distinguishes one species of purification from all others, to all the species contained in the genus. This is absurd. It is at war with all usage. Ebony is a peculiar kind of tree. Would it not be absurd to apply its name to the pine, and to every other species of trees, although entirely devoid of its peculiarities ?

Nay, more, as it regards the term baptism, the case is much stronger, Dr. Carson being judge.

Though the rite of immersion is a kind of purification, yet it is a kind so peculiar, that it needs the specific name immersion *to denote its peculiarity*. This peculiarity is that it symbolizes a purification effected by union with Christ, in his death, burial, and resurrection. A true view of immersion is essentially connected with these great ideas. For this reason, *the act* immersion is needed, and sprinkling and pouring will not answer. For the same reason the peculiar and specific *name* immersion is

needed, and was chosen, and purification will not answer. And yet this name, so peculiar, select, specific, and distinctive, can, according to Dr. Carson, be applied to any rite whatever, if it does but symbolize purification, although without any reference to death, burial, or resurrection. We might far more rationally call pine, oak, and all other trees, ebony. To such absurd shifts is Dr. Carson driven, to avoid the conclusion that baptism has the generic sense for purification.

#### § 84. *Dr. Carson's Self-Contradiction.*

But in taking this ground, Dr. Carson directly contradicts what he elsewhere asserts. In reply to Mr. Hall and Dr. Miller, he asserts that rites of purification which exclude immersion, cannot be called baptism, and never were.

He tells Dr. Miller, on p. 392, that "sprinkling cannot be called baptism, with more propriety than sand can be called water. This I do not leave as an inference from my doctrines. I wish to proclaim it to all my brethren."

In reply to Mr. Hall, he ridicules the idea that sprinklings were ever called baptisms. Mr. H. humbly supposed that the practice of a people who called a purifying by sprinkling or pouring a baptism, would have some little weight upon the question. Dr. Carson replies :

"A people who called a purifying, by sprinkling or pouring, a *baptism* !!! Where is such a people ? Not under the heavens. The facts alleged to prove this are all mere assumptions." p. 401. Again—"If one instance of sprinkling was called immersion, I would give up the point of univocal meaning." p. 409. Again, Mr. Hall alleges that Paul calls sprinklings baptisms, in Heb. ix. 10. Dr. Carson pointedly contradicts him, charges him with deliberate and intentional falsehood, and then adds—

"The subtlety of Satan himself cannot plausibly contrive to force these sprinklings into the divers baptisms." p. 405. From such positions there is no retreat.

And yet, when I bring testimony to prove that the Fathers do call sprinkling with water, blood, and ashes, baptisms, and that in more than one instance, Dr. Carson does not, as he promises, give up the point of univocal meaning, but simply turns round and contradicts himself.

Anything, he now tells us, can be called immersion, if it agrees with in it being an emblem of purification. It is neither absurd nor contrary to fact. Dr. Carson can now do what not even the subtlety of Satan could plausibly effect. He does it with perfect ease, with a single dash of his pen—a single bold assertion.

And it is not a little curious, and perfectly characteristic of Dr. Carson, that he first soundly castigates Dr. Miller and Mr. Hall, because they had not the sense to see that sprinklings could not, by any possibility, be called baptisms, and never were, and then turns round and castigates me for not having the sense to see that they could be called baptisms, with perfect ease, and that the Fathers did so call them. But if the Fathers did so call them, why could not Paul, in Heb. ix. 10, on the same ground?

It was, no doubt, very convenient for Dr. Carson, as emergencies arose, to resort for shelter to both sides of a contradiction. And it was perfectly in character for him to castigate others for not agreeing with him on both sides. But to a controversialist who so often insults his antagonists, as devoid of all perspicacity, and who is eulogized as the Jonathan Edwards of the nineteenth century, it is not in the highest degree creditable to be detected in such manifest self-contradictions, and such sorry and futile evasions of manifest and indisputable truth.

In the present case, Dr. Carson's first ground was correct. If the act of immersion is the emblem, not of purification, but of death, burial, and resurrection; if the word immersion was chosen as the name of the rite, for this reason; and if, for the same reason, purification was not suitable to be the appropriated name of the rite, and if what immersion denotes is essential to the kind of purification emblemized in the rite, then it is absurd to transfer

the significant, specific, and appropriated name immersion, to any rites of purification in which there is no immersion.

But suppose that this theory could explain the cases quoted by me, in which sprinkling is called baptism; what has it to do with the great body of my proofs? Basil defines βάπτισμα as meaning purification. What has it to do with this? This definition is enough to settle the question, for it professedly defines the word as used by John the Baptist and Christ, at the time of the institution of the rite. Dr. C.'s theory does not touch this case. It does not touch the definition of Zonaras, nor the assertion of Athanasius, nor the argument from the use of prepositions, nor the testimony of Jerome, Origen, Eusebius, Basil, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theodoret, on Is. iv. 4, nor that of Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theophylact, on Jn. iii. 25. In short, if true, it would affect only a few cases, and leave the main body of proofs totally untouched. Could Dr. Carson have believed that he had looked intelligently through the subject, when he called on me to study it, and affirmed that his theory, so false, and withal so limited in its application if true, could solve all my examples? Or did he make so bold an assertion merely for effect on the minds of his confiding followers? Let those who choose, judge. It is enough for me to unfold the facts.

But while both of Dr. Carson's theories fail, the view that I advocate explains all facts, including the one adduced by him from Justin Martyr. He calls circumcision a baptism. It is, in fact, a purification, and, for this reason, is called a baptism. So Macarius calls it, and so explains it. Comparing Jews and Christians, he says of the latter, "the heavenly knife cuts off the superfluity of the mind, that is, the polluted foreskin of sin. With them was a purification (βάπτισμα) sanctifying the flesh. With us a purification (βάπτισμα) of the Holy Ghost and of fire, for this John proclaimed, He shall purify you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire." Gallandius, Bibliotheca Vet. Pat. Venice, 1765, vol. 7, p. 147.



Jerome also, commenting on Jer. iv. 4, "Circumcise yourselves to the Lord, and take away the foreskins of your heart," thus explains the figure, "by circumcision he represents purification, and by foreskins, sin."

### § 85. *Clinic Baptisms.*

Dr. Carson's first theory, I have said, is not only insufficient, if true, but it is also false, and cannot solve the only cases where it could be applied, if true.

His theory is this; Cyprian, that great high church bishop, that father of ecclesiastical power, when he calls perfusion an ecclesiastical baptism, does not regard an *ecclesiastical* baptism as a real and proper baptism, but only as an ecclesiastical substitute for it, so that the antithesis to an ecclesiastical baptism is immersion.

Both of Dr. Carson's replies to me are full of exclamations at my ignorance. I will not imitate or retort. But I will say, that the slightest knowledge of ecclesiastical history would have taught Dr. Carson that the antithesis of an ecclesiastical baptism was not immersion, but a heretical baptism, a baptism *out of the church*. If Dr. Carson knew nothing of the controversy of Cyprian and the eastern bishops with pope Stephen, on this point, he might, at least, have learnt this from the end of Cyprian's own letter, in which he expressly contrasts a clinic baptism, performed in the church, with a heretical baptism, performed out of the church, which Stephen regarded as valid, but Cyprian as a nullity. If such baptisms of heretics out of the church are regarded as valid, and clinic baptisms in it as invalid, then, according to Cyprian, it will follow "that those who out of the church are polluted with profane water, among adversaries and antichrists, will be considered as baptized, but those who *are baptized in the church*, will be considered as having obtained less forgiveness and divine grace than they, and the heretics will be so much honored, that those who come from them will not be asked

whether they have been immersed or sprinkled, whether they are clinics or peripatetics, but among us the integrity of the faith will be injured, and the proper majesty and sanctity of an ecclesiastical baptism be diminished." Cyprian, then, by an ecclesiastical baptism, meant a purification by holy water, as opposed to pollution by profane water, i. e. a baptism performed in the church, and by the church, and not by heretics. He meant, from the necessity of the case, and as his own words testify, a perfect baptism of the highest majesty and sanctity, and not a mere apology and substitute for baptism, as Dr. Carson supposes. Thus falls his whole theory.

Equally futile is Dr. Carson's effort to prove that "Cyprian uses the word baptize in the sense of immersion, in reference to the ordinance in contradistinction to perfusion."

"He argues," says Dr. C., "the validity of perfusion, from the fact that the persons who were perfused in their sickness, were never afterwards baptized or *immersed*, which they must have been, had not perfusion been accounted valid, in such cases. If, as he reasons, the grace usually conferred by the ordinance has not been received *by perfusion*, let them be baptized or *immersed* when they recover. But as this is not the custom of the church, why do they object? No evidence can be more conclusive than this. This Father uses the word in its proper sense of immerse in reference to the ordinance."

Dr. Carson has here, I charitably hope ignorantly and not wilfully, represented Cyprian as commanding what he in fact pointedly prohibits. Cyprian does not say, let them be baptized when they recover. He says, let them not be so deceived as to be baptized, if they recover. He says this on the supposition that some said that pardon and grace were not conferred by perfusion, and that to believe this and act on it, would be to act under the influence of a delusion. If Dr. Carson so stumbles from ignorance, in giving the sense of a simple Latin sentence, he ought to have been more sparing in his charges of want of perspicacity in others.

Equally erroneous is Dr. Carson's assertion that Cyprian here uses the word baptize to denote immersion.

He uses baptism in contradistinction to that which is no baptism, i. e. no purification, no absolution, but a nullity, whether performed by immersion or sprinkling. The heretics immersed as well as the church, but Cyprian denied that they could give pardon and the grace of God. Hence their immersions were no baptisms, i. e. no purifications, no absolutions, as Ambrose also said. Pope Stephen called those who baptized heretics, on their conversion to the church, anabaptists. In reply to this, Cyprian said, "Those who come from the heretics to us are not *rebaptized*, but *baptized*. For they receive nothing among those who have nothing to give," i. e. they are not baptized at all. The essential item, then, in a valid baptism, was the fact that in it sins were forgiven, and the grace of God conferred. The church, and the church only, has power to do this. Heretics have no such power; they may immerse, they cannot baptize. Hence, if a man is not really forgiven, he is not baptized, even if immersed.

Now we can understand the force of his reasoning as to clinics. "But if any one teaches that the clinics *have received nothing*, because they have been only sprinkled with saving water, but that they are *empty and devoid of divine grace*, let them not be so deceived as if they recover, to be baptized."

That is, let them not be so deceived as to admit that they have not received forgiveness and grace as is alleged, and of course have not been baptized at all, and on this ground be baptized, that is, receive absolution and the grace of God, as if for the first time. It is indeed implied that immersion would be resorted to as the mode, in health, but this is involved in the nature of the case, and not in the word baptized. Cyprian then proceeds, "But if those who have been once sanctified by an ecclesiastical baptism (that is by a true and valid absolution, given by the church and not by heretics), cannot be baptized (since it would involve the absurdity of pardoning one already pardoned), why are they troubled as it regards their own faith, and the forgiveness received from God?

Do they fear that although they have received the grace of God they have received it in less proportion? But the spirit is not thus measured out, but is poured out wholly on the believer."

The doctrine of Cyprian then was, that even *an immersion* out of the church was *no baptism*, because it conferred no forgiveness and no grace, but a sprinkling in the church, in cases of necessity, was a true and valid baptism, because it conferred forgiveness, and the grace of God in full measure. Hence Zonaras defines baptism, not as immersion, but as the remission of sins by water and the spirit. That is, it is equivalent to *καθαρismus* in the sacrificial sense. Vain then are Dr. Carson's theories and assertions. Nothing has been said by him which weakens at all my argument in § 52, and § 57, on the subject of clinic baptism, to which I refer the reader for a more full view of the case.

#### § 86. *Dr. Carson's Insinuations.*

Dr. Carson insinuates that the testimony alleged by me does not decide the meaning of the word at the time of the institution or commencement of the rite.

"Nothing alleged by Mr. Beecher at all affects my view of the testimony of the Fathers on this subject. I still equally admit that testimony, in a proper view of the subject. It is their testimony as it regards the meaning of the word at the time of the institution or commencement of the rite." He then more than insinuates that I had not discrimination enough to know the importance of this. "Mr. Beecher's confidence is an additional proof of his want of discrimination. He ought to perceive that the Fathers might prove a secondary meaning, while at the same time, they prove that in reference to the original institution the word is used in its primary meaning."

Let now the reader judge of Dr. Carson's candor after he has noted these facts. 1. The Greek Fathers, Dr. Carson being judge, could not but understand the true meaning of the word βαπτίζω as used by John and Christ, and as recorded in the

Gospels. Therefore, what they declared to be the sense is the sense. 2. John says, I indeed baptize with water, but he shall baptize with the Holy Ghost and with fire. 3. Basil compares these words with Is. iv. 4, in the Septuagint, and declares βαπτίζω to be synonymous with the words there denoting to purify. He then from these premises draws out a formal definition of βάπτισμα, as used by Christ and John, as meaning purification. 4. Eusebius of Cesarea, in view of the same facts, gives the same testimony. 5. Cyril of Alexandria, Origen, Jerome, and Theodoret coincide. Does not this prove beyond dispute, Dr. Carson himself being judge, what John and Christ meant by baptism at the time of its institution? Again. 6. Athanasius gives the words of John the same sense. 7. I proved that John the evangelist uses *καθαρισμός* as a synonyme of *βάπτισμός* by an appeal to Theophylact, Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Alexandria: does not this prove how John the evangelist understood the word? 8. Cyril of Alexandria contrasts baptism with the ashes of a heifer, with the baptism of the Holy Ghost, spoken of by John; is it not then plain that in reading the New Testament he regarded the words baptism of the Holy Ghost, as meaning purification of the Holy Ghost? 9. Theophylact regards the meaning of βαπτίζω in Luke xi. 38, as I do; does not this prove what was the *usus loquendi* of Luke? But I forbear. If all of Dr. Carson's conduct were not equally strange, I should wonder that he dared even to insinuate that my evidence does not prove the meaning of the word at the time of establishing the ordinance, and much more, to assert that I had not discrimination enough to know that it was necessary. Testimony more directly to this point cannot be conceived, than I have given. I have thus noticed all that Dr. Carson had said by way of theory, assertion, or insinuation, to break the force of my argument. The intelligent will easily see how worse than vain it is. I will next consider his own attempt to argue from the Fathers.

## CHAPTER II.

### DR. CARSON'S ARGUMENT FROM THE FATHERS.

AFTER so many assertions that the Fathers never use baptizo in the sense to purify, but always in the sense to immerse, one would expect an overwhelming display of evidence from Dr. Carson. We can easily conceive of evidence that would settle the question. If one Greek Father had said, when the question of the validity of baptism by perfusion was up, "the word baptism means immersion and nothing else—the idea of immersion by sprinkling is absurd," then he would have taken Dr. Carson's ground. And if the Greek Fathers so believed, would they not have said so? Did not the occasion call for it? Has Dr. Carson been able to find one such passage? Has he found a single definition of the word by a Greek Father, excluding the idea of purification, and declaring immersion the only sense? In vain has Dr. Carson searched for any such thing. After long and thorough search, I do not hesitate to express my full belief that nothing of the kind can be found. Why should it be? Have not the Greek Fathers testified directly to the contrary? I have experienced no difficulty in finding definitions expressly to my purpose. I could not ask for anything more explicit. Dr. Carson, then, has produced no evidence of the kind we ought to expect if his view is correct.

But this is not all. The whole of what he has produced, or rather referred to, does not prove anything that I ever denied. It rather confirms what I not only admit but have oftentimes clearly asserted. If he had carefully read what I had stated in my second part he would have seen that the greater part of his proofs, so called, have no logical bearing whatever on the question at issue.



For the sake of greater clearness I will again state the point at issue.

§ 87. *Point at Issue.*

1. It is not whether βαπτίζω has sometimes, or often, the sense to immerse. This I admit and affirm.

2. It is not whether the Fathers do not sometimes use it in this sense, both literally and figuratively. In § 10 I have quoted from Chrysostom such figurative phrases as immersed in cares, immersed in sins, immersed in waves of trouble; in which he uses baptizo to denote immersion. To prove this does not disprove the sense to purify.

3. It is not whether the Fathers, except in cases of necessity, immersed, and regarded immersion as significant. I have conceded and affirmed it. But I deny that their philology can be inferred from their practice. Under a command to purify, they might for local reasons see fit to immerse. I have shown that they did, and what the reasons were, in §§ 22 and 23, to which I refer the reader.

4. It is not whether in speaking of trine immersion, and in analogous cases, they do not sometimes use βαπτίζω to denote the acts of immersion which are involved in the rite of purification. This I have admitted and affirmed, long before Dr. Carson ever referred to such cases. But from it I derived by appeal to Zonaras and Balsamon, one of the strongest arguments for the truth of my views, for they regard this use of βαπτίζω as so unusual in connexion with the rite, that it became necessary for them to state in a note that *in that case* it meant immerse, plainly implying that in its common religious use it did not so mean. See §§ 28, 4, and 64, where the principles of the case are fully considered.

5. It is not whether there may not be in the Fathers cases of what on our principles of interpretation would be inconsistent use. We do not allow that a word can, in the same place, have two meanings. The Fathers were not tied by any such rules, and in

their rhetorical paintings and amplifications, they sometimes try to get out of a word all the meaning they can. So Chrysostom in two places assigns to the word both senses. See § 64.

6. It is not whether cases of real inconsistent use may not be found in writers so many and so various. I do not admit that such cases exist, but I have said, if they do, it cannot disprove my argument. See §§ 21, 27, and 64.

7. The point at issue is this, do not the Fathers directly declare that βαπτίζω has the meaning to purify in the ordinance of baptism, and does not a large class of facts clearly and irresistibly sustain this assertion?

I affirm that it is so, and have adduced proofs. Has Dr. Carson fairly met them, and shown that they do not prove the point? No. Nor, as I believe, can it be done by any one.

If now it could even be proved that other Fathers do in some cases interpret βαπτίζω in the ordinance as meaning to immerse, what would be the result? Plainly this, that inasmuch as the word βαπτίζω has both senses, the great majority of the Fathers interpret it in the ordinance in the sense to purify, and one or two occasionally in the sense to immerse. This is the utmost point that proof could reach, as facts are.

But the whole of Dr. Carson's proofs are so far from reaching this, that they do not prove anything that I ever denied, or even doubted. But yet Dr. Carson has so much confidence in them, as to speak thus of them, "I shall submit two or three arguments that I hesitate not to say will produce conviction on the mind of every unprejudiced reader. I shall rather suggest them than urge them." These arguments be it remembered are to prove "that the Fathers understood the word as immersion in reference to the institution of baptism." This he tells us "no scholar ever questioned." Though it is "totally unsuitable to his work to prove it at any length," yet he will submit two or three arguments which he does not hesitate to say will produce conviction on the mind of every unprejudiced reader.

If Dr. Carson is to produce but two or three arguments he will

of course produce the strongest. What are they? I have read all that he has said, again and again, and I candidly profess that I cannot tell. He has not stated two or three prominent points, but has given a series of assertions arranged in short separate paragraphs numbered from one to twelve. These are followed by eighteen miscellaneous assertions as to the *usus loquendi* of the Fathers, not numbered by him, and illustrated by no references to volume or page, and arranged without system. In such a swamp of assertions I have in vain asked, which are the two or three arguments which he does not hesitate to say will produce conviction on the mind of every unprejudiced reader?

But I will apply analysis and classification to this chaotic mass, and see what is the worth of its various confused elements.

§ 88. *Analysis and Classification of Dr. Carson's Assertions.*

I begin then with the paragraphs numbered from 1 to 12. Of these, four have nothing to do, not even in the remotest degree, with the question at issue. I refer to the paragraphs from 8 to 11, inclusive. Two of the rest profess to be arguments from historical facts, viz. 1 and 2. Five are arguments, so called, from Cyprian and Tertullian, neither of them Greek Fathers, viz. from 3 to 7 inclusive. One is an argument from the Septuagint and Josephus, viz. No. 12. After this follow the eighteen miscellaneous assertions as to certain Latin and Greek Fathers. These I shall classify in their place.

Let us then look at the four irrelevant assertions. No. 8. "It appears to me self-evident that Christ would not appoint a rite without appointing the way of its observance." What has this to do with the question, what did the Fathers say as to the meaning of βαπτίζω? In Dr. Carson's words I would say, "Must I dignify this with the appellation of reasoning?" Is this one of the two or three arguments on which Dr. Carson so confidently relies?

No. 9. "If the word signifies to purify, and if all may purify as they please, then all the mummary of superstition is a fulfil-

ment of Christ's command in the performance of the ordinance." What has this to do with settling a philological question—a question of fact as to the usage of the Fathers?

No. 10. "If the word denotes purification in general, then we may purify with fire, or sulphur, or salt, or oil, or anything we please, and water will not be essential. We may dispense with water as well as the mode." Again I say, what has this to do with a question of fact? Suppose that the Fathers in plain terms assert that βαπτίζω means to purify, and so use it, what power has such an argument as this to prove the contrary? Besides the argument can be retorted. If the word means immerse, then we can immerse in oil, or wine, or vinegar, or milk, or dye, or mud, &c. &c. The act only is enjoined—not purification—and immersion, as an act, does not imply purification; it may, and often does pollute.

No. 11. "If the water is known to be essential from the practice recorded in the Scripture, this will not serve Mr. Beecher. He cannot reason on this principle. According to his principle the first Christians might choose water in their purification; but *that* others were not bound to their purification." (I am not responsible for the word *that* which I have underscored. It is as Dr. Carson left it.) Again I say, what is all this to the question at issue? Are proofs from the Fathers so scarce that the little space devoted to the subject Dr. Carson must fill up with such arguments as these? As we have nothing in any of these paragraphs but unproved assertions, it is enough for me to deny them all as untrue, which I do, and I also reject them as not to the point if true. Surely Dr. Carson is not the man to read lessons to others on discrimination, perspicacity, and a capacity for the philosophy of language.

I next come to the two paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, which profess to be arguments from historical facts. The facts are, 1. That the Fathers did in fact immerse except in cases of necessity. 2. That the question did come up—Is the sprinkling, or perfusion of clinics valid baptism. On these statements we have the infer-

ence that neither fact could have existed if they considered any purification to fulfil the word. This is the amount of Nos. 1 and 2. To complete this view the 17th of Dr. Carson's miscellaneous assertions ought to be added, i. e. that Cyprian and others did not justify perfusion in the case of Novatian, on the ground of the meaning of the word, but on other grounds. Had the word signified purification without respect to mode, would they not have appealed to the meaning of the word? This, he thinks, is proof clear as demonstration that they understood the word as signifying immersion. To the first two of these statements and inferences I have already given a decisive answer in my second Part, §§ 22, 23. There I have shown that the early prevalence of immersion can be abundantly explained by these causes. 1. Oriental usages, and the habits of warmer regions. 2. A false interpretation of Rom. vi. 2, 3, and Col. ii. 1, 2; and 3. A very early habit of ascribing magical virtue to external forms. These causes I showed to be amply sufficient in power and extent to account for the prevalence of immersion under a command to purify. Of course no presumption exists against the sense I claim. In a generation attaching magical power to forms, and swayed by the authority of prevailing present usage, the proposal to sprinkle or perfuse sick persons, would of course raise the inquiry, can real absolution and the grace of God be obtained in a way of applying holy water, which is by no means so thorough as immersion? The materializing and formal habits of the age would of course raise this inquiry. And I have shown that this was the inquiry. See § 52. The argument from not appealing to the meaning of the word, can be retorted with fatal power. If the command was understood to be to immerse, why did no man use the universal and all-comprehending argument of modern Baptists? Why did no man say neither sprinkling nor perfusion is baptism? Nothing but immersion is baptism. You cannot immerse by sprinkling. To sprinkle or perfuse does not fulfil the command in any sense. Can you find a modern Baptist book of which this argument is not the soul? How is it, then, that there is not a lisp of it in a

solitary Father of any age? The reason why Cyprian and others did not appeal to the word purify in defence, was, that to those who objected to sprinkling on the ground that immersion was a more thorough purification, and alone gave full grace and pardon, it would be no argument to say that the command was to purify. The difficulty to be met was, how a purification so limited and deficient in thoroughness could give full remission and grace. That this was the difficulty Cyprian's letter shows. He proves by an appeal to Ezek. xxxvi. 25, and Num. xix. 13, that divinely ordained compendious modes like these used in the Old Testament were sufficiently thorough. That the mind was not purified like the body, but could be thoroughly purified even if it was not immersed in a bath or pool; and that the grace of God is not given in divided measures according to the amount of external washing, but is given wholly to all who believe.

That Cyprian and those who thought with him, did not appeal to the meaning of the word, is, therefore, no argument against me. That his opponents did not appeal to it, that no opposer of clinic baptism ever appealed to it, throws the "demonstration" against Dr. Carson with a force not to be resisted.

In Nos. 3, 5, and 6, he tells us that Cyprian considered perfusion as not baptism properly, but a valid substitute for it, and on this ground calls it *ecclesiastical* baptism, as opposed to *real* baptism; and that he uses baptize in the sense immerse, as opposed to perfusion. Out of this, his first theory of solution springs. The falsehood of these assertions, and the ignorance which they involve of the *usus loquendi* of Cyprian and the age, I have so fully exposed in § 85, that I need add nothing more.

In No. 4, he tells us that Cyprian calls perfusion an abridgment or compend of the ordinance. What then? Is sprinkling a compendious mode of immersion? How can that which annihilates immersion, so that not even a shadow of it remains, be called a compend of it? Immersion is indeed the most full and thorough mode of purification, and sprinkling is another mode of purification much more compendious, but it is not, and cannot be,



a compendious mode of immersion. Dr. Carson's assertion, therefore, is a decisive argument against himself.

In No. 7, he refers to Tertullian's mode of speaking on trine immersion. Here I admit that *tingo*, like βαπτίζω, if used with numerals in reference to trine immersion, has the sense immerse. This usage I had stated and explained long before Dr. Carson referred to it; and shown from Zonaras and Balsamon that it was such a deviation from common use, as to need a note to explain it. The practice of trine immersion was a human invention, and in trying to illustrate or prove it from the word of God, they fell into an unusual and improper use of language, as we might expect. This Zonaras and Balsamon explained by notes; but the most, to avoid it, resorted to *κατάουσις* and *ανάουσις* as univocal terms and not liable to breed confusion. See § 28, No. 4, and § 64.

In No. 12, in order to prove the usage of the Fathers, he tells us that Josephus and the Septuagint do not use βαπτίζω to denote purification in innumerable cases where they speak of rites of purification. What has this to do with the Fathers? Was Josephus a Christian Father? Were the authors of the Septuagint Christian Fathers? Again, what has it to do with the argument if these were Christian Fathers? It is mere negative testimony. They might use καθαρίζω, or ῥύπτω, or ἀποῤῥύπτω, or σμήχω, or ἀποσμήχω, or ἀγνίζω, or πλύνω, or ἐκπλύνω, and omit βαπτίζω, and yet it would be mere negative testimony. One single assertion of Basil that βαπτίζω means to purify, has more weight than ten thousand such omissions. Yet Dr. Carson relies on such evidence as perfect demonstration.

### § 89. *Second Class of Assertions.*

Dr. Carson's numbered paragraphs have all been considered. Which of these contains the two or three arguments sufficient to convince every unprejudiced reader, I will not attempt to say. I will only say, after so much boasting and insult, is this all?

But perhaps his two or three arguments may be picked out of

his eighteen unnumbered miscellaneous assertions as to the Fathers, which follow his numbered paragraphs. I will then analyse and classify these.

#### CLASSIFICATION OF MISCELLANEOUS ASSERTIONS AS TO THE FATHERS.

It is proper here to repeat that Dr. Carson has not referred to the page of one passage to confirm any of his assertions.

It is a provoking mode of controversy to make assertions concerning sentences and words scattered through fifteen or twenty folio volumes of Greek and Latin, without a reference to volume, page, or treatise, and occasionally to say in triumph,—What can be more decisive? This is perfect demonstration! Notwithstanding this skulking and unfair method of fighting, I have succeeded in tracking Dr. Carson through all his lurking-places, and shall proceed to show that his assertions are false, or else that the facts alleged are not at all decisive of the question in debate. But perhaps I ought to say in excuse of Dr. Carson, that he probably did not know where many of the passages to which he refers were to be found. He does, indeed, give evidence of having read Justin Martyr; but his quotations from Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Gregory Thaumaturgus, seem to have been taken at second-hand from some friend of Dr. Gale's, since they are the same which Dr. Wall long ago replied to, as coming from some Dutch friend of Dr. Gale. The references to Tertullian and Chrysostom seem also to be second-hand references. Justin Martyr and Cyprian appear to have been somewhat studied by Dr. Carson, but how superficially, may be inferred from what I have already said on his reasoning from them, and still more, from what remains to be said.

#### § 90. *Assertions as to Justin Martyr.*

Many of Dr. Carson's assertions relate to Justin Martyr. His testimony is of great importance. He lived in Palestine, and wrote about fifty years after the death of the Apostle John. He

professes to give in his apology a full account of baptism, and in his dialogue with Trypho, the Jew, he incidentally speaks of it. From this dialogue I made a quotation to prove that the word meant to purify. To this, Dr. Carson, as usual, makes no reply.

Instead of this, he accumulates assertions. These relate—

1. To Justin's description of baptism in his apology.
2. To that part of the dialogue with Trypho, the Jew, from which I made my quotation.
3. To a passage relative to raising the head of the axe, by Elisha, by throwing in a piece of wood.
4. To an alleged neglect of Justin, to denote purification by any word that signifies baptism.

With regard to Justin's description of baptism, his first assertion is, that "he describes the performance of the rite as an immersion." This is not so. He describes it as a washing. His name of it as a washing is derived from the command, Is. i. 16. "Wash you, make you clean." This he regards as a command to baptize, or a prediction of baptism, as I shall more fully show in considering his dialogue with Trypho, the Jew. Moreover, the word βαπτίζω does not occur in the whole description, nor any word that means to immerse.

Dr. Carson once said that "I was the dupe of my own sophistry, and that a sophistry childishly weak," because to decide the meaning of βαπτίζω, I introduced, as a part of a cumulative argument, some passages that did not contain the word. Yet here he is doing the same thing, for, as I have said, this whole passage does not contain the word, or any of its derivatives. And yet the entire omission of this word, and of the idea to immerse, from a professed description of baptism, is a fair argument on my side, for the idea of immersion, if as essential as Dr. C. says, would not be omitted, but there is nothing in the passage from which Dr. Carson can draw the slightest logical inference in favor of his views.

His second assertion is, that Justin regarded immersion as emblematical, and therefore essential to the rite in its proper sense; this he infers from the fact that Justin says that in this rite they

are born again. Here the reference is, he affirms, "to their being in the water, and coming out of the water." This is not correct. Justin does not give this explanation. They are said to be born again, in this rite, he tells us, because in it, by *intelligence and choice* they become the children of God—whereas the first birth was a matter of necessity, and when it took place, they were in utter ignorance, and after it, they grew up in sinful ways. What right had Dr. Carson to crowd his crude notions upon Justin, contrary to his own clear explanation?

His third assertion is, that Justin declares that "in the water they have remission of sins. This shows that to be in the water and to come out of it is the true meaning of the rite." This is a mere begging of the question. The language of Justin may be just as well translated *by water*, and so it is translated by Wall. Moreover, this agrees with the modes of speaking already developed, in which persons are said to be baptized *by water*, and not in it. Baptism by fire, by water, by repentance, by tears, by martyrdom, are of common occurrence, and denote purification or remission of sins by these means. Hence, if, as we ought, we translate the passage, *by water* they have remission of sins, Dr. Carson's argument vanishes into smoke.

This completes the refutation of Dr. Carson's argument from Justin's description of baptism. I am the more particular thus to refute Dr. Carson's assertions, because I wish to call attention to the fact that Justin, the earliest writer who has professedly described baptism, fixes the mind solely on purification, as its great idea, and says nothing of burial with Christ, or resurrection with him. This false application of Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, cannot be found in him.

In a spurious work ascribed to him, entitled Questions to the Orthodox, composed in a later age, that false interpretation appears. But in the genuine works of Justin nowhere.

So much I have said for the truth's sake—but now I add, that even if Justin had described the rite as in fact performed by immersion, and regarded the mode as significant, still it would not

touch the question of philology, for as I have often said, under a command to purify, they might, for various reasons, purify by immersion, just as in later ages they clearly did. All the probability of immersion in this description is created by Justin's assertion that they take those who are to be baptized to a place where there is water. But of this Dr. Carson here says nothing, and it is of no force in settling the meaning of βαπτίζω, even if it renders it probable that immersion was practised.

Let us pass to the dialogue with Trypho, the Jew. Dr. Carson's assertions here are quite remarkable. He grazes on the passage quoted by me, in which Justin uses βαπτίζω to denote purify—and which no man can refute; he quotes a part of it, he must have had it in full view, he had read my argument from it, and yet he passes it by—nor is this all; in the very teeth of it he dares to make the assertion that “when Justin speaks of purification, he never employs any word that signifies baptism,” and then asks, “If the word had this signification in his time, why did he not sometimes use it in that sense?”

I now ask the attention of all candid men to the impregnable strength of the passage which he thus suppresses, while professing to seek the truth, and to the futility of all that he alleges from the context in support of his own theory.

Justin says, rebuking the Jews for their confidence in external observances, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ σαρκὶ μέγα φρονεῖτε, “ye glory in the flesh.” He declares that they needed a second circumcision, and rebukes their sabbatizing and eating of unleavened bread, while full of sin; with such things God is not pleased. He then enjoins repentance and a new life. If any has stolen, let him cease; if any is an adulterer, let him repent; if any man has impure hands, “let him wash, and he is clean.”

He thus comes to the passage, “Wash you, make you clean,” in Isaiah i. 16, so remarkable for the frequent references made to it by the Fathers as a prediction or command of baptism. But as he is rebuking confidence in external rites, he proceeds to declare that the washing here commanded is no external washing.

“Isaiah did not send you to the bath, there to wash away your murder and your other sins, which not all the water of the sea can expiate (*καθαρίσαι*), but as the case required, he referred even of old, to that saving washing which took place in those who repent and are purified (*καθαριζομένοις*), not by the blood of goats and of sheep, nor by the ashes of a heifer, nor by offerings of the finest flour, but by faith, through (*διὰ*) the blood of Christ, and his death, who died for this end, as Isaiah has declared, thus speaking.” He then quotes the whole passage from the 10th verse of the 52d of Is. in the Septuagint, to the 6th of the 54th, including all of the 53d, in which is that striking prophetic account of the atoning death of Christ, and in which he is spoken of in the Hebrew, as justifying many by his knowledge, and in the Septuagint as forming or creating them by knowledge, justifying the righteous, and taking away sins.

He then proceeds, “Therefore, by *the washing of repentance, and of the knowledge of God*, which was provided for the sins of the people of God, as Isaiah proclaims, we have believed, and know that this is that *baptism*, i. e. purification, which he foretold, which alone can purify those who repent.

Here he is, avowedly describing an inward purification by repentance and faith, as opposed to any washing in a bath, or any external rite. This spiritual purification he proceeds to contrast with their external rites, using the beautiful figure of Jeremiah, “My people have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and have hewed out to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water.” This, says he, is the living water, but the cisterns which ye have hewn out for yourselves are broken, and can profit you nothing.

Then follows the passage which I have quoted, and called unanswerable.

τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἐκείνου τοῦ βαπτίσματος, ὃ τὴν σάρκα καὶ μόνον τὸ σῶμα φαιδρύνει; βαπτίσθητε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας, ἀπὸ φθόνου, ἀπὸ μισοῦς, καὶ ἰδοὺ τὸ σῶμα καθαρὸν ἐστίν.

“What is the use of that purification which purifies the flesh



and the body alone? Be purified as to your soul, from anger and from covetousness, from envy and from hatred, and lo! your body is pure."

Let it now be well noted, that the great scope of the passage is to expose a reliance on *any external forms*, as a means of removing sin, and to inculcate the necessity of inward purification, by repentance, and faith. All external forms of purification, by a striking metaphor, he calls broken cisterns, which can profit nothing. He then exposes the vanity of such external purification, as purifying the flesh and the body alone. He then, by βαπτίζω, enjoins the inward purification. After βαπτίζω, and before that from which the mind is to be purified, he uses ἀπό, be purified from anger, &c. He then, by way of antithesis, declares the effect of this inward purification on the body, lo, your body is pure. The laws of antithesis require the sense of βαπτίζω to correspond to the sense of καθαρόν. Be purified as to your mind, and your body is pure. If the verb means to immerse, it ought to read, be immersed as to your mind, and lo, your body is immersed. In § 50, I clearly unfolded the argument from this passage, and declared it unanswerable, and it is so. What then does Dr. Carson do? As I have said, he makes no effort to answer it, but in the full blaze of its light, he gropes around with closed eyes, to feel out something to be said in behalf of immersion.

What does he say? 1. "He (Justin) speaks of baptism as cleansing the flesh and the body only; this shows that the water was applied to the body in general." If it were so, what then? Cannot water be applied to the body in general, in other modes besides immersion? Was it not applied to the body in general, in clinic perfusion? But it does not imply that water was applied to the body in general. It does not imply water at all. Justin had just contrasted purification, not by water, but by the blood of bulls and goats, and the ashes of a heifer, with purification by repentance and faith. So Cyril of Alexandria contrasted baptism by the ashes of a heifer, with the baptism of the

Holy Ghost. One uses καθαρίζω, the other βαπτίζω, with reference to purification by sprinkling. Is it not proper to say of sprinklings by blood and by ashes, that they cleanse the flesh and the body alone? and does this imply an immersion of the body in blood and ashes? To illustrate Is. i. 16, the same Cyril too, refers to the sprinklings of the old law. Plainly, then, Justin had no thought of immersion in his mind. He thought only of external purification by any rites affecting merely the flesh, the body—as contrasted with an inward purification from sin.

But again, Dr. Carson says, “He speaks of it also as referring to cisterns, or pits, as trenches that are dug. It must then have been an immersion.” This is not correct. The Hebrew is, ye have *hewn out* cisterns. The Greek admits, and therefore demands, the same rendering. Justin therefore refers to hewn out cisterns, *that are broken, and can hold no water*. Does this imply immersion? It is a figure to denote the unprofitableness of external rites to satisfy the spiritual wants of the mind. True inward purification does this. Therefore it is the living water. External purifications cannot—therefore they are broken cisterns, that can hold no water. Upon such a straw as this Dr. Carson seizes, to keep himself from drowning. In the first place, the real baptism, of which Justin is speaking, is not performed in water at all, and has no reference to cisterns, pits, or ditches. In the second place, the metaphor of broken cisterns is applied as much to external purifications by blood and ashes, as to those by water, and implies neither sprinkling, nor immersion, nor any other mode, but merely unprofitableness.

In view, then, of the passage totally omitted by Dr. Carson, and shining in the splendor of irrefutable truth, how pitiful do such subterfuges appear, and how daring Dr. Carson’s assertion that Justin never employs any word that signifies baptism, when he speaks of purification. To convey the idea of purification, he uses βαπτίζω itself; and does not this signify baptism?

Dr. Carson once said, “What is the hardihood of men who can presume to allege the Fathers on the other side?”

It certainly required no common hardihood in Dr. Carson, thus to suppress, and then to contradict, the express testimony of Justin.

Dr. Carson next argues from the fact that Justin calls circumcision a baptism. This fact I have fully considered, and retorted as an argument against Dr. Carson. He then affirms—"Justin speaks, also, of certain washings prescribed by Moses, as being baptisms. Now, purification in general would not suit this, *for every purification would not fulfil the injunction.*" What then? Does this prove that the Mosaic washings in question are not purifications? Certainly not, for they are. Why, then, may they not be called by their right generic name? What though purifying by blood or ashes will not fulfil a command to wash in water? Does washing in water therefore cease to be a purification, and is it wrong to call all washings in water purifications? I would say, in Dr. Carson's words, "such reasoning is to me a perfect astonishment."

### § 91. *Dr. Carson's Demonstration.*

But one passage now remains, a figure taken from the sinking of the axe, and in that, βαπτίζω clearly and undeniably means to immerse. At this Dr. Carson greatly glories. He says—"It puts Justin's testimony on this subject beyond controversy." So it does, but that testimony is directly against Dr. Carson, and for me. Let us examine it. The head of the axe sank in the water.

By a striking figure taken from it, Justin speaks of sinners as immersed in the heaviest sins—βεβαπτισμένους ταῖς βαρυτάταις ἁμαρτίαις.

This is but a new proof of the truth of my assertion in § 10, that the sense to immerse is not transferred to the mind to indicate the effects of the agency of the Holy Spirit, that is, purification, but where oppressive, crushing, painful, or injurious influences are denoted, it is so transferred. I illustrated it by passages from Chrysostom—βεβαπτισμένοι (i. e. immersed) in cares,—*in the heaviest sins*,—in many waves of troubles, &c. At the

close of § 28, No. 16, I repeated the same ideas. I there say of the figurative use of the idea to immerse, common usage connects it with adjuncts denoting calamity and degradation, and never purity. Thus we say immersed in luxury, ease, sins, pollution, indolence, sloth, cares, anxieties, but not immersed in purity, holiness, fortitude, self-denial, temperance, industry. Sinking and downward motion are associated with moral degradation—not with moral elevation. So in this case, Dr. Carson, with great simplicity, asks, “Are we purified by sin?” No, certainly, we are immersed in it. Dr. Carson also furnishes me another proof from Origen, another from Gregory Thaumaturgus, and still another from Clemens Alexandrinus, of the same thing. Origen, he tells us, speaks of persons totally given up to sin, as being entirely immersed, or sunk down under wickedness. Gregory compares men involved in calamities, to men sinking in water, and to be drawn out. So Clement speaks of men as baptized by drunkenness into sleep. He says, “All languages must recognise this figure.” Certainly, it is an immersion into a drunken sleep, one of the most degrading and polluting things conceivable. Thus all their testimony is for me. I am under great obligations to Dr. Carson. These are all second hand quotations. Dr. Carson quotes nothing of his own knowledge from Origen, Gregory, or Clement.

But let us return to the sinners immersed in sin, like the head of the axe, spoken of by Justin. Certainly Dr. Carson does not regard this immersion in sin, as the rite of Christian baptism, nor is it the baptism of the Holy Ghost. It is a state of degradation and pollution, out of which they must be *elevated* and *lifted up*. And how is this to be done? Is it not by reversing the immersion, and thus lifting the sinner up to the regions of holiness? And what does this? Justin says baptism. Baptism, then, does not immerse, it delivers from immersion. So Justin expressly says, that Christ delivered them from this immersion in sin, by being crucified for them upon the tree, and by *purifying them by water* (δι' ὕδατος ἀγνίσαι). This use of purification, by water, to

reverse immersion in sin, deserves particular notice. Justin by it explicitly tells us that as the axe immersed in the water, was raised by wood, so the sinner immersed in sin, is *raised* by purification, that is, baptism.

The same is thus stated by Ambrose. "Elisha called on the name of the Lord, and the head of the axe, which had been immersed, CAME UP. Behold another kind of BAPTISM. Wherefore? Because every man before his purification (*ante baptismum*), is weighed down and immersed like the iron. When he has been purified (*ubi baptizatus fuerit*), he is not like iron, but like some lighter species of fruitful wood, *he rises*." Here, beyond all doubt, Ambrose calls the *rising up* of the axe a kind of baptism, because it represents the rising up of a purified sinner. But *immersion* represents, not his baptism, but his state before his baptism—his degradation in sin.

I can heartily re-echo Dr. Carson's own words, "What can be more decisive than this?" But decisive of what? That the idea of immersion is used to denote, not baptism, but degradation in sin, and the idea purification, i. e. baptism, to denote elevation out of it. βαπτίζω, then, when applied to the rite or to the action of the Holy Spirit, must mean to purify. Dr. Carson's appeal to the Fathers Origen, Gregory, and Clemens Alexandrinus, I have thus considered—they testify for me. If anything in Dr. Carson could surprise me, it would be that he should produce such passages, as if they proved anything in his favor, or anything that I ever denied. The question is not, does the word βαπτίζω ever mean immersion. No one denies it. All affirm it. I had already proved it abundantly by similar passages. If any wish, I will bring more. Thus Cyril of Alexandria says, that "the earth was immersed (βεβαπτισμένη) in the darkness of ignorance, when Christ died." But in no cases like these is the word used with any reference to the rite of baptism. They merely contain figures taken from the act of immersion, to denote a condition of calamity, distress, or degradation. The original of the passage from Gregory Thaumaturgus may be found in Wall, iii.

112. Dr. Carson does not quote it, nor does he translate it so as to give any correct idea of the passage. He says, "Gregory Thaumaturgus speaks of drawing baptized persons up, as fish are drawn out of water by a line." Gregory says nothing about drawing fish up out of water, and he has no reference, as might be supposed from Dr. Carson's translation, to the rite of baptism. He is speaking of a person as "stretching out his hand to save others, as if he were drawing out, with a rope, men immersed," i. e. in the water (ἄλλοις ὀρέγων χεῖρα διασώσσειτο ὥσπερ βαπτίζομένους ἀνιμώμενος). These persons are no more spoken of as baptized in the religious sense, than men immersed in sin or ignorance are spoken of as baptized in that sense.

### § 92. *Argument from Tertullian and Chrysostom.*

Dr. Carson next asserts "that Tertullian understood immersion to be a part of the nature of the rite, is evident from his saying 'that in baptism we die through a likeness;' there is no death in purification, except it be performed by immersion." p. 491. But this throws no light on the meaning of the word, but only proves that the rite of purification was at the time of Tertullian administered by immersion. This being the case, he states truly the matter of fact, as things then were, "that in purification, they died emblematically."

But I have clearly shown that in other cases he applies the word baptism to all kinds of purification, including sprinkling. This proves decisively that he understood the word baptism to mean, not immersion, but purification.

I pass to Chrysostom. Dr. Carson says, Chrysostom most definitely shows that he attached this meaning to the word, by coupling it with the word sink, and making the action designated by both, an emblem of burial and resurrection. "*To be baptized, and to sink down,*" says he, "then to rise, is a symbol of the going down into the grave, and of coming up from it. Here he not only couples baptizing with sinking down, but makes both words



as to the ordinance of baptism, designate an idea which is an emblem of going down into the grave. He not only uses the word in the sense of immersion, but in that sense he applies it to the ordinance of baptism. No evidence can be more decisive than this."

Dr. Carson then seems to think that the greatest strength of his argument lies here. Yet I had by anticipation answered this, and all similar arguments, long ago. In § 27 and in § 28, No. 4, I clearly stated that the word βαπτίζω is sometimes used with reference to the rite of baptism, in the sense to immerse, as well as in the sense to purify. But I stated that these two senses are applied to the rite in different ways, and for different ends. Taken in the sense to purify, it denotes the real import of the rite as a whole, and the thing enjoined, and is used in the sacrificial and religious sense. Taken in the sense to immerse, it fixes the mind on a physical act, which, in the rite, is *but one part of a complex whole*. The usage in trine immersion illustrates this. The phrase τρία βαπτίσματα μιᾷς μυστικῆς, denotes not three performances of the rite of purification, but three acts of immersion, included as a part of one performance of the rite.

But this use of βαπτίζω to denote a particular act in baptism, is an exception to the general rule. This the notes of Zonaras and Balsamon clearly prove, for they state that *in such cases*, the word denotes immerse, which is a perfect demonstration that this is not its common meaning, when applied to the rite. In the passage now under consideration, and which Dr. C. regards as his main reliance, Chrysostom is explaining merely the import of *the acts of immersion and emersion, as parts of the rite of purification*, and his language is to be explained on the same principles as in the case of trine immersion.

This use of βαπτίζω, with reference to baptism, in two senses, need not surprise any one. On p. 442, Dr. Carson tells us that "Bapto, *in the art of dyeing*, may be used in the same page for *dyeing* and for *dipping*." Is it at all strange then, that for different purposes, baptizo should be used on the same page, now for purifi-

cation, then for immersion? At one time, with reference to the rite of purifying, as a whole; at another, with reference to an act involved in it?

But the pains taken to introduce and use *κατάδυσις* in such cases, instead of *βάπτισμα*, for the sake of avoiding ambiguity, as well as the necessity of resorting to notes to explain *βάπτισμα*, when used in the sense immersion, establish the truth of my views on this subject beyond all question.

Chrysostom then proves nothing against me—nothing that I ever denied. He does not prove that *βάπτισμα*, as the name of the rite, viewed as a whole, does not mean purification. He does not prove that *βαπτίζω* has not the sense to purify in other cases. He merely uses it in this case, to denote the physical act of immersion, as a part of the complex rite, to which was applied, as a whole, the name purification. And the fact that in Rom. vi. Chrysostom saw asserted an emblem of burial and resurrection, in the rite of baptism, does not prove at all that the name of the rite denotes immersion, and not purification. It proves that Chrysostom believed that under a command to purify, immersion was the proper mode, and that it was significant of death, burial, and resurrection. That he believed all this, I have never denied, or even called in question. But that his view of Rom. vi. was incorrect, I have both asserted and proved.

### § 93. *Trine Immersion.*

Dr. Carson next proceeds to remark on the subject of trine immersion. Here he meets the fact that three immersions are called one Baptism. "*My philosophy*," says he, "can account for this."

This implies that mine cannot. But this is merely bold vaunting, for want of argument. My philosophy gives by far the best account of it. Which is most likely, that the Fathers said, three immersions of one purification, or three immersions of one immersion? He says that in such a case, the words one baptism, are

used with reference to the rite in its appropriated sense. They are indeed used for the performance of the act of purification taken as a whole, as is plain from the L. Apostolical Canon, where μύησις is used in place of βάπτισμα, for the purpose of avoiding the verbal ambiguity involved in saying three baptisms of one baptism; hence they say three immersions of one initiation. But the most general mode of avoiding this verbal ambiguity proves the truth of my view. It was to introduce the univocal word, καταδύσεις, to denote immersion, and to retain βάπτισμα to denote the initiation, that is, the purification taken as a whole. So Theophylact says, “as purification (βάπτισμα) by immersion (καταδύσεως) shows forth death, so by emersion (αναδύσεως) it shows forth resurrection.” And Photius, using the same words to denote immersions and emersions, says “the three immersions and emersions of purification (τοῦ βαπτίσματος) symbolize death and resurrection.” This resort to an univocal word to denote immersion, clearly indicates a purpose to leave to βάπτισμα the undisputed work of denoting purification as its proper and usual sense.

#### § 94. *Appeal to Jerome.*

Last of all Dr. Carson appeals to the learned Jerome. “Jerome,” he says, “translated the word in the commission by *intingo*, to *dip into*, which shows that in his time the Greek word was understood to signify immersion.”

How to explain such an assertion I know not. Dr. Carson was certainly able to read the Latin of Jerome’s translation. Let any one who can read Latin turn to Jerome’s version, and he will find these words, as a translation of the commission. “Euntes ergo docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, et spiritus sancti.” Was Dr. Carson then entirely ignorant of the facts in the case? No. He must have known that *intingunt* was not in the translation, for in this very volume he speaks of it as a part of Jerome’s *exposition*, p. 292, and it is in fact a part of

a comment of some length on the commission. After translating the commission as above stated, Jerome proceeds to explain what was, in his view, the practice under the commission. "First, they teach all nations, then they immerse those who are taught, in water." He then states the reasons of this mode of proceeding. This gives us simply Jerome's view of the practice of the apostles, and not at all a translation of the word baptize. According to him, under a command to purify, they did in fact immerse. Dr. Carson's assertion that Jerome translates the word in the commission by *intingo*, I leave for his friends to explain. Had he not "discrimination" enough to distinguish translation from comment? Perhaps he spoke from a general impression, and did not take pains to consult the translation at all. Perhaps he had forgotten what he once knew about it. However this may be, I will apply to him his own words, "This is a strange observation for a man of letters."

I have now finished Dr. Carson's argument from the Fathers. Let all candid and competent judges decide whether it is not, as I affirm, entirely aside from the point at issue, and totally devoid of power to prove Dr. Carson's position, or to overthrow mine. But since Dr. Carson has brought forward Jerome as a witness, I will allow him to testify to his real opinion, before leaving the stand.

He translates Ezek. xxxvi. 25, thus, "I will pour out (or sprinkle) upon you clean water." In his comment he represents God as saying concerning the Jews, "for my name sake I spared, sanctified, and restored them, so that upon those who believe and are converted from error, I might pour out the clean water of saving baptism (*baptismi salutaris*) and cleanse them from all their abominations."

In this passage there is no reference direct or implied to immersion. God speaks simply of sprinkling or pouring clean water. Jerome calls it the water of baptism. What can he possibly mean but the water of purification?

On Is. lii. 15, he says, "He shall sprinkle many nations;" and thus unfolds the import of it, "cleansing them in his own

blood, and *by baptism* consecrating them to the service of God." Jerome certainly could not extract from sprinkling the idea of immersion. But he could easily derive from it the idea purification.

On Is. iv. 4, he says, "Observe that he shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Zion, by the spirit of judgment, and purge away the blood of Jerusalem by the spirit of burning. Concerning which spirit of judgment and spirit of burning, John the Baptist spoke in the Gospel, I indeed baptize you with water, but he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire. From this we learn that man can bestow nothing but water, but God bestows the Holy Spirit, by whom *filth is washed away*, and crimes of blood are *purged away*." Here he perfectly agrees with Basil in his views of Is. iv. 4, and in giving to baptize the sense to purify and purge, in the New Testament.

Again in Ezek. xvi. 9, God says to Jerusalem, "then washed I thee with water, yea, I thoroughly washed away thy blood from thee." On this Jerome thus comments, "I washed thee in the water of saving baptism," concerning which baptism Isaiah speaks, saying, "when the Lord shall have washed away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and shall have purged the blood of Jerusalem from the midst thereof, by the spirit of judgment and the spirit of burning."

Here Jerome explicitly calls the washing by the spirit of judgment and the purging by the spirit of burning, of which Isaiah speaks, a baptism. This baptism must mean a moral purification by the Holy Spirit. It cannot mean an immersion. No wresting of language can force on it that sense.

Again when Moses, Lev. viii., washed Aaron and his sons with water, Jerome sees in it a sacrament of baptism. He says, "even then the sacraments of baptism symbolized the purification of the world." There is no evidence of any immersion in this case. Moses speaks simply of washing Aaron and his sons, and this Jerome calls a sacrament of baptism, that is of purification.

I will also let Cyprian say a few words more before he is discharged.

In describing the baptism of heretics in a passage already quoted, he thus contrasts it with that of the church: "*illi extra ecclesiam polluuntur, hi vero in ecclesia baptizantur.*" Those are *polluted* out of the church, these are *purified* in the church. Here the antithesis shows unanswerably that Cyprian by baptize understood to purify.

I have elsewhere fully shown that all of Dr. Carson's remaining witnesses testify against him, but none does it more unanswerably than the learned Jerome, and the eloquent Cyprian.

The truth is, and I now do not hesitate to assert it, when Dr. Carson made his sweeping assertions that the Fathers "always without exception use the word (βαπτίζω) for immersion," he had read very few of the Fathers with any degree of thoroughness, and was totally unqualified to make such an assertion. And when I adduced passages pointedly exposing the falsehood of this assertion, he knew not on what ground to meet them, and therefore, first, boldly asserted that they could all be explained in one way, and then that they could all be explained in another, and a different way, without proving either assertion. He then tried, for the most part, by second-hand quotations, none of which can endure a critical scrutiny, to cover up his defeat, under a show of defence.

#### § 95. Cause of Dr. Carson's Delusion, and notice of Dr. Sears.

No doubt, like multitudes of others, Dr. C. had confounded the philology of the Fathers with their practice, and because they did in fact immerse, concluded that they regarded βαπτίζω as meaning to immerse. This fallacy runs through the argument of Prof. Sears, in the Christian Review, and yet it is wonderful that a passage quoted by him from Cyril of Jerusalem, did not deceive him.

He translates a passage in which Cyril speaks of a man as ὁ ἐνδύων ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ βαπτιζόμενος, thus, "He who is *immersed* in water and *baptized*." Is it not plain that Cyril did not mean



to speak of a man as immersed in water, and *immersed*? Could he have meant anything but immersed in water and *purified*? The translation of ἐνδύνων is correct. The Latin translator renders it “is qui mergitur,” he who is immersed. Abraham Booth renders it, “he who is plunged in water.” Liddell and Scott, in their lexicon on the basis of Passow, say of δύνω that it is more fully rendered in all senses by subeo, to go under. Hence ἐνδύνω is to go into and under the water, that is, as correctly translated by Dr. Sears, to be immersed. The rest of the passage clearly exhibits the same sense to purify in βαπτίζω. The whole passage is this. “As he who is immersed in the water, and purified, is surrounded by the waters on all sides, so they (i. e. the apostles) were completely purified (ἐξεπατίσθησαν) by the spirit. But the water purifies (βαπτίζει) the exterior, but the spirit, the soul within, and that incomprehensibly.” Here the water in the nominative case is said to baptize. It is proper to say that water purifies, but not that it immerses. So the spirit is said to baptize the soul within. It is proper to say that the spirit purifies the soul within, but not that he immerses it. Still further to confirm this view Cyril goes on to compare the operation of the spirit to that of fire. “Fire penetrates and pervades iron till it all glows with heat. So the Holy Spirit penetrates into the recesses of the soul.” He does not represent the Holy Spirit as immersing the soul in anything, but as pervading and purifying it.

I have before shown that Basil gave in his remarks on Is. iv. 4, a *three-fold* definition of βαπτισμα, viz. 1. Material purification. 2. Spiritual purification or regeneration. 3. Purification by the trial by fire at the judgment day.

A passage from his work De Spiritu Sancto, Cap. 15, illustrates and confirms the third sense—τὸ τοῦ πυρὸς βάπτισμα τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ δοκιμασίαν λέγων, κάθα φησὶν ἀπόστολος, 1. Cor. iii. 15. “Calling the trial (by fire) at the judgment, the baptism of fire, as says the apostle.” The passage referred to, he, in common with other Fathers, understood as teaching purification, and thus salvation, by fire. He shall be saved, yet so as by fire, διὰ πυρός. Of im-

mersion Paul says nothing in the whole passage. Hilarius thus expresses the common view of the Fathers. "*Per ignem purgatus, fiat saluus.*" Being purified by fire he may be saved. This is the baptism of fire. It is purification by fire.

### § 96. *Baptism of the Holy Spirit.*

On no part of the discussion has Dr. Carson, through his whole volume, made greater efforts than on the sense of the expression, so often used in the New Testament, he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, *αὐτὸς ὑμῶς βαπτίσει ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*. The importance of the point induces me to give it another separate and prominent notice, even at some hazard of repetition.

Clearly the whole discussion on this point turns on the question, is the Holy Spirit spoken of as a person who purifies, or as an influence in which Christians are immersed? and this depends on the rendering of the preposition *ἐν*. If we render it *BY*, then a person may be denoted; thus, he shall baptize you by the Holy Ghost. This demands purify as the sense of baptism, for the Holy Ghost, as a person, does not immerse, he purifies. On the other hand, if we render *ἐν* by *IN*, then divine influence is implied, and the sense immerse is admissible, though even then it is not necessary. He shall immerse you in divine influences, may be the sense. Dr. Carson insists that this is the sense, and that by it is denoted the abundance of the gifts or influences of the Spirit, and the entire subjection of the soul to those influences, and that immersion in water is a symbol of these things. In this view Dr. Carson is not peculiar.

Neander, in his history of the planting of the church, says, that "Submersion is a symbol of the immersion of the whole man in the spirit of a new life." Wahl, Schleusner, Rosenmüller, and Bloomfield, are also of opinion that the sense is, copiously to imbue with abundant gifts of the Spirit. But beyond all doubt this view must be erroneous. Indeed it is very remarkable how full and how powerful the testimony of the Fathers

is against this view. In Is. iv. 4, it was predicted that the Messiah should purify (ἐκκαθαρίζω) by the spirit of judgment (ἐν πνεύματι κρίσεως), and by the spirit of burning (ἐν πνεύματι κάυσεως). Here there can be no dispute as it regards the causative sense of ἐν.

This passage the Fathers refer to with great frequency, as conveying the same sense as the passage in question, he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, and with fire. Basil says that both passages *plainly* foretell the same things concerning Christ. Eusebius of Cæsarea says that both passages "coincide in sense to a remarkable degree." Origen, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theodoret, coincide in this view.

Origen, in Homil. ii. on Jer., after quoting as a prophecy Is. iv. 4, "the Lord shall purify by the spirit of judgment, and the spirit of burning," thus proceeds: "*Therefore, Jesus purifies (βαπτίζει) by the Holy Spirit and fire.*"

After explaining his view that two classes of persons are referred to, one of whom is purified by the Holy Spirit, the other by fire, he proceeds to say, "Blessed is he who is purified by the Holy Spirit, and who does not need the purification resulting from fire," μὴ δεόμενος τοῦ βαπτίσματος τοῦ ἀπὸ πυρός.

Here the use of ἀπό occurs, on which I have already commented. He then proceeds, "Thrice miserable is he who needs to be purified by fire (πυρί). Blessed is he who has part in the first resurrection, who has preserved the purification (τὸ βάπτισμα) of the Holy Spirit." To speak of preserving *purity*, is good sense; to speak of preserving an *immersion*, is absurd. But if a man lost the purification conferred by the Holy Spirit, by falling into moral pollution, then, according to Origen, he was to be purified by fire. Concerning such a one he speaks, as one who needs purification (βαπτίσματος), and comes to that fire, and of the fire he speaks, as trying him, and finding wood, hay, and stubble, consuming it, and thus purifying him. Here he refers to the words of Paul in 1 Cor. iii. 13, 15, and regards the man who is thus purified as saved by fire (διὰ πυρός).

This is the mode, according to Origen, in which Jesus *baptizes* by fire. I do not in this case vouch for the theology of Origen, I quote him as a witness to the sense of the word βαπτίζω.

Theodoret, commenting on Is. iv. 4, "He shall purify by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning," says,

"He foretells the purification (κάθαρσιν), by the washing of regeneration, and he declares that it shall be effected by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning. Since as gold *tried in the fire, is rendered pure*, so he who is thus purified (βαπτίζόμενος), lays aside the dross of sin. This the blessed John the Baptist proclaimed in the words, He shall baptize you by the Holy Spirit and fire." What can be more explicit?

Cyril of Alexandria is very full on the same passage, to the same effect, and he says expressly, that, by the spirit of burning, grace given in the rite of purification (βαπτίσματι) is meant, and that this grace proceeds from the Holy Spirit. For we have not been purified (βεβαπτίσμεθα) by water alone, nor by the ashes of a heifer (for sprinkling purifies the flesh alone, as says the blessed Paul), but by the Holy Spirit, and by divine and spiritual fire, which consumes all the pollutions of wickedness in us, and purges out the pollution of sin."

He thus fixes the sense of the word βαπτίζω, as applied to the Holy Spirit, in two ways, by identifying it in sense with καθαρίζω, in Is. iv. 4, as applied to him, and by applying the word to a purification by sprinkling with the ashes of a heifer.

Jerome, with equal explicitness, says, in his comment on Is. iv. 4, that John, in his prophecy that Christ should baptize by the Holy Spirit and fire, referred to the Spirit of Judgment, and the Spirit of burning, in this passage, by which we learn that man can give water alone, but that God gives the Holy Spirit, by whom filth is washed away, and crimes of blood are purged away.

Similar testimony could be derived from the comments of the Fathers, on Mal. i. 1-3. But it is needless.

By means of such testimony, the controversy as to the baptism of the Holy Spirit is settled most unanswerably, and for ever.

Not only is the causative sense of *ἐν* thus established by the comments of Eusebius of Cesarea, and other Fathers, on Is. iv. 4 ; but it is no less clearly established by 1 Cor. xii. 13, *ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἐν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν*. “By one Spirit we have all been baptized into one body.” In all of the context of this passage, the Spirit is represented as an active, intelligent divine person, by whom wisdom, faith, and spiritual gifts are given ; and *ἐν* and *διὰ* are interchanged as equivalent. “To one is given, by (*διὰ*) the Spirit, the word of wisdom ; to another, gifts of healing, by (*ἐν*) the same Spirit. All these things worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every one as he will.” After this comes the assertion,—“By one Spirit have we all been baptized into one body”—that is, of necessity, purified and thus united in one spiritual body, not immersed into one body. The spirit never immerses externally, and internal immersion is here out of the question, for if immersion were meant, something would follow, into which the mind could be immersed, as spiritual water, or spiritual fire, according to the conceptions of the Fathers. But immersion into a body is absurd.

But I do not rest upon this one passage to decide the translation of *ἐν*. The numerous testimonies of the Fathers as to the same point, already adduced, and all the proofs that *βαπτίζω* means to purify, in the ordinance, concentrate upon this point, and establish incontrovertibly the rendering, he shall baptize you *with* the Holy Spirit.

In addition to this, the antithesis requires it. John did not mean to set forth the abundance of the water used by himself, as if water was scarce, and they thirsty. The idea is ludicrous. And yet, if the second member of the antithesis is designed, as Dr. Carson and others assert, to set forth the abundance of the gifts and influences of the Holy Spirit, the first member should set forth the abundance of water, conferred by John. Thus John should be represented as saying, I indeed confer upon you, in your necessities, abundant supplies of water, I fill and imbue you copiously with it, but he shall confer upon you abundant supplies of divine influences, and shall fill and imbue you largely with

them. Besides, if the passage is thus rendered, the very pith and point of it is lost, that is, the contrast between an external purification, of no saving power, and one that is internal and effectual, produced by the Omnipotent energy of the Divine Spirit. That this is the very pith and point of the passage, is plain from the fact that Basil and Eusebius declare that to baptize by the Holy Spirit and fire, is entirely equivalent to the expression in Is. iv. 4, "he shall purify by the Spirit of Judgment, and by the Spirit of burning," also from the fact that the Fathers see in the words "he shall purify and purge," Malachi iii. 3, a prediction of baptism by the Holy Spirit. Athanasius also expressly declares that to baptize by the Holy Ghost, is to purify, and he does not at all refer to the idea of *abundant supplies* of divine influence.

Hence, when on p. 402, Dr. Carson says, that "the baptism of the Spirit refers to the abundance of the gifts of the Spirit," and on p. 311, "that it denotes excess, and nothing but excess," and tries to illustrate it by such cases as drunk with oil, joy, blood, &c., p. 310, he is simply following his own imagination, and arraying himself alike against the clear testimony of the New Testament and the Fathers.

And so long as it is true that the Holy Spirit as a person baptizes, it is absurd to speak of being immersed into him. So long also will my assertion "that there is no similitude between the operations of the Holy Spirit and immersion," hold true. Dr. Carson asks, "Is not the resemblance in the effects?" p. 493. I answer no. The effects of the agency of the Holy Spirit in his work, are to illuminate and to purify. The effects of immersion as such are nothing definite. The effects of immersion in dye, are to color, in filthy water to pollute, in clean water to purify. If we then simply say, the Holy Spirit immerses, and omit all mention of that into which he immerses, it conveys no definite idea of any effect to the mind. If we simply say that he purifies, it exactly describes his real work.

My reply therefore to Dr. Carson's lesson in rhetoric needs no change. "The Holy Spirit illuminates and purifies. Immersion



as such, does neither. It signifies mode, and nothing else, and it may pollute as well as purify. For this reason I deny the propriety of its application to the Holy Ghost, and claim the sense to purify, for this is his glorious, grand, and peculiar work."

At the same time I freely admit that if ἐν were not used in the causative sense, and if a person were not meant, and if the words Holy Spirit meant merely divine influences, the idea of abundance could be conveyed by the phrase immersion in divine influences; and that as "to dip the foot in oil" implies plenty of oil, and as "steeping the senses in forgetfulness," or "the soul in the milk of human nature," implies an entire subjection of the senses to forgetfulness, and of the soul to the spirit of kindness, so immersion in divine influences might denote, not only abundance of such influences, but also entire subjection to them; and that the general use of the idea immersion in other cases to denote degradation, calamity, &c., would not forbid. For as I have before said, I freely admit the truth of the principle that to justify a metaphor, previous use is not necessary, but only resemblance. But in the cases quoted by Dr. Carson, the words steep, dip, &c., are not used absolutely, but in connexion with something in which the dipping and steeping take place. Hence if Christians are said absolutely to be baptized *by* the Holy Spirit, as a person, or the Holy Spirit is said absolutely to baptize them, or to baptize the mind, without reference to anything in which immersion can take place, as is the case in the Scripture, and in the Fathers, then it is plain that Dr. Carson's mode of solution cannot apply to such cases, and is of no possible avail to his cause.

And although I admitted, § 28, No. 16, that it would be possible to use immersion figuratively to denote ideas not involving degradation and calamity, yet Dr. Carson has failed to bring forward any such cases, and the general use is as I have stated, as may be seen by his own examples on pp. 80, 81, 86.

On p. 311, it is true that he asserts as follows, in reply to a writer in the Congregational Magazine (Prof. J. H. Goodwin):

"All the instances of classical usage in a figurative application do not confine this word to evil. As to immersion, *bapto* and *baptizo* are the same, and immersed in justice, a classical phrase, is not an immersion in evil."

Yet on p. 52, Dr. Carson says of this very case, "I would not explain this with Dr. Gale, 'dipped as it were in, or swallowed up with justice.' Justice is here represented as a coloring liquid, which imbues the person dipped in it. The virtuous man is dipped to be dyed in justice." He speaks of *tincturing* thoughts as a similar figure. From all this it is plain that the sense to immerse is not here of necessity implied at all. Tinctured or dyed, will fully express the sense, and Dr. Carson not only admits, but strongly asserts that *bapto* often denotes to dye, without respect to mode. After all his efforts, then, Dr. Carson can find but this one case to oppose to my assertion, and in this case I deny the sense of immersion entirely.

#### § 97. *Dr. Carson's Candor.*

To my proof that what he called "metaphysical nonsense," and for exceeding which he offered a premium, is sound sense, and is sustained by the Fathers, he replies, "I find nothing like it in his quotations; and notwithstanding the modesty of the President I still think that the union of *meanings running into each other*, is all his own." p. 494.

I said nothing of *the union of meanings running into each other*. What Dr. Carson meant by the union of such meanings, I know not. It is not my language. It is his own. I did speak of analogical senses, as running into each other. What I meant I have fully explained.

Dr. Carson says he can see nothing like it in my quotations. This may be true as a fact, and yet have very little weight as an argument. It is very hard for some men to see, after ridiculing and sneering at an opponent, that he is clearly in the right, and **they in the wrong.**

His remarks as to the sense of *κλῶζω* are truly painful, so far as I desire to respect Dr. Carson. In reviewing my translation of *περικλυσάσθαι*, p. 445, he charges me with "criticising from imagination, and not from a knowledge of the language, and with not justifying my criticism with a single example." I at once arrayed many examples against him, and also, the authority of Stephens, Scapula, Damm, Hedericus, Ernesti, Passow, Schneider, and all lexicographers of any note, § 62. I also said that his charge was, upon the face of it, as false as if I were to say that it is criticising from imagination, to translate *ἵδωρ* water, and *πῦρ* fire. I also declared that Dr. Carson's character as an accurate scholar could not long survive such criticisms. One would have supposed that Dr. Carson in such a case would either defend himself, by confuting me, or else retract his charge. No such thing. He coolly says, "the characteristic meaning of the word *kluzo*, is exactly what I have represented, and all the examples accord with this." p. 494.

This, no doubt, will pass current with the majority of Dr. Carson's readers, and with others who have never read my examples. But if any man desires to judge of the candor of Dr. Carson, to say nothing of conscience, and of the fear of God, let him turn to my examples in § 62, and then again read the assertion which I have just quoted.

Arguments and facts of the clearest kind, are of no use in dealing with a man who will thus coolly make assertions without proof, directly in the teeth of unanswerable facts.

### § 98. *Dr. Carson's Bad Spirit.*

My censures of his spirit, Dr. Carson answers by a denial of writing in a bad spirit, and by a retort of the charge on me. p. 494.

"What spirit is indicated by such expressions as 'the guise of zeal for the glory of God?' 'Being determined not to admit the truth, he did the only thing that remained, first to misrepresent,

and then to deny it?" If this is not a bad spirit, what will indicate a bad spirit?"

To say such things without reason, would indicate a bad spirit. But painful facts may compel an honest belief of such charges. I take no pleasure in saying that facts have compelled me to this belief concerning Dr. Carson. I do not question his piety in the main. But he has done things that I cannot regard as honorable, or honest, and yet thrown over all, the cloak of zeal for the glory of God. I have just called attention to one case. But this is not a solitary or the worst case. Another statement in his first reply to me, much surpasses it. He contemptuously appeals on p. 496, to common sense, as deciding that in order to prove my views of the meaning of βαπτίζω, by the Fathers, I must allege examples in which they use the word in question, and pointedly denies that I do it. Hear his words, "But Mr. Beecher *attempts no such thing, he does not appeal to the use of the word by the Fathers*, but to other words applied by the Fathers to the same ordinance." He then graciously acquits me of intentional dishonesty, and insults me by professing to do me the justice to believe that I am the dupe of my own credulity, and that a credulity childishly weak. In reply, I informed Dr. Carson that he had misstated obvious facts, that I did appeal to the use of the word by the Fathers, and *that he must have known it*, because he tried to answer the passages. See p. 224, § 68.

In this case he not only grossly misstated a simple matter of fact, but he then ridiculed and insulted me on the basis of that misstatement. I pointed out to him the entire falsehood of his statement. Would not an honest man correct it in a second edition? Would not an honorable man apologize for the groundless insult, and retract it? But Dr. Carson does neither. In the last edition of his reply, he retains the same obviously false statement, and the same insult to me based upon it.

And yet no one can eulogize Dr. Carson more highly for candor, honesty, and a single-hearted regard to the glory of God

than he has eulogized himself. He is profuse in his claims of the full possession of nearly every moral virtue.

But after all, I must judge by acts, and not by words. When a man makes such professions whilst doing such acts, I cannot but call his professions, the guise of zeal for the glory of God, and declare that he is unwilling to admit the truth, and therefore misrepresents and denies it. In the statement of my principles he took the same course, and he has done it again in his second reply.

But in defence of himself he says, "I never pronounce on the motives of my opponents; but I always as a matter of duty measure their talents," p. 494. Again, "I never judge the heart," p. 12. What then is the meaning of such charges as these, that I am guilty of "perverse cavilling?" p. 459. That in reasoning with me he is called upon "to put obstinacy to the blush and overwhelm it with confusion," p. 456. That my "artifice is dishonest and uncandid," p. 449. "That my cavilling is unworthy of a candid mind and a sound understanding," p. 438. And finally, "that I am guilty of blasphemy," p. 495.

As to the duty of measuring an antagonist's talents, I admit it, so far as it is implied in a candid and honorable answer of his arguments. But all attempts to destroy the reputation and influence of an antagonist by exposing incidental errors, whilst his main arguments are left unanswered, I regard as dishonorable and unchristian.

But Dr. Carson says, "I act on principle, solemnly and deliberately. My design is to show my unlearned readers, what account they are to make of his discoveries, in a balloon above the clouds, from a specimen of what he has done before their own eyes. In questioning a decision of a court of law, is it not proper to show that they who made the decision were men without discrimination, and without accurate knowledge of the law? If such a case is made out has it not the nature of evidence?"

To all this I reply, the time was when Dr. Carson did not call explicit quotations from Greek writers, on the import of the word

*βαρτιζω*, a balloon above the clouds. When he began the controversy, he made numerous quotations from writers of classic Greek, which to the unlearned are certainly as much a balloon above the clouds, as my quotations from the Fathers. Yet he then said, "I shall give a copious list of examples, as it is from this that my readers will be able independently to form their own judgment. This method will doubtless appear tedious and uninteresting to many ; but it is the only method entitled to authority. For a writer on controverted subjects, to give merely his own opinion of the import of his documents, accompanied by a few examples as a specimen of proof, would be the same as if an advocate should present a judge and jury with his own views of evidence, instead of giving them all his facts and circumstances in detail to enable them to decide with knowledge. A work of this kind is not for amusement, but requires patience and industry in the reader as well as in the writer. If the one has ransacked documents to most readers inaccessible, to collect evidence, the other should not grudge the toil of examining the evidence, seeing it is only by such an examination that he can have the fullest conviction of the truth. Is the meaning of this word to be eternally disputed? If one party says it has this meaning and another that, while a third differs from both, and a fourth is confident that all three are wrong, what method can legitimately settle the controversy, but an actual appeal to the passages in which it is to be found? These are the witnesses whose testimony must decide this question; and consequently the more numerous and definite the examples, the more authoritative will be the decision. And as it is possible to tamper with evidence, the witnesses must be questioned and cross-questioned, that the truth may be ascertained without a doubt. Instead, therefore, of making an apology for the number of my examples, and the length of the observations that ascertain their meaning, the only thing I regret is, that I have not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language."



So spake Dr. Carson when in the first fervor of controversy he girded on his armor. Then, copious extracts from the original writers, were not a balloon above the clouds. Then, it was the duty, even of unlearned readers, to study such extracts, and to form their judgment from them, and they were able so to do, p. 480. Then, it was the only authoritative mode. Then, he regretted that he had not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language. But at last, I place before him and his readers a copious collection of passages from the Fathers, the very best authorities extant, as he pointedly assures us, when lo! all of a sudden he begins to doubt the capacity of his unlearned readers to understand them. My discoveries are now, it seems, so far as they are concerned, in a balloon above the clouds, and to enable them to judge of them, he feels called on solemnly and deliberately to assail my competency as a scholar, upon some trifling points, merely incidental to the main issue, in order to destroy the force of direct testimony produced by me on the vital point of the whole discussion.

Dr. Carson professes to do all this on principle, solemnly and deliberately! He may do it deliberately. But that he can do it with a right spirit, and on right principles, I deny; and if such maxims were universally followed in controversy, no great question could ever be settled, and nothing could result but unworthy jangling, and endless confusion.

Dr. Carson adds, "In like manner, when we ask who are our opponents, and assert that all illustrious scholars of all ages and countries are on our side, our design is not wantonly to wound. There is in this fact a species of self-evidence."

But Dr. Carson's implication that all illustrious scholars of all ages are with him is entirely unfounded. In principle they are with me, for they all maintain that βαπτίζω has a secondary sense. This even Dr. Carson admits. On p. 55, he says concerning βαπτίζω, "My position is, THAT IT ALWAYS SIGNIFIES TO DIP; NEVER EXPRESSING ANYTHING BUT MODE. Now as I have all the

*lexicographers and commentators* against me in this opinion, it will be necessary to say a word or two with respect to the authority of lexicons."

So then, as it regards Dr. Carson's fundamental position, the "illustrious scholars" are against him, and not against me, and the presumptive evidence, according to his own principles, is against his system, and not against mine.

### § 99. *Attacks on my Competency.*

To this I add that I do not admit that, even on incidental points, he has proved errors on me. I have refrained from answering such assaults, because I wished to keep Dr. Carson and my readers to the main issue, and not to lose myself and them in a labyrinth of minute and profitless discussions.

Such assaults I called logical mosquitoes. They have a sting, they buzz, they irritate; but they have no fatal power, and are so numerous and minute that there is no time to pursue them. But if it were of any importance, they are easily killed. And since Dr. Carson makes so much of them, I will kill a few as a specimen. He arrays seven of them at the beginning of his second reply.

The first is this. "He makes the words *baptismos* and *katharismos* synonymous, on the ground that they both, in a certain place, refer to the same rite. This is an error into which no philologist could fall; it shows a remarkable deficiency in discrimination."

He here refers to my argument on Jn. iii. 25. I reply, I do not make them synonymous on that ground alone. *In view of all the facts of the case*, I exercised a critical judgment to that effect, and the testimony of the Fathers shows that I judged rightly. See § 68, and § 67, No. 1.

The second is this. "He makes *baptismos* a word denoting purification in general, because it is a synonyme of the word *katharismos*; and the general word *katharismos* he makes

specific, as it corresponds to *baptismos*. I have called this legerdemain. Here, also, I might offer a premium for a purer specimen of nonsense," p. 488.

To this I reply, the assertions are both false. I judge that *baptismos* sometimes means purification in view of evidence, and infer that *in that sense* it is synonymous with *katharismos*. The general word *katharismos* I do not make specific, but apply it as a generic word, to any kind of purification, and I show that the Fathers use *baptismos* in the same way as a generic term, when it denotes purification.

The third is, "That the disputed word signifies purification, he proves from Malachi, iii. 1—3. Does not even a child see that the prophet does not refer to ritual purification, but to the separation of the chaff from the wheat; and that the prophecy could have been equally fulfilled had no ritual ordinance of purification ever been instituted?"

I reply. This passage plainly predicts a *purification of the spirit* to be effected by the Messiah; but the Fathers declare that the passage is a prediction of the *baptism of the spirit*, to be effected by the Messiah. Does not this prove that baptism and purification are synonymous? If a spiritual baptism was thus predicted of the Messiah, in Mal. iii. 1—3, then a new symbolical baptism would arrest attention, and lead to the inquiry, has not the great baptizer come? Now by a critical judgment on the New Testament, I decided that this was the true view, even before reading the Fathers. The Fathers sustain my judgment.

The fourth is, "He makes the title of John the Baptist originate in the administration of a rite of purification, and he finds *proof* for this in John's being a moral reformer. May I not offer another premium here?" I reply, I do not find *proof* for it in John's being a moral reformer. I merely say that the name John the purifier, would be an *appropriate* name for him as a reformer, which is the truth. As a reformer, it was fit that he should both administer a rite of purification, and be called a purifier. I stated these undeniable facts, and left every man to infer what he pleased from them.

The fifth is, "He proceeds on the principle, that every occurrence of a word *must prove its own meaning*. No philologist could fall into such an error. The meaning of no word could submit to such a test."

I proceed on no such principle. My words are these, "Proof of the meaning of a word in one passage, is not of course proof of its meaning in another; because the meanings of all words are liable to change. Now in all cases where the meaning immerse has been proved by Dr. Carson, to belong to βαπτίζω, I do not deny that it so belongs. But this is not proof of its meaning in all other cases. *Its meaning in each case must be decided for itself.*" I do not say that each case *can or must prove its own meaning*, but that each case must be decided *separately*. The evidence may be derived from any source, in the passage, or out of it. When one meaning of the word has been established, there may be no reason in many other passages to introduce a secondary sense. But in other cases there may be a reason; if so, let it be done. Is it not a very different thing to say that the meaning of a word must be decided in each passage *separately*, from saying that *every occurrence of a word must prove its own meaning*? Such a thing I never said. Dr. Carson ought to have had perspicacity enough to know it.

The sixth is, "With respect to the testimony of Josephus, Mr. Beecher tells us, 'that there was nothing to cause Josephus to think of the mode, or to attach any importance to it.' This observation assumes as a principle, that Josephus had a share in giving this rite its name. Can anything be more unlike a philologist? Can any observation be more destitute of common sense? Josephus speaks of the rite by the name already given to it."

I reply, my observation assumes no such principle. I state the fact that Josephus applies the term βάπτισις to the rite. I then inquire in what sense he probably used it. It has two senses, 1. Immersion, and 2. Washing, or purification. This I had proved, this lexicographers assert. Then to show the

probability that Josephus used it in the second sense I say, "there was nothing to cause him to think of the mode, or to attach any importance to it. No idea of a fancied reference in the rite to the death of Christ, *could bias his mind to the sense immerse*. To him it is plain that it *meant nothing but purifying the body*," &c. Does this imply that I conceived that Josephus named the rite? Not at all. It is merely an effort to show that he used the word *βάπτισις* in the sense *purification*. Was Dr. Carson so dull that he could not see this? It was not enough so unaccountably to misunderstand and misrepresent me, but on the basis of such misrepresentation, he must assail my capacity as a philologist, and my common sense.

The seventh is, "As a proof that the disputed word is *often used* in the sense for which he contends, he alleges a passage in which the word is not used at all. Is this philology? Must this be dignified as criticism? Can the author possess that discrimination which is necessary to determine such a question?"

I reply, I did not produce that passage to prove what is asserted, but to prepare the way for such proof. Was Dr. Carson unable to see that the proof of the point stated was introduced by the preliminary remark numbered 1, and that I then went on to prove the point in No. 2. "They often use *βαπτισμός* in the legal and sacrificial sense so as to exclude any idea but *καθαρισμός*." I then quote three passages, one from Chrysostom, and two from Theophylact, to prove the assertion, each containing the word *βαπτισμός* so used. In No. 3, I still further illustrate and confirm the introductory remark.

Disingenuous as is this criticism of Dr. Carson's, yet his other statement, which I have already exposed, is still worse, for in that he asserts that I do not here appeal to the use of the word *βαπτισμός* by the Fathers at all. Nay, that I attempt no such thing. This he said with the three passages above referred to before his eyes, and after a few pages he tries to answer them.

This is worse than bad philology, or bad criticism, or want of discrimination. No man would resort to such measures to



injure the influence of an antagonist, who had not a desperate cause to defend.

It is on the strength of such flimsy allegations as these, that he winds up by saying, "This is but a small specimen of the author's qualifications as a critic, yet it clearly manifests his incompetency."

This Dr. Carson said, be it remembered, whilst he was refusing to answer quotations from the Fathers expressly defining βαπτίζω as meaning to purify, and was calling these a balloon in the clouds! This he did in order that his unlearned readers, by losing all confidence in me, might conclude that there was nothing in the balloon worth looking at;—and Dr. Carson took good care not to tell them what was there. Such things appear to me so contemptible that I would not notice them, if Dr. Carson were not endorsed and eulogized as he is. But as men are, they produce their effect, and the cause of truth demands their exposure.

#### § 100. *Second Series of Attacks.*

The last page and a half of his second reply is employed in a similar onset upon me. "To enable my readers to estimate the qualifications of my antagonist as a controversialist, I shall slightly notice the several particulars which he states in recommendation of his view, of the meaning of the word in dispute."

But this statement of recommendations is no part of my argument. The argument is closed, and my recommendations are based on its truth. Why did he not answer my argument? That is the proper way to enable them to judge of my qualifications as a controversialist. His real aim is disclosed at the end of his assault, in these words, "Now I call the attention of my *plain unlettered* readers to this brief specimen of my antagonist's reasoning powers, that they may judge what confidence to place in his criticism. If in matters of common sense he stumbles at every step, can he be trusted in matters of the most profound



metaphysics?" The plain English of this is, Dr. Carson, not being able to answer my argument, goes to work to destroy the confidence of his plain unlettered readers in me, by exhibiting a specimen of my reasoning powers, in a passage where I was not reasoning at all, but was stating recommendations of my view on the assumption that I had already proved my point.

I will introduce some of his items by the remark that if all should adopt my views as true, the effect would be that every man could be baptized in the way he prefers. No valued practice would be taken away. But the right to deem those wrong who do not immerse, would be taken away. These things are too plain to be denied.

To express these ideas I said, "the position defended by me, takes nothing from any one, but the right to think others wrong and to censure and exclude them." No candid man could fail to see that in these words I referred specifically to the Baptists.

Concerning this Dr. Carson says, "He tells us for instance that to adopt his conclusions 'takes nothing from any one but the right to think others wrong.' Now was there ever a purer specimen of absurdity than this? Were it as true as it is false, it could not take from any man the right to think another wrong." To adopt my views would surely take from every Baptist the right to think those wrong who baptize by sprinkling, and this is plainly all that I meant. Dr. Carson takes my words as if I meant that it would take away in all cases, the general right of thinking others wrong, and then gravely reasons against such a fiction. He proceeds, "Must not every one who thinks his own view on any subject right, think all others wrong who differ from him? Does not the writer think that I am wrong?" I reply, the context and the nature of the case, limited my meaning to the Baptists, and to the particular right now exercised by them of thinking all who do not immerse, wrong, and of excluding them from the church. Dr. Carson might easily have seen that this was my sense; but he was hunting after specimens of pure absurdity for the sake

of his "plain unlettered readers," and to understand me truly was not to his purpose.

If any man, in interpreting the word of God, should thus look merely at the sound of words, and overlook the end, scope, and spirit of the writer, he could manufacture similar "pure absurdities" to any amount. To Dr. Carson I will apply his own words, "In a controversialist nothing can compensate for candor."

I mentioned six considerations as recommending my view. Dr. Carson says, "it is perfect absurdity to talk of recommendations, on one side or the other in such matters. Whatever God has appointed must be observed."

But could not Dr. Carson see that I regarded my view, on the ground of previous proof, as setting forth the appointment of God? And is it perfect absurdity to talk of recommendations of God's appointment, after I had proved that it was such? I did not try to *prove* that God ordained in the rite of baptism, nothing but purification, *by recommendations*. I proved it by evidence which Dr. Carson neither did nor could answer, and then I set forth the considerations which do in fact recommend the view, when proved.

1. Dr. Carson tries to rebut my assertion that my view is "better adapted to the varying conditions of man, and to all changes of climate, times, seasons, and health." He tells us that immersion is healthy in all climates; that if needed, the warm bath can be used, and that in such sickness as prevents immersion, the rite is not a duty.

But after all, he well knows that immersion, especially in cold weather, and where there are no baptisteries and other conveniences, is a very troublesome and inconvenient rite, and that in some circumstances it may be impossible, even to those in health. Its inconvenience, in fact, led to a change in the greater part of Europe. Besides, Dr. Carson himself says, that "if it were left optional he would never immerse," p. 448. Is not this a virtual confession of the truth of all that I have said?

2. I declared my view to be more accordant with the liberal and enlarged spirit of Christianity, as a religion of freedom, designed for all countries and all times.

Dr. Carson replies, "Does the writer mean that the prescription of mode, as emblematical in a Christian rite, is inconsistent with the practice of religion? Another may as well say, that the prescription of water, or of wine, or of anything else, is equally inconsistent with Christianity. What a notion this writer must have of religious freedom!"

I reply, an inspired apostle called the Mosaic ritual *a yoke* that the Jews were not able to bear; and declared to Gentile believers that in being exempt from it, they were called to *liberty*; and when Judaizers would impose on them the necessity of circumcision, he said, "be not entangled again in *the yoke of bondage*."

Though of divine origin, yet the observances of Judaism were so excessively inconvenient and troublesome as to be called a yoke, and to be exempt from such forms, under Christianity, was by inspiration called freedom.

Now immersion is an excessively inconvenient rite, and I *had proved* that it was not of divine appointment. Was I not then authorized to say that the spirit of Christianity as a religion of freedom from burdensome rites, and my view which delivered Christians from a burdensome rite, were in strict accordance?

I did not say, "that the prescription of mode as emblematical in a Christian rite, *is inconsistent with the practice of religion*." The Mosaic system was not inconsistent with the practice of religion, and yet, though divinely ordained, it was, because of its inconvenience, a yoke. Much more is immersion, which is not divinely ordained, a yoke, and exemption from it is freedom.

3. I said, "It better agrees with our ideas of what is reasonable and fit."

Dr. Carson replies, "And will the writer take on him to say that it is not reasonable and fit, in God, to appoint immersion as

the mode of this ordinance, as an emblem of the burial of Christ? If this is not blasphemy, I know not what blasphemy is."

I reply—I first proved by evidence that Dr. Carson could not answer, that God did not, in fact, ordain immersion as an emblem of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ. And having thus decided that God did not ordain the burdensome rite in question, but allowed men to use the beautiful, simple, and significant rite of sprinkling, I said this better agrees with our ideas of what is reasonable and fit. And is it blasphemous to regard as peculiarly reasonable and fit what I had just proved that God has actually done?

4. I say—"It offers no temptation to formalism, nor does it tend to foster arrogance and exclusion." Dr. Carson replies: "Here is the very spirit of philosophy." How so? It is merely eulogizing a decision of God, as tending to spirituality, humility, and unity. Is this the very spirit of philosophy?

Dr. Carson proceeds—"How does immersion or any other mode appointed by God offer a temptation to formalism? Is it formalism to observe a mode which by the very supposition is appointed by God? Is it formalism to observe divine forms?"

I reply—Where rites are numerous and complex, even if ordained by God, they tend to formalism, more than a few simple rites. So it was notoriously in Judaism. Again, a rite which is the grand peculiarity of one sect, and which excludes from it all others, even though real Christians, even if ordained of God, would tend to assume undue importance, and to take the place of spiritual religion. The mere observance of divine forms is not of necessity formalism. But to put forms, even divine forms, in the place of spirituality, is formalism.

But I did not, when I wrote, admit that immersion was a divine form. I had proved that it was not. This being the case, much more does it tend to formalism, to exalt such a human form above piety, and to refuse to receive or commune with those whom God has received, and with whom he communes.

“As to arrogance,” proceeds Dr. Carson, “is it arrogant to say that immersion is the only mode, if that is the meaning of the word?” I reply, no, if such is the fact. But the belief that such is the fact, when it is not, tends to arrogance, in its influence on partially sanctified men, as facts show.

Was it not arrogant, when, in the report of the American Baptist Bible Society, it was announced “that the heathen world must look to THEM ALONE for an unveiled view of the glories of the Gospel of Christ.”

And what produced this arrogance? Was it not magnifying the mere rite of immersion as the exclusive glory of a sect? And did this not result from their views of the meaning of the word?

Nor is this all. I have proved that immersion is not the meaning of the word, and it was also on the ground of this proof that I spoke as I did of the influence of the Baptist view of immersion in producing arrogance.

Dr. Carson proceeds, “As to exclusion, the meaning of the word is not concerned in settling the question of church fellowship.”

I reply, it is, in fact, concerned, and it does affect it in fact. Dr. Carson, I know, held to open communion, after the example of Robert Hall. But his brethren in America regard such views as loose and erroneous, and do, as a general fact, exclude from communion all who do not believe and practise as they do, with reference to immersion.

5. I say “it is perfectly adequate to harmonize the church.”

Dr. Carson replies: “What a recommendation! Is it not obvious to every human intellect, that any view of the meaning of the word, if universally received, is equally calculated to effect harmony?”

But I did not say, nor mean, that my view, *if universally received*, was adequate to harmonize the church. I said *unconditionally* that it was adequate to do it. I meant that it was better adapted than any other view, to be universally received. The reasons

were, that it leaves to all the mode of baptism which they prefer, and its truth is so easily evinced, that it is eminently adapted to convince all.

Dr. Carson then, in order to make out an absurdity, introduces the condition, *if universally received*, which is purely an idea of his own, and all that produces the aspect of absurdity, and then proceeds to ridicule it, as if it were mine, as follows :

“The advocates of pouring, of sprinkling, of immersing, &c. &c., may all equally allege that recommendation. Even if a man says that the word signifies to tattoo ; he may say that, *if all parties receive this meaning*, it would harmonize the church. Was ever such a specimen of reasoning committed to the types ?”

I answer, no ; certainly not by me. It is all a pure fiction of Dr. Carson, got up for the benefit of his “plain, unlettered readers,” who either cannot or will not see through his sophistry.

No doubt it will produce its effect. I do not expect that the majority of Dr. Carson’s readers will ever see my reply. He has no doubt gained his end with them. But let all candid men judge of the honor of such a course.

6. I said, “It is susceptible of any degree of proof.” To this Dr. Carson replies, “This confounds evidence with recommendation. If it is capable of proof, it should be received without any recommendation. If it is not proved, no recommendation can entitle it to reception.”

But I ask, is it not a great recommendation of a view, that it is adapted to gain universal credence ? And does not abundance of evidence fit a view to gain such credence ? A view may be true in fact, and yet the proof of it be so sparing, that it will never generally prevail.

I do not then confound evidence with recommendation. I first show that the proof of my views is abundant, and then say that any necessary degree of proof can be adduced.

I say this, not to show that the view is true, or ought to be adopted. I had already abundantly *proved* this. I say it to show that the view is *likely* to be universally adopted, and thus to har-



monize the church. And this certainly is a great recommendation of the view.

Dr. Carson intimates that he has given but a specimen of his proofs of my incapacity. But he has given enough to enable all candid men to judge of the quality of the rest. His first reply is filled with such things. But I have already spent too much time upon them. I have written thus much, because the eulogists of Dr. Carson talk so loudly of his honor, fairness, candor, learning, and logical discrimination.

Let now one fact be noticed. He does not dare to charge me with misrepresenting him in one single instance. Nor does he but once charge me with omitting what is essential to a fair view of his opinions, and in that one case, the charge was as obviously incorrect as possible.

How happens it then that he has scarcely assailed me on a single point without resorting to misrepresentation?

The reason is plain; he could not assail my true opinions by the truth. Therefore he was under a steady temptation to misrepresent them.

On the other hand, the more clearly his opinions are stated, the easier is it for me to assail them with the truth.

Again, why was he so tempted to try to destroy my personal reputation as a scholar? I answer, for want of better arguments. I adopt and apply to Dr. Carson his own words, "No man unjustly disparages the abilities of his opponent who is not conscious either of having a bad cause, or of his inability to defend a good one." p. 136. On the other hand, I have been willing all along to concede to Dr. Carson any degree of ability which I fairly can. I have made no attacks on his capacity as a scholar, nay I have admitted it. I only say, the greater his ability, the clearer is it that he was endeavoring to sustain a desperate cause.

No man who was sustained and guided by the truth, would ever have adopted and pursued his course.

In conclusion I have nothing to add, but to request all who are

of a candid spirit to read § 70 once more, with which I close the third part of this work. May a truly Christian spirit at length unite all learned scholars and leading minds. Then will all division in the church of God on this momentous question soon cease. May God grant it, and to him shall be the praise !

## NOTES.

---

*Note 1 on §§ 19 and 20, pp. 48—51.*

THE analogy between external purification and internal purification, here spoken of, and the manner in which the Fathers commingled both ideas in their views of baptism, are with great clearness illustrated on pp. 264, 265, in the passages quoted from Cyril, Gregory, and Clement. Indeed, it is impossible for a more perfect illustration to be conceived of the ideas here stated. In two cases the import of the analogy cannot be disputed, for καθαρίσιον and κάθαρσις (purification) are used. In the third case βάπτισμα is used in a manner so perfectly similar, that it must have the same sense. Is it not singular that where Dr. Carson has most indulged in efforts to ridicule my views, then the proof of their correctness from the Fathers is clearest? Now when these analogous senses are commingled and made to co-exist, it changes the nature of the external rite by making it a medium of real regeneration, and this is the true idea of Baptismal Regeneration. It also changes the sense of passages which speak of internal purification alone, and makes them the proofs of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, as I have said.

*Note 2, on p. 68.*

It is common to speak of the modern Greeks as denying that βαπτίζω means anything but immersion. But the learned Gases, a member of the modern Greek Church, in his large and valuable Lexicon of Ancient Greek, defined βαπτίζω by βρέχω, λούω, and ἀντλέω; that is, 1. To wet or moisten. 2. To wash or to bathe. 3. To draw water. The Lexicon is in general use among the modern Greeks. See my letters to Rev. Wm. Hague, Boston—Hall on Baptism, p. 37, and "Chronicle of the Church," New Haven, May 25, 1838. See also Remarks on λούω, pp. 208—11 of this volume, for proof that it

denotes merely to wash, and is as applicable when there is no immersion as where there is.

*Note 3 on p. 192 and p. 198.*

There is clear proof that βαπτίζω denotes washing, or bathing by pouring, in the use of language describing bathing rooms and apparatus. In the hot baths there was no immersion. The hot bath, in the public baths at Pompeii, was a basin 12 feet long, 4 feet 4 inches wide, and only 1 foot four inches deep. Around this was a marble bench, below the surface of the water, on which the bathers sat. They first scraped themselves, and were then washed by having water poured over them from vases, or pails. But the name of the warm bath was in Greek βαπτιστήριον, in Latin, Lavacrum. See Eschenberg's Manual, pp. 140, 539. See also Potter's Grecian Antiquities, Vol. 2, p. 368, for proof of the same fact. Dr. Smith, in his Dictionary of Classical Antiquities, p. 148, states that the vessel from which water was poured on the bathers, was also called βαπτιστήριον, and refers to Pliny for his authority. His words are, "The word *baptisterium*, is not a bath sufficiently large to immerse the whole body, but a vessel or *labrum*, containing cold water for pouring over the head."—Plin. Ep. v. 6, and Ep. xvii. 2.

This is only one more of the already innumerable proofs of the radical fallacy of Dr. Carson's notions. It also clearly sustains Gases, in defining βαπτίζω by λούω, to wash. See Note 2.

*Note 4 on p. 242.*

There is one of my quotations on which Dr. Carson has made an assertion to which I reply, by here annexing a part of my reply to Rev. Wm. Hague, on the same passage. It is the passage from Clement, p. 53, § 50.

I translate ἐπὶ κοίτῃ, "upon a couch." Mr. Hague, following Potter, translates it "post concubitum." Dr. Carson translates it "on account of the bed." Both deny that it can mean a couch to be reclined on at meals. The fact is that ἐννῇ and λέχος are never used to denote such a couch. But κλίνη and κοίτη are used to denote either such a couch, or a bed for sleep, or a marriage bed. In my reply to Mr. Hague I answer Dr. Carson's question, "Where did the

President learn that *koite* is a dinner couch?" It appears that I learned it of Xenophon the Athenian. Dr. Carson says that the passage means "they were immersed on account of the bed," that is, pollution contracted there. If Dr. C. means by this, the pollution of sexual intercourse, his view and that of Mr. Hague in effect amount to the same thing. And this being the only pollution peculiar to the bed, after which washing was prescribed, I suppose that he must refer to it. His mode of arriving at his sense is very awkward—"on account of the bed, *that is*, pollution contracted there." The remarks of Hervetus on this passage are these: "The Jews washed themselves, not only at sacrifices, but also at feasts, and this is the reason why Clement says that they were purified, or washed upon a couch, that is, a dining couch or triclinium. To this Mark refers, chap. vii. and Matth. chap. xv. Tertullian also refers to it when he says, *Judæus Israel quotidie lavat*" (The Jewish Israel daily washes).

I have adopted the same view, and I now subjoin the defence of it already referred to. See my letters to Rev. Wm. Hague, pp. 21-26.

In this case I do not admit the charge of error. To translate ἐπὶ κοίτῃ, upon a couch, is not erroneous. For, 1. The words will admit of this translation. 2. The Syntax will admit of it, and, 3. The context; and, 4. The nature of the things spoken of call for it.

1. The words will admit of my translation. It will not be doubted, I suppose, that κοίτῃ can mean a bed or couch. Who does not know that this is its primary sense, and that the sense concubitus is only secondary and derivative? Again, it will not, I think, be denied that it can mean a couch at a feast. For Xenophon, in his *Memorabilia*, authorizes the usage. Speaking of the marks of honor due from the younger to the elder, he mentions "rising up in their presence, honoring them with a soft couch, κοίτῃ μαλακῇ, and giving them the precedence in speech." In this case, the couch is obviously not a bed for repose at night, but one to recline on in a circle engaged in conversation, and participating in the enjoyments of social life. In short, it was, as Struzius well remarks, in his learned and critical *Lexicon Xenophon-teum*, "lectus quietis et convivii," a couch on which to repose and to feast, Απ. 2, 3, 16. Morell also, in his *Lexicon Prosodaicum*, gives κλίνη and κοίτῃ as synonymes. Xenophon the Athenian is surely sufficient authority for Clement the Athenian in using the word in this sense. As to ἐπί, you will not, I suppose, deny that it *can* be

translated *upon* in this case, inasmuch as this is its original and primary sense, and *after* is only a derivative and secondary sense. The words, then, will admit of my translation. So, too, will the Syntax. Is it not as truly grammatical to say, it was the custom of the Jews to be baptized upon a couch, as it is to say, it was the custom of the Jews to be baptized "*post concubitum*?"

We come, then, to the context, and to the nature of the things spoken of. What, then, is the context? Has Clement been speaking of concubitus, or of washings after concubitus, among the Gentiles, that he should here refer to this kind of washing among the Jews? I answer, no. He has, indeed, spoken of the night, but not with any reference to sexual pollution, as you seem to indicate, by copying from Potter a reference to Rom. xiii. 13, but to inculcate a habit of keeping the thoughts on God and eternity, even in our dreams. The following is the train of thought preceding the passage I have quoted. If a man has truly learned to love God, he will not lose his habits of virtue in any way—neither in a vision nor in a dream, nor in any actings of the imagination. Since a habit never ceases to be a habit, and the dreams of the night flow from the habits of thought in the day; therefore, the Lord commands us to watch, that we may keep our natural life as pure by night as by day. There is nothing that tends to sin in the natural night. Indeed, it is favorable to serious thought, for it calls off the mind from the senses, and leaves it free to think of God. The night that injures the soul is a moral night. It is immersion in the things of time and sense, so as to exclude eternity and God. But happy are they who see God, according to the Apostle, who says, the night is far spent, the day is at hand; let us, therefore, cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armor of light. Rom. xiii. 12. Here, says he, Paul "*figuratively represents by the day, and by light, the Son of God—and by the armor of light his doctrines.*" In like manner he intimates, that we, being washed, should come pure and neatly apparelled to engage in sacred rites and prayers; and that our being thus purified externally and neatly arrayed, is merely for the sake of its symbolical import; for true purity consists in placing the affections on holy things. Then follows the passage which I quoted. "*And, indeed, an image of purification (baptism) may have been transmitted from Moses to the poets thus. Penelope, having washed herself, and having on her body clean apparel, goes to prayer; and Telemachus,*



having washed his hands in the salt sea, prayed to Minerva. And it was the custom of the Jews that they should oft purify (baptize) themselves upon a couch:" that is, at their meals, and reclining upon a couch. Let it now be remembered, that there was a washing of hands at meals and feasts among the Jews, and that it was not a matter of mere decorum but of religious obligation. It was also a prominent custom (ἔθος) of the Jews. It was among the elders a prominent subject of religious law. So important was it deemed, that our Saviour and his Apostles were again and again called to account for neglecting it, and in view of it our Saviour felt himself called on repeatedly to maintain the superior importance of purity of heart over any external forms of purification. See Matt. xv. 1-20; Mark vii. 1-23; Luke xi. 37-41. Let it be remembered, that these passages had made a strong impression on Clement's mind, as appears by the deep interest with which he, in other parts of his works, refers to them. Let it be remembered, that Clement's preceding train of thought is precisely the same with that of Christ in these passages; that is, to exalt mental purity above all its images and symbols. Let it be remembered, too, that in the view of Clement, *Pedagog. Lib. 2, Cap. 4*, Potter, p. 113, Vol. 1, Oxford, 1715, meals and public feasts were highly religious occasions, and that he recommends to open them by praising the Creator, and during their progress to introduce devotional Psalms—(as Ps. 33), and that he speaks of the heathen song (σκόλιον) during feasts, as κατ' εἰκόνα 'Εβραίων ψαλμῶν (after the image of the Hebrew Psalms); and will any one dare to say, that it was not both natural and appropriate for him to pass in thought from the religious washing of hands by Telemachus, to a religious washing of hands by the Jews, at their meals and public feasts? What custom more prominent, more public, more likely to excite universal attention, than this? It was almost a national badge of the Jews. Not a day could be spent with them without seeing it at least three times observed, and in all probability more. "For the Pharisees and *all the Jews*, except they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the tradition of the elders."—Mark vii. 3.

But what in this train of thought should lead him to mention the washing suggested by Potter? Surely, the chaste Penelope, in the absence of Ulysses, and the unmarried Telemachus, needed no such washing.

Besides, it was not merely a washing, but one *oft-repeated* (πολλάκις),

that is by Clement ascribed to the Jews. And we know that the Jews at meals did often wash their hands, as Clement says.

But did the law call for an oft-repeated washing in the case referred to by Potter! Not at all. See Lev. xv. 16-18. Was there any reason or motive to repeat it? None at all, for it could not shorten in the least the stated time of uncleanness. The law was, wash in the morning, and be unclean till evening.

Was this a washing common to all the Jews, as such? No, it was obviously designed for those only who were married. Was it a washing that they would be likely to perform in a public and ostentatious way, so that it should be a national badge, and excite universal attention and produce imitation? Let common sense judge. Of all Jewish washings this must have been the most private. What man, and especially what woman, would wish ostentatiously to proclaim the reason of washing in such a case? How unlike to this secret washing, that left its subjects still unclean till evening, was the public washing of Telemachus, of which Clement had just spoken, which made him clean at once, so that he was not obliged to wait till the next day before he could engage in religious services.

I freely confess, that to introduce the idea "*post concubitum*" in such a connexion seems to me alike at war with taste, and with the eminently spiritual train of thought in the context. If the words, or the laws of syntax forced it on me, I would adopt it, but still with great reluctance; for it interrupts a current of pure spiritual thoughts by an idea, such that even you preferred not to present it in a plain English dress, but veiled it under a euphemism, or hid it in the Latin tongue.

But neither the words nor the syntax forced it on me. The primary and natural meaning of the words gives the sense that I claim. To educe the other you are obliged to resort to derived and secondary senses.

I have a great respect for Archbishop Potter. But I cannot, on the ground of his naked assertion, adopt a translation so repulsive and so out of keeping with the letter and spirit of the context. If you still choose to adhere to it, you are free to do so. But I do demand that you shall not pronounce my translation erroneous till you have *proved* it so; nor charge me with haste till you give some evidence from the context that I had not patiently investigated the relations of the passage

before I translated it; nor sneer at light from Illinois till you have not merely *asserted* but *proved* that Archbishop Potter has given us the true light; nor try to destroy the authority of my citations till you have proved them incorrect.

And let me here anticipate any reply to my argument from the sentence that follows: "Well therefore has it been said, be clean, not merely by washing, but in your mind." It may be said, that λουτρῶν, washing, implies bathing, and cannot be applied to the washing of hands. To this I reply, it is not so. Cyril of Alexandria applies to the high-priest, ἀπολούσαιτο, to denote merely washing his hands and feet in the laver; and λουτρόν is applied by Basil to purification by sprinkling or pouring; and so also it is by Photius and others. And a basin for washing the hands and face is called by Pollux and Anaxilas λουτήριον, and is used by way of contrast to a bathing tub; thus "in baths there are no wash-basins," λουτήρια.

And now let the candid reader judge, have I erred in giving to βάπτισμα the sense *purification*, in its relations to such a passage as this? especially when Clement calls *the washing of hands*, ἐκὼν βαπτίσματος, an image of baptism? An image of purification, surely, it is—of immersion, it is no image at all.

Have I erred in believing, that by *often* baptizing on a couch, he meant that kind of purification which was practised by the Jews, so often and so pertinaciously as to attract to itself in a peculiar manner the notice of Christ, and not a washing, private—not universal, not oft-repeated.

I am still further confirmed in my view of this passage, by noticing the extensive and spiritual import given by Cyril of Alexandria to the washing of hands and feet, by the priests of old. By washing their *hands* and *feet*, he tells us, they show forth the purity and sincerity of all their *deeds* and *ways*, so that it denotes entire purity of life. And he repeatedly speaks of it as a designed type or image of the grace of God in Christian baptism. Indeed, this seems to have been a familiar idea to all writers of the Alexandrian school, such as Clement and Cyril. And inasmuch as Cyril expressly mentions, as a baptism, the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer; we cannot fail to see, that by baptism he meant purification and not immersion; and that he and Clement regarded the washing of hands not as an image of immersion, for it was not, but as an image of purification.

*Note 5 on Part II. Chap. II.*

## Exposition of Romans vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12.

Dr. Carson has gloried so greatly in the passages here interpreted, that it is remarkable that he makes no reference at all to this chapter. Perhaps, he did not see it. At all events the argument is as yet unanswered.

## ERRATA.

Page 18, line 4, for טְבוּלָרִים read טְבוּלָרִים

“ “ “ 7, “ קָבֵס “ קָבֵס

“ 20, “ 23, “ טָבַל “ טָבַל

“ 29, “ 11, “ בָּפֶר “ בָּפֶר

“ 34, “ 20 “ קָבֵס “ קָבֵס

“ “ “ 32, “ } “ “

“ 33, “ 12, “ } רָחַץ “ רָחַץ

“ 42, “ 6, “ } “ “

“ 68, “ 26, “ } “ “

“ “ Note, “ טָבַל “ טָבַל

“ 65, line 10, at the beginning, for *baptismus*, read baptismum.

“ 75, foot note, after *usage*, put a period.

“ 192, line 12, for רָחַץ read רָחַץ

“ 209, line 6, for *Nicephoras*, read Nicephorus.

“ 264, line 13, for *Gallandias*, read Gallandius.















Beecher, E. 265. 124K  
B391

Baptism, with reference to

265. 124K

B391

